KIRKLAND & ELLIS LLP
Citigroup Center
153 East 53rd Street
New York, New York 10022-4675
Richard L. Wynne (RW 5630)
Bennett L. Spiegel (BS 7153)
-and-
777 South Figueroa Street
Los Angeles, California 90017
Telephone: (213) 680-8400
Facsimile: (213) 680-8500
Melissa D. Ingalls (admitted pro hac vice)
Erin Brady (pro hac vice motion pending)
Laura A. Thomas (admitted pro hac vice)
Attorneys for The Non-Agent Lenders
UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
SOUTHERN DISTRICT OF NEW YORK
ADELPHIA RECOVERY TRUST,
Plaintiff,
v.
BANK OF AMERICA, N.A., et al.,
Defendants.
No. 05-CV-9050 (LMM)
THE CCH NON-AGENT LENDERS’ MEMORANDUM OF LAW
IN SUPPORT OF THEIR MOTION TO DISMISS COUNTS 5, 6, 7, 8, 33, 41, AND 50
OF PLAINTIFFS’1 AMENDED COMPLAINT
(Non-Agent Lenders’ Motion to Dismiss No. 1 of 6)
1 The Adelphia Recovery Trust (the “ART”) represents the separate and unique interests of more than 250
individual Adelphia entities in this litigation. Because these entities’ interests in this lawsuit are, indeed, separate —
and not consolidated — the CCH Non-Agent Lenders refer to the ART as “Plaintiffs” rather than “Plaintiff”
throughout this Motion.
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TABLE OF CONTENTS
Page(s)
INTRODUCTION ...........................................................................................................................1
I. BACKGROUND FACTS........................................................................................5
A. The CCH Credit Facility And Indemnity Provisions...................................5
B. The CCH Debtors’ Confirmed Plan Of Reorganization And
Indemnity Provisions ...................................................................................7
C. The Amended Complaint And Absence of Any Alleged
Wrongdoing By The CCH Non-Agent Lenders ........................................10
1. Plaintiffs’ conflicting and confusing “definitions” help
demonstrate the absence of factual allegations of “bad acts”
against the CCH Non-Agent Lenders. ...........................................11
2. Plaintiffs’ allegations regarding the CCH Credit Facility
also reveal that the CCH Non-Agent Lenders played no
role in the wrongdoing at Adelphia. ..............................................12
D. Allegations Regarding The Rigases’ Use Of The Cash
Management System Also Do Not Involve The CCH Non-Agent
Lenders.......................................................................................................18
II. LEGAL STANDARDS FOR ASSESSING THE CCH NON-AGENT
LENDERS’ MOTION TO DISMISS ....................................................................19
III. PURSUANT TO THE PLAN AND CONFIRMATION ORDER, THIS
COURT MUST DISMISS ALL COUNTS AGAINST THE CCH NON-
AGENT LENDERS BECAUSE ALL CLAIMS WOULD BE
INDEMNIFIED UNDER THE CCH CREDIT AGREEMENT. ..........................20
A. In Both The CCH Credit Agreement And Again In The Confirmed
Plan, Plaintiffs Agreed To Indemnify The CCH Non-Agent
Lenders For The Claims Asserted In The Amended Complaint................22
B. Because None Of Plaintiffs’ Theories Of The Rigases’ Fraud
Requires Or Alleges That The Non-Agent Lenders Acted With
Gross Negligence Or Willful Misconduct, There Is No Exception
To Plaintiffs’ Indemnity Obligations To The Non-Agent Lenders. ..........23
1. Plaintiffs make no factual allegations that the CCH Non-
Agent Lenders assisted in the creation of the CMS or knew
that the Rigases misappropriated money through the CMS...........23
2. Plaintiffs make no factual allegations that the CCH Non-
Agent Lenders created the CCH Credit Facility, or knew of
the alleged deception of the Independent Directors.......................24
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C. None Of The Individual Claims Against The CCH Non-Agent
Lenders Contains Allegations Of Gross Negligence Or Willful
Misconduct That Could Excuse Plaintiffs’ Indemnity Obligations...........25
D. Plaintiffs’ Anticipated Reliance On The Enron “Tainted Claim”
Theory Does Not Relieve The CCH Debtors Of Their Indemnity
Obligations.................................................................................................28
IV. THE BANKRUPTCY CLAIMS AGAINST THE CCH NON-AGENT
LENDERS MUST BE DISMISSED BECAUSE THE CCH DEBTORS
DO NOT HAVE STANDING TO BRING THEM...............................................30
A. The CCH Debtors Do Not Have Standing To Pursue The
Bankruptcy Claims.....................................................................................30
1. Plaintiffs do not have standing to prosecute their
bankruptcy claims because none of the CCH Debtors’
creditors suffered a “personal injury.” ...........................................32
a. None of the CCH Debtors’ creditors were injured
on account of the allegations Plaintiffs make in their
Amended Complaint. .........................................................32
b. Plaintiffs cannot manufacture creditors to establish
standing. .............................................................................35
2. Plaintiffs do not have standing to prosecute the CCH
Debtors’ bankruptcy claims because the requested relief
cannot redress the CCH Debtors’ creditors’ injuries. ....................37
a. Where creditors of the CCH Debtors have no
interest in the recovery from this lawsuit, Plaintiffs
cannot pursue bankruptcy claims on their behalf. .............37
b. The fact that the CCH Debtors themselves could
benefit from avoidance of their obligations under
the CCH Credit Facility does not invest Plaintiffs
with standing......................................................................37
i. Plaintiffs cannot avoid the CCH Debtors’
contractual obligations so as to redress
injuries that the CCH Debtors — as opposed
to their creditors — suffered. .................................37
ii. In fact, if there are no creditors to benefit
from avoidance of a contractual obligation,
the Court must enforce the contract or
transfer at issue. .....................................................39
c. The fact that affiliated debtor entities — and their
creditors — could benefit from avoidance of the
CCH Debtors’ obligations under the CCH Credit
Facility does not invest Plaintiffs with standing. ...............39
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d. The operation of section 502(h) of the Bankruptcy
Code reaffirms that the Plaintiffs do not have
standing to bring their avoidance claims because the
requested relief will not redress the CCH Debtors’
creditors injuries.................................................................41
e. Even if Plaintiffs succeed on their equitable
subordination claims, their success will not redress
any creditor injury..............................................................42
B. The Bankruptcy Code Does Not Provide An Exception To The
Standing Requirements ..............................................................................43
V. THE COURT SHOULD DISMISS PLAINTIFFS’ EQUITABLE
SUBORDINATION AND EQUITABLE DISALLOWANCE CLAIMS
BECAUSE PLAINTIFFS FAIL TO STATE A CLAIM UPON WHICH
RELIEF CAN BE GRANTED ..............................................................................48
A. Plaintiffs Equitable Subordination Claims Against The Non-Agent
Lenders Must Be Dismissed. .....................................................................48
1. The Amended Complaint fails to allege plausible liability
for equitable subordination because Plaintiffs’ allegations
make clear that the necessary vehicle for the alleged fraud
was the Rigas and Adelphia established CMS, not the co-
borrowing facilities. .......................................................................50
2. The Amended Complaint fails to allege plausible liability
for the equitable subordination of the CCH Non-Agent
Lenders’ claims because Plaintiffs make no factual
allegations of gross and egregious conduct on the part of
the CCH Non Agent Lenders.........................................................51
B. Plaintiffs’ Equitable Disallowance Claims Against The Non-Agent
Lenders Must Also Be Dismissed..............................................................54
CONCLUSION..............................................................................................................................56
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TABLE OF AUTHORITIES
Page(s)
Cases
718 Arch Street Assocs. v. Blatstein (In re Blastein),
260 B.R. 698 (E.D. Pa. 2001) ........................................................................................... 32
80 Nassau Assoc. v. Crossland Fed. Sav. Bank,
169 B.R. 832 (Bankr. S.D.N.Y. 1994).............................................................................. 48
Adelphia Commc’ns Corp. v. Bank of Am., N.A. (In re Adelphia Commc’ns Corp.),
365 B.R. 24 (Bankr. S.D.N.Y. 2007)............................................................................ 5, 48
Allen v. Wright,
468 U.S. 737 (1984).......................................................................................................... 30
Am. Nat’l Bank of Austin v. Mortgage Am. Corp (In re Mortgage Am. Corp.),
714 F.2d 1266 (5th Cir. 1983) .......................................................................................... 33
Associated Gen’l Contractors of Cal. Inc. v. Carpenters,
459 U.S. 519 (1983).......................................................................................................... 19
Balaber-Strauss v. Town of Harrison (In re Murphy),
331 B.R. 107 (Bankr. S.D.N.Y. 2005)............................................................ 32, 33, 38, 39
Bartang Bank and Trust Co. v. Caiola,
No. 04 Civ. 2402, 2006 WL 2708453 (S.D.N.Y. Sept. 18, 2006) .................................... 20
Bear, Stearns Sec. Corp. v. Gredd,
275 B.R. 190 (S.D.N.Y. 2002)........................................................................ 32, 33, 34, 38
Bell Atl. Corp. v. Twombly,
127 S. Ct. 1955 (2007)................................................................................................ 19, 49
Bennett v. Spear,
520 U.S. 154 (1997).......................................................................................................... 47
Bondi v. Bank of Am. Corp. (In re Parmalat),
383 F. Supp. 2d 587 (S.D.N.Y. 2005)............................................................................... 33
Buttes Gas & Oil Co. v. Cal. Reg’l Water Quality Control Bd.,
182 B.R. 493 (Bankr. S.D. Tex. 1994) ............................................................................... 7
City Nat. Bank & Trust Co. v. Oliver,
230 F.2d 686 (10th Cir. 1956) .......................................................................................... 46
Coated Sales, Inc. v. First E. Bank, N.A. (In re Coated Sales, Inc.),
119 B.R. 452, (Bankr. S.D.N.Y. 1990)............................................................................. 27
Cohen v. KB Mezzanine Fund II., LP,
291 B.R. 314 (D. Del. 2003)............................................................................................. 49
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Coleman v. Comm. Trust Bank (In re Coleman),
426 F.3d 719 (4th Cir. 2005) ..................................................................................... passim
Colotone Liquidating Trust v. Bankers Trust N.Y. Corp.,
243 B.R. 620 (S.D.N.Y. 2000)............................................................................................ 7
Consol. Pet Foods, Inc. v. Millard Refrigerated Servs., Inc. (In re S&D Foods, Inc.),
110 B.R. 36 (Bankr. D. Colo. 1990) ........................................................................... 40, 43
Corporate Food Mgt., Inc. v. Suffolk Cmty. College,
223 B.R. 635 (Bankr. E.D.N.Y. 1998)................................................................................ 7
Cortec Indus., Inc. v. Sum Holding, L.P.,
949 F.2d 42 (2d Cir. 1991).................................................................................................. 5
DaimlerChrysler Corp. v. Cuno,
126 S. Ct. 1854 (2006).......................................................................................... 30, 31, 32
Daventree Ltd. v. Republic of Azerbaijan,
349 F. Supp. 2d 736 (S.D.N.Y. 2004)............................................................................... 53
DeJesus v. Sears, Roebuck & Co., Inc.,
87 F.3d 65 (2d Cir. 1996) ........................................................................................... 19, 53
Dewsnup v. Timm,
502 U.S. 410 (1992).......................................................................................................... 46
Dura Pharm., Inc. v. Broudo,
544 U.S. 336 (2005).......................................................................................................... 19
Eaves v. Snyder,
84 A.2d 195, 197 (Pa. 1951) ....................................................................................... 38, 40
Enron Corp. v. Ave. Special Situations Fund II, L.P.,
333 B.R. 205 (Bankr. S.D.N.Y. 2005)........................................................................ 28, 29
Esoimeme v. United Airlines, Inc.,
369 B.R. 531 (N.D. Cal. 2007) ........................................................................................... 7
F.D.I.C. v. Colonial Realty Co.,
966 F.2d 57 (2d Cir. 1992).................................................................................................. 8
Fleet Nat’l Bank v. Gray (In re Bankvest Capital Corp.),
375 F.3d 51, 62 (1st Cir. 2004)......................................................................................... 42
Fragoso v. Romano,
702 N.Y.S.2d 333 (App. Div. 2000) ................................................................................. 26
Global Entm’t Inc. v. N.Y. Tel. Co.,
No. 00 Civ. 2959, 2000 WL 1672327 (S.D.N.Y. Nov. 6, 2000) ...................................... 53
Hartford Ins. Co. v. Holmes Prot. Group,
673 N.Y.S.2d 132 (App. Div. 1998) ................................................................................. 22
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Hawkins Home Groups, Inc. v. S. Energy Homes, Inc.,
714 N.Y.S.2d 539 (App. Div. 2000) ........................................................................... 20, 28
Holt v. Fed. Deposit Ins. Corp.,
868 F.2d 146 (5th Cir.1989) ............................................................................................. 49
In re Adelphia Commc’ns Corp. Sec. and Derivative Litig.,
No. 03 MD 1529, 2007 WL 2615928 (S.D.N.Y. Sept. 10, 2007) .................................... 19
In re Adelphia Commc’ns Corp.,
368 B.R. 140 (Bankr. S.D.N.Y. 2007).............................................................................. 31
In re Asia Global Crossing, Ltd.,
344 B.R. 247 (Bankr. S.D.N.Y. 2006).............................................................................. 38
In re Bd. of Dirs. of Hopewell Int’l Ins. Ltd.,
238 B.R. 25 (Bankr. S.D.N.Y. 1999).......................................................................... 38, 40
In re Best Prods. Co.,
168 B.R. 35 (Bankr. S.D.N.Y. 1994)................................................................................ 38
In re Crowthers McCall Pattern, Inc.,
120 B.R. 279 (Bankr. S.D.N.Y. 1990).............................................................................. 33
In re Forte,
234 B.R. 607 (Bankr. E.D.N.Y. 1999)................................................................................ 7
In re Glanz,
205 B.R. 750 (Bankr. D. Md. 1997) ................................................................................. 43
In re Gurley,
311 B.R. 910 (Bankr. M.D. Fla. 2001) ............................................................................. 41
In re J.C. Winship Co.,
120 F. 93 (7th Cir. 1903) .................................................................................................. 45
In re Martin Custom Made Tires Corp.,
108 F.2d 172 (2d Cir. 1939).............................................................................................. 45
In re Oceana Int’l, Inc.,
376 F. Supp. 956 (D.C.N.Y. 1974) ................................................................................... 36
In re Parkwood, Inc.,
461 F.2d 158 (D.C. Cir. 1971) .......................................................................................... 46
Le Cafe Creme, Ltd. v. Le Roux,
244 B.R. 221 (Bankr. S.D.N.Y. 2000).............................................................................. 48
Matter of Schwab,
613 F.2d 1279 (5th Cir. 1980) .......................................................................................... 46
Maung Ng We v. Merrill Lynch & Co., Inc.,
No. 99 Civ. 9687, 2000 WL 1159835 (S.D.N.Y. Aug. 15, 2000) .................................... 53
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Metro. Life Ins. Co. v. Noble Lowndes Int’l, Inc.,
600 N.Y.S.2d 212 (App. Div. 1993) ................................................................................ 22
Mills v. Polar Molecular Corp.,
12 F.3d 1170 (2d Cir. 1993).............................................................................................. 19
Moore v. Bay,
284 U.S. 4 (1931).............................................................................................................. 45
Nazarenus v. J.F. Daley Int’l, Ltd.,
714 F. Supp. 361 (N.D. Ill. 1989) ..................................................................................... 15
Official Comm. of Asbestos Claimants of G-I Holding, Inc. v. Heyman,
277 B.R. 20 (S.D.N.Y. 2002)...................................................................................... 34, 37
Official Comm. of Unsec. Creditors of Enron Corp. v. Martin (In re Enron Creditors
Recovery Corp.),
376 B.R. 442 (Bankr. S.D.N.Y. 2007).............................................................................. 41
Official Comm. of Unsec. Creds. of Lois/USA, Inc., v. Conseco Fin. Serv. Crop.,
264 B.R. 69 (Bankr. S.D.N.Y. 2001)................................................................................ 48
Official Comm. of Unsec. Creds. of Radnor Holdings Corp. v. Tennenbaum Capital
Partners, LLC,
353 B.R. 820 (Bankr. D. Del. 2006) ................................................................................. 49
Official Comm. of Unsec. Creds. of Sunbeam Corp. v. Morgan Stanley & Co. (In re
Sunbeam Corp.),
284 B.R. 355 (Bankr. S.D.N.Y. 2002)........................................................................ 48, 49
Official Comm. of Unsecured Creditors of AppliedTheory Corp. v. Halifax Fund, L.P. (In
re AppliedTheory Corp),
345 B.R. 56 (S.D.N.Y. 2006), aff’d, 493 F.3d 82 (2d Cir. 2007) ..................................... 33
Olin Corp. v. Consol. Aluminum Corp.,
5 F.3d 10 (2d Cir. 1993).................................................................................................... 20
Oppenheimer & Co. v. Oppenheim, Appel, Dixon & Co.,
86 N.Y.2d 685 (1995) ....................................................................................................... 20
Peak v. United States,
353 U.S. 43 (1957)............................................................................................................ 15
People v. Williams,
668 N.Y.S.2d 305 (Sup. Ct. 1997).................................................................................... 21
Pepper v. Litton,
308 U.S. 295 (1939).............................................................................................. 33, 54, 55
Raines v. Byrd,
521 U.S. 811 (1997).......................................................................................................... 30
Raleigh v. Illinois Dept. of Revenue,
530 U.S. 15 (2000)............................................................................................................ 33
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Rent Stabilization Ass’n of N.Y. v. Dinkins,
5 F.3d 591 (2d Cir. 1993) ................................................................................................. 19
Rodriguez v. Citibank F.S.B. (In re Nowicki),
202 B.R. 729 (Bankr. N.D. III. 1996) ............................................................................... 33
Rosenberg v. XO Commc’ns, Inc.,
330 B.R. 394 (Bankr. S.D.N.Y. 2005)................................................................................ 7
Sharrer v. Sandles,
477 N.Y.S.2d 897 (App. Div. 1984) ................................................................................. 39
Siler v. N. Trust Co.,
80 F. Supp. 2d 906 (N.D. Ill. 2000) .................................................................................. 20
Simon v. E. Ky. Welfare Rights Org.,
426 U.S. 26 (1976)............................................................................................................ 30
Southgate Owners Corp. v. Pub. Serv. Mut. Ins. Co.,
660 N.Y.S.2d 129 (App. Div. 1997) ................................................................................. 20
Springfield Assocs., L.L.C. v. Enron Corp.,
Nos. 06 Civ. 7828, 07 Civ. 1957, 2007 WL 2446498 (S.D.N.Y. Aug. 27, 2007) 28, 29, 30
State v. Barclays Bank of New York, N.A.,
563 N.E.2d 11 (N.Y. 1990)............................................................................................... 20
Stewart v. Kearney,
6 Watts 453 (Pa. 1837)...................................................................................................... 38
Thompson v. County of Franklin,
15 F.3d 245 (2d Cir. 1994).......................................................................................... 19, 20
Union Sav. Bank v. Augie/Restivo Baking Co., Ltd.,
860 F.2d 515 (2d Cir. 1988)............................................................................................. 35
United Capital Corp. v. Sapolin Paints, Inc.,
11 B.R. 930 (Bankr. E.D.N.Y. 1981)................................................................................ 40
Vintero Corp. v. Corporacion Venezolana de Fomento,
735 F.2d 740 (2d Cir. 1984).................................................................................. 34, 39, 45
Warth v. Seldin,
422 U.S. 490 (1975).......................................................................................................... 40
Waslow v. MNC Commercial Corp.
