KIRKLAND & ELLIS LLP
Citigroup Center
153 East 53rd Street
New York, New York 10022-4675
Richard L. Wynne (RW 5630)
Bennett L. Spiegel (BS 7153)
-and-
777 South Figueroa Street
Los Angeles, California 90017
Telephone: (213) 680-8400
Facsimile: (213) 680-8500
Melissa D. Ingalls (admitted pro hac vice)
Erin Brady (pro hac vice motion pending)
Laura A. Thomas (admitted pro hac vice)
Attorneys for The Non-Agent Lenders
UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
SOUTHERN DISTRICT OF NEW YORK
ADELPHIA RECOVERY TRUST,
Plaintiff,
vs.
BANK OF AMERICA, N.A., et al.,
Defendants.
No. 05-CV-9050 (LMM)
THE PARNASSOS NON-AGENT LENDERS’ MEMORANDUM OF LAW IN
SUPPORT OF THEIR MOTION TO STRIKE COUNT 33 AND DISMISS
COUNT 44 OF PLAINTIFFS’1 AMENDED COMPLAINT
(Non-Agent Lenders’ Motion to Dismiss No. 4 of 6)
1 The Adelphia Recovery Trust (the “ART”) represents the separate and unique interests of more than 250
individual Adelphia entities in this litigation. Because these entitites’ interests in this lawsuit are, indeed, separate
— and not consolidated — the Parnassos Non-Agent Lenders refer to the ART as “Plaintiffs” rather than “Plaintiff”
throughout this Motion.
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TABLE OF CONTENTS
Page(s)
INTRODUCTION ...........................................................................................................................1
I. BACKGROUND FACTS........................................................................................2
A. The Parnassos Credit Facility ......................................................................2
B. Parnassos’ Confirmed Plan Of Reorganization And Indemnity
Provisions.....................................................................................................5
C. The Plan of Reorganization For The Remaining Adelphia Entities ............8
D. The Initial Complaint And Subsequent Motions To Dismiss......................9
E. The Amended Complaint And Absence Of Any Alleged
Wrongdoing By The Parnassos Non-Agent Lenders.................................10
II. THE COURT SHOULD STRIKE COUNT 33 AS AGAINST THE
PARNASSOS NON-AGENT LENDERS BECAUSE THE
BANKRUPTCY COURT ALREADY DISMISSED IT WITH
PREJUDICE. .........................................................................................................12
III. THE COURT SHOULD DISMISS COUNT 44 OF THE COMPLAINT. ...........13
A. Legal Standards For Assessing The Parnassos Non-Agent Lenders’
Motion To Dismiss ....................................................................................13
B. Pursuant To The Plan And Confirmation Order, This Court Must
Dismiss The Preference Claim Against The Parnassos Non-Agent
Lenders Because The Parnassos Non-Agent Lenders Would Be
Indemnified Under The Parnassos Credit Agreement. ..............................14
1. The JV Plan, which expressly adopts the indemnity
provisions of the Parnassos Credit Agreement, requires
dismissal of all claims that do not arise from the Parnassos
Non-Agent Lenders’ gross negligence or willful
misconduct. ....................................................................................16
2. As the Bankruptcy Court already found in dismissing the
equitable subordination claim, Plaintiffs do not allege gross
negligence or willful misconduct against the Parnassos
Non-Agent Lenders with respect to the Parnassos Credit
Facility. ..........................................................................................17
3. Plaintiffs’ preference claim does not arise from the
Parnassos Non-Agent Lenders’ gross negligence or willful
misconduct. ....................................................................................18
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C. The Preference Claim Against The Parnassos Non-Agent Lenders
Must Be Dismissed Because Plaintiffs Do Not Have Standing To
Bring It. ......................................................................................................19
1. Plaintiffs do not have standing to prosecute their preference
claim on behalf of Parnassos’ creditors because none of
Parnassos’ creditors suffered a “personal injury.”.........................21
a. Parnassos’ creditors were not injured on account of
Parnassos’ allegedly preferential transfer. .........................21
b. Plaintiffs cannot manufacture creditors to establish
standing. .............................................................................23
2. Plaintiffs do not have standing to prosecute the Parnassos
preference claim because the requested relief cannot
redress Parnassos’ creditors’ injuries.............................................25
a. Where Parnassos cannot recover on behalf of and
for the benefit of its creditors, Plaintiffs cannot
pursue a preference claim on Parnassos’ creditors
behalf..................................................................................25
b. The fact that creditors of affiliated debtor entities
could benefit from a recovery on Parnassos’
preference claim does not invest Plaintiffs with
standing to pursue it. ..........................................................25
c. The operation of section of the Bankruptcy Code
reaffirms that Plaintiffs do not have standing to
bring the Parnassos preference claim because the
requested relief will not redress Parnassos’
creditors’ injuries. ..............................................................26
CONCLUSION..............................................................................................................................28
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TABLE OF AUTHORITIES
Page(s)
Cases
Adelphia Commc’ns Corp. v. Bank of Am., N.A.,
365 B.R. 24 (Bankr. S.D.N.Y. 2007).............................................................. 10, 12, 13, 17
Allen v. Wright,
468 U.S. 731 (1984).......................................................................................................... 19
Associated Gen’l Contractors of Cal. Inc. v. Cal. State Council of Carpenters,
459 U.S. 519 (1983).......................................................................................................... 14
Bartang Bank and Trust Co. v. Caiola,
No. 04 Civ. 2402, 2006 WL 2708453 (S.D.N.Y. Sept. 18, 2006) .................................... 14
Bear, Stearns Sec. Corp. v. Gredd,
275 B.R. 190 (S.D.N.Y. 2002).................................................................................... 21, 22
Bell Atl. Corp. v. Twombly,
127 S. Ct. 1955 (2007)...................................................................................................... 14
Colotone Liquidating Trust v. Bankers Trust New York Corp.,
243 B.R. 620 (S.D.N.Y. 2000).......................................................................................... 22
Corporate Food Mgt., Inc. v. Suffolk Cmty. College,
223 B.R. 635, (Bankr. E.D.N.Y. 1998)............................................................................. 22
Cortec Indus., Inc. v. Sum Holding L.P.,
949 F.2d 42 (2d Cir.1991).................................................................................................. 3
DaimlerChrysler Corp. v. Cuno,
126 S. Ct. 1854 (2006).......................................................................................... 19, 20, 21
DeJesus v. Sears, Roebuck & Co., Inc.,
87 F.3d 65 (2d Cir. 1996) ................................................................................................. 14
Esoimeme v. United Airlines, Inc.,
369 B.R. 531 (N.D. Cal. 2007) ......................................................................................... 22
F.D.I.C. v. Colonial Realty Co.,
966 F.2d 57 (2d Cir. 1992).................................................................................................. 7
Fleet Nat’l Bank v. Gray,
375 F.3d 51 (1st Cir. 2004)............................................................................................... 27
Gerber v. Computer Assocs. Int’l, Inc.,
860 F. Supp. 27 (E.D.N.Y. 1994) ..................................................................................... 13
Hartford Ins. Co. v. Holmes Prot. Group,
673 N.Y.S.2d. 132 (App. Div. 1998) ............................................................................... 16
Case 1:05-cv-09050-LMM -RLE Document 180 Filed 12/21/07 Page 4 of 34
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Hawkins Home Groups, Inc. v. S. Energy Homes, Inc.,
714 N.Y.S.2d 539 (App. Div. 2000) ................................................................................. 14
In re Adelphia Commc’ns Corp. Secs. and Derivative Litig.,
No. 03 MD 1529, 2007 WL 2615928 (S.D.N.Y. Sept. 10, 2007) .................................... 13
In re Adelphia Commc’ns Corp.,
368 B.R. 140 (Bankr. S.D.N.Y. 2007).............................................................................. 20
In re Alstom SA Sec. Litig.,
454 F. Supp. 2d 187 (S.D.N.Y. 2006)............................................................................... 13
In re Bd. of Dirs. of Hopewell Int’l Ins. Ltd.,
238 B.R. 25 (Bankr. S.D.N.Y. 1999), aff’d, 275 B.R. 699 (S.D.N.Y.) ............................ 25
In re Buttes Gas & Oil, Co.,
182 B.R. 493 (Bankr. S.D. Tex. 1994) ............................................................................. 22
In re Forte,
234 B.R. 607 (Bankr. E.D.N.Y. 1999).............................................................................. 22
In re Maxwell Commc’n Corp.,
170 B.R. 800 (S.D.N.Y., 1994)......................................................................................... 18
In re Messamore,
250 B.R. 913 (Bankr. S.D. Ill. 2000) ................................................................................ 21
In re Oceana Int’l, Inc.,
376 F. Supp. 956 (D.C.N.Y. 1974) .................................................................................. 24
Metro. Life Ins. Co. v. Noble Lowndes Int’l., Inc.,
600 N.Y.S.2d 212 (App. Div. 1993) ................................................................................. 16
Mills v. Polar Molecular Corp.,
12 F.3d 1170 (2d Cir. 1993).............................................................................................. 13
Motor Carriers Inc., v. MCI Telecomms.,
231 B.R. 874 (Bankr. D. Del. 1999) ................................................................................. 26
Official Comm. of Equity Sec. Holders of Adelphia Commc’ns Corp. v. Adelphia
Commc’ns Corp.,
371 B.R. 660 (S.D.N.Y. 2007).......................................................................................... 24
Olin Corp. v. Consol. Aluminum Corp.,
5 F.3d 10 (2nd Cir. 1993) ................................................................................................. 15
Oppenheimer & Co. v. Oppenheim, Appel, Dixon & Co.,
86 N.Y.2d 685 (N.Y. 1995) .............................................................................................. 15
People v. Williams,
668 N.Y.2d. 305 (Sup. Ct. 1997) ...................................................................................... 15
Raines v. Byrd,
521 U.S. 811 (1997).......................................................................................................... 19
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Rent Stabilization Ass’n of N.Y. v. Dinkins,
5 F.3d 591 (2d Cir. 1993) ................................................................................................. 14
Rosenberg v. XO Commc’ns, Inc.,
330 B.R. 394 (Bankr. S.D.N.Y. 2005).............................................................................. 22
Siler v. N. Trust Co.,
80 F. Supp. 2d 906 (N.D. Ill. 2000) .................................................................................. 15
Simon v. E. Ky. Welfare Rights Org.,
426 U.S. 26 (1976)............................................................................................................ 19
Southgate Owners Corp. v. Pub. Serv. Mut. Ins. Co.,
660 N.Y.S.2d 129 (App. Div. 1997) ................................................................................. 15
State v. Barclays Bank of N.Y., N.A.,
563 N.E.2d 11 (N.Y. 1990)............................................................................................... 15
Thompson v. County of Franklin,
15 F.3d 245 (2d Cir. 1994)................................................................................................ 14
Union Sav. Bank v. Augie/Restivo Baking Co., Ltd.,
860 F.2d 515 (2d Cir. 1988).............................................................................................. 23
Whiteford Plastics Co. v. Chase Nat’l Bank of N.Y. City,
179 F.2d 582 (2d Cir. 1950).............................................................................................. 25
Statutes
11 U.S.C. § 502(h) .................................................................................................................. 26, 27
11 U.S.C. § 547(b) (2006) ...................................................................................................... 18, 22
Other Authorities
3 Norton Bankr. L. & Prac. 2d § 57:1........................................................................................... 18
5 Collier on Bankruptcy, ¶ 547.03.[2] (15th ed. rev. 2000).......................................................... 21
William L. Prosser, Torts § 34 (4th ed. 1971) .............................................................................. 16
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INTRODUCTION
Of the 57 claims Plaintiffs assert in their Amended Complaint, they assert just two
against the Parnassos Non-Agent Lenders:2 an equitable subordination claim and a preference
claim. The mere presence of the equitable subordination claim in the Amended Complaint is
itself remarkable, given that the Bankruptcy Court already dismissed that claim, without leave to
amend, on the initial complaint. Plaintiffs have not appealed that ruling. They cannot now
ignore that Court’s prior ruling and continue to maintain their equitable subordination claim.