161 B.R. 107 (E.D.Pa.1993) ............................................................................................. 49
Whiteford Plastics Co. v. Chase Nat’l Bank of N.Y. City,
179 F.2d 582 (2d Cir. 1950)................................................................................. 34, 37, 45
Statutes
11 U.S.C. § 101(31) ...................................................................................................................... 55
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11 U.S.C. § 502(d) ........................................................................................................................ 29
11 U.S.C. § 502(h) ........................................................................................................................ 41
11 U.S.C. § 510(c) .................................................................................................................. 26, 40
11 U.S.C. § 544(b)(1) ................................................................................................................... 44
11 U.S.C. § 547(b) ........................................................................................................................ 26
11 U.S.C. § 547(b)(5) ................................................................................................................... 34
11 U.S.C. § 548(a)(1)(A). ............................................................................................................. 26
11 U.S.C. § 548(a)(1)(B) .............................................................................................................. 26
11 U.S.C. § 550(a) ........................................................................................................................ 44
28 U.S.C. § 2201........................................................................................................................... 26
Rules
5 Lawrence King, Collier on Bankruptcy ¶ 544.09 (15th ed. rev. 1999) ..................................... 34
Dan Schechter, Debtor May Completely Avoid Lien As Fraudulent Transfer Based on
Debtor’s Own Fraudulent Intent, and Bankruptcy Court Cannot Limit Scope of
Debtor’s Recovery, 2005 Comm. Fin. News. 84, 84 (2005) ............................................ 47
Ralph Brubaker, Lien Avoidance “for the Benefit of the Estate”: Textualism, Equitable
Powers, and Code Common Law,
26 No. 1 Bankruptcy Law Letter (2006)........................................................................... 46
William L. Prosser, Torts § 34 (4th ed. 1971) .............................................................................. 22
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INTRODUCTION
This Court should dismiss all claims against the CCH Non-Agent Lenders,2 who had no
role in negotiating or establishing the CCH Credit Facility or in the alleged misconduct that is
central to the Amended Complaint, for at least two reasons. First, the indemnification
provisions incorporated into the now final Adelphia Plan of Reorganization require dismissal
unless the individual CCH Non-Agent Lenders acted with gross negligence or willful
misconduct. Plaintiffs, however, never allege that the CCH Non-Agent Lenders engaged in such
“bad” acts, so there is no exception to the indemnity obligations that require dismissal of all
claims. Second, Plaintiffs do not have standing to bring the “bankruptcy claims” (such as
fraudulent transfer, preference, equitable subordination, and equitable disallowance) because
such claims require the existence of unpaid creditors who would benefit from a recovery in this
lawsuit, and each individual Adelphia corporate debtor that might have otherwise asserted such
bankruptcy claims against the CCH Non-Agent Lenders has paid all of its creditors in full.
Dismissal Based on Indemnity: The Plan’s indemnification provisions — which
expressly adopt as new the lender-indemnity provisions contained in the CCH Credit Agreement
— bar Plaintiffs from pursuing their claims against the CCH Non-Agent Lenders. Specifically,
the Plan requires this Court to dismiss against a CCH Non-Agent Lender any and all claims that
would have been indemnifiable under the CCH Credit Agreement. The CCH Credit Agreement,
in turn, requires the CCH Debtors to indemnify their lenders against all claims involving the
CCH Credit Facility, provided that those claims do not arise from the lenders’ individual gross
negligence or willful misconduct. While the Amended Complaint contains allegations of
2 For purposes of this brief, the Non-Agent Lenders or CCH Non-Agent Lenders movants are those defendants
represented by Kirkland & Ellis LLP and sued in their capacity as “Syndicate Banks” or “Assignees” in relation to
the CCH Credit Facility. To the extent that any Kirkland & Ellis LLP represented defendant is alleged to be a “John
Doe” lender in the CCH Credit Facility, that defendant is also a moving party here. A list of Kirkland & Ellis LLP
represented defendants in all credit facilities appears as Exhibit 22 to the Request for Judicial Notice and Joint
Appendix of Exhibits, filed concurrently. Kirkland & Ellis LLP represents approximately 400 Non-Agent Lenders
across all six credit facilities, who received payments of approximately $4.1 billion in relation to the Adelphia debt
paper.
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wrongdoing as to the Agent Banks and Investment Banks, it contains no such allegations against
the CCH Non-Agent Lenders. Absent factual allegations that the CCH Non-Agent Lenders
engaged in specific acts of gross negligence or willful misconduct, the Plan’s indemnity
obligation must be enforced. Accordingly, the Plan requires this Court to dismiss the Amended
Complaint as to the CCH Non-Agent Lenders.
With no specific factual allegations against the CCH Non-Agent Lenders, Plaintiffs
instead try to tie the CCH Non-Agent Lenders to the alleged “bad acts” or fraudulent conduct of
other defendants by employing a “slide” tactic. For example, Plaintiffs first allege some specific
fact against the Agent and/or Investment Banks having to do with the Rigas Family’s activities in
defrauding Adelphia, or a supposition of knowledge of the same. Then, through the misleading
use of overbroad and inexact definitions, other lenders (“Syndicate” Lenders or “Assignee”
Lenders) are swept into a definition of a larger group such as “CCH Lenders” or “Co-Borrowing
Lenders” or just “Lenders.” Finally, Plaintiffs make a summary allegation, with no new
supporting or specific facts, that “slides” the bad acts specifically alleged against the Agent
Banks and/or Investment Banks onto “all Banks” or “all Lenders.” In reality, there is not a
single factual allegation that the CCH Non-Agent Lenders knew or could have known anything
not also known to Adelphia and its independent directors, nor is there a single factual allegation
that the CCH Non-Agent Lenders were involved in or participated in the alleged fraud. In short,
because Plaintiffs do not allege gross negligence or willful misconduct on the part of any of the
CCH Non-Agent Lenders, the Plan’s indemnity provisions mandate dismissal of all claims
against the CCH Non-Agent Lenders.
Dismissal Based on Lack of Standing: To establish standing, Plaintiffs must be able to
show that the CCH Non-Agent Lenders (either by wrongful acts or receipt of preferential or
fraudulent transfers) injured at least one bona-fide creditor of a CCH Debtor, and that this
lawsuit can redress that injury. Plaintiffs cannot do that. First, no bona-fide creditor of a CCH
Debtor was injured on account of the allegations in the Amended Complaint. Rather, the CCH
Debtors have paid (or have reserved amounts sufficient to pay) all of their bona-fide creditors in
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full. Second, even if the CCH Debtors had not paid their creditors in full, this lawsuit would do
nothing to redress any injury their creditors may have suffered as a result. The Plan provides that
only holders of so-called “CVV Interests,” interests that the Plan distributed to certain creditor
groups, have a right to share in any recovery Plaintiffs receive from this action. The CCH
Debtors and their creditors do not hold any “CVV Interests.” Thus, even if Plaintiffs prevailed
on the substance of the alleged bankruptcy claims, the creditors of the CCH Debtors — the real
parties in interest whose injuries must be redressed — will receive nothing. Accordingly,
Plaintiffs do not have standing to assert the bankruptcy claims, and those claims must therefore
be dismissed.
In an attempt to avoid this fatal standing defect, the Amended Complaint is drafted to
create an illusion in which the legally separate and distinct Adelphia operating subsidiaries that
issued the CCH Credit Facility’s secured debt are miraculously transformed and combined with
all of the other separate and distinct Adelphia Debtor entities into one giant, rolled up
agglomerated entity called “Adelphia.” While such an agglomeration is possible under certain
rare circumstances through a legal process called “substantive consolidation” — where the assets
and debts of multiple entities in related bankruptcies may be pooled and distributed — none of
the more than 250 separate Adelphia-related entities sought substantive consolidation in the
bankruptcy case. Indeed, the Plan — which is the final word in the Adelphia bankruptcy cases
— specifically provides that each Adelphia entity will remain a separate legal entity. With that
Plan now substantially consummated, it is too late for Plaintiffs or any individual Adelphia entity
to seek substantive consolidation.
Notwithstanding this, the Amended Complaint tries to create the illusion of substantive
consolidation with wordsmithing, combining all of the legally separate and distinct operating
subsidiaries, along with their parent, sister, brother, aunt, uncle and grandparent corporations,
into an agglomerated “Adelphia.” This “pseudo” substantive consolidation is a fundamentally
flawed predicate to the Amended Complaint, by which the ART, as the holder of the claims of
remote shareholders of shareholders of CCH Debtors, seeks to assert the bankruptcy claims.
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Absent a bona fide creditor of the CCH Debtors whose claims have not been paid in full
(i.e. who suffered an injury) and who would actually benefit from this action (i.e. whose injury
would actually be redressed), there is no party with standing to assert the bankruptcy claims. No
such creditor exists. As such, the bankruptcy claims against the CCH Non-Agent Lenders must
be dismissed.
Other Grounds for Dismissal: There are at least two more reasons for this Court to
dismiss the Amended Complaint as to the CCH Non-Agent Lenders. First, Plaintiffs have not
alleged adequate facts to sustain their claim for equitable subordination against the CCH Non-
Agent Lenders. To state such a claim against the CCH Non-Agent Lenders — who are not
alleged to be insiders or fiduciaries — Plaintiffs must allege facts that the CCH Non-Agent
Lenders engaged in gross and egregious conduct that is tantamount to fraud, misrepresentation,
overreaching, spoliation or conduct involving moral turpitude. As Plaintiffs fail to allege even
one bad act against the CCH Non-Agent Lenders, Plaintiffs fall woefully short of this
requirement, and the equitable subordination claim should be dismissed on this separate and
independent ground.
Finally, Plaintiffs have not stated a claim for equitable disallowance against the CCH
Non-Agent Lenders. As an initial matter, no cause of action for equitable disallowance exists.
Moreover, even if this Court were to find that such a cause of action exists, equitable
disallowance is a far more severe sanction than equitable subordination, and when applied (in the
rare case) historically, was generally reserved only for insider misconduct. Plaintiffs, who fail to
plead facts sufficient to state an equitable subordination claim, also fail to meet the more
rigorous pleading requirements necessary to state a purported claim for equitable disallowance.
Thus, this Court should also dismiss Plaintiffs’ equitable disallowance claim against the CCH
Non-Agent Lenders.
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I. BACKGROUND FACTS
A. The CCH Credit Facility And Indemnity Provisions
Pursuant to a Credit Agreement dated April 14, 2000 (the “CCH Credit Agreement”), two
Adelphia entities and one Rigas Family Entity (“RFE”) entered into a $2.25 billion Co-
Borrowing Facility with various lenders, comprising a $1.5 billion revolving credit facility, and a
$750 million term loan. Am. Compl. ¶ 879. The CCH Credit Facility lenders later funded an
additional $500 million term loan, bringing the total amount available under the facility to $2.75
billion. See id. The two Adelphia borrowers were CCH Cable Holdings, LLC, and Ft. Meyers
Cablevision, LLC (the “CCH Debtors”), while the one RFE borrower was Highland Prestige (the
“CCH RFE Borrower”) (collectively, the “CCH Borrowers”).3 See id. The CCH Credit
Agreement, along with any related agreements, are referred to as the “CCH Credit Facility.” As
of the Petition Date, approximately $2.5 billion was outstanding under the CCH Credit Facility.
Id. ¶ 923. Of that amount, Plaintiffs allege that the CCH RFE Borrower had drawn down
approximately $1.66 billion. Id. ¶ 979.
As part of the CCH Credit Agreement, the CCH Borrowers agreed that, unless a lender
thereto (including a Non-Agent Lender) acted with gross negligence or intentional misconduct,
the CCH Borrowers would indemnify and defend that lender from and against all claims,
damages, losses, and expenses, arising out of, or in connection with, or by reason of any
investigation, litigation or proceeding related to the CCH Credit Facility. See Joint App., Ex. 1
§ 11.12 (CCH Credit Agreement);4 see also id. § 13.12(b) (extending Lender status under the
3 The CCH Borrowers and their subsidiaries guaranteed payment and performance. Am. Compl. ¶¶ 879-80. In
addition, “other indirect subsidiaries of ACC pledged the stock of their direct subsidiaries to secure repayment under
the CCH Credit Agreement.” Id. ¶ 880.
4 “[O]n a motion to dismiss, a court may consider certain documents in addition to the complaint, including the
contents of any documents attached to the complaint or incorporated by reference[.]” Adelphia Commc’ns Corp. v.
Bank of Am., N.A. (In re Adelphia Commc’ns Corp.), 365 B.R. 24, 34 (Bankr. S.D.N.Y. 2007); see also Cortec
Indus., Inc. v. Sum Holding, L.P., 949 F.2d 42, 47-48 (2d Cir. 1991), cert. denied, 503 U.S. 960 (1992). All Exhibits
referenced herein are attached to the Request for Judicial Notice and Joint Appendix of Exhibits (“Joint App.”), filed
concurrently.