The claim should be stricken.
That leaves just one (equally flawed) claim against the Parnassos Non-Agent Lenders —
a preference claim. By that claim, and on the basis of nine paragraphs in an Amended Complaint
that contains more than 1,655 paragraphs, Plaintiffs seek to recover from the Parnassos Non-
Agent Lenders more than $25 million in alleged preferential loan repayments. They are not
entitled to do so.
Preference claims are, by definition, creditor remedies that exist solely to ensure that all
creditors receive a fair and equal distribution of a debtor’s available assets. A preference claim
— which allows a trustee to avoid certain payments that a debtor made in the 90 days before
filing for bankruptcy — arises when a debtor’s payment to one creditor diminishes or depletes
the assets available to satisfy other, similarly situated creditors. Preference claims require no
negligence or misconduct on the part of the paying debtor, much less on the part of the passive
creditor recipient.
2 For purposes of this brief, the Non-Agent Lenders or Parnassos Non-Agent Lenders moving to dismiss are those
defendants represented by Kirkland & Ellis LLP and sued in their capacity as “Syndicate Banks” or “Assignees” in
relation to the Parnassos Credit Facility. To the extent that any Kirkland & Ellis LLP represented defendant is
alleged to be a “John Doe” lender in the Parnassos Credit Facility, that defendant is also a moving party here. A list
of Kirkland & Ellis LLP represented defendants in all credit facilities appears as Exhibit 22 to the Request for
Judicial Notice and Joint Appendix of Exhibits. Kirkland & Ellis LLP represents approximately 400 Non-Agent
Lenders across all six credit facilities, who received payments of approximately $4.1 billion in relation to the
Adelphia debt paper. All Exhibits referenced herein are attached to the Request for Judicial Notice and Joint
Appendix of Exhibits (“Joint App.”), filed concurrently.
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In light of these principles, the Court should dismiss Plaintiffs’ preference claim against
the Parnassos Non-Agent Lenders for two reasons. First, Parnassos’ plan of reorganization —
which expressly adopts as new the lender-indemnity provisions contained in the Parnassos Credit
Agreement — requires the Court to dismiss all claims Plaintiffs make against the Parnassos Non-
Agent Lenders relating to the Parnassos Credit Agreement, unless those claims arise from the
“particular” Parnassos Non-Agent Lenders’ individual gross negligence or willful misconduct.
Because Plaintiffs never allege that the Parnassos Non-Agent Lenders did anything improper,
and because the preference claim, by definition, does not arise from the Parnassos Non-Agent
Lenders’ gross negligence or willful misconduct (but rather arises on account of scheduled loan
repayments), Parnassos’ plan requires that the preference claim be dismissed.
Second, Plaintiffs do not have standing to bring a preference claim on Parnassos’
creditors’ behalf. Again, preference claims are intended to remedy creditor injury by ensuring
equal distribution of a debtor’s assets among similarly situated creditors. Thus, to establish
standing, Plaintiffs must allege and prove both that Parnassos’ allegedly preferential loan
repayments caused at least one Parnassos creditor to receive less than it would have absent the
repayments, and that this lawsuit can redress that injury. They have not so alleged, nor could
they. Parnassos has paid, or has reserved amounts sufficient to pay, all of its creditors in full.
By definition, therefore, the allegedly preferential loan repayments did not result in the sort of
unequal distribution that would cause injury to any creditor of Parnassos. But even if they had,
this lawsuit could not redress any such injury because Parnassos’ creditors will not be entitled to
receive any recovery from this litigation; instead, any recovery will inure only to the benefit of
Parnassos’ corporate great grandparents and their creditors. Accordingly, Plaintiffs do not have
standing to assert their Parnassos preference claim. It must be dismissed.
I. BACKGROUND FACTS
A. The Parnassos Credit Facility
Parnassos, L.P. (“Parnassos”), as borrower, entered into a $700 million facility in
December 1998 with various lenders, comprising a $350 million term loan and a $350 million
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revolving line of credit (the “Parnassos Credit Agreement”).3 Am. Compl. ¶ 819. The Parnassos
Credit Agreement, along with all Guaranties, Pledge Agreements, and related agreements are
referred to as the “Parnassos Credit Facility.” As of the Petition Date, approximately $623
million was outstanding under the Parnassos Credit Facility. Id. ¶ 821.
Unlike some of the other credit facilities implicated in this lawsuit, the Parnassos Credit
Facility was not a so-called “co-borrowing facility.” Id. ¶ 815. This means that neither the Rigas
Family nor any of its privately-owned companies were able to borrow funds from the Parnassos
Credit Facility. And Plaintiffs never allege that the Rigas Family did, in fact, access any funds
from the Parnassos Credit Facility.
As part of the consideration provided in exchange for the $700 million credit facility,
Parnassos agreed that if any claims were asserted against a lender thereto (including a Non-
Agent Lender) on the basis of its involvement in the Parnassos Credit Facility, Parnassos would
indemnify and defend that lender from and against all claims, losses, damages and expenses,
including attorneys’ fees, unless the claim arose by reason of that individual lender’s gross
negligence or willful misconduct. Joint App., Ex. 5 § 10.4 (Parnassos Credit Agreement);4 see
also Ex. 5 § 10.11.1 (Parnassos Credit Agreement) (extending Lender status under the
Agreement to Non-Agent Lenders who purchase the debt in the secondary market). Section 10.4
of the Parnassos Credit Agreement states in relevant part:
[T]he Borrower hereby indemnifies, exonerates and holds each Secured
Party [which includes Lenders] and each of their respective officers,
directors, employees and agents (collectively, the “Indemnified Parties”)
free and harmless from and against any and all actions, causes of action,
suits, losses, costs, liabilities and damages, and expenses incurred in
connection therewith (irrespective of whether any such Indemnified Party
3 Other indirect ACC subsidiaries pledged their respective partnership interests in Parnassos to secure repayment.
See Am. Compl. ¶ 819.
4 “[O]n a motion to dismiss, a court may consider certain documents in addition to the complaint, including the
contents of any documents attached to the complaint or incorporated by reference.” Adelphia Commc’ns Corp. v.
Bank of Am., N.A. (In re Adelphia Commc’ns Corp.), 365 B.R. 24, 34 (Bankr. S.D.N.Y. 2007); see also Cortec
Indus., Inc. v. Sum Holding L.P., 949 F.2d 42, 47-48 (2d Cir.1991), cert. denied, 503 U.S. 960 (1992).
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is a party to the action for which indemnification hereunder is sought),
including reasonable attorneys’ fees and disbursements, whether incurred
in connection with actions between or among the parties hereto or the
parties hereto and third parties (collectively, the “Indemnified
Liabilities”), incurred by the Indemnified Parties or any of them as a result
of, or arising out of, or relating to
(a) any transaction financed or to be financed in whole or in part, directly
or indirectly, with the proceeds of any Credit Extension, including all
Indemnified Liabilities arising in connection with the entering into and
performance of this Agreement;
(b) the entering into and performance of this Agreement and any other
Loan Document by any of the Indemnified Parties (including any action
brought by or on behalf of the Borrower as the result of any determination
by the Required Lenders pursuant to Article V not to fund any Credit
Extension, provided that any such action is resolved in favor of such
Indemnified Party);
(c) any investigation, litigation or proceeding related to any acquisition or
proposed acquisition by the Borrower or any of its Subsidiaries of all or
any portion of the stock or assets of any Person, whether or not an
Indemnified Party is party thereto;
. . .
except for any such Indemnified Liabilities arising for the account of a
particular Indemnified Party by reason of the relevant Indemnified
Party’s gross negligence or willful misconduct . . . .