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Agreement to Non-Agent Lenders who purchase the debt in the secondary market). Section
11.12 of the CCH Credit Agreement states, in relevant part:
Each Borrower . . . agrees, jointly and severally, to indemnify and hold
harmless each Agent, Arranger, and each Lender and each of their
respective affiliates and their respective officers, directors, employees,
agents, attorneys, and advisors (each, an “Indemnified Party”) from and
against any and all claims, damages, losses, liabilities, . . . costs, and
expenses (including, without limitation, reasonable attorneys’ fees) that
may be incurred by or asserted or awarded against any Indemnified Party,
in each case arising out of or in connection with or by reason of
(including, without limitation, in connection with any investigation,
litigation, or proceeding or preparation of defense in connection therewith)
the Loan Documents, any of the transactions contemplated herein or the
actual or proposed use of the proceeds of the Borrowings (including any of
the foregoing arising from the negligence of the Indemnified Party),
except to the extent such claim, damage, loss, liability, cost, or expense is
found in a final, non-appealable judgment by a court of competent
jurisdiction to have resulted from such Indemnified Party’s gross
negligence or willful misconduct.
Id. 1 § 11.12 (emphasis added).
The CCH Borrowers also agreed to the same indemnification obligations for each
purchaser of the CCH debt in the secondary market, upon such purchaser’s execution of an
Assignment and Acceptance agreement like the one attached as Exhibit F to the CCH Credit
Agreement. Section 13.12(b) states, in relevant part, “[u]pon execution, delivery, acceptance,
and recordation of such Assignment and Acceptance Agreement, the assignee thereunder shall be
a party hereto and, to the extent of such assignment, have the obligations, Rights, and benefits of
a Lender under the Loan Documents. . . .” Id. § 13.12(b). All indemnity rights that the CCH
Borrower owed to the individual Lenders, including those who purchased the debt in the
secondary market, survive any assignment and termination of the CCH Credit Agreement.
See id. § 13.5.
While the CCH Credit Agreement affirmatively creates an indemnity relationship
between the CCH Borrowers and the Lenders to the CCH Facility, it expressly denies the
creation of any fiduciary relationship between the Non-Agent Lenders and the Agents. See id.
§ 12.5(a) (stating that no Agent has a fiduciary relationship with any Lender); see also id.
§ 12.1(c) (stating that the Administrative Agent has no fiduciary duty to the CCH Borrowers or
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the Lenders). In fact, the CCH Credit Agreement specifically provides that no Agent or Lender
shall incur any liability to any other Person for any act or omission of any other Lender or Agent.
Id. § 12.7.
B. The CCH Debtors’ Confirmed Plan Of Reorganization And Indemnity
Provisions
The CCH Debtors filed voluntary Chapter 11 bankruptcy cases in the Southern District of
New York on June 25, 2002. Am. Compl. ¶ 1067. The Bankruptcy Court jointly administered
the CCH Debtors’ bankruptcy cases with those of other Adelphia entities, who had also filed for
bankruptcy. See Joint App., Ex. 7 (Joint Administration Order).
After years of failed plan proposals, the CCH Debtors and other Adelphia affiliates
agreed upon the terms of a joint plan of reorganization embodied in the First Modified Fifth
Amended Joint Chapter 11 Plan for Adelphia Communications Corporation and Certain of its
Affiliated Debtors (the “Plan”), which Plan the Bankruptcy Court confirmed in January 2007.5
See Joint App., Ex. 8 at DSS2-6 (Second Disclosure Statement Supplement) (recounting history
of the negotiations); see also Joint App., Ex. 9 (Confirmation Order). The Plan effectuates a
release between and among all Adelphia entities (including the CCH Debtors) of any and all
intercompany claims they may have held against one another. See Joint App., Ex. 10 § 2.3
(Plan). It also called for the creation of a Contingent Value Vehicle (the “CVV”), from which
certain Adelphia creditor groups could receive distributions if, among other things, the claims
5 Courts routinely take judicial notice of bankruptcy court dockets, and pleadings filed therein, including plans of
reorganization. See, e.g., Esoimeme v. United Airlines, Inc., 369 B.R. 531, 533 n. 2 (N.D. Cal. 2007) (taking judicial
notice of the bankruptcy petition and various bankruptcy court orders); Colotone Liquidating Trust v. Bankers Trust
N.Y. Corp., 243 B.R. 620, 622 n.2 (S.D.N.Y. 2000) (taking judicial notice of the confirmation order, plan of
reorganization and the related trust instrument); Rosenberg v. XO Commc’ns, Inc. (In re XO Commc’ns, Inc.), 330
B.R. 394, 418 (Bankr. S.D.N.Y. 2005) (taking judicial notice of the debtor’s disclosure statement); In re Forte, 234
B.R. 607, 613 n.11 (Bankr. E.D.N.Y. 1999) (taking judicial notice of the schedules to determine who owned the
relevant property); Corporate Food Mgt., Inc. v. Suffolk Cmty. College (In re Corporate Food Mgt., Inc.), 223 B.R.
635, 646 (Bankr. E.D.N.Y. 1998) (taking judicial notice of the Debtor’s bankruptcy schedules and concluding
therefrom that the unsecured creditors “would have received less than a one hundred percent distribution at the time
the Debtor converted the involuntary Chapter 7 bankruptcy proceeding to a case under Chapter 11”); Buttes Gas &
Oil Co. v. Cal. Reg’l Water Quality Control Bd. (In re Buttes Gas & Oil, Co.), 182 B.R. 493, 494 (Bankr. S.D. Tex.
1994) (taking judicial notice of the docket sheet and Bankruptcy Court file, and concluding therefrom that all of the
debtor’s creditors are being paid pursuant to the plan).
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Plaintiffs assert in this lawsuit generate a recovery. See id. § 9. The Plan does not give the CCH
Debtors’ creditors a right to receive any distributions from the CVV. Rather, that right is given
to creditors of the CCH Debtors’ corporate great grandparent and great-great grandparent and
their respective creditors. See Joint App., Ex. 11 (Adelphia Corporate Organization Chart).
Notably, the Plan does not effectuate a merger or so-called “substantive consolidation” of
the Adelphia entities.6 Rather, the Plan provides that each Adelphia entity remains a separate
legal entity and that the estates are not substantively consolidated. See Joint App., Ex. 10 § 2.2
(Plan); see also Joint App., Ex. 11 (Adelphia Corporate Organization Chart). This lawsuit does
not and cannot change that fact. Each of the CCH Debtors is responsible only for satisfying its
own creditors’ claims — no more, no less. See Joint App., Ex. 10 § 2.2 (Plan).
And, in fact, the CCH Debtors have had ample funds to satisfy in full their respective
creditors’ claims. See Joint App., Ex. 12 (Status Report). The following chart summarizes the
Plan’s treatment of the various classes of the CCH Debtors’ creditors (all classified as
“Subsidiary” creditors) and shows that the Debtors have paid all of their creditors in full.
6 Substantive consolidation occurs when the assets and liabilities of two or more distinct, bankruptcy entities are
combined in a single pool and treated as if they belong to one entity. Therefore, substantive consolidation generally
results in the satisfaction of liabilities from the resulting common fund of assets and also the elimination of
intercompany claims between and among the substantively consolidated entities. F.D.I.C. v. Colonial Realty Co.,
966 F.2d 57, 58-59 (2d Cir. 1992).
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Class of Claims
Treatment
Under The Plan Actual Treatment7
Subsidiary Priority Claims
An amount equal to payment in
full, in cash. (Joint App., Ex. 8
at DSS2-26 (Second Disclosure
Statement Supplement); Joint
App., Ex. 10 § 5.2(a) (Plan))
Paid In Full.
Subsidiary Secured Claims
Paid in full, in cash, with
postpetition interest. (Joint
App., Ex. 8 at DSS2-26 - DSS2-
27 (Second Disclosure Statement
Supplement); Joint App., Ex. 10
§ 5.2(b) (Plan))
Paid In Full.
Subsidiary Bank Claims
An amount equal to payment in
full, in cash, with postpetition
interest (but subject to
disgorgement). (Joint App., Ex.
8 at DSS2-26 - DSS2-27
(Second Disclosure Statement
Supplement); Joint App., Ex. 10
§ 5.2(c)(A) (Plan))
Paid In Full.
Subsidiary Trade Claims
An amount equal to payment in
full, in cash or stock in TWC,
with postpetition interest (except
for agreed-upon give ups).
(Joint App., Ex. 8 at DSS2-30
(Second Disclosure Statement
Supplement); Joint App., Ex. 10
§ 5.2(d) (Plan))
Paid In Full.
Subsidiary Other Unsecured
Claims
An amount equal to payment in
full, in cash or stock in TWC,
with postpetition interest (except
for agreed-upon give ups).
(Joint App., Ex. 8 at DSS2-30
(Second Disclosure Statement
Supplement); Joint App., Ex. 10
§ 5.2(e) (Plan))
Paid In Full.
In addition to requiring the CCH Debtors to pay their creditors in full, the Plan also
cancels and extinguishes the CCH Credit Facility as it relates to the CCH Debtors (Joint App.,
Ex. 10 § 8.6(a) (Plan)), with one important caveat. The Plan expressly obligates the CCH
7 See Joint App., Ex. 12 (Status Report).
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Debtors to indemnify each of their Non-Agent Lenders on virtually the same terms as were
contained in the now extinguished CCH Credit Agreement.8 It does this through the definition of
“Dismissed Bank Actions,” which provides in relevant part:
Dismissed Bank Actions means the Bank Actions [which term includes
this litigation] or one or more Claims asserted therein, if any: . . . (ii) with
respect to a particular defendant as to which there is a determination by a
court of competent jurisdiction pursuant to a Final Order that such
defendant as to such Bank Actions, is (or would be, but for any limitation
on indemnification or contribution pursuant to this Plan) entitled to
indemnification or contribution (whether under a Prepetition Credit
Agreement or under another agreement or principle of law), either by a
Debtor or by a Person who is (or would be, but for any limitation on
indemnification or contribution pursuant to the Plan) entitled to
indemnification or contribution by a Debtor, but only to the extent of such
indemnification or contribution. . . .
Id. at A-17 (Plan) (citing Prepetition Credit Agreement indemnification language as the basis for
finding indemnification under the Plan) (emphasis added). The Confirmation Order incorporates
the CCH Debtors and lenders’ agreement regarding Dismissed Bank Actions, stating:
all Dismissed Bank Actions, if any, shall, with respect to the Debtor
Parties only, be dismissed with prejudice and without costs, and the
Debtor Parties shall be deemed to release the Bank Lenders, Investment
Banks and/or other defendants with respect to the Dismissed Bank
Actions, effective as of the Effective Date.
Joint App., Ex. 9 ¶ II (Confirmation Order). Thus, under the Plan and Confirmation Order, each
Non-Agent Lender who participated in the CCH Credit Facility is entitled to dismissal of the
claims alleged against it to the extent the CCH Borrowers would have been required to
indemnify the CCH Non-Agent Lenders under the now extinguished CCH Credit Facility.
C. The Amended Complaint And Absence of Any Alleged Wrongdoing By The
CCH Non-Agent Lenders
Plaintiffs filed their almost 500-page Amended Complaint on October 31, 2007, more
than seven months after the Plan’s effective date. They assert, on the CCH Debtors’ behalf, five
causes of action against the CCH Non-Agent Lenders, including avoidance and subordination
8 The one change in the CCH Debtors’ indemnity obligation under the Plan is that the CCH Non-Agent Lenders
may no longer seek money damages under the indemnification clauses. See Joint App., Ex. 10 § 9.2(b) (Plan).
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claims. See Am. Compl. ¶¶ 1124-1144 (fraudulent conveyance pursuant to federal law), 1145-
1168 (fraudulent conveyance pursuant to state law), 1370-1390 (equitable disallowance or
equitable subordination), 1452-1457 (declaratory judgment), 1514-1519 (preferences). Despite
the length of the Amended Complaint and the more than four years it took to be produced,
Plaintiffs do not allege any facts indicating that the CCH Non-Agent Lenders committed any
“bad acts” that would nullify the indemnity provision set forth in the Plan and the Confirmation
Order. In fact, with the exception of Plaintiffs’ claims for intentional fraudulent conveyance,
equitable subordination and, to the extent it exists, equitable disallowance, the claims Plaintiffs
assert against the CCH Non-Agent Lenders do not require Plaintiffs to plead or prove any such
“bad acts” at all.
1. Plaintiffs’ conflicting and confusing “definitions” help demonstrate
the absence of factual allegations of “bad acts” against the CCH Non-
Agent Lenders.
In the Amended Complaint, Plaintiffs define different “types” of lender defendants that
participated in the credit facilities, including the CCH Credit Facility. For example, Plaintiffs
place all Agents — the Administrative Agent and the Nominal Agents — in one group known as
“Agent Banks,” and define that group as those banks that participated in arranging, structuring
and managing the Co-Borrowing Facilities.9 See Am. Compl. ¶ 24. “Investment Banks” are
defined as each being affiliated with one of the Agent Banks, and which “assisted their affiliate
Agent Banks and the Rigas Family in structuring the Co-Borrowing Facilities and provided
services and advice to Adelphia in connection with a series of debt and equity offerings issued
during the same time period that the Co-Borrowing Facilities were created.” Id. ¶ 25.
When it comes to the Non-Agent Lenders, however, Plaintiffs’ definitions are
inconsistent. For example, Plaintiffs identify two “types” of defendants that would include the
9 Although Plaintiffs’ definition of “Agent Banks” may be concise, it is far from clear. As can be seen from the
plain text of the CCH Credit Agreement, the Administrative Agent had rights and obligations distinct from any other
lender, including the Nominal Agents. Joint App., Ex. 1 § 12 (CCH Credit Agreement).
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Non-Agent Lenders: “Syndicate Banks” and “Assignees.”10 Plaintiffs initially define
“Syndicate Banks” as banks to whom the Co-Borrowing Facilities were syndicated, who agreed
to lend Adelphia money under the Co-Borrowing Facilities, and who were therefore “original co-
borrowing lenders.” See id. ¶¶ 74, 75. Plaintiffs then define “Assignees” to be those lenders that
received a transfer of rights from an “original Co-Borrowing Lender” (i.e. a Syndicate Bank or
an Agent Bank) under one of the Co-Borrowing Facilities. See id. ¶ 146. Plaintiffs then
combine the definitions, stating that the CCH Syndicate Banks include “one or more of the
Assignees.” Id. ¶ 883.
Plaintiffs’ conflation of these terms (such that Syndicate Banks include all Non-Agent
Lenders, whether original syndicate members or secondary purchasers in the market) is
confusing and suggests a lack of any principled difference in Plaintiffs’ distinctions between
“Syndicate Banks” and “Assignees.” Nevertheless, this conflation does not change the fact that
Plaintiffs make few, if any, factual allegations against the CCH Non-Agent Lenders, none of
which assert that the CCH Non-Agent Lenders did anything wrong. Instead, Plaintiffs abandon
the definitions that relate solely to Non-Agent Lenders and replace them with broader terms
designed to encompass the Agent Banks and/or lenders to other credit facilities (i.e., “CCH
Lenders,” “CCH Co-Borrowing Lenders,” or broader still, the “Co-Borrowing Lenders”) to
create the illusion that the CCH Non-Agent Lenders are part of their story.
2. Plaintiffs’ allegations regarding the CCH Credit Facility also reveal
that the CCH Non-Agent Lenders played no role in the wrongdoing at
Adelphia.
Plaintiffs prefer to eschew using definitions that focus solely on the Non-Agent Lenders
because the Non-Agent Lenders play no role in Plaintiffs’ story of wrongdoing at Adelphia.
Instead, as described below, the CCH Non-Agent Lenders appear simply as investors in a CCH
Credit Facility that was approved by Adelphia’s Independent Directors.
10 Capitalized terms that are not otherwise defined in the Motion have the same meaning as in the Amended
Complaint. Such usage does not indicate agreement with Plaintiffs’ definitions or characterizations and the Non-
Agent Lenders reserve the right to challenge Plaintiffs’ definitions and characterizations.
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Plaintiffs allege that the CCH Credit Facility arose because the Rigas Family needed to
access credit to finance acquisitions by the RFEs. See Am. Compl. ¶ 878. The Agent and
Investment Banks, Plaintiffs allege, conducted significant due diligence prior to closing the CCH
Facility, and worked with the Rigas Family to prepare an offering memorandum to solicit other
lenders (i.e. Non-Agent Lenders) to participate in the facility. See id. ¶ 882. Plaintiffs allege that
because the CCH Co-Borrowing Facility constituted an affiliated transaction, “Adelphia needed
the approval of Adelphia’s Board of Directors and the separate approval of the Independent
Directors to participate in the CCH Co-Borrowing Facility[,]” and that the Rigas Family sought
and obtained that approval at a meeting of the Adelphia Board of Directors on March 9, 2000.