Id. § 10.4 (Parnassos Credit Agreement) (emphasis added). Parnassos also agreed to the same
indemnification obligations for each purchaser of the Parnassos debt in the secondary market.
Section 10.11.1 of the Parnassos Credit Agreement states, in relevant part, “[f]rom and after the
date that the Administrative Agent accepts [a] Lender Assignment Agreement . . . the Assignee
Lender thereunder shall be deemed automatically to have become a party [to the Parnassos
Credit Agreement] and to the extent that rights and obligations hereunder have been assigned and
delegated to such Assignee Lender in connection with such Lender Assignment Agreement, shall
have the rights and obligations of a Lender [under the Parnassos Credit Agreement] and under
the other Loan Documents.” Moreover, each lender’s right to indemnity from Parnassos
survived any assignment from one lender to another, as well as the termination of the Parnassos
Credit Agreement. Id. § 10.5.
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B. Parnassos’ Confirmed Plan Of Reorganization And Indemnity Provisions
Almost four years after entering into the Parnassos Credit Facility, Parnassos filed a
voluntary Chapter 11 bankruptcy case in the Bankruptcy Court for the Southern District of New
York on June 25, 2002. Am. Compl. ¶ 1067. The Bankruptcy Court jointly administered
Parnassos’ bankruptcy case with those of other Adelphia entities who had also filed for
bankruptcy. See Joint App., Ex. 7 (Joint Administration Order).
In April 2005, each of the Adelphia entities agreed to sell substantially all of their assets,
including (to the extent they held any) their equity in Parnassos and certain other entities held in
a joint venture (collectively, the “JV Entities”), to Time Warner NY Cable LLC and Comcast
Corporation (together, the “Buyers”). Joint App., Ex. 8 at DSS2-8 (Second Disclosure Statement
Supplement). Pursuant to that agreement, the Buyers required the Adelphia entities to
consummate the agreed-upon sale through a confirmed plan of reorganization by no later than
July 31, 2006. Id.
That was easier said than done. After a year of trying to formulate and confirm a joint
plan of reorganization that would appease the creditors of more than 250 separate entities, the
Adelphia entities and the Buyers ultimately agreed upon an alternative path. Id. Rather than
continue trying to push through a plan for all Adelphia entities before the deadline, the parties
agreed that they would consummate the sale through (i) a plan of reorganization (the “JV Plan”)
that dealt only with the JV Entities, including Parnassos; and (ii) a separate Bankruptcy Court
order permitting the remaining Adelphia entities to sell their assets to the Buyers free and clear
of liens. Id. at DSS2-9. Not surprisingly, the JV Plan received the support necessary for
confirmation; it did, after all, provide that all JV Entity creditors would be paid in full, in cash,
from the sale proceeds and that substantial funds would be generated for the JV Entities’ equity
holders. Id.
Several provisions of the JV Plan are particularly relevant to this lawsuit. First, the JV
Plan cancels and extinguishes the Parnassos Credit Facility as it relates to the Parnassos Debtors
(Joint App., Ex. 21 § 6.07 (JV Plan)), with one important caveat. The JV Plan expressly
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obligates Parnassos to indemnify each of its Non-Agent Lenders on virtually the same terms as
were contained in the now extinguished Parnassos Credit Agreement.5 It does this through the
definition of “Dismissed Bank Actions,” which provides:
Dismissed Bank Actions means the Bank Actions [which term includes
this litigation] or one or more Claims asserted therein, if any: . . . (ii) with
respect to a particular defendant as to which there is a determination by a
court of competent jurisdiction pursuant to a Final Order that such
defendant as to such Bank Actions, is (or would be, but for any limitation
on indemnification pursuant to the Plan) entitled to indemnification
(whether under a Prepetition Credit Agreement or under another
agreement or principle of law), either by a Debtor or by a Person who is
(or would be, but for any limitation on indemnification pursuant to the
Plan) entitled to indemnification by a Debtor, but only to the extent of
such indemnification.
Id. at 11 (emphasis added) (referencing “Prepetition Credit Agreement” as basis for
indemnification). Additionally, the JV Plan also states “on the Effective Date, all Dismissed
Bank Actions shall, with respect to the Debtor Parties only, be dismissed . . . with prejudice and
the Debtor Parties shall be deemed to release the Bank Lenders with respect to the Dismissed
Bank Actions, effective as of the Effective Date.” Id. § 6.04(b)(ii) (emphasis added). Thus,
under the JV Plan, the Parnassos Non-Agent Lenders are entitled to dismissal of the preference
claim to the extent that Parnassos would have been required to indemnify them under the now
extinguished Parnassos Credit Agreement.
Second, the JV Plan effectuated the JV Entities’ assignment of certain claims and causes
of action (including the causes of action implicated in this lawsuit) to “Distribution Companies,”
who could then prosecute them on the JV Entities’ behalf. Id. § 7.03(a). Third, the JV Plan
required these Distribution Companies to assume any intercompany claims (after paying all of
the JV Entities’ creditors in full) against Parnassos and to treat them as provided in any
subsequent resolution to the then-ongoing dispute regarding the validity of intercompany claims.
Id. § 4.92.
5 The one change in Parnassos’ indemnity obligation under the JV Plan is that the Parnassos Non-Agent Lenders
may no longer seek money damages under the indemnification clauses. See id. §§ 6.04(b)(iv), 7.03(b).
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Finally, the JV Plan did not effectuate a merger or so-called “substantive consolidation”
of the JV Entities (or, for that matter, any of the Adelphia entities).6 Rather, the JV Plan
specifically provides that each JV Entity remains a separate legal entity and that the JV Plan
does not effectuate any substantive consolidation of the estates. See id. § 5.01. That means that
each debtor, including Parnassos, is responsible only for satisfying its own creditors’ claims —
no more, no less. Id.
Parnassos has had ample funds to satisfy its creditors’ claims.7 The following chart
summarizes the JV Plan’s treatment of the various classes of Parnassos creditors — showing that
all are or will be paid in full.
Class of Claims Treatment
Under The JV Plan
Other Priority Claims An amount equal to payment in full, in cash. Joint App., Ex. 21 § 4.01(b) (JV Plan).
Secured Tax Claims
An amount equal to payment in full, in cash or
other consideration. Joint App., Ex. 21 § 4.02(c)
(JV Plan).
Other Secured Claims
Paid in full, in cash, with postpetition interest or
satisfaction by the Buyers under the sale
agreement. Joint App., Ex. 21 § 4.03(b) (JV Plan).
Parnassos Bank Claims
An amount equal to payment in full, in cash, with
postpetition interest (but subject to disgorgement).
Joint App., Ex. 21 § 4.17(c) (JV Plan).
Parnassos Trade Claims
An amount equal to payment in full, in cash, with
postpetition interest or satisfaction by the Buyers
under the sale agreement. Joint App., Ex. 21
§ 4.18(b) (JV Plan).
6 Substantive consolidation occurs when the assets and liabilities of two or more distinct bankruptcy entities are
combined in a single pool and treated as if they belong to one entity. Therefore, substantive consolidation generally
results in the satisfaction of liabilities from the resulting common fund of assets and also the elimination of
intercompany claims between and among the substantively consolidated entities. F.D.I.C. v. Colonial Realty Co.,
966 F.2d 57, 58-59 (2d Cir. 1992).
7 Even Parnassos’ equity holders were unimpaired under the Main Plan. See Joint App., Ex. 21 § 4.20 (JV Plan).
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Class of Claims Treatment
Under The JV Plan
Parnassos Other Unsecured Claims
An amount equal to payment in full, in cash, with
postpetition interest or satisfaction by the Buyers
under the sale agreement. (Joint App., Ex. 21
§ 4.19(b) (JV Plan))
C. The Plan of Reorganization For The Remaining Adelphia Entities
After the sale closed on July 31, 2006, the remaining Adelphia entities attempted once
again to negotiate a joint plan of reorganization. After months of additional negotiations, they
reached the compromise embodied in the First Modified Fifth Amended Joint Chapter 11 Plan
for Adelphia Communications Corporation and Certain of Its Affiliated Debtors (the “Main
Plan”), which the Bankruptcy Court ultimately confirmed on January 5, 2007. Joint App., Ex 8
at DSS2-12–DSS2-13 (Second Disclosure Statement Supplement); see also Joint App., Ex. 10
(Main Plan). The Main Plan, like the JV Plan, did not effectuate a substantive consolidation of
the debtors party thereto; each remains a separate legal entity. Joint App., Ex. 10 § 2.2 (Main
Plan).
The Main Plan calls for the participating Adelphia entities to create a Contingent Value
Vehicle (the “CVV”), and assigns certain creditors and equity holders (notably, none of whom
are Parnassos creditors or equity holders) an interest in the CVV. See id. § 9.1. The CVV is
comprised of, among other things, (i) the claims and causes of action held by the Adelphia
entities party to the Main Plan; and (ii) the claims and causes of action held by the JV Plan’s
Distribution Companies, to the extent the proceeds of those claims and causes of action are
unnecessary to satisfy a JV Entity’s creditors. Id. §§ 8.9, 9.2. Of course, because Parnassos’
creditors were paid in full, no proceeds from this litigation will be necessary to satisfy Parnassos’
creditors, and as a result any and all recovery will flow to the CVV for the benefit of CVV
beneficiaries. Am. Compl. ¶¶ 1370-1390, 1470-1475.
The Main Plan also embodies a global resolution of alleged intercompany claims
amongst the various Adelphia entities. Pursuant to that global resolution, all Adelphia entities
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(including the JV Entities) released all claims or potential claims they may have held against any
other Adelphia entity. Joint App., Ex. 10 §§ 2.3, 5.3 (Main Plan).
D. The Initial Complaint And Subsequent Motions To Dismiss
In the midst of the bankruptcy case, the Unsecured Creditors Committee, on behalf of
Parnassos and certain other Adelphia affiliates (collectively, the “Plaintiffs”),8 filed suit against
hundreds of parties, including some Parnassos Non-Agent Lenders. Plaintiffs asserted, on
Parnassos’ behalf, several claims, including a preference claim under Section 547 of the
Bankruptcy Code and a claim for equitable subordination. Given the sheer number of defendants
named in the suit, the Bankruptcy Court entered a briefing schedule requiring the “administrative
agents” of each credit facility, including the Parnassos Credit Facility, to file the first round of
motions to dismiss. See Joint App., Ex. 19 at 4-5 (Briefing Schedule Order). The briefing
schedule contemplated that the remaining parties, including the Parnassos Non-Agent Lenders,
would file their own motions to dismiss once the first round of motions had been decided. Id. at
5-6. This motion is the Parnassos Non-Agent Lenders’ first legal challenge to Plaintiffs’
allegations.
The Bank of Nova Scotia (“BNS”), as the administrative agent to the Parnassos Credit
Facility, filed its motion to dismiss the Complaint as to the Parnassos lenders on October 3,
2003. In its brief, BNS argued (among other things) that (i) the allegations against the Parnassos
Lenders did not support a finding of wrongdoing, and as a result, Plaintiffs, on behalf of
Parnassos, could not maintain their equitable subordination claim; and (ii) the initial complaint
itself demonstrated that the payments subject to the preference claim were made in the ordinary
course of business pursuant to Bankruptcy Code Section 547(c)(2). BNS Mot. to Dismiss,
Docket No. 15 in Case No. 03-04942 (Bankr. S.D.N.Y.).
8 After the Bankruptcy Court confirmed the Main Plan, the Adelphia Recovery Trust (the “ART”), on behalf of
Parnassos and certain other Adelphia affiliates, took over as the Plaintiffs in this action.
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The Bankruptcy Court decided BNS’ motion (as well as those of the other administrative
agents) in June 2007. Adelphia Commc’ns Corp. v. Bank of Am., N.A. (In re Adelphia Commc’ns
Corp.), 365 B.R. 24 (Bankr. S.D.N.Y. 2007). As part of that decision, the Court dismissed
Plaintiffs’ equitable subordination claim in relation to the Parnassos Credit Facility on the basis
that the Complaint contained “insufficient allegations of wrongdoing” with respect to the
Parnassos Credit Facility. Id. at 70. At the same time, it let stand Plaintiffs’ preference claim
(brought on Parnassos’ behalf) on the basis that it could not determine, as a matter of law,
whether the ordinary course defense could apply to the preference claims Plaintiffs alleged in the
initial complaint. Id. at 79.
E. The Amended Complaint And Absence Of Any Alleged Wrongdoing By The
Parnassos Non-Agent Lenders
Plaintiffs filed an Amended Complaint on October 31, 2007, more than 15 months after
the JV Plan became effective. Plaintiffs assert against the Parnassos Non-Agent Lenders, on
Parnassos’ behalf, a preference claim under Section 547 of the Bankruptcy Code and (apparently
in error, given its earlier dismissal) a claim for equitable subordination and disallowance. Am.
Compl. ¶¶ 1370-1390, 1470-1475. As relief, Plaintiffs seek to avoid and recover certain
allegedly preferential loan repayments Parnassos made to the Parnassos Non-Agent Lenders
during the 90 days before its bankruptcy filing. Id. ¶¶ 1471, 1475. Notably, because the Plan
provides that any recovery Plaintiffs receive on the Parnassos preference claim will be
distributed to the beneficiaries of the CVV — which do not include Parnassos’ creditors —
Parnassos’ creditors will receive nothing on account of this action. See Joint App., Ex. 10
§§ 9.2-9.3 (Main Plan).
The Amended Complaint contains 1,655 paragraphs and is nearly 500 pages long.
Allegations regarding the lenders’ involvement in the Parnassos Credit Facility, including the
rote element allegations of the preference count, comprise just nine paragraphs of the Amended
Complaint. Am. Compl. ¶¶ 819-821, 1470-1475. In these nine paragraphs, Plaintiffs allege
merely the existence of the Parnassos Credit Facility, the amount outstanding under the facility at
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the time of the bankruptcy, and the amount of the loan repayments Parnassos made to its lenders
during the 90 days before its bankruptcy. See id. ¶¶ 1470-1475. They also take one paragraph to
identify approximately 25 lenders to the Parnassos Credit Facility — including the administrative
and nominal agents, but only a handful of Parnassos Non-Agent Lenders. Id. ¶ 820.
Despite the absence of any meaningful factual allegations regarding the Parnassos Non-
Agent Lenders, Plaintiffs attempt to create the impression that the Parnassos Non-Agent Lenders
somehow were “bad” (and thus are likely to argue that they are not entitled to indemnity under
the Parnassos Credit Agreement or dismissal under the JV Plan) by lumping them in with lenders
to the various co-borrowing facilities (i.e., those credit facilities that included Rigas Family
Entities). To do this, they slide overarching definitional terms like “Defendants” or “Non-Co-
Borrowing Lenders” (which include the Parnassos Non-Agent Lenders) into paragraphs that,
while replete with factual allegations of wrongdoing against some parties (primarily the Rigas
Family and Adelphia itself), in no way discuss or relate to the Parnassos Non-Agent Lenders.
Perhaps one of the most blatant examples of this tactic occurs in paragraph 1015, where
Plaintiffs allege (emphasis added):
Through the CMS, the Rigas Family misappropriated over $3.4 billion
from the Co-Borrowing Facilities for its own benefit. Adelphia’s banking
and wire transfer records reflect that the Rigas Family obtained funds from
the Co-Borrowing Facilities by transferring funds from the CMS to an
account maintained at Wachovia by Highland Holdings or some other
RFE, followed by a transfer from the RFE either directly to individual
members of the Rigas Family or to other RFEs, many of which also
maintained accounts at Wachovia. Typically, these transfers occurred on
the same business day. Thus, on any given business day in which an RFE
received cash transfers from Adelphia, the RFE’s account balance at
Wachovia would fluctuate from zero, to the amount transferred in from
Adelphia, and back to zero after the RFE funneled those funds out to the
Rigas Family. Defendant Wachovia, an agent bank or lender under each
of Adelphia’s credit facilities (including the Co-Borrowing Facilities),
thus was in a unique position to observe the fraudulent transfer of funds
from Adelphia to the Rigas Family. In accordance with its role as an
Agent Bank, Wachovia, upon information and belief, shared its
knowledge of these transactions with other Co-Borrowing and Non-Co-
Borrowing Lenders.
This paragraph, like others of its kind, attempts, merely on information and belief, to impart the
Rigas Family’s intent and Wachovia’s alleged knowledge of that intent (based solely on the fact
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that it held the accounts for Adelphia’s cash management system) on the Parnassos Non-Agent
Lenders by use of a simple conclusory summary statement — without any facts that even suggest
that the statement could be true.
The paucity of Plaintiffs’ “allegations” specifically regarding the Parnassos Non-Agent
Lenders and their participation in the Parnassos Credit Facility — and the complete absence of
any factual allegations regarding their wrongdoing — is indicative of the fact that Parnassos and
the Parnassos Credit Facility are wholly tangential to the story of woe that Plaintiffs attempt to
plead in the Amended Complaint.9 As contrasted with Plaintiffs’ claims attempting to implicate
the Agent Banks of the various co-borrowing facilities, which allegations focus on the Rigas
Family and Adelphia’s alleged orchestration of fraud on innocent creditors and investors,
Plaintiffs’ claim against the Parnassos Non-Agent Lenders seeks only the technical remedy of
avoiding and recovering allegedly preferential loan repayments made in the 90 days before
bankruptcy. See, e.g., Am. Compl. ¶¶ 1-17, 1470-1475. The pages upon pages of allegations
relating to the co-borrowing facilities are simply not relevant to the preference allegations
against the Parnassos Non-Agent Lenders.
II. THE COURT SHOULD STRIKE COUNT 33 AS AGAINST THE PARNASSOS
NON-AGENT LENDERS BECAUSE THE BANKRUPTCY COURT ALREADY
DISMISSED IT WITH PREJUDICE.
On June 11, 2007, the Bankruptcy Court dismissed, with prejudice, Count 33 of the initial
complaint, which set forth Plaintiffs’ equitable subordination and equitable disallowance claims
against the lenders to the Parnassos Credit Facility. See Adelphia Commc’ns Corp. v. Bank of
Am., N.A. (In re Adelphia Commc’ns Corp.), 365 B.R. 24, 70 (Bankr. S.D.N.Y. 2007). The
Bankruptcy Court concluded that there were “insufficient allegations of inequitable conduct in
connection with [the Parnassos Credit Facility] to support equitable subordination.”10 Plaintiffs
9 In fact, other than in its claim for relief, the Amended Complaint only references Parnassos or the Parnassos
Credit Facility in three paragraphs: paragraphs 819, 820, and 821.