Id. ¶¶ 884, 886. There is no allegation that any CCH Lender, Agent or Non-Agent, was present
at this meeting. See id. ¶ 886.
To obtain the Independent Directors’ approval, Plaintiffs allege that “CCH Agent Banks
and their affiliated Investment Banks worked closely with the Rigas Family and James Brown to
prepare a term sheet describing the terms of the CCH Co-Borrowing Facility” (the “CCH Term
Sheet”), which the Rigas Family presented to the Independent Directors at the meeting. Id.
¶¶ 885, 887. Plaintiffs further allege that “the Rigas Family and the CCH Term Sheet prepared
with the CCH Agents Banks and their affiliated Investment Banks deliberately failed to disclose
all material facts to the Independent Directors concerning the CCH Co-Borrowing Facility and
intentionally provided the Independent Directors with false and misleading information
regarding the terms and conditions of the facility and the uses to which the RFE intended to put
the funds it drew down from the facility.” Id. ¶ 897.
Plaintiffs allege that the CCH Term Sheet stated that the CCH Credit Facility would
contain protective clauses barring certain affiliate transactions. See id. ¶¶ 892-95. Plaintiffs
further allege that “the Rigas Family and the CCH Agent Banks and their affiliated Investment
Banks knew at the time they provided the CCH Term Sheet to the Independent Directors that the
Rigas Family intended to engage in conduct and affiliate transactions that violated those
restrictions.” Id. ¶ 908.
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Plaintiffs also allege that the CCH Term sheet provided that “[t]he Restricted Borrowers
shall not permit the Leverage Ratio for the most recently completed quarter to exceed the
following levels” but failed to include a definition of “Leverage Ratio,” which omission
Plaintiffs allege was material. Id. ¶¶ 896, 899. Timothy Rigas and James Brown, Plaintiffs
allege, informed “the Independent Directors that the leverage ratio would be applied to prevent
any individual co-borrower from borrowing more funds than could be supported by its own
collateral and assets[,]” although the Rigas Family knew this statement was false when made. Id.
¶ 898. “The Rigas Family had agreed previously with the CCH Agent Banks and their affiliated
Investment Banks that the leverage ratio would be calculated on a combined basis for all
borrowers so that any individual co-borrower could draw down as much as any other co-
borrower regardless of its individual assets or financial condition.” Id.
In addition to the CCH Term Sheet’s alleged misrepresentations, Plaintiffs also allege
that Timothy Rigas and James Brown verbally misrepresented to the Independent Directors that
each of the co-borrowers could only borrow amounts that were commensurate with the amount
of collateral the co-borrower provided, when in fact the CCH Credit Facility contained no limits
on the amounts that each co-borrower could borrow. See id. ¶¶ 889, 906. Due to the Rigases’
“verbal misrepresentations and the incomplete and/or inaccurate information set forth in the
CCH Term Sheet[,]” Plaintiffs allege that the Independent Directors were misled into believing
that the terms and conditions of the CCH Credit Facility were in the best interests of Adelphia,
when they were not. See id. ¶ 890. There is no allegation that any of the CCH Non-Agent
Lenders were involved in preparing, or even saw, the CCH Term Sheet.
After the Independent Directors approved the CCH Credit Facility, Plaintiffs allege that
the CCH Agent Banks and their affiliated Investment Banks prepared and sent to the CCH Non-
Agent Lenders a Confidential Information Memorandum (“CCH Confidential Memo”), which
described the terms of the CCH Credit Facility and made clear that “the collateral put up by the
ACC co-borrowers was significantly greater than the collateral put up by Highland Prestige.” Id.
¶ 905. Plaintiffs further allege that the CCH Confidential Memo “explicitly stated that the
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collateral contributions of ACC co-borrowers Century Holdings, LLC and Ft. Myers Acquisition
LP would be based on revenues from a combined total of 1,476,983 cable television subscribers,
whereas RFE co-borrower Highland Prestige’s collateral contribution would be based on
revenues from 55,831 cable television subscribers.” Id. This information, Plaintiffs allege, was
neither in the CCH Term Sheet nor disclosed to the Independent Directors.11 Id.
Plaintiffs also allege that the CCH Agent Banks and Investment Banks knew that the
Independent Directors had a duty to approve only those transactions that were in the best
interests of Adelphia and that satisfied limits on affiliate transactions. See id. ¶ 917. The true
terms of the CCH Credit Facility, Plaintiffs allege, were not in Adelphia’s best interests. See id.
“The CCH Agent Banks and their affiliated Investment Banks knew or consciously avoided the
fact that the Independent Directors’ approval was secured by false and fraudulent omissions and
misstatements of material facts.” Id.
Finally, Plaintiffs allege that Adelphia did not publicly disclose, prior to March 27, 2002,
the contingent liabilities incurred as a result of RFE Highland Prestige’s draws on the CCH
Facility, and that “the CCH Agent Banks knew, or consciously avoided, the fact that ACC’s
Independent Directors could not have approved public disclosures of ACC that failed to disclose
those liabilities unless the Independent Directors had been misled and defrauded.” Id. ¶¶ 920,
922.
Noticeably absent from Plaintiffs’ factual allegations of wrongdoing in relation to the
CCH Credit Facility is any mention of the CCH Non-Agent Lenders. Instead, Plaintiffs use their
11 Plaintiffs’ story that the Rigases made verbal representations regarding the terms of CCH Credit Facility, and
that the CCH Term Sheet lacked relevant information, and that therefore the Independent Directors were deceived
about the actual terms of the CCH Credit Agreement, actually defies common sense. See Nazarenus v. J.F. Daley
Int’l, Ltd., 714 F. Supp. 361, 362 (N.D. Ill. 1989) (“Notice pleading does not require the suspension of common
sense.”); see generally Peak v. United States, 353 U.S. 43, 46 (1957) (noting that “common sense often makes good
law”). Plaintiffs allege that the CCH Confidential Memo contained the relevant information the Independent
Directors allegedly did not receive, but never explain how it is that the Independent Directors did not ask for or
obtain copies of this CCH Confidential Memo, which contained a cover letter from Adelphia confirming that the
information in the CCH Confidential Memo was accurate. See Joint App., Ex. 13 at 1664-00762930 (CCH
Confidential Memo). Even less plausible is the implied allegation that the Independent Directors of a multi-billion
dollar family of entities never obtained or read the actual CCH Credit Agreement before approving the transaction.
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overly-broad definitions to give completely unsupported allegations against the CCH Non-Agent
Lenders the false appearance of being tied to facts alleged against other defendants. Plaintiffs’
most common tactic is to use an allegation that originated with a reference to a particular lender
or the group of Agent Banks, but then recast the allegation — without adding any new or
supporting factual allegations — using a broader term like “CCH Lenders” in an attempt to slide
the specific allegations against one defendant onto defendants against which no specific
allegations have been made.
Examples of Plaintiffs’ “slide tactic” include:
• “The CCH Credit Agreement was created and agreed to by the Rigas
Family, the CCH Agent Banks and their affiliated Investment Banks, and
the CCH Co-Borrowing Lenders.” Id. ¶ 901 (emphasis added).
(But there are no factual allegations that any of the CCH Non-Agent Lenders created the Credit
Agreement, and to the extent that the “CCH Co-Borrowing Lenders” includes Assignees, it is
factually impossible for the downstream purchasing Non-Agent Lenders to have “created” the
CCH Credit Agreement.)
• “The three Co-Borrowing Facilities that remained outstanding as of the
Petition Date – the UCA/HHC Co-Borrowing Facility, the CCH Co-
Borrowing Facility and the Olympus Co-Borrowing Facility . . . were at
the heart of the fraud perpetrated by the Rigas Family with the substantial
assistance of the Agent Banks and the Investment Banks. . . . The Agent
Banks, Investment Banks, and Syndicate Lenders all knew that permitting
the RFEs to borrow substantial amounts – that they clearly could not repay
– against the credit of the Adelphia co-borrowers served no legitimate
corporate purpose for Adelphia and provided no benefit to Adelphia.” Id.
¶¶ 825, 826 (emphasis added).
(But there are no factual allegations that any CCH Non-Agent Lenders knew this nor that the
CCH Non-Agent Lenders had any duty to second guess Adelphia’s business judgment.)
• “Based on substantial participation of CCH Lenders that had participated
in the UCA/HHC Co-Borrowing Facility, the CCH Lenders also knew
that the Rigas Family had been using the proceeds of other co-borrowing
loans for fraudulent purposes. The CCH Lenders knew that the
Independent Directors were never advised of such activities.” Id. ¶ 977
(emphases added).
(But there are no factual allegations that any of the CCH Non-Agent Lenders knew of the
misappropriation or what the Independent Directors had been told or knew.)
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• “Nonetheless, as of the Petition Date, Highland Prestige had drawn
approximately $1.66 billion of the $2.48 billion outstanding under the
CCH Co-Borrowing Facility, or 67% of the amount borrowed. No
prudent lender would have lent Highland Prestige $1.66 billion (or more)
without the credit support of Adelphia. The CCH Lenders knew or
consciously avoided the facts, which were readily apparent to them, that
the terms of the CCH Co-Borrowing Facility were significantly less
favorable to Adelphia than terms that would have been available from
third parties in arm’s-length transactions, and that Highland Prestige and
the Rigas Family benefited enormously and personally from their
participation in the CCH Co-Borrowing Facility, at the expense of
Adelphia.” Id. ¶ 979 (emphasis added).
(But there are no factual allegations that any of the CCH Non-Agent Lenders knew that the
Independent Directors had allegedly been deceived, nor that the Non-Agent Lenders had any
duty to second guess the business judgment of the Independent Directors in entering into the
CCH Co-Borrowing Facility.)
• “Upon information and belief, the Co-Borrowing Lenders performed
periodic analyses demonstrating Adelphia’s concealment, as caused by the
Rigas Family, of billions of dollars under the Co-Borrowing Facilities
from Adelphia’s balance sheet. For example, on or about March 29, 2001,
Defendant Wachovia performed an analysis of Adelphia’s total
outstanding ‘bank debt’ at the subsidiary level, as of September 30, 2000,
under the two Co-Borrowing Facilities then outstanding — UCA/HHC
and CCH — and under six Non-Co-Borrowing Facilities then outstanding
— Parnassos, Chelsea Communications, Adelphia Cable Partners, Harron
Communications, FrontierVision and Century-TCI. Wachovia determined
that Adelphia’s total ‘bank debt’ as of September 30, 2000 was
approximately $5.2 billion. Adelphia’s public filings for the same period,
however, disclosed that Adelphia’s bank debt, as of September 30, 2000,
was approximately $3.8 billion. Wachovia did not need any ‘special’
access to Adelphia to obtain this information…. Wachovia’s analysis
demonstrates that many, if not all, Defendants knew or consciously
avoided knowing that Adelphia was understating its total bank debt in
2000 by approximately $1.4 billion and that Adelphia’s leverage was not
being reduced as represented.” Id. ¶¶ 1027-28 (emphases added).
(But there are no factual allegations that any of the CCH Non-Agent Lenders performed this
calculation, had a duty to perform this calculation, or were in a position to perform this
calculation.)
Plaintiffs’ factual allegations of wrongdoing in relation to the CCH Credit Facility never
include the CCH Non-Agent Lenders.
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D. Allegations Regarding The Rigases’ Use Of The Cash Management System
Also Do Not Involve The CCH Non-Agent Lenders.
Despite Plaintiffs’ theory that the Co-Borrowing Facilities were the linchpin of
Adelphia’s fraud, Plaintiffs also allege that the Rigases had adequate means to perpetrate their
alleged fraud with the Adelphia Cash Management System (“CMS”) regardless of whether the
credit facilities into which Adelphia entered were co-borrowing facilities or non-co-borrowing
facilities. Although the CMS story contradicts the story that Adelphia could not accomplish its
fraud without the co-borrowing facilities, both theories nevertheless share one thing in common:
neither alleges that the CCH Non-Agent Lenders did anything improper.
With respect to the CMS theory, Plaintiffs allege that the CMS “was a key
instrumentality of the fraud,” and that “[t]hrough the CMS, the Rigas Family misappropriated
over $3.4 billion from the Co-Borrowing Facilities for its own benefit.” Id. ¶¶ 1011, 1015.
Accordingly, the CMS, and not the Co-Borrowing structure, was the sine qua non of the alleged
Rigas/Adelphia fraud:
The CMS was a central depository (in reality, the Rigas Family’s
personal piggy bank) for cash generated or obtained by Adelphia from all
sources (including borrowings under each of the Co-Borrowing Facilities,
the Non-Co-Borrowing Facilities, the proceeds from Adelphia’s debt and
equity securities offerings, and Adelphia’s operations). Adelphia
commingled all of its cash with that of the RFEs in the CMS. After
Adelphia deposited cash into the CMS, “ownership” of the cash could be
transferred through simple journal entries to any RFE. The cash also
could be transferred from the CMS to any of a number of bank accounts
held in the name of the RFEs.
Id. ¶ 1012. Plaintiffs allege that the Rigases manipulated funds — co-borrowing and non-co-
borrowing funds alike — in and out of the CMS for their personal benefit. For instance,
Plaintiffs allege that the Rigases used funds from Century-TCI — a non-co-borrowing facility —
for fraudulent purposes. According to Plaintiffs, the Rigases caused Adelphia to make multiple
draws on the Century-TCI Facility and then used the CMS to transfer the money it obtained from
that facility to Rigas Family accounts. Id. ¶¶ 1005. Additionally, Plaintiffs allege that the Rigas
Family “used funds from the CMS to fund expenses for Niagara Frontier Hockey, L.P., a Rigas
Family controlled entity that owned the Buffalo Sabres professional hockey team.” Id. ¶ 999.
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Thus, the Rigas Family, using the CMS, could steal, at will, funds lent under a Non-Co-
Borrowing Facility, making it irrelevant which type of credit facility Adelphia set up.
Nonetheless, regardless of the theory Plaintiffs ultimately adopt, no theory of liability
asserted in the Amended Complaint involves any participation or wrongdoing by the CCH Non-
Agent Lenders. In this regard, the Amended Complaint is conspicuously silent.
II. LEGAL STANDARDS FOR ASSESSING THE CCH NON-AGENT LENDERS’
MOTION TO DISMISS
In assessing a Rule 12 motion to dismiss, the Court must accept as true a complaint’s
factual allegations and draw all inferences in plaintiff’s favor. See Mills v. Polar Molecular
Corp., 12 F.3d 1170, 1174 (2d Cir. 1993). But a complaint must “provide ‘plausible grounds’
for the allegations with ‘enough fact to raise a reasonable expectation that discovery will reveal
evidence’ to support them.” In re Adelphia Commc’ns Corp. Sec. and Derivative Litig., No. 03
MD 1529, 2007 WL 2615928, at *1 (S.D.N.Y. Sept. 10, 2007) (McKenna, J.) (quoting Bell Atl.
Corp. v. Twombly, 127 S. Ct. 1955, 1965 (2007)). Courts should not assume that plaintiffs can
prove facts they have not alleged. See Associated Gen’l Contractors of Cal. Inc. v. Carpenters,
459 U.S. 519, 526 (1983); see also Dura Pharm., Inc. v. Broudo, 544 U.S. 336, 346-47 (2005)
(finding amended complaint legally insufficient for failure to adequately allege facts). Factually
unsupported and conclusory allegations are not enough to state a claim. See DeJesus v. Sears,
Roebuck & Co., Inc., 87 F.3d 65, 70 (2d Cir. 1996). Accordingly, to state a claim against the
CCH Non-Agent Lenders, Plaintiffs’ allegations against the CCH Non-Agent Lenders must be
factual, not just conclusory. See Twombly, 127 S. Ct. at 1966 n.5. Legal conclusions resting on
other unsupported allegations do not meet this standard. See id. at 1970.
Rule 12 motions to dismiss are also the proper avenue for challenging a plaintiff’s
standing to sue. See Rent Stabilization Ass’n of N.Y. v. Dinkins, 5 F.3d 591, 594 (2d Cir. 1993)
(noting that courts in the Second Circuit have dismissed claims for lack of standing under both
Rule 12(b)(1) and Rule 12(b)(6)); Thompson v. County of Franklin, 15 F.3d 245, 247 (2d Cir.