10 Although Judge Gerber’s opinion mistakenly cites Claim 39 — as opposed to Claim 33 — in the section of the
opinion where he discusses the dismissal of the Parnassos equitable subordination claim, the opinion itself is clear
(Continued…)
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did not seek interlocutory appeal. Nonetheless, Plaintiffs reasserted equitable subordination and
equitable disallowance claims against the Parnassos Non-Agent Lenders in their Amended
Complaint. See Am. Compl. Count 33 (pleaded against “all Defendants”). This is improper.
“Once a count is dismissed . . . against certain parties it no longer should appear against
those parties.” Gerber v. Computer Assocs. Int’l, Inc., 860 F. Supp. 27, 29 (E.D.N.Y. 1994). A
dismissed claim, which is repled, should be stricken. See In re Alstom SA Sec. Litig., 454 F.
Supp. 2d 187, 216-17 (S.D.N.Y. 2006) (“strik[ing] portions of the complaint relating to
previously dismissed claims and parties.”). Because the Bankruptcy Court has already
dismissed, with prejudice, Count 33 as it relates to the Parnassos Lenders, this Court should
strike it from the Amended Complaint.11
III. THE COURT SHOULD DISMISS COUNT 44 OF THE COMPLAINT.
A. Legal Standards For Assessing The Parnassos Non-Agent Lenders’ Motion
To Dismiss
The Court, in reviewing the Amended Complaint in response to the Parnassos’ Non-
Agent Lenders’ Rule 12(b) motion to dismiss, must accept as true the factual allegations of the
Amended Complaint, and draw all inferences in favor of it. See Mills v. Polar Molecular Corp.,
12 F.3d 1170, 1174 (2d Cir. 1993). Plaintiffs’ Amended Complaint must “provide ‘plausible
grounds’ for the allegations with ‘enough fact to raise a reasonable expectation that discovery
will reveal evidence’ to support them.” In re Adelphia Commc’ns Corp. Secs. and Derivative
Litig., No. 03 MD 1529, 2007 WL 2615928, at *1 (S.D.N.Y. Sept. 10, 2007) (McKenna, J.)
that Judge Gerber intended for Claim 33 to be dismissed with respect to the Parnassos Credit Facility. First, the
section in which the decision occurs is titled, “Equitable Subordination and Disallowance Claims (Claim 33).” In re
Adelphia Commc’ns Corp., 365 B.R. at 67. Moreover, the chart at the end of the opinion, which Judge Gerber
expressly incorporates into his conclusion, states that Claim 33 is dismissed with respect to the Parnassos Credit
Facility. See id. at 81.
11 In the event the Court chooses to not strike this improperly repled count, the Parnassos Non-Agent Lenders
reiterate that the Amended Complaint contains no factual allegations of any wrongdoing at all by the Parnassos
Non-Agent Lenders — and certainly none that would support claims for equitable subordination and disallowance.
Movants incorporate by reference the arguments made in the CCH Non-Agent Lenders’ Motion To Dismiss Part V,
filed concurrently, articulating why this count should be dismissed.
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(quoting Bell Atl. Corp. v. Twombly, 127 S. Ct. 1955, 1965 (2007)). Courts should not assume
that plaintiffs can prove facts they have not alleged. See Associated Gen’l Contractors of Cal.
Inc. v. Cal. State Council of Carpenters, 459 U.S. 519, 526 (1983). Factually unsupported and
conclusory allegations are not adequate to state a claim. See DeJesus v. Sears, Roebuck & Co.,
Inc., 87 F.3d 65, 70 (2d Cir. 1996).
Courts in the Second Circuit have found dismissal for lack of standing to be properly
raised by Rule 12(b)(1) and Rule 12(b)(6) motions. See Rent Stabilization Ass’n of N.Y. v.
Dinkins, 5 F.3d 591, 594 (2d Cir. 1993) (noting that district courts in the Second Circuit have
dismissed for lack of standing under both Rule 12(b)(1) and Rule 12(b)(6)); Thompson v. County
of Franklin, 15 F.3d 245, 247 (2d Cir. 1994) (same). In either case, “like other jurisdictional
inquiries, [standing] cannot be inferred argumentatively from averments in the pleadings, but
rather must appear affirmatively in the record, so that, on a motion to dismiss, it is the burden of
the party asserting standing to sue clearly to allege facts demonstrating that he is a proper party
to invoke judicial resolution of the dispute.” Bartang Bank and Trust Co. v. Caiola, No. 04 Civ.
2402, 2006 WL 2708453, at *4 (S.D.N.Y. Sept. 18, 2006) (quoting Thompson, 15 F.3d at 249)
(internal punctuation omitted). If after considering all relevant materials this Court cannot
discern a basis for Plaintiffs’ standing, the Amended Complaint must be dismissed. See
Thompson, 15 F.3d at 249.
B. Pursuant To The Plan And Confirmation Order, This Court Must Dismiss
The Preference Claim Against The Parnassos Non-Agent Lenders Because
The Parnassos Non-Agent Lenders Would Be Indemnified Under The
Parnassos Credit Agreement.
In interpreting indemnification clauses, New York12 courts “first look to the express
contract language used” to effectuate the intention of the parties. Hawkins Home Groups, Inc. v.
S. Energy Homes, Inc., 714 N.Y.S.2d 539, 540 (App. Div. 2000). “[W]here the language of a
12 The Parnassos Credit Agreement is governed by New York law. See Joint App., Ex. 5 § 10.9 (Parnassos Credit
Agreement).
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contract is clear and unambiguous, the court will construe and discern that intent from the
document itself as a matter of law.” Id.; see also Olin Corp. v. Consol. Aluminum Corp., 5 F.3d
10, 16 (2nd Cir. 1993). And “in the absence of countervailing public policy concerns, there is no
reason to relieve [sophisticated parties] of the consequences of their bargain. If they are
dissatisfied with the consequences of their agreement, ‘the time to say so [was] at the bargaining
table.’” Southgate Owners Corp. v. Pub. Serv. Mut. Ins. Co., 660 N.Y.S.2d 129, 131 (App. Div.
1997) (quoting Oppenheimer & Co. v. Oppenheim, Appel, Dixon & Co., 86 N.Y.2d 685, 695
(N.Y. 1995)).
In addition, futile indemnification actions have long been disfavored by courts. See State
v. Barclays Bank of N.Y., N.A., 563 N.E.2d 11, 14 (N.Y. 1990) (reasoning that a particular course
of action would avoid circuity of action); see also Siler v. N. Trust Co., 80 F. Supp. 2d 906, 908
(N.D. Ill. 2000) (“A circuity of obligation will defeat a plaintiff’s claim as a matter of law. A
circuity is created when, by virtue of pre-existing indemnity agreements or obligations, the
plaintiff is in effect obligated to indemnify the defendants for claims including the plaintiff’s
own claim.”). Moreover, courts seek to avoid parties undertaking vain or useless acts. See
People v. Williams, 668 N.Y.2d. 305, 306 (Sup. Ct. 1997) (reasoning that a hearing should be
denied because the law does not compel one to do “vain or useless” things).
For these very reasons, the JV Plan makes clear that Plaintiffs cannot maintain their
preference claim against the Parnassos Non-Agent Lenders if those lenders would have been
entitled to indemnification for that claim under the now extinguished Parnassos Credit
Agreement. See Joint App., Ex. 21 § 6.04(b)(ii) (JV Plan). And for at least two reasons, the
Parnassos Non-Agent Lenders would have been entitled to indemnity. First, as the Bankruptcy
Court already found when it dismissed Plaintiffs’ equitable subordination and equitable
disallowance claims against the Parnassos Lenders, Plaintiffs have not alleged that the Parnassos
Non-Agent Lenders acted in any improper way. So, there is no basis for any exception to
Parnassos’ indemnity obligation. Second, preference claims themselves, by definition, do not
arise from any party’s gross negligence or willful misconduct. Rather, they arise simply on
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account of the fact that a debtor’s payment to one creditor diminishes the assets it has available
for distribution to other creditors. Thus, without a single allegation that the Parnassos Non-
Agent Lenders acted with gross negligence or willful misconduct, and with one remaining cause
of action that does not even require such allegations, the Parnassos Non-Agent Lenders are
entitled to indemnification and, therefore, dismissal.
1. The JV Plan, which expressly adopts the indemnity provisions of the
Parnassos Credit Agreement, requires dismissal of all claims that do
not arise from the Parnassos Non-Agent Lenders’ gross negligence or
willful misconduct.
The Parnassos Credit Agreement obligates Parnassos to indemnify each Parnassos Non-
Agent Lender from all actions, costs, damages, and expenses arising out of or relating to the
Parnassos Credit Facility. See Joint App, Ex. 5 § 10.4 (Parnassos Credit Agreement). The only
exception to Parnassos’ indemnity obligation is the extent to which a claim against a Non-Agent
Lender arises from that individual lender’s gross negligence or willful misconduct. See id.