1994) (same). “[L]ike other jurisdictional inquiries, [standing] cannot be inferred
argumentatively from averments in the pleadings, but rather must appear affirmatively in the
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record, so that, on a motion to dismiss, it is the burden of the party asserting standing to sue
clearly to allege facts demonstrating that he is a proper party to invoke judicial resolution of the
dispute.” Bartang Bank and Trust Co. v. Caiola, No. 04 Civ. 2402, 2006 WL 2708453, at *4
(S.D.N.Y. Sept. 18, 2006) (quoting Thompson, 15 F.3d at 249) (internal punctuation omitted).
Here, if after considering all relevant materials, this Court cannot discern a basis for Plaintiffs’
standing, the Amended Complaint must be dismissed. See Thompson, 15 F.3d at 249.
III. PURSUANT TO THE PLAN AND CONFIRMATION ORDER, THIS COURT
MUST DISMISS ALL COUNTS AGAINST THE CCH NON-AGENT LENDERS
BECAUSE ALL CLAIMS WOULD BE INDEMNIFIED UNDER THE CCH
CREDIT AGREEMENT.
In interpreting indemnification clauses, New York courts12 “first look to the express
contract language used” to effectuate the intention of the parties. Hawkins Home Groups, Inc. v.
S. Energy Homes, Inc., 714 N.Y.S.2d 539, 540 (App. Div. 2000). “[W]here the language of a
contract is clear and unambiguous, the court will construe and discern that intent from the
document itself as a matter of law.” Id.; see also Olin Corp. v. Consol. Aluminum Corp., 5 F.3d
10, 16 (2d Cir. 1993). And “in the absence of countervailing public policy concerns there is no
reason to relieve [sophisticated parties] of the consequences of their bargain. If they are
dissatisfied with the consequences of their agreement, ‘the time to say so [was] at the bargaining
table.’” Southgate Owners Corp. v. Pub. Serv. Mut. Ins. Co., 660 N.Y.S.2d 129, 131 (App. Div.
1997) (quoting Oppenheimer & Co. v. Oppenheim, Appel, Dixon & Co., 86 N.Y.2d 685, 695
(1995)).
In addition, futile indemnification actions have long been disfavored by courts. See State
v. Barclays Bank of New York, N.A., 563 N.E.2d 11, 14 (N.Y. 1990) (reasoning that a particular
course of action would avoid circuity of action); see also Siler v. N. Trust Co., 80 F. Supp. 2d
906, 908 (N.D. Ill. 2000) (“A circuitry of obligation will defeat a plaintiff’s claim as a matter of
law. A circuitry is created when, by virtue of pre-existing indemnity agreements or obligations,
12 The CCH Credit Agreement is governed by New York law. See Joint App., Ex. 1 § 13.6 (CCH Credit
Agreement).
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the plaintiff is in effect obligated to indemnify the defendants for claims including the plaintiff’s
own claim.”). Moreover, courts seek to avoid parties undertaking vain or useless acts. See
People v. Williams, 668 N.Y.S.2d 305, 306 (Sup. Ct. 1997) (denying a hearing because the law
does not compel one to do “vain or useless” things).
Here, Plaintiffs’ stories of alleged fraud and other wrongdoing at Adelphia contain no
factual allegations of bad acts by any Non-Agent Lenders. Instead, the Amended Complaint
establishes the Non-Agent Lenders as innocent, passive investors in the CCH Credit Facility.
See Background Facts, supra Part I. Indeed, Plaintiffs have previously admitted to the
Bankruptcy Court that they do not allege that the Non-Agent Lenders did anything improper
because the Non-Agents were mere downstream purchasers of the CCH Credit Facility (either
purchasing as Syndicate Banks based on syndication materials provided by Adelphia and the
Agents Banks, or purchasing in the secondary market as “Assignees” under the facility).13
Yet, despite admitting that they do not allege that the Non-Agent Lenders did anything
wrong, Plaintiffs use their “slide tactic” throughout the Amended Complaint to try to avoid the
consequences of their obligations to indemnify the CCH Non-Agent Lenders. But the CCH
Borrowers are sophisticated parties who understood their indemnity obligation when they
undertook it. Plaintiffs cannot now avoid the consequences of the CCH Debtors’ bargain with
clever pleading tactics.
In the end, and for the reasons discussed more fully herein, this action against the Non-
Agent Lenders will be circuitous and wasteful of the Court’s and the parties’ time because each
of the CCH Non-Agent Lenders is indemnified for all counts alleged against them. This Court
13 See Joint App., Ex. 14 ¶ 8 (Estimation Mot.) (stating that “In the Bank Action, there is no allegation that the
Syndicate Banks individually did anything improper. Rather, the only issue specific to the Syndicate Banks is
whether as ‘after-market’ holders of Bank Claims under the Prepetition Credit Facilities, their debt may be ‘tainted’
by the torts and other wrongful conduct of the Banks from whom they purchased that debt.”) (emphasis added); id. ¶
40 (“[T]he complaint in the Bank Action does not allege that the Syndicate Banks individually committed
wrongdoing . . . .”) (emphasis added); id. ¶ 67 (“In the Bank Action, there are no claims that any of the ‘after-
market’ Syndicate Banks individually did anything improper. In fact, most, if not all of the Syndicate Banks are
not even banks.”) (emphasis added).
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should honor the Plan’s indemnity provisions and dismiss all counts alleged against the CCH
Non-Agent Lenders.
A. In Both The CCH Credit Agreement And Again In The Confirmed Plan,
Plaintiffs Agreed To Indemnify The CCH Non-Agent Lenders For The
Claims Asserted In The Amended Complaint.
The CCH Credit Facility obligated the CCH Borrowers (a discrete subset of Plaintiffs) to
indemnify each Non-Agent Lender from all claims, damages, costs and expenses arising out of
or in connection with the CCH Credit Facility. See Background Facts, supra Part I. The only
exception to the CCH Borrowers’ indemnity agreement was the extent to which an individual
Non-Agent Lender acted with gross negligence or willful misconduct. See id.; see also Joint
App., Ex. 1 § 11.12 (CCH Credit Agreement). Gross negligence requires acting in a manner that
evinces a reckless disregard for the rights of others or smacks of intentional wrongdoing. See,
e.g., Hartford Ins. Co. v. Holmes Prot. Group, 673 N.Y.S.2d 132, 133 (App. Div. 1998). Willful
misconduct requires intentionally committing an act of an unreasonable character in disregard of
a risk known or obvious and so great as to make it highly probable that harm would follow.
Metro. Life Ins. Co. v. Noble Lowndes Int’l, Inc., 600 N.Y.S.2d 212, 216 (App. Div. 1993)
(citing William L. Prosser, Torts § 34 (4th ed. 1971)). Said another way, unless a CCH Non-
Agent Lender seeking indemnification itself committed “bad acts” (i.e. gross negligence or
willful misconduct), the CCH Borrowers must indemnify that Non-Agent Lender against all
claims and losses arising out of, in connection with, or by reason of, the CCH Credit Facility.
Having already agreed to indemnify the CCH Non-Agent Lenders in the Credit
Agreement, the CCH Debtors agreed to indemnify the CCH Non-Agent Lenders a second time in
the Plan. Although the Plan cancels and extinguishes the CCH Credit Agreement with respect to
the CCH Debtors, the Plan expressly provides for the CCH Debtors to indemnify the CCH Non-
Agent Lenders on virtually the same terms as in the CCH Credit Agreement. See Background
Facts, supra Part I; see also Joint App., Ex. 10 at A-16-17 (Plan) (stating that one criterion of
Dismissed Bank Actions is whether the party would be entitled to indemnification “under a
Prepetition Credit Agreement”). The one change in the CCH Debtors’ indemnity obligation
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under the Plan is that the CCH Non-Agent Lenders may no longer seek money damages under
the indemnification clauses. See Joint App., Ex. 10 § 9.2(b) (Plan). Instead, upon establishing
their right to indemnification from the CCH Borrowers in “a court of competent jurisdiction,”
any indemnified claims against the CCH Non-Agent Lenders must be dismissed. See id. at A-17.
Dismissing the claims against the CCH Non-Agent Lenders would complete the circuit
contemplated in the Plan and Confirmation Order. Plaintiffs have not alleged any bad conduct
by the CCH Non-Agent Lenders, and the CCH Non-Agent Lenders are herein invoking their
indemnification rights under the Plan and Confirmation Order. As a matter of law, the CCH
Non-Agent Lenders are indemnified for all counts alleged against them in the Amended
Complaint, and therefore are entitled to dismissal.
B. Because None Of Plaintiffs’ Theories Of The Rigases’ Fraud Requires Or
Alleges That The Non-Agent Lenders Acted With Gross Negligence Or
Willful Misconduct, There Is No Exception To Plaintiffs’ Indemnity
Obligations To The Non-Agent Lenders.
Before getting to the individual claims alleged against the CCH Non-Agent Lenders, it is
important to look at Plaintiffs’ overarching theories of their case and determine whether any
exception to Plaintiffs’ indemnity obligations is asserted. As outlined in the Background Facts
(supra Part I), Plaintiffs allege two stories of how the fraud at Adelphia occurred: (1) through
the Rigases’ establishment and use of the CMS; or (2) through the Rigases’ establishment of the
Co-Borrowing Credit Facilities with the Agent and Investment Banks. Neither of Plaintiffs’
theories requires nor contains any factual allegations of gross negligence or willful misconduct
by the Non-Agent Lenders.
1. Plaintiffs make no factual allegations that the CCH Non-Agent
Lenders assisted in the creation of the CMS or knew that the Rigases
misappropriated money through the CMS.
Plaintiffs make numerous allegations about the Rigases’ fraudulent use of the CMS. See
Background Facts, supra Part I. None of them involves the CCH Non-Agent Lenders. Indeed,
the CMS story of fraud at Adelphia does not require the CCH Non-Agent Lenders to have
engaged in improper conduct, and Plaintiffs allege no facts that they did. In fact, Plaintiffs do
not allege any facts indicating that the CCH Non-Agent Lenders even knew of illicit transfers via
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the CMS. As such, Plaintiffs’ CMS story actually reinforces the role of the Non-Agent Lenders
as passive investors in a CCH Credit Facility from which the Rigas Family allegedly
misappropriated funds. As passive investors in an arms-length financial transaction, the CCH
Non-Agent Lenders did not act with and are not alleged to have acted with gross negligence or
willful misconduct. Therefore, the CMS theory does not provide an exception to Plaintiffs’
indemnity obligations to the CCH Non-Agent Lenders.
2. Plaintiffs make no factual allegations that the CCH Non-Agent
Lenders created the CCH Credit Facility, or knew of the alleged
deception of the Independent Directors.
Plaintiffs also allege that the Co-Borrowing Facilities were the “principal tools” of the
Rigases’ fraud, and that the Agent and Investment Banks worked with the Rigas Family to create
and establish these “tools.” Am. Compl. ¶¶ 3-4; see also Background Facts, supra Part I. A key
element to the alleged fraud, Plaintiffs allege, is that although Adelphia’s Independent Directors
in fact approved the CCH Credit Facility, such approval resulted from the verbal
misrepresentations of the Rigas Family “and the incomplete and/or inaccurate information set
forth in the CCH Term Sheet.”14 Am. Compl. ¶ 890. The CCH Term Sheet, Plaintiffs allege,
arose from work among the Rigas Family, James Brown, and the CCH Agent and Investment
Banks. Id. ¶ 885.
Like the CMS story, the Co-Borrowing structure story of fraud at Adelphia does not
require that the CCH Non-Agent Lenders engaged in any bad acts, and Plaintiffs never allege
that any of the CCH Non-Agent Lenders did anything improper regarding the creation of the
CCH Credit Facility or the alleged deception of the Independent Directors. Specifically,
Plaintiffs do not allege any facts that (1) any CCH Non-Agent Lender participated in the creation
14 Plaintiffs’ allegations regarding what the Independent Directors could and could not learn from the CCH Term
Sheet, again, are illogical. The very first sentence of the CCH Term Sheet states that all of the borrowers will be
jointly and severally liable and specifically names an RFE as one of the borrowers. See Joint App., Ex. 15 at 1
(CCH Term Sheet) (“Century Holdings, LLC, Ft. Meyers Acquisition Limited Partnership and Highland Prestige
Georgia, LLC to be jointly and severally liable.”). It is not rational to believe that Independent Directors of
Adelphia, who knew that the CCH Borrowers would be jointly and severally liable for all borrowings, would not
obtain and read a copy of the CCH Confidential Memo and the credit agreement itself.
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of the CCH Credit Facility, (2) any CCH Non-Agent Lender helped prepare the CCH Term
sheet, (3) any CCH Non-Agent Lender was present at the meeting at which the alleged
misrepresentations occurred, or (4) any CCH Non-Agent Lenders knew about the alleged
misrepresentations to the Independent Directors. And Plaintiffs do not allege that the CCH Non-
Agent Lenders had any duty to question the business judgment of the Independent Directors in
approving the CCH Credit Facility, nor could they, since no such duty exists.
Indeed, Plaintiffs’ own allegations establish that the CCH Non-Agent Lenders were
investors who (1) received information about a CCH Credit Facility, which facility Adelphia’s
Board, including the Independent Directors, had approved, and (2) decided to purchase portions
of that facility, either at inception or on the secondary market. Such actions are not, and are not
alleged to be, grossly negligent nor actions of willful misconduct. Thus, because Plaintiffs’
stories of fraud establish that the CCH Non-Agent Lenders are not alleged to have engaged in
gross negligence or willful misconduct, no exception to the CCH Debtors’ indemnity agreement
exists.
C. None Of The Individual Claims Against The CCH Non-Agent Lenders
Contains Allegations Of Gross Negligence Or Willful Misconduct That Could
Excuse Plaintiffs’ Indemnity Obligations.
Plaintiffs allege five causes of action, in seven counts, against the CCH Non-Agent
Lenders. But Plaintiffs never allege facts that the CCH Non-Agent Lenders were grossly
negligent nor involved in willful misconduct in relation to any of the individual causes of action
alleged against them. In fact, four of the five causes of action alleged against the CCH Non-
Agent Lenders do not even require factual allegations of bad acts by the Non-Agent Lenders in
order to state a claim, because bad acts are not elements of these claims. The Court should not
endorse Plaintiffs’ decision to plead claims against the CCH Non-Agent Lenders that are
unsupported (or unsupportable) by factual allegations of bad acts, and then to use the “slide
tactic” to try to avoid the CCH Debtors’ indemnification obligations.
The causes of action alleged against the CCH Non-Agent Lenders, and the legal elements
of these claims, are as follows:
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Description Elements
5th &
7th
Avoidance and Recovery of
Intentionally Fraudulent Transfers
The debtor “made such transfer or incurred such
obligation with actual intent to hinder, delay, or
defraud any entity to which the debtor was or
became, on or after the date that such transfer
was made or such obligation was incurred,
indebted[.]” 11 U.S.C. § 548(a)(1)(A).
6th &
8th
Avoidance and Recovery of
Constructively Fraudulent
Transfers
Transfer or obligation incurred for “less than
reasonably equivalent value” and Debtors were
insolvent or became insolvent, had unreasonably
small remaining capital, did not intend to repay,
or made transfer to benefit insider, not in
ordinary course of business.. 11 U.S.C.
§ 548(a)(1)(B).
33rd Equitable Subordination The court may “(1) under principles of equitable
subordination, subordinate for purposes of
distribution all or part of an allowed claim to all
or part of another allowed claim or all or part of
an allowed interest to all or part of another
allowed interest; or (2) order that any lien
securing such a subordinated claim be transferred
to the estate.” 11 U.S.C. § 510(c).
41st Declaratory Judgment Seeks interpretation of Section 9.6 of Credit
Agreement (maximum amount of obligation for
which Restricted Borrower is liable limited to
amount that would not render such obligations
subject to avoidance). Pursuant to New York
law, “[i]n order to maintain an action for
declaratory judgment, a party must present a
concrete, actual controversy for adjudication.”
Fragoso v. Romano, 702 N.Y.S.2d 333, 333
(App. Div. 2000) (citations omitted); see also 28
U.S.C. § 2201 (stating that under the Federal
Declaratory Judgment Act, an “actual
controversy” is similarly required).