Gross negligence requires acting in a manner that evinces a reckless disregard for the rights of
others or smacks of intentional wrongdoing. See e.g., Hartford Ins. Co. v. Holmes Prot. Group,
673 N.Y.S.2d. 132, 133 (App. Div. 1998). Willful misconduct requires intentionally committing
an act of an unreasonable character in disregard of a risk known or so obvious and so great as to
make it highly probable that harm would follow. See e.g., Metro. Life Ins. Co. v. Noble Lowndes
Int’l., Inc., 600 N.Y.S.2d 212, 216 (App. Div. 1993) (citing William L. Prosser, Torts § 34 (4th
ed. 1971)). Said another way, unless the claim against a Parnassos Non-Agent Lender relating to
the Parnassos Credit Facility arises from that particular Parnassos Non-Agent Lender’s “bad
acts” (i.e. gross negligence or willful misconduct), the Parnassos Credit Agreement requires
Parnassos to indemnify that Non-Agent Lender against all losses as a result of, arising out of, or
relating to that claim.
Having already agreed to indemnify the Parnassos Non-Agent Lenders in the Credit
Agreement, Parnassos agreed to it a second time in the JV Plan. Although the JV Plan cancels
and extinguishes the Parnassos Credit Agreement with respect to Parnassos, the JV Plan
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expressly provides for Parnassos to indemnify the Non-Agent Lenders on virtually the same
terms as in the Parnassos Credit Agreement. Joint App., Ex. 21 at 11 (JV Plan) (stating that one
criterion of Dismissed Bank Actions is whether the party would be entitled to indemnification
“under a Prepetition Credit Agreement”). The one change in Parnassos’ indemnity obligation
under the JV Plan is that the Parnassos Non-Agent Lenders may no longer seek money damages
under the indemnification clauses. See id. §§ 6.04(b)(iv), 7.03(b). Instead, upon establishing
their right to indemnification from Parnassos in “a court of competent jurisdiction,” any
indemnified claims against the Parnassos Non-Agent Lenders must be dismissed. See id. at 11.
In short, if Plaintiffs’ preference claim against a Parnassos Non-Agent Lender does not arise
from that “particular” Non-Agent Lender’s gross negligence or willful misconduct, the JV Plan
requires that it be dismissed.
2. As the Bankruptcy Court already found in dismissing the equitable
subordination claim, Plaintiffs do not allege gross negligence or willful
misconduct against the Parnassos Non-Agent Lenders with respect to
the Parnassos Credit Facility.
Plaintiffs do not allege any facts that the Parnassos Non-Agent Lenders — passive
investors in an arms-length financial transaction — engaged in either gross negligence or willful
misconduct. While Plaintiffs tell two stories of fraud at Adelphia, one of which focuses on the
Rigas Family’s abuse of the Adelphia Cash Management System and one of which focuses on
allegations regarding the structure of the co-borrowing facilities, Plaintiffs never allege facts that
the Non-Agent Lenders to the earlier, non-co-borrowing Parnassos Credit Facility knew of or
participated in any of this. It is for this very reason that the Bankruptcy Court dismissed, with
prejudice, Plaintiffs’ equitable subordination claim against the Parnassos Lenders, finding that
the complaint contained “insufficient allegations of inequitable conduct in connection with [the
Parnassos Credit Facility] to support equitable subordination.” See In re Adelphia Commc’ns
Corp., 365 B.R. 24, 70 (Bankr. S.D.N.Y. 2007) (emphasis added). With the Bankruptcy Court’s
finding, and the utter lack of a single allegation of any wrongdoing whatsoever by the Parnassos
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Non-Agent Lenders, there is no exception to the Non-Agent Lenders’ rights to indemnity and
they are entitled to dismissal from this case.
3. Plaintiffs’ preference claim does not arise from the Parnassos Non-
Agent Lenders’ gross negligence or willful misconduct.
By their very definition, preference claims do not arise out of any party’s gross
negligence or willful misconduct.
[T]he law of preferences frequently reverses and avoids transactions that
are entirely valid outside of bankruptcy. . . . [T]hese transfers violate
neither overt moral, nor explicit legal proscriptions. Rather, they may be
fully consistent with principles of debt collection, but nevertheless
avoidable in bankruptcy. Generally, the debtor’s or creditor’s motives
with respect to preferential transfers are irrelevant. . . . The effect of the
transfer rather than the intent is the controlling factor.
3 Norton Bankr. L. & Prac. 2d § 57:1 (emphasis added); see also In re Maxwell Commc’n Corp.,
170 B.R. 800, 808 (S.D.N.Y. 1994) (“[I]t is the effect of the transaction, rather than the debtor’s
or creditor’s intent or state of mind in making the transfer, that is controlling.”). Instead,
preference claims arise when the result of a pre-bankruptcy transaction is that one creditor
receives more than other similarly situated creditors. See 11 U.S.C. § 547(b) (2006).13 Because
preference claims, by definition, do not arise from any party’s gross negligence or willful
misconduct, the Parnassos Credit Agreement requires Parnassos, as a matter of law, to indemnify
the Parnassos Non-Agent Lenders on account of the preference claims asserted herein. That
indemnification obligation triggers the JV Plan’s dismissal provisions, which requires dismissal
of the preference claim here.
In sum, because Plaintiffs’ preference claim do not arise from the Parnassos Non-Agent
Lenders’ gross negligence or willful misconduct — and because the Amended Complaint
contains no allegations of such wrongful acts — the Parnassos Non-Agent Lenders are entitled to
13 To plead a preference claim, Plaintiffs must allege (1) a transfer of debtor’s interest in property, (2) to or for the
benefit of a creditor, (3) for or on account of antecedent debt, (4) made while debtor was insolvent, (5) made on or
within 90 days prior to petition date, (6) that enabled creditor to receive more than this creditor would have received
in Chapter 7 liquidation. See 11 U.S.C. § 547(b).
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indemnification for the preference claim Plaintiffs assert against them. Plaintiffs’ pursuit of the
Parnassos preference claim is, therefore, circuitous and wasteful of the Court’s and the parties’
time because the Non-Agent Lenders’ indemnification rights require that this Court dismiss the
preference claim in accordance with the JV Plan. The Court should therefore dismiss the
preference claim.14
C. The Preference Claim Against The Parnassos Non-Agent Lenders Must Be
Dismissed Because Plaintiffs Do Not Have Standing To Bring It.
There is yet another reason to dismiss the preference claim: Plaintiffs have no standing
to bring it. “‘No principle is more fundamental to the judiciary’s proper role in our system of
government than the constitutional limitation of federal-court jurisdiction to actual cases or
controversies.’” Raines v. Byrd, 521 U.S. 811, 818 (1997) (quoting Simon v. E. Ky. Welfare
Rights Org., 426 U.S. 26, 37 (1976)). To establish an actual case or controversy, a litigant
seeking relief in the federal courts “must allege personal injury fairly traceable to the
defendant’s allegedly unlawful conduct and likely to be redressed by the requested relief.”
DaimlerChrysler Corp. v. Cuno, 126 S. Ct. 1854, 1861 (2006) (emphasis added) (citing Allen v.
Wright, 468 U.S. 731, 751 (1984)). Where a litigant fails to make these fundamental allegations,
the federal courts have no subject matter jurisdiction over its claim, and the claim must be
dismissed. Simon, 426 U.S. at 37-38.
Plaintiffs (under the guise of a non-existent, agglomerated “Adelphia”) assert a
preference claim in this case on behalf of and for the benefit of Parnassos’ creditors.15 To
14 As discussed in the CCH Non-Agent Lenders’ Motion to Dismiss, Plaintiffs have previously argued that liability
can be found against innocent down stream purchasers who purchased “tainted” debt. See CCH Motion to Dismiss,
Part III.D (which argument is incorporated herein to the extent the Court finds it relevant). As discussed there, even
if the Court finds that an “Enron taint” exists, that theory of liability is limited to actions for equitable subordination
and has no application here.
15 In earlier motions filed in this case, Plaintiffs have asserted that all payments they seek to avoid “were funneled
through one debtor entity, Adelphia Communications LLC, also known as the ‘Bank of Adelphia,’” and that the
Bank of Adelphia “had extensive obligations to other Adelphia debtors that remained unpaid.” See Pls.’ Opp’n to
Motions for Leave to Appeal at 36, Docket No. 60 in Case No. 05 Civ. 9050 (S.D.N.Y.). That assertion is contrary
to the Amended Complaint. As an initial matter, there is no Adelphia debtor known as “Adelphia Communications
LLC.” But to the extent the Plaintiffs may have meant “Adelphia Cablevision, LLC,” which Judge Gerber identified
(Continued…)
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establish their standing to maintain this claim, they must establish both that Parnassos’ creditors
were injured on account of the Parnassos Non-Agent Lenders’ alleged unlawful acts and that the
relief they seek can redress that injury. DaimlerChrysler Corp., 126 S. Ct. at 1856 (noting that
it is the plaintiff’s burden to establish constitutional standing). They fail to do so.
First, no Parnassos creditors were injured on account of the alleged preferential loan
repayments Plaintiffs allege in their Amended Complaint. Parnassos had sufficient assets not
only to satisfy, in full, all of its creditors’ claims, but also to pass value upstream to its parent
entities. Second, even if Parnassos had not been able to satisfy all of its creditors — thus
hypothetically giving rise to a creditor injury — any damages Parnassos receives in this action
will do nothing to redress that hypothetical injury. Instead, because the Main Plan provides that
any recovery in this action will be distributed to CVV beneficiaries (i.e., Parnassos’ corporate
great-great grandparent and it’s creditors), Parnassos’ creditors — the real parties in interest with
the hypothetical injury — have absolutely no stake in the resolution of these matters.16 In short,
Plaintiffs do not have standing to assert and maintain their preference claim on behalf of
Parnassos’ creditors and, as a result, the claim must be dismissed.
as the “Bank of Adelphia” in his confirmation decision, see In re Adelphia Commc’ns Corp., 368 B.R. 140, 151
(Bankr. S.D.N.Y. 2007), the Amended Complaint fails to allege that Adelphia Cablevision, LLC made any of the
payments Plaintiffs seek to avoid. In any event, Adelphia Cablevision, LLC, like Parnassos, has no unpaid creditor
that would benefit from the avoidance of any such payments. In fact, Adelphia Cablevision, LLC — like each of the
CCH Debtors — is one of the “Subsidiary Debtors” under the Main Plan, whose creditors (if any) were paid in full
and are not beneficiaries of the CVV. See Joint App., Ex. 8 at Schedule II (Second Disclosure Statement).
16 As already discussed, the more than 250 Adelphia bankruptcy estates are not substantively consolidated. Rather,
all of the various debtor and respective creditor bodies remain separate and can only recover if they can individually
establish standing. See Joint App., Ex. 21 § 5.01 (JV Plan); Joint App., Ex. 10 § 2.2 (Main Plan) (recognizing that
“all Debtors shall continue to exist as separate legal entities”). As a result, the Court must separately assess the
standing of each debtor entity or representative to sue on behalf of its creditors.
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1. Plaintiffs do not have standing to prosecute their preference claim on
behalf of Parnassos’ creditors because none of Parnassos’ creditors
suffered a “personal injury.”
a. Parnassos’ creditors were not injured on account of Parnassos’
allegedly preferential transfer.
The Court should dismiss Plaintiffs’ preference claim against the Parnassos Non-Agent
Lenders because Parnassos’ alleged preferential transfers did not injure any of its creditors.
Instead, the JV Plan and accompanying Disclosure Statement are clear that Parnassos has or will
pay all of its creditors in full. The Amended Complaint does not allege otherwise.17
The fact that Parnassos has paid (or has reserved funds with which to pay) all of its
creditors in full is dispositive of the standing question. Preference actions are “creditor
remedies” designed to redress the injury a debtor causes to its general creditor body when it
satisfies all or part of one creditor’s claim — to the exclusion of others — during the 90 days
before filing for bankruptcy, thereby depleting the pool of assets ultimately available to satisfy
other creditors in the bankruptcy case. See Bear, Stearns Sec. Corp. v. Gredd, 275 B.R. 190, 194
(S.D.N.Y. 2002) (stating that “[i]n order to determine whether property that is transferred
belongs to the debtor for purposes of § 547, we apply the ‘diminution of estate’ doctrine.”)
(citation omitted); In re Messamore, 250 B.R. 913, 916 (Bankr. S.D. Ill. 2000) (stating that “a
transfer is preferential only if it diminishes the fund to which other creditors can look for
payments of their debts, thus making it impossible for similarly situated creditors to obtain as
great a percentage as the favored creditor.” (citing 5 Collier on Bankruptcy, ¶ 547.03.[2] (15th
ed. rev. 2000)).
In light of the purpose underlying preference actions — ensuring that all creditors receive
a fair distribution, courts in this circuit are clear that trustees or other estate representatives can
assert bankruptcy claims only when a debtor’s preferential, pre-bankruptcy payment to one
17 Plaintiffs do not allege that Parnassos has any unpaid creditors. See Am. Compl. ¶¶ 1470-1475. As it is
Plaintiffs’ burden to allege and, ultimately, prove the existence of unpaid creditors to establish standing with respect
to its preference claim, the claim must be dismissed. DaimlerChrysler Corp., 126 S.Ct. at 1861.
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creditor precludes other similarly situated creditors from equally recovering on their claims.
Bear, Stearns Sec. Corp., 275 B.R. at 194 (holding that a debtor does not have standing to bring
avoidance claims if all creditors are paid). Where all creditors are paid in full notwithstanding
the alleged preferential transfer, no creditor is injured within the scope of the law, and as a result
no party has standing to assert claims thereunder. 11 U.S.C. § 547(b)(5) (2006) (explaining that
a trustee can pursue a preference action against a creditor only when a preferential payment
allowed the creditor to receive more than it would have in a chapter 7 liquidation, thus
precluding preference actions in bankruptcy cases where all creditors are paid in full).
Under this well-developed body of law, Plaintiffs do not have standing to maintain their
preference claim on behalf of Parnassos’ creditors. The JV Plan and its accompanying
Disclosure Statement — both documents of which the Court may take judicial notice — make it
clear that no Parnassos creditors were injured on account of Parnassos’ loan repayments to the
Parnassos Non-Agent Lenders during the 90 days before its bankruptcy.18 Joint App., Ex. 21 (JV
Plan); Joint App., Ex. 8 (Second Disclosure Statement Supplement). Instead, Parnassos has paid
(or reserved amounts sufficient to pay) each and every creditor of its estate in full — without
even a single cent of recovery from the preference action. Because none of these creditors,
having been paid in full and having received equal distributions, has suffered the injury
18 Courts routinely take judicial notice of bankruptcy court dockets, and pleadings filed therein, including plans of
reorganization. See, e.g., Esoimeme v. United Airlines, Inc., 369 B.R. 531, 533 n. 2 (N.D. Cal. 2007) (taking judicial
notice of the bankruptcy petition and various bankruptcy court orders); Colotone Liquidating Trust v. Bankers Trust
New York Corp., 243 B.R. 620, 622 n.2 (S.D.N.Y. 2000) (taking judicial notice of the confirmation order, plan of
reorganization and the related trust instrument); Rosenberg v. XO Commc’ns, Inc. (In re XO Commc’ns, Inc.), 330
B.R. 394, 418 (Bankr. S.D.N.Y. 2005) (taking judicial notice of the debtor’s disclosure statement); In re Forte, 234
B.R. 607, 613 n.11 (Bankr. E.D.N.Y. 1999) (taking judicial notice of the schedules to determine who owned the
relevant property); Corporate Food Mgmt., Inc. v. Suffolk Cmty. College (In re Corporate Food Mgmt., Inc.), 223
B.R. 635, 646 (Bankr. E.D.N.Y. 1998) (taking judicial notice of the Debtor’s bankruptcy schedules and concluding
therefrom that the unsecured creditors “would have received less than a one hundred percent distribution at the time
the Debtor converted the involuntary Chapter 7 bankruptcy proceeding to a case under Chapter 11.”); In re Buttes
Gas & Oil, Co., 182 B.R. 493, 494 (Bankr. S.D. Tex. 1994) (taking judicial notice of the docket sheet and
Bankruptcy Court file, and concluding there from that all of the debtor’s creditors are being paid pursuant to the
plan).
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preference claims were designed to remedy, Plaintiffs’ Parnassos preference claim must be
dismissed as a matter of law.
b. Plaintiffs cannot manufacture creditors to establish standing.
Because Parnassos has no injured creditors, Plaintiffs attempt to manufacture creditors on
behalf of whom they may assert Parnassos’ preference claims. They do this — in both their
Amended Complaint and in motions defending the initial complaint — in two ways. First, they
pretend that the more than 250 individual Adelphia entities are one and the same, depicting a
scenario in which Parnassos not only has to satisfy its own creditors, but also must satisfy its
corporate great-great grandparents’ creditors as well. See Joint App., Ex. 11 (Adelphia Corporate
Organization Chart). And second they invoke the existence of alleged intercompany claims,
arguing that various Adelphia affiliates have direct creditor claims against Parnassos. Pls.’
Opp’n to Motions for Leave to Appeal at 35, Docket No. 60 in Case No. 05 Civ. 9050
(S.D.N.Y.) (“[T]here are numerous inter-company claims that were not paid under the Plan.”).
These imaginings are no more than flights of fancy, and are ineffective to “create” creditors
where none exist.19
First, the more than 250 Adelphia entities are not one and the same. Rather, the
Bankruptcy Court has already ruled that each Adelphia entity is a separate legal entity, with its
own assets, liabilities and creditors. Joint App., Ex. 21 (Confirmation Order of JV Plan); Ex. 9
(Confirmation Order of Main Plan). In fact, both the JV Plan and the Main Plan specifically
provide that each debtor must pay only those claims asserted against its respective estate.20 Joint
19 Notably, the two theories are mutually exclusive. If the estates were substantively consolidated, the assets and
liabilities of each of the more than 250 individual Adelphia entities would be combined, making the existence of
intercompany claims an impossibility. See Union Sav. Bank v. Augie/Restivo Baking Co., Ltd. (In re Augie/Restivo
Baking Co.), 860 F.2d 515, 518 (2d Cir. 1988) (“Substantive consolidation usually results in . . . eliminating inter-
company claims . . .”) (citation omitted).
20 The Main Plan further specified that its terms “shall not affect any Debtor’s status as a separate legal
entity, . . . cause a merger or consolidation of any legal entities, nor cause the transfer of any assets.” Joint App.,
Ex. 10 § 2.2 (Main Plan) (emphasis added).
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App., Ex. 10 § 2.2 (Main Plan); Joint App., Ex. 21 § 5.01 (JV Plan). The Plans do not permit,
much less obligate, Parnassos to pay claims asserted against its parent entities. Id. If the
Adelphia entities hoped to merge or “substantively consolidate” their estates, pooling their
collective assets to satisfy their collective creditors, they were required to seek and obtain court
approval of such consolidation before they distributed even one dime to their respective
creditors. See Official Comm. of Equity Sec. Holders of Adelphia Commc’ns Corp. v. Adelphia
Commc’ns Corp. (In re Adelphia Commc’ns Corp.), 371 B.R. 660, 677 (S.D.N.Y. 2007) (finding
that the Adelphia Plan could not be unraveled after payments had been made). They did not do
so. Accordingly, Parnassos must satisfy its own creditors — no more, no less.