50th Avoidance and Recovery of
Voidable Preferences
Debtor must establish (1) a transfer of debtor’s
interest in property, (2) to or for the benefit of a
creditor, (3) for or on account of antecedent debt,
(4) made while debtor was insolvent, (5) made
on or within 90 days prior to petition date, (6)
that enabled creditor to receive more than this
creditor would have received in Chapter 7
liquidation. 11 U.S.C. § 547(b).
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As shown, Plaintiffs’ preference and declaratory judgment claims15 do not require any
bad acts at all on the part of any of the parties, plaintiffs or defendants, much less gross
negligence or willful misconduct. Plaintiffs’ constructively fraudulent transfer claims similarly
do not require gross negligence or willful misconduct on the part of either Plaintiffs or the CCH
Non-Agent Lenders. Intentionally fraudulent transfer claims, in contrast, do require bad acts in
order to state a claim — but the relevant bad actors are the CCH Debtors, not the Non-Agent
Lenders. See Coated Sales, Inc. v. First E. Bank, N.A. (In re Coated Sales, Inc.), 119 B.R. 452,
456 n.4 (Bankr. S.D.N.Y. 1990) (“The focus of fraudulent conveyance law is on the intent of the
debtor-transferor . . . .”) (emphasis added).16 Plaintiffs do not make any factual allegations that
the Non-Agent Lenders were grossly negligent or involved in willful misconduct in relation to
the CCH Credit Facility with respect to any of these claims.
Plaintiffs’ claim for equitable subordination or equitable disallowance (to the extent it
exists) does require allegations of some inequitable or bad act by the Non-Agent Lenders in
order for Plaintiffs to state a claim. However, Plaintiffs completely fail to make any such factual
allegations. See infra Part V (analyzing Plaintiffs’ failure to plead facts to support the count for
equitable subordination/disallowance). Plaintiffs’ failure to plead the required element of the
Non-Agent Lenders’ inequitable conduct dooms this claim and mandates dismissal.
In sum, Plaintiffs twice entered into binding agreements to indemnify each CCH Non-
Agent Lender in relation to the CCH Credit Facility, except in cases where the particular CCH
Non-Agent Lender seeking indemnification was grossly negligent or was involved in willful
misconduct. Plaintiffs’ Amended Complaint and the claims alleged against the CCH Non-Agent
15 Additionally, Plaintiffs’ count for Declaratory Judgment requires Plaintiffs to demonstrate that an actual
controversy exists. Here, Plaintiffs baldly assert that the parties dispute the meaning of this paragraph in the now
extinguished Credit Agreement, but offer no allegations at all supporting the existence of a controversy over the
meaning of this language. Moreover, they fail to explain why they seek declaratory relief to interpret a provision of
an extinguished agreement.
16 And Plaintiffs allege in some detail the bad acts and fraudulent intentions of the Rigas Family. See Background
Facts, supra Part I.
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Lenders therein contain no factual allegations of gross negligence or willful misconduct on the
part of any of the CCH Non-Agent Lenders. Because no exception to Plaintiffs’ indemnity
obligation exists, this Court should hold Plaintiffs to their bargain, find that the CCH Non-Agent
Lenders are indemnified for all counts pleaded against them, and dismiss all such counts as
against the CCH Non-Agent Lenders.
D. Plaintiffs’ Anticipated Reliance On The Enron “Tainted Claim” Theory Does
Not Relieve The CCH Debtors Of Their Indemnity Obligations.
As they have in the past, Plaintiffs will likely maintain that they need not plead that the
CCH Non-Agent Lenders did anything wrong to support their claims in order to avoid their
indemnity obligations. See Joint App., Ex. 14 ¶ 67 (Estimation Mot.) (citing Enron Corp. v. Ave.
Special Situations Fund II, L.P. (Enron I), 333 B.R. 205, 210 (Bankr. S.D.N.Y. 2005) (Enron
I)).17 Plaintiffs have previously argued that, as a matter of law, a “claim in the hands of the
acquirer remains subject to challenge based upon the conduct of its predecessor, even though the
acquirer did not personally participate in the wrongdoing.” Id. They rely on the Bankruptcy
Court’s decision in Enron to make this argument. This reliance on Enron to support their theory
is misplaced for at least three reasons. First, the novel Enron analysis, decided against a very
different legal and factual background than exists with Adelphia, is not binding on this Court.
See Hawkins v. Steingut, 829 F.2d 317, 321 (2d Cir. 1987) (recognizing that a district court
decision does not clearly establish the law even within its own circuit). Second, the District
Court’s subsequent appellate decision is admittedly narrow and applies (if at all) only to
equitable subordination claims in a case where there are unpaid creditors. See Enron II, 2007
WL 2446498 at *8. Finally, both the Bankruptcy Court’s and District Court’s Enron decisions
17 A consolidated interlocutory appeal was granted by the District Court on the question of whether equitable
subordination and disallowance applied to claims held by a transferee based on alleged acts or omissions on the part
of the transferor. See Springfield Assocs., L.L.C. v. Enron Corp. (In re Enron Corp.), Nos. 06 Civ. 7828, 07 Civ.
1957, 2007 WL 2446498, at *2 (S.D.N.Y. Aug. 27, 2007) (Enron II). The District Court concluded that equitable
subordination and disallowance are personal disabilities which do not inhere in the claim, but that they may travel to
a transferee if the claims were transferred by way of pure assignment as opposed to purchase. Id. at *16. Thus, the
Court vacated the Bankruptcy Court’s order and remanded the matter to decide the motions to dismiss in accordance
with the decision. Id.
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make clear that sophisticated parties, like those in this action, may contract around the impact of
any “taint” through the adoption of indemnification clauses, which is exactly what the parties
here have done.
While Plaintiffs may ask this Court to apply the questionable Enron analysis to each of
their many causes of action, the District Court’s appellate decision in Enron II is applicable, if at
all, only to Plaintiffs’ equitable subordination claims against Non-Agent Lenders who acquired
debt in a “tainted” chain. 18 See id. at *1 (noting that the opinions of the Bankruptcy Court
overreached, and stating that its “conclusions of law cleave tightly to the facts presented”).19
Neither the Enron II Court, nor any other District Court in this or any other Circuit, has adopted
Plaintiffs’ theory that claims held by an innocent transferee are subject to any challenge that
could be made against the transferor based on that party’s conduct, as it would require an
unwarranted expansion of even the broadest view of the Enron theory to have it applicable to
other claims such as the fraudulent transfer and preference claims at issue here. This Court
should likewise decline to adopt this theory.
Even if this Court is persuaded by the Enron II Court’s narrow holding that an innocent
transferee may in some circumstances have his claim equitably subordinated, both the
Bankruptcy Court and the District Court made clear that bargained for indemnification rights can
offer protection to such transferees. See Enron I, 333 B.R. at 229 (“in order to protect the
interests of both transferors and transferees, the industry has promulgated standardized
provisions relating to transferred rights, assumed obligations, buyer’s rights and remedies”);
18 Although Plaintiffs prefer to ignore the logical consequences of their reliance on their Enron taint theory,
application of this theory necessarily means that some of the Adelphia debt at issue here is untainted. Plaintiffs
allege that there were Non-Agent Lenders who participated in the Co-Borrowing Facilities at inception (“Syndicate
Banks”). Am. Compl. ¶ 74. Plaintiffs make no factual allegations as against the Syndicate Banks that differ from
the allegations against the rest of the Non-Agent Lenders—aside from the fact that the Syndicate Banks are original
lenders. As Plaintiffs allege no facts supporting bad acts by the Non-Agent Lenders at all, each loan line originating
with a Syndicate Bank is an untainted loan line, and under Plaintiffs’ theory, all Non-Agent Lenders named due to
purchases of the untainted loan lines should be dismissed.
19 The Enron II Court also considered disallowance under 11 U.S.C. § 502(d), but no such claims are brought by
Plaintiffs in this action.
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Enron II, 2007 WL 2446498 at *10 (noting that even parties to an assignment “can easily
contract around the risk of equitable subordination or disallowance by entering into indemnity
agreements to protect the assignee”). Such negotiation around risk is exactly what these parties
have done, not only in the original credit agreements, but also in the Plan which requires that
indemnified claims be released. Any application of the Enron II decision should include the
Court’s recognition of the validity of, and protection offered by, indemnity provisions such as
those included in the original agreements and the Plan and Confirmation Order.
IV. THE BANKRUPTCY CLAIMS AGAINST THE CCH NON-AGENT LENDERS
MUST BE DISMISSED BECAUSE THE CCH DEBTORS DO NOT HAVE
STANDING TO BRING THEM.
A. The CCH Debtors Do Not Have Standing To Pursue The Bankruptcy
Claims.
The Court should also dismiss Plaintiffs bankruptcy claim because they have no standing
to bring them. “‘No principle is more fundamental to the judiciary’s proper role in our system of
government than the constitutional limitation of federal-court jurisdiction to actual cases or
controversies.’” Raines v. Byrd, 521 U.S. 811, 818 (1997) (quoting Simon v. E. Ky. Welfare
Rights Org., 426 U.S. 26, 37 (1976)). To establish an actual case or controversy, a litigant
seeking relief in the federal courts “must allege personal injury fairly traceable to the
defendant’s allegedly unlawful conduct and likely to be redressed by the requested relief.”
DaimlerChrysler Corp. v. Cuno, 126 S. Ct. 1854, 1861 (2006) (emphasis added) (citing Allen v.
Wright, 468 U.S. 737, 751 (1984)). A litigant’s failure to allege these fundamental elements
leaves the federal courts without subject matter jurisdiction. Simon, 426 U.S. at 37-38. That is
just what Plaintiffs have done here.
Plaintiffs (under the guise of a non-existent, agglomerated “Adelphia”) assert various
bankruptcy claims — preference, fraudulent conveyance, equitable subordination, and equitable
disallowance — on behalf of and for the benefit of the CCH Debtors’ respective creditors.20 To
20 In earlier motions filed in this case, Plaintiffs have asserted that all payments they seek to avoid “were funneled
through one debtor entity, Adelphia Communications LLC, also known as the ‘Bank of Adelphia,’” and that the
(Continued…)
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establish their standing to maintain these claims, they must establish both that the CCH Debtors’
creditors were injured on account of the Non-Agents’ alleged unlawful acts and that the relief
they seek can redress those injuries. DaimlerChrysler Corp., 126 S. Ct. at 1861 (noting that it is
the plaintiff’s burden to establish constitutional standing). The CCH Debtors cannot meet this
burden.
First, none of the CCH Debtors’ creditors were injured on account of the allegations
Plaintiffs make in their Amended Complaint. In fact, the CCH Debtors satisfied each and every
one of their respective creditors (or reserved amounts sufficient to do so), with value to spare.
Second, even if the CCH Debtors had not been able to satisfy all of their creditors — thus,
hypothetically, giving rise to a creditor injury — this lawsuit simply cannot redress that
hypothetical injury. Instead, under the Plan, any recovery Plaintiffs receive in this action will
flow directly to the beneficiaries of the CVV (none of whom are creditors of the CCH Debtors).
Accordingly, the CCH Debtors’ creditors — the real parties with the hypothetical injury — have
absolutely no stake in the resolution of these matters.21 In short, the Plaintiffs do not have
standing to assert and maintain their bankruptcy claims on behalf of the CCH Debtors’ creditors,
and, as a result, the claims must be dismissed.
Bank of Adelphia “had extensive obligations to other Adelphia debtors that remained unpaid.” See Pls.’ Opp’n to
Motions for Leave to Appeal at 36, Docket No. 60 in Case No. 05 Civ. 9050 (S.D.N.Y.). That assertion is contrary
to the Complaint. As an initial matter, there is no Debtor known as “Adelphia Communications LLC.” But to the
extent the Plaintiffs may have meant “Adelphia Cablevision, LLC,” which Judge Gerber identified as the “Bank of
Adelphia” in his confirmation decision, see In re Adelphia Commc’ns Corp., 368 B.R. 140, 151 (Bankr. S.D.N.Y.
2007), the Amended Complaint fails to allege that Adelphia Cablevision, LLC made any of the payments Plaintiffs
seek to avoid. See Background Facts, supra Part I. In any event, Adelphia Cablevision, LLC, like the CCH
Debtors, has no unpaid creditor that would benefit from the avoidance of any such payments. Adelphia Cablevision,
LLC is one of the “Subsidiary Debtors” under the Joint Plan, whose creditors (if any) were paid in full and are not
beneficiaries of the CVV. See Joint App., Ex. 8 at Schedule II (Second Disclosure Statement Supplement ).
21 As previously discussed, the more than 250 individual Adelphia bankruptcy estates are not substantively
consolidated. Rather, all of the various debtor and respective creditor bodies remain separate and can only recover if
they can individually establish standing. See Joint App., Ex. 10 § 2.2 (Plan) (recognizing that “all Debtors shall
continue to exist as separate legal entities”). As a result, the Court must separately assess the standing of each
debtor entity or representative to sue on behalf of its creditors.
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1. Plaintiffs do not have standing to prosecute their bankruptcy claims
because none of the CCH Debtors’ creditors suffered a “personal
injury.”
a. None of the CCH Debtors’ creditors were injured on account
of the allegations Plaintiffs make in their Amended Complaint.
The Court should dismiss the various bankruptcy claims because the CCH Non-Agent
Lenders’ alleged wrongdoing did not injure any creditor of the CCH Debtors. Instead, the Plan,
the Disclosure Statement and the October 15, 2007 Status Report all show that the CCH Debtors
have fully satisfied each and every one of their creditors under the terms of the Plan. The
Amended Complaint does not allege otherwise.22
The fact that the CCH Debtors have satisfied all of their creditors’ claims is dispositive of
the standing question. The CCH Debtors’ bankruptcy claims — preference, fraudulent
conveyance, equitable subordination and, to the extent it exists, equitable disallowance — are
each creditor remedies fashioned to prevent one creditor from improperly receiving a benefit to
the detriment of others. Specifically, fraudulent conveyance and preference claims are intended
to remedy the injuries creditors suffer when a debtor improperly transfers the property necessary
to satisfy their claims. Balaber-Strauss v. Town of Harrison (In re Murphy), 331 B.R. 107, 122
(Bankr. S.D.N.Y. 2005) (noting that courts have consistently held that avoidance actions can
only be pursued if there is some benefit to creditors and may not be pursued if they would only
benefit the debtor); Bear, Stearns Sec. Corp. v. Gredd, 275 B.R. 190, 194 (S.D.N.Y. 2002)
(finding that the purpose of preference and fraudulent conveyance actions is to ensure that
transfers that have harmed creditors may be avoided).23 Similarly, equitable subordination and
22 Notably, the CCH Debtors do not allege that they have any unpaid creditors. See Am. Compl. ¶¶ 1124-1168,
1370-1390, 1452-1457, 1514-1519. As it is their burden to allege and, ultimately, prove the existence of unpaid
creditors to maintain standing with respect to the bankruptcy claims, the bankruptcy claims must be dismissed. See
DaimlerChrysler Corp., 126 S. Ct. at 1861.
23 It is unclear which state’s law applies to the fraudulent conveyance claims Plaintiffs assert under Bankruptcy
Code Section 544. However, the Plaintiffs allege that the laws of Pennsylvania, New York, Texas, North Carolina
and Illinois could apply. See Am. Compl. ¶¶ 1156, 1167. All five of these jurisdictions recognize that avoidance
actions are intended to benefit creditors. See In re Murphy, 331 B.R. at 127 (stating that under New York law, a
“fraudulent transfer is voidable by creditors only”) (citation omitted); 718 Arch St. Assocs. v. Blatstein (In re
Blatstein), 260 B.R. 698, 712 (E.D. Pa. 2001) (recognizing that actions under the Pennsylvania Uniform Fraudulent
Conveyance Act are intended to redress creditor harm); Rodriguez v. Citibank F.S.B. (In re Nowicki), 202 B.R. 729,
(Continued…)
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(to the extent they exist) equitable disallowance claims are intended to remedy the injury
creditors suffer when one creditor engages in wrongdoing that negatively impacts the debtor’s
ability to satisfy its other creditors’ claims. Official Comm. of Unsecured Creditors of
AppliedTheory Corp. v. Halifax Fund, L.P. (In re AppliedTheory Corp)., 345 B.R. 56, 59
(S.D.N.Y. 2006), aff’d, 493 F.3d 82 (2d Cir. 2007) (“The purpose of equitable subordination is to
undo wrongdoing by an individual creditor in the interest of the other creditors.”); Raleigh v.
Illinois Dept. of Revenue, 530 U.S. 15, 24-25 (2000) (recognizing that bankruptcy courts can
reorder distributions to the extent necessary to ensure fair creditor distribution, but cannot disturb
the ultimate validity of a claim); Pepper v. Litton, 308 U.S. 295, 310-313 (1939) (disallowing
insider’s claim when the insider’s claim was a sham created to put himself in front of bona-fide
creditors); see also supra Part V.B.
In light of the purpose underlying these causes of action — ensuring that all creditors
receive a fair distribution — courts in this circuit are clear that trustees or other estate
representatives can only assert bankruptcy claims when one creditor benefits at the expense of
other creditors. See Bear, Stearns Sec. Corp., 275 B.R. at 194-95 (holding that a debtor does not
have standing to bring avoidance claims if all creditors are paid); In re Murphy, 331 B.R. at 124
(recognizing that “[t]he purpose of fraudulent conveyance law ‘is to protect a debtor’s unsecured
creditors from unfair reductions in the debtor’s estate to which creditors usually look for
security’”) (citations omitted); In re Crowthers McCall Pattern, Inc., 120 B.R. 279, 288 (Bankr.
S.D.N.Y. 1990) (finding that “a transaction can be avoided under section 544(b) only to the
extent the avoidance benefits unsecured creditors”).
736 (Bankr. N.D. III. 1996) (holding that under Illinois law, which adopts the Uniform Fraudulent Transfer Act, a
fraudulent transfer is only voidable “to the extent necessary to satisfy the claims of creditors”), Am. Nat’l Bank of
Austin v. Mortgage Am. Corp. (In re Mortgage Am. Corp.), 714 F.2d 1266, 1272 (5th Cir. 1983) (stating that
pursuant to the Texas Fraudulent Transfer Act, a fraudulent transfer is pursued for the benefit of creditors); Bondi v.
Bank of Am. Corp. (In re Parmalat), 383 F. Supp. 2d 587, 601 (S.D.N.Y. 2005) (demonstrating that North
Carolina’s fraudulent transfer law “assigns the remedies for a fraudulent transfer to creditors”).
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Where all creditors are paid in full, a debtor’s payment to one creditor cannot be said to
have impaired its other creditors’ ability to recover on their claims. In such a case, no creditor is
injured within the scope of the law, and as a result, no party has standing to assert any creditor
claims. Vintero Corp. v. Corporacion Venezolana de Fomento (Matter of Vintero Corp.), 735
F.2d 740, 742 (2d Cir. 1984), cert. denied, 469 U.S. 1087 (1984) (holding that the debtor in
possession had the right to avoid in order to protect its other creditors but “not to create a
windfall” for the debtor itself); 11 U.S.C. § 547(b)(5) (2006) (a trustee can pursue a preference
action against a creditor only when a preferential payment allowed the creditor to receive more
than it would have in a Chapter 7 liquidation, thus precluding preference actions in bankruptcy
cases where all creditors are paid in full); Whiteford Plastics Co. v. Chase Nat’l Bank of N.Y.
City, 179 F.2d 582, 584 (2d Cir. 1950) (holding that the debtor could not avoid the lien of a
creditor where creditors would obtain no benefit from avoidance); Official Comm. of Asbestos
Claimants of G-I Holding, Inc. v. Heyman, 277 B.R. 20, 29 (S.D.N.Y. 2002) (recognizing that a
trustee is “powerless to act under section 544(b)” unless there are “creditors against whom the
transfer is voidable under applicable law” that would benefit from the avoidance) (quoting 5
Lawrence King, Collier on Bankruptcy ¶ 544.09 (15th ed. rev. 1999)); Bear, Stearns Sec. Corp.,
275 B.R. at 195 (noting that “[a]t its core, fraudulent transfer law is a debt-collection device and
not a revenue generating tool; its mission is to prevent unjust diminution of the debtor’s estate”)
(citation omitted).
Under this well-developed body of law, Plaintiffs do not have standing to maintain
bankruptcy claims on behalf of the CCH Debtors’ creditors. The Plan, Disclosure Statement and
subsequent October 15, 2007 Status Report — all documents of which the Court may take
judicial notice — make it clear that no creditors of the CCH Debtors were injured on account of
the CCH Non-Agent Lenders’ alleged wrongful conduct. See Joint App., Ex. 8 at DSS2-26-
DSS2-30 (Disclosure Statement); Ex. 9 § 5.2 (Plan); Ex. 12 (Status Report). Instead, each and
every creditor of the CCH Debtors’ estates has been paid in full under the Plan — without even a
single cent of recovery from the various bankruptcy claims. Because none of these creditors has
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suffered the type of injury bankruptcy claims were designed to remedy, the underlying claims
must be dismissed as a matter of law.
b. Plaintiffs cannot manufacture creditors to establish standing.
Because the CCH Debtors have no injured creditors, Plaintiffs attempt to manufacture
creditors on behalf of whom they may assert the CCH Debtors’ bankruptcy claims. They do this
— in both their Amended Complaint and in motions defending their initial complaint — in two
ways. First, they pretend that the more than 250 individual Adelphia entities are really one and
the same, depicting a scenario in which the CCH Debtors not only have to satisfy their own
creditors, but must also satisfy their corporate great-great grandparents’ creditors as well. Joint
App., Ex. 11 (Adelphia Corporate Organization Chart). Second, they invoke the existence of
alleged intercompany claims, arguing that various Adelphia affiliates have claims against the
CCH Debtors. Pls.’ Opp’n to Motions for Leave to Appeal at 35, Docket No. 60 in Case No. 05
Civ. 9050 (S.D.N.Y.) (“[T]here are numerous inter-company claims that were not paid under the
Plan.”). These imaginings are ineffective to “create” creditors where none exist.24
First, the more than 250 Adelphia entities are not one and the same. Rather, the
Bankruptcy Court has already ruled that each Adelphia entity is a separate legal entity, with its
own assets, liabilities and creditors. Joint App., Ex. 9 (Confirmation Order). In fact, the court-
approved Plan provides that the “Subsidiary Debtors” — among whom are the CCH Debtors —
must pay only those claims asserted against their respective estates.25 Joint App., Ex. 10 § 2.2
(Plan); Joint App., Ex. 8 at Schedule II (Second Disclosure Statement Supplement). The Plan
does not permit, much less obligate, the CCH Debtors to pay claims asserted against their parent
24 Notably, the two theories are mutually exclusive. If the estates were substantively consolidated, the assets and
liabilities of each of the more than 250 individual Adelphia entities would be combined, making the existence of
intercompany claims an impossibility. See Union Sav. Bank v. Augie/Restivo Baking Co., Ltd. (In re Augie/Restivo
Baking Co.), 860 F.2d 515, 518 (2d Cir. 1988) (“Substantive consolidation usually results in . . . eliminating inter-
company claims . . .”) (citation omitted).
25 The Plan further specified that its terms “shall not affect any Debtor’s status as a separate legal entity, . . . cause
a merger or consolidation of any legal entities, nor cause the transfer of any assets.” Joint App., Ex. 10 § 2.2 (Plan).
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entities. If the Adelphia entities hoped to merge or “substantively consolidate” their estates,
pooling their collective assets to satisfy their collective creditors, they were required to seek
court approval of such consolidation before they distributed even one dime to their respective
creditors. They did not. Accordingly, the CCH Debtors must satisfy their own creditors — no
more, no less.
Additionally, there are no unresolved intercompany claims pending against the CCH
Debtors.26 On this point, the Plan is clear: when the Plan becomes effective, all “Intercompany
Claims shall be deemed resolved,” and, as a result, the holders of such claims “shall not be
entitled to . . . receive any Plan Distributions or other allocations of value.” Id. §§ 2.3, 5.3. The
fact that the Plan resolved these claims pursuant to a release and compromise, rather than by
requiring payment in full, does not change the reality that the holders of those resolved claims
are no longer creditors of the CCH Debtors’ estates.27 In re Oceana Int’l, Inc., 376 F. Supp. 956,
962 (D.C.N.Y. 1974) (in a case where creditors’ recoveries were capped at ten percent and where
the plan does not provide for “any retained interest for the benefit of creditors in the proceeds of
a recovery [from an avoidance claim],” the court had no jurisdiction over the claims). There are
no intercompany creditors. And without creditors — intercompany or otherwise — Plaintiffs do
not have standing to bring the CCH Debtors’ bankruptcy claims. Accordingly, Plaintiffs’
bankruptcy claims must be dismissed.
26 Plaintiffs have alleged in prior pleadings, but not in the Amended Complaint, that intercompany claims exist
against the Bank of Adelphia (i.e., Adelphia Cablevision, LLC), the entity that it claims made loan repayments to
CCH Debtors. See, e.g., Pls.’ Opp’n to Motions for Leave to Appeal at 35, Docket No. 60 in Case No. 05 Civ. 9050
(S.D.N.Y.) (“[T]here are numerous inter-company claims that were not paid under the Plan.”). This is irrelevant as
the Plan released all intercompany claims. Joint App., Ex. 10 § 2.2 (Plan); Joint App., Ex. 8 at Schedule II (Second
Disclosure Statement Supplement). As a result, the discussion in this section applies equally to both Adelphia
Cablevision, LLC and the CCH Debtors.
27 Additionally, as part of the Plan, the creditors of the CCH Debtors agreed to contribute certain funds toward a
global settlement agreement. As a result, their creditors’ recoveries are capped at the amount agreed upon in that
settlement, and the possibility that they might have recovered more absent the global settlement contained in the
Plan is irrelevant to their ability to recover in this lawsuit. In re Oceana Int’l, Inc., 376 F. Supp. at 962.
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2. Plaintiffs do not have standing to prosecute the CCH Debtors’
bankruptcy claims because the requested relief cannot redress the
CCH Debtors’ creditors’ injuries.
a. Where creditors of the CCH Debtors have no interest in the
recovery from this lawsuit, Plaintiffs cannot pursue
bankruptcy claims on their behalf.
Even assuming that the Plaintiffs could show that the CCH Debtors’ creditors suffered an
actual injury (i.e., that the CCH Debtors could not satisfy their creditors’ claims) as a result of
the acts they allege in the Amended Complaint, they still would not be able to show that their
prosecution of the bankruptcy claims would remedy that creditor injury. Pursuant to the Plan,
any and all proceeds of this litigation will inure to the benefit of parties with an interest in the
CVV. See Joint App., Ex. 10 §§ 9.2 - 9.3 (Plan) (explaining that beneficiaries of the CVV will
be entitled to the proceeds from this and other lawsuits). Creditors of the CCH Debtors,
however, are not beneficiaries of the CVV and, as a result, will never realize any recovery on
account of the bankruptcy claims Plaintiffs assert in this action. As a result, even assuming that
creditors of the CCH Debtors were injured, the bankruptcy claims they assert in this lawsuit
cannot serve to redress their injuries. Plaintiffs therefore have no standing to bring their
bankruptcy claims. Whiteford Plastics Co., 179 F.2d at 584 (holding that the debtor could not
avoid the lien of a creditor where creditors would obtain no benefit from avoidance); Official
Comm. of Asbestos Claimants of G-I Holdings, Inc. v. Heyman, 277 B.R. at 20 (recognizing that
a debtor is “powerless to act under section 544(b)” unless there are “creditors against whom the
transfer is voidable under applicable law” that would benefit from the avoidance).
b. The fact that the CCH Debtors themselves could benefit from
avoidance of their obligations under the CCH Credit Facility
does not invest Plaintiffs with standing.
i. Plaintiffs cannot avoid the CCH Debtors’ contractual
obligations so as to redress injuries that the CCH
Debtors — as opposed to their creditors — suffered.
Moreover, Plaintiffs do not have standing to use fraudulent transfer law for the benefit of
the CCH Debtors. “Fraudulent conveyance statutes were not intended to protect transferors from
their own generosity, stupidity or improvidence, and there is no federal bankruptcy interest in
disrupting any legally binding state property relationships to the extent that creditors or
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administrative creditors are not harmed under Section 548.” In re Murphy, 331 B.R. at 126; see
also Bear, Stearns Sec. Corp., 275 B.R. at 194 (noting the purpose of preference and fraudulent
conveyance actions is to ensure that transfers that have harmed creditors may be avoided). In
fact, where the principles underlying fraudulent conveyance law are not implicated — where
there is no creditor harm — a court will “not concern itself with the relative value of what the
parties exchanged, and will enforce a bad bargain.” In re Asia Global Crossing, Ltd., 344 B.R.
247, 252 (Bankr. S.D.N.Y. 2006). Thus, even assuming that the CCH Debtors struck a bad deal
in agreeing to the CCH Credit Agreement, because no creditor suffered any harm that could be
remedied by the pursuit of this action, the avoidance claims must be dismissed as a matter of
law.
In fact, permitting Plaintiffs to avoid the CCH Debtors’ obligations under the CCH Credit
Agreement simply because they filed bankruptcy is flatly prohibited. “The Bankruptcy Code
will not be interpreted to allow debtors [or their representatives] to avoid the state property law
consequences of their actions except to the extent necessary to serve a valid bankruptcy
purpose.” In re Murphy, 331 B.R. at 126. Accordingly, once creditors’ claims have been
satisfied, the transaction remains valid and enforceable as between the transferor and transferee.
In re Bd. of Dirs. of Hopewell Int’l Ins. Ltd., 238 B.R. 25, 55 (Bankr. S.D.N.Y. 1999), aff’d 275
B.R. 699 (S.D.N.Y. 2002) (“a transfer, avoidable as fraudulent by a creditor, is considered valid
as between the grantor and grantee”); In re Best Prods. Co., 168 B.R. 35, 57 (Bankr. S.D.N.Y.
1994), appeal dismissed, 168 B.R. 35 (S.D.N.Y. 1995), aff’d, 177 B.R. 791 (2d Cir. 1995)
(“Because the fraudulent transfer is voidable by creditors only, it is not remarkable that, as
between the parties to the transfer, the law regards the transfer as real and binding.”).28 Here, the
28 State law also holds that as between the CCH Debtors and the CCH Non-Agent Lenders, the loan is valid and
not subject to a fraudulent transfer claim. See, e.g., Eaves v. Snyder, 84 A.2d 195, 197 (Pa. 1951) (“It is well settled
that a deed intended to defraud creditors, although void as against creditors, yet is valid as against the grantor, or
those claiming under him . . . .”); Stewart v. Kearney, 6 Watts 453, 1837 WL 3105 (Pa. 1837) (finding a party who
sells property in fraud of creditors is not entitled to have the Court void his obligation because the “action is
maintainable in the name of the administrator, as a trustee for the creditors . . . only so far as the property in contest
may be needed for payment of debts, whose existence the plaintiff would be bound to show.”). Sharrer v. Sandles,
(Continued…)
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CCH Non-Agent Lenders have a valid state law property interest in the CCH Debtors’ obligation
to repay their loans, and in the absence of harmed creditors, neither sections 544 nor 548 can be
used to avoid those obligations.
ii. In fact, if there are no creditors to benefit from
avoidance of a contractual obligation, the Court must
enforce the contract or transfer at issue.
Indeed, courts must “give effect to state law . . . and . . . recognize state law property
interests to the extent they do not conflict with a federal interest.” In re Murphy, 331 B.R. at
122-23 (citations omitted). With respect to transfers subject to fraudulent conveyance law, the
federal bankruptcy interest in avoiding improper transfers ends when all creditors recover in full.
At that point, state law governs the relationship between the transferor and transferee. Congress
did not — and could not — intend fraudulent conveyance law to give debtors a “do over.” Id. at
125 (“Congress could not have intended Section 548 to abrogate state law obligations and allow
debtors to avoid the state law consequences of their actions and to reap a ‘windfall merely by
reason of the happenstance of bankruptcy,’” where their creditors suffered no injury); In re
Vintero Corp., 735 F.2d at 742 (finding that a creditor could avoid a security interest to protect
creditors, but “not to create a windfall [for the debtor] itself”). A debtor cannot reap a windfall
as a result of a Chapter 11 proceeding, even if it hopes to give that windfall to what it views as a
deserving third party.
c. The fact that affiliated debtor entities — and their creditors —
could benefit from avoidance of the CCH Debtors’ obligations
under the CCH Credit Facility does not invest Plaintiffs with
standing.
Plaintiffs may argue that the beneficiaries of the CVV will benefit from recovery on the
CCH Debtors’ bankruptcy claims. But because no creditor of the CCH Debtors is a CVV
beneficiary, this is irrelevant.
477 N.Y.S.2d 897, 899 (App. Div. 1984) (stating that “the transaction between [the parties] may be legally binding
as to them, but ineffectual as to. . . creditors”).
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As discussed, the bankruptcy claims raised in this lawsuit are creditors’ remedies,
intended solely for the benefit of creditors. As a result, a debtor or trustee may not avoid
obligations, subordinate claims or disallow claims for the benefit of third parties. See Warth v.
Seldin, 422 U.S. 490, 500 (1975) (standing “exists only to redress or otherwise to protect against
injury to the complaining party, even though the court’s judgment may benefit others
collaterally”); In re Bd. of Dirs. of Hopewell, 238 B.R. at 55 (“There is no need to recover assets
in order to ensure equality of distribution when there is a large enough roast in the oven to feed
all the hungry mouths. For this reason . . . a trustee’s or debtor in possession’s avoidance powers
can only be exercised for the benefit of creditors”); United Capital Corp. v. Sapolin Paints, Inc.
(In re Sapolin Paints, Inc.), 11 B.R. 930, 938 (Bankr. E.D.N.Y. 1981) (stating that a third party
purchaser, to whom the debtor had assigned its right to pursue preference claims, attempted “to
stand the law of preferences on its head” in seeking to avoid those transfers for its own benefit
(as opposed to that of the debtor’s general creditors)); Consol. Pet Foods, Inc. v. Millard
Refrigerated Servs., Inc. (In re S&D Foods, Inc.), 110 B.R. 34, 36 (Bankr. D. Colo. 1990)
(finding that “[e]quitable subordination is available only to subordinate ‘all or part of an allowed
claim to all or part of another allowed claim’”) (quoting 11 U.S.C. § 510(c)); Eaves v. Snyder, 84
A.2d 195, 197 (Pa. 1951) “It is well settled that a deed intended to defraud creditors, although
void as against creditors, yet is valid as against the grantor, or those claiming under him . . . .”).
This is true regardless of whether a third party was somehow injured as a result of the allegations
made in the action. Simply put, if there are no injured creditors, there is no standing to sue.
Here, there is no dispute that the only parties who will benefit from this action are the
beneficiaries of the CVV, none of whom are creditors of the CCH Debtors. Despite the
Plaintiffs’ painstaking efforts to create the illusion that the more than 250 individual Adelphia
entities are really one and the same, creating a pool of needy “Adelphia” creditors, they are not.
The Plan does not effectuate a substantive consolidation of the Adelphia entities. Instead, it is
clear that “all Debtors shall continue to exist as separate legal entities.” See Joint App., Ex. 10
§ 2.2 (Plan); see also Joint App., Ex. 11 (Adelphia Corporate Organization Chart). And, to the
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extent that Plaintiffs seek to assert claims on behalf of a particular debtor’s creditor constituency,
they must show that that particular debtor’s creditors — not some other, amorphous “Adelphia”
creditors — suffered an injury that the lawsuit can redress. Where, as here, they cannot, they do
not have standing to maintain their claims.
d. The operation of section 502(h) of the Bankruptcy Code
reaffirms that the Plaintiffs do not have standing to bring their
avoidance claims because the requested relief will not redress
the CCH Debtors’ creditors injuries.
If the CCH Debtors were to prevail on their avoidance (i.e., fraudulent conveyance and
preference) claims, they would have the right to recover from the CCH Non-Agent Lenders on
account thereof. That right, however, does not exist in a vacuum. Instead, if the CCH Debtors
receive any recovery from the CCH Non-Agent Lenders, section 502(h) of the Bankruptcy Code
will allow the CCH Non-Agent Lenders to assert their own corresponding claims against the
CCH Debtors for the amounts they recover.29 In other words, the CCH Non-Agent Lenders will
have a claim against the CCH Debtors for whatever value the CCH Debtors obtain from them in
this lawsuit. The Plan, as well as section 502(h) of the Bankruptcy Code, specifically
contemplate this result. See Plan § 5.1(c)(iv) (“[U]nless otherwise provided [in a settlement,
order or judgment, a bank whose claim is subject to disgorgement] shall retain its pro rata right
to a distribution of any transfer avoided, if any, under section 502(h) of the Bankruptcy Code
pursuant and subject to the Plan and shall be entitled to net such claim against any amounts to be
paid under a Disgorgement Order”); see also Official Comm. of Unsec. Creditors of Enron Corp.
v. Martin (In re Enron Creditors Recovery Corp.), 376 B.R. 442, 465 (Bankr. S.D.N.Y. 2007)
(“When a preferential payment is avoided, ‘[t]he obligation for which the payment was made is
revived and may be asserted against the debtor’s estate because the creditor has lost the value of
the payment received.’”) (quoting In re Gurley, 311 B.R. 910, 918 (Bankr. M.D. Fla. 2001));
29 Pursuant to section 502(h) of the Bankruptcy Code, “[a] claim arising from the recovery of property under
section 522, 550, or 553 of this title shall be determined, and shall be allowed under subsection (a), (b), or (c) of this
section, or disallowed under subsection (d) or (e) of this section, the same as if such claim had arisen before the date
of the filing of the petition.” 11 U.S.C. § 502(h) (2006).
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Fleet Nat’l Bank v. Gray (In re Bankvest Capital Corp.), 375 F.3d 51, 62 (1st Cir. 2004)
(creditor “entitled to pursue whatever claim it may have had in the avoided sum against the
debtor” pursuant to section 502(h)).
With these corresponding 502(h) claims, the CCH Non-Agent Lenders will be entitled to
payment from the CCH Debtors’ estates in an amount equal to the Plaintiffs’ recovery in this
lawsuit. As already discussed, each of the CCH Debtors has already satisfied (or reserved
amounts significant to satisfy) all of its respective creditors. With no existing creditors to satisfy
— and given the Bankruptcy Code’s absolute priority rule that debtors must pay creditors before
equity holders — the CCH Non-Agent Lenders’ 502(h) claims will be the first (and only) claims
in line for payment from the proceeds of Plaintiffs’ recovery from the CCH Non-Agent Lenders.
Simply put, Plaintiffs will have to use any recovery from the CCH Non-Agent Lenders to satisfy
the CCH Non-Agent Lenders’ resultant claims.
Thus, Plaintiffs’ pursuit of the CCH Debtors’ avoidance claims is utterly pointless. In re
Bankvest Capital Corp., 375 F.3d at 71 (holding avoidance actions are “pointless” where a
creditor “would be entitled to receive exactly what it would be forced to return through
avoidance” pursuant to section 502(h)). After spending what will undoubtedly be a significant
amount of time and money pursuing these actions (particularly given the sheer number of
defendants they have elected to pursue), even if Plaintiffs win, they will simply have to turn
around and give their spoils back to the CCH Non-Agent Lenders. There is no reason for the
Plaintiffs to waste the estates’ assets or, for that matter, the CCH Non-Agent Lenders’ money on
this senseless, circular endeavor. The Court should dismiss the preference and fraudulent
conveyance claims.
e. Even if Plaintiffs succeed on their equitable subordination
claims, their success will not redress any creditor injury.
Similarly, even if Plaintiffs win their equitable subordination claim, their success will not
inure to the benefit of any of the CCH Debtors’ creditors. Again, the CCH Debtors have already
satisfied their creditors in full without subordinating the CCH Non-Agent Lenders’ claims. And
even if the CCH Non-Agent Lenders’ claims were subordinated (to non-existent claims), their
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claims must still be paid before equity interests. Plaintiffs concede as much. See Appellee’s
Opp’n Br. at 51, Docket No. 127 in Case No. 05 Civ. 9050 (S.D.N.Y.) (“[T]he remedy of
equitable subordination may not help the creditors at the parent company level since the
defendants may remain superior by reason of their structural priority.”). Accordingly, even if
Plaintiffs succeed in moving the CCH Non-Agent Lenders’ claims to the back of the creditor
line, no party (including the CCH Debtors’ corporate great grandparents) will receive any
additional recovery as a result. In re S&D Foods, Inc., 110 B.R. at 36 (finding that equitable
subordination would be a “frivolous exercise” where all unsecured creditors will receive the
same amount regardless of whether the defendants’ claims were equitably subordinated). The
Court should therefore dismiss this futile claim.
B. The Bankruptcy Code Does Not Provide An Exception To The Standing
Requirements
Relying predominantly on the Fourth Circuit’s decision in Coleman v. Comm. Trust Bank
(In re Coleman), 426 F.3d 719 (4th Cir. 2005), Plaintiffs have in the past attempted to draw a
distinction between the Bankruptcy Code’s avoidance provisions (sections 544, 547 and 548)
and its recovery provision (section 550) to argue that they need not establish creditor injury — or
the ability of their avoidance claims to redress such injury — to bring their claims. Coleman
considered whether a Chapter 11 debtor could avoid a nonrecourse mortgage lien, conveyed in
fraud of creditors, in an amount greater than that necessary for it to pay its creditors’ claims in
full. Relying on a single phrase in section 550 — “for the benefit of the estate” — the court
concluded that it could. Id. at 725-26; cf. In re Glanz, 205 B.R. 750, 758 (Bankr. D. Md. 1997)
(finding that the Bankruptcy Code does not preclude a debtor from avoiding fraudulent
conveyances even if avoidance will not benefit the estate, but that equitable principles may be
applied to bar a lien avoidance action where avoidance does not accrue to benefit creditors, but
instead creates a windfall for the debtor). The Coleman court misinterprets the Bankruptcy
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Code, and in doing so ignores more than one hundred years of case law establishing that
avoidance is a creditor remedy intended solely to redress creditor injury.30
In Coleman, the debtor argued that the plain language of Bankruptcy Code section
544(b)(1), which authorizes avoidance of any transfer that a creditor could avoid under
applicable state law, allowed her to completely avoid her bank’s lien even when just a partial
avoidance would have allowed her to satisfy her prepetition and administrative creditors’ claims.
In re Coleman, 426 F.3d at 725. The bank, on the other hand, argued that the phrase “for the
benefit of the estate” contained in Bankruptcy Code section 550(a) — the provision governing a
trustee’s right to recover an avoided transfer — only permitted the debtor to avoid the bank’s
liens to the extent necessary to benefit her creditors. Id. The remainder of the security interest,
the bank argued, should remain in favor of the bank as transferee. Id. The Fourth Circuit
ultimately turned the bank’s argument on its head, holding not only that section 550(a)’s “for the
benefit of the estate” language did not limit a trustee’s right to fully avoid a transfer where only
partial avoidance was necessary to satisfy creditors, but also that Congress’ choice not to include
the phrase “for the benefit of the estate” in section 544 indicated Congress’ intent to allow
complete avoidance even when that avoidance would only partially inure to creditors’ benefit.31
In re Coleman, 426 F.3d at 725-26 (“[T]he presence of the phrase ‘for the benefit of the estate’ in
§ 550 merely highlights the fact that Congress knew how to include such a limitation when it
wanted to.”).
30 Notably, the debtor in Coleman did have creditors that would benefit from avoidance (even though the full
proceeds of avoidance were not necessary to satisfy those creditors’ claims). Here, however, the CCH Debtors do
not have even one creditor that could benefit from a recovery in this case. Instead, any recovery the Plaintiffs
receive will flow to creditors of the CCH Debtors’ corporate great grandparent. This alone makes Coleman — and
the Plaintiffs’ reliance thereon — inapplicable to this case.
31 See 11 U.S.C. § 544(b)(1) (2006) (“[T]he trustee may avoid any transfer of an interest of the debtor in property
or any obligation incurred by the debtor that is voidable under applicable law by a creditor holding an unsecured
claim that is allowable under section 502 of this title or that is not allowable only under section 502(e) of this title.”);
11 U.S.C. § 550(a) (2006) (“(a) Except as otherwise provided in this section, to the extent that a transfer is avoided
under section 544, 545, 547, 548, 549, 553(b), or 724(a) of this title, the trustee may recover, for the benefit of the
estate, the property transferred, or, if the court so orders, the value of such property . . . . ) (emphasis added).
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As an initial matter, Coleman is contrary to the established law in this Circuit. In fact,
courts in this Circuit have consistently held that a trustee cannot avoid a transfer unless there are
creditors that will benefit from the avoidance. Matter of Vintero Corp., 735 F.2d at 742.
Moreover, the Fourth Circuit’s analysis in Coleman is just wrong.32 The purpose of
avoidance actions — to redress creditor injuries caused when a debtor’s transfer of property
benefits one creditor to the detriment of other creditors — has been deeply embedded in
bankruptcy common law (including the Second Circuit common law this Court is bound to
follow) since the time of the 1898 Bankruptcy Act, more than 100 years ago. See In re J.C.
Winship Co., 120 F. 93, 96 (7th Cir. 1903) (“It would be mockery of justice to say that the
alleged bankrupt may claim through and in the right of creditors whose debts have been paid and
discharged; that he may avoid a transaction, valid as to himself but voidable as to creditors, in
the right of nonexisting creditors. . . . The court of bankruptcy is a court of equity.”); see also
Matter of Vintero Corp., 735 F.2d at 741-742 (demonstrating that the trustee had the ability to
act on behalf of creditors); Whiteford Plastics Co., 179 F.2d at 585 (“In our opinion the bank,
which had a good secured claim as against the debtor, can still hold it where the petition to avoid
the sale is not in the interest of the general creditors.”); In re Martin Custom Made Tires Corp.,
108 F.2d 172, 173 (2d Cir. 1939) (noting that a “debtor in possession holds its powers in trust for
the benefit of the creditors,” and thus, “the debtor in possession may move to have the mortgage
held invalid as to creditors,” but “in the unlikely event that, after creditors have been satisfied
32 The facts of Coleman are analogous to those of Moore v. Bay, 284 U.S. 4 (1931), yet Coleman (by employing its
forced statutory analysis) erroneously goes further than Moore. In Moore, the trustee sought to avoid a transfer
standing in the shoes of a creditor that existed at the time of the transfer, and to use the proceeds of that avoidance to
satisfy all creditors, i.e., those that existed both at the time of and after the avoided transfer. The Supreme Court
held that the trustee could avoid a fraudulent conveyance to the extent necessary to benefit the estate, and thus that
all creditors, including those whose claims arose subsequent to the time of the avoidable transfer, could share in that
recovery. Id. at 5. Moore, however, said nothing about the proper disposition of an avoided transfer to the extent
that there are proceeds beyond those necessary to satisfy all creditors in full. In Coleman, there were both
prepetition and administrative creditors that stood to benefit from avoidance. Under Moore, the debtor would have
been permitted to avoid the transfer to the extent necessary to satisfy all prepetition and administrative creditors.
The court in Coleman, however, went beyond the holding of Moore, and held that the debtor could avoid the subject
lien beyond the extent necessary to satisfy all creditors in full, and thus provide a benefit to the debtor on account of
the avoidance at the expense of the lien counterparty. This was an error.
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accordingly, some of the mortgaged property should be left unaffected by the plan and some part
of the debt due the [mortgagee] should remain,” then “whatever security the [mortgagee] may
have under the mortgage is left for determination.”); Matter of Schwab, 613 F.2d 1279, 1281 n.2
(5th Cir. 1980) (holding that the court may void lien for benefit of creditors); In re Parkwood,
Inc., 461 F.2d 158, 162-163 (D.C. Cir. 1971) (accord); City Nat. Bank & Trust Co. v. Oliver, 230
F.2d 686, 689-90 (10th Cir. 1956) (accord).
The Supreme Court has repeatedly held that, in the absence of clear statutory language or
legislative history to the contrary, bankruptcy common law established under the pre-Code 1898
Bankruptcy Act retains its validity under the Bankruptcy Code. See Dewsnup v. Timm, 502 U.S.
410, 419-420 (1992) (stating that “[w]hen Congress amends the bankruptcy laws, it does not
write ‘on a clean slate,’” and also that the Supreme Court “has been reluctant to accept
arguments that would interpret the [Bankruptcy] Code . . . to effect a major change in pre-Code
practice that is not the subject of at least some discussion in the legislative history” except in
circumstances where the language of the Bankruptcy Code is “unambiguous”) (citations
omitted).
Here, Congress’ enactment of the Bankruptcy Code does nothing to invalidate this time-
honored precedent. Neither the legislative history nor inclusion of the phrase “for the benefit of
creditors” in the recovery