Additionally, there are no unresolved intercompany claims pending against Parnassos.21
On this point, the Main Plan is clear: when the Main Plan becomes effective, all “Intercompany
Claims shall be deemed resolved,” and, as a result, the holders of such claims “shall not be
entitled to . . . receive any Plan Distributions or other allocations of value.” Joint App., Ex. 10
§§ 2.3, 5.3 (Main Plan).22 The fact that the Main Plan resolved these claims pursuant to a release
and compromise, rather than by requiring payment in full, does not change the reality that the
holders of those resolved claims are no longer Parnassos creditors. In re Oceana Int’l, Inc., 376
F. Supp. 956, 962 (D.C.N.Y. 1974) (in a case where creditors’ recoveries were capped at ten
percent, and where the plan does not provide for “any retained interest for the benefit of creditors
in the proceeds of a recovery [from an avoidance claim],” the court had no jurisdiction over the
21 Plaintiffs have argued in prior pleadings that intercompany claims exist against Adelphia Cablevision, LLC., the
entity that it claims made loan repayments to Parnassos. See, e.g., Pls.’ Opp’n to Motions for Leave to Appeal at 35,
Docket No. 60 in Case No. 05 Civ. 9050 (S.D.N.Y.) (“[T]here are numerous inter-company claims that were not
paid under the Plan.”). This is irrelevant as the Main Plan released all intercompany claims. Joint App., Ex. 10 §
2.2 (Main Plan); Joint App., Ex. 8 at Schedule II (Second Disclosure Statement Supplement). As a result, the
discussion in this section applies equally to both Adelphia Cablevision, LLC and Parnassos.
22 The JV Plan required the Distribution Companies to assume the intercompany claims (after paying all of the JV
Entities’ creditors in full) and to treat them as provided in the intercreditor dispute resolution, which was ultimately
incorporated in the Main Plan. Accordingly, the terms of the Main Plan govern this point for all Adelphia entities.
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claims). There are no intercompany creditors. And without creditors, Plaintiffs do not have
standing to assert the Parnassos preference claim. The claim must be dismissed.
2. Plaintiffs do not have standing to prosecute the Parnassos preference
claim because the requested relief cannot redress Parnassos’
creditors’ injuries.
a. Where Parnassos cannot recover on behalf of and for the
benefit of its creditors, Plaintiffs cannot pursue a preference
claim on Parnassos’ creditors behalf.
Even assuming that Plaintiffs could show that Parnassos’ creditors suffered an actual
injury (i.e., that Parnassos could not satisfy all of its creditors’ claims), they still would not be
able to show that their prosecution of their preference action would remedy that injury. Pursuant
to the Plan, any and all proceeds of this litigation will inure solely to the benefit of parties with
an interest in the CVV. See Joint App., Ex. 10 §§ 9.2 - 9.3 (Plan) (explaining that beneficiaries
of the CVV will be entitled to the proceeds from this and other lawsuits). Parnassos’ creditors,
however, are not beneficiaries of the CVV, and as a result, will never realize any recovery on
account of the bankruptcy claims Plaintiffs assert in this action. As this lawsuit cannot serve to
redress their injuries, Plaintiffs have no standing to bring their bankruptcy claims. Whiteford
Plastics Co. v. Chase Nat’l Bank of N.Y. City, 179 F.2d 582, 584 (2d Cir. 1950) (holding that the
debtor could not avoid the lien of a creditor where creditors would obtain no benefit from
avoidance).
b. The fact that creditors of affiliated debtor entities could benefit
from a recovery on Parnassos’ preference claim does not invest
Plaintiffs with standing to pursue it.
Plaintiffs may argue that the beneficiaries of the CVV will benefit from a recovery on
Parnassos’ preference claim. As no Parnassos creditor is a beneficiary of the CVV, this is
irrelevant.
Preference claims belong solely to creditors, and a trustee or estate representative may
not avoid preferential transfers for the benefit of non-creditor third parties. In re Bd. of Dirs. of
Hopewell Int’l Ins. Ltd., 238 B.R. 25, 55 (Bankr. S.D.N.Y. 1999), aff’d, 275 B.R. 699 (S.D.N.Y.)
(“There is no need to recover assets in order to ensure equality of distribution when there is a
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large enough roast in the oven to feed all the hungry mouths. For this reason . . . a trustee’s or
debtor in possession’s avoidance powers can only be exercised for the benefit of creditors.”);
Motor Carriers Inc., v. MCI Telecomms.(In re Burlington Motor Holdings, Inc.), 231 B.R. 874,
877-78 (Bankr. D. Del. 1999) (finding that plaintiff did not have standing to prosecute preference
claims because recovery of preferential payments would not benefit estate or creditors). This is
true regardless of whether a third party was or claims it was somehow injured as a result of the
alleged preferential transfer. Simply put, if there are no injured creditors, there is no standing to
sue. Third party injuries are irrelevant.
Here, there is no dispute that the beneficiaries of the CVV are third parties. Despite
Plaintiffs’ painstaking efforts to create the illusion that the more than 250 individual Adelphia
entities are really one and the same, creating a pool of needy “Adelphia” creditors, they are not.
Neither the JV Plan nor the Main Plan effectuates a substantive consolidation of the Adelphia
entities. Instead, both are clear that “all Debtors shall continue to exist as separate legal entities.”
See Joint App., Ex. 10 § 2.2 (Main Plan); Joint App., Ex. 21 § 5.01 (JV Plan); Joint App., Ex. 11
(Adelphia Corporate Organization Chart). Accordingly, to the extent Plaintiffs seek to assert
claims on behalf of Parnassos’ creditors, they must show that those creditors — not some other,
amorphous “Adelphia” creditors — suffered an injury that the lawsuit can redress. Where, as
here, they cannot, they do not have standing to maintain their claims.
c. The operation of section of the Bankruptcy Code reaffirms
that Plaintiffs do not have standing to bring the Parnassos
preference claim because the requested relief will not redress
Parnassos’ creditors’ injuries.
If Plaintiffs somehow win their preference action against the Parnassos Non-Agent
Lenders, they will have the right to recover from the Parnassos Non-Agent Lenders any amounts
that Parnassos paid them during the 90 days before its bankruptcy filing. That right, however,
does not exist in a vacuum. Instead, if Plaintiffs obtain a preference recovery from the Parnassos
Non-Agent Lenders, section 502(h) of the Bankruptcy Code will allow the Parnassos Non-Agent
Lenders to assert their own corresponding claims against Parnassos’ estate for the amount
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Plaintiffs recover.23 Fleet Nat’l Bank v. Gray (In re Bankvest Capital Corp.), 375 F.3d 51, 69
(1st Cir. 2004) (“The trustee’s recovery of the transfer restores the original claim, with the
transferee’s status becoming that of the holder of a prepetition claim existing at the time of the
filing of the debtor’s petition.”).
With these corresponding 502(h) claims, the Parnassos Non-Agent Lenders will be
entitled to payment from Parnassos’ estate in an amount equal to Plaintiffs’ recovery in this
lawsuit. As already discussed, Parnassos has satisfied each and every one of its creditors. With
no existing creditors to satisfy — and given the Bankruptcy Code’s strict rule that debtors must
pay creditors before equity holders — the Parnassos Non-Agent Lenders’ 502(h) claims will be
the first (and only) claims in line for payment from the proceeds of the Plaintiffs’ recovery from
the Parnassos Non-Agent Lenders. Simply put, Plaintiffs will have to use their recovery from
the Parnassos Non-Agent Lenders to satisfy the Parnassos Non-Agent Lenders’ resulting 502(h)
claims.
Thus, Plaintiffs’ pursuit of its preference claim against the Parnassos Non-Agent Lenders
is pointless. In re Bankvest Capital Corp., 375 F.3d at 71 (holding avoidance actions are
“pointless” where a creditor “would be entitled to receive exactly what it would be forced to
return through avoidance” pursuant to section 502(h)). After spending what will undoubtedly be
a significant amount of time and money pursuing this action (particularly given the sheer number
of defendants they have elected to pursue), even if Plaintiffs win, they will never be entitled to
any affirmative recovery. There is no reason for Plaintiffs to waste the estate’s assets or, for that
matter, the Parnassos Non-Agent Lenders’ money, on this senseless, circular endeavor. The
Court should dismiss the preference claim against the Parnassos Non-Agent Lenders.
23 Pursuant to Section 502(h) of the Bankruptcy Code, “[a] claim arising from the recovery of property under
section 522, 550, or 553 of this title shall be determined, and shall be allowed under subsection (a), (b), or (c) of this
section, or disallowed under subsection (d) or (e) of this section, the same as if such claim had arisen before the date
of the filing of the petition.” 11 U.S.C. § 502(h).
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CONCLUSION
For the foregoing reasons, the Parnassos Non-Agent Lenders respectfully request that the
Court strike Count 33 and dismiss, without leave to amend, Count 44 of Plaintiffs’ Amended
Complaint as to the Parnassos Non-Agent Lenders.
Dated: December 21, 2007
/s/ Richard L. Wynne
KIRKLAND & ELLIS LLP
Citigroup Center
153 East 53rd Street
New York, New York 10022-4675
Richard L. Wynne (RW 5630)
Bennett L. Spiegel (BS 7153)
-and-
777 South Figueroa Street
Los Angeles, California 90017
Telephone: (213) 680-8400
Facsimile: (213) 680-8500
Melissa D. Ingalls (admitted pro hac vice)
Erin Brady (pro hac vice motion pending)
Laura Thomas (admitted pro hac vice)
Attorneys for The Non-Agent Lenders
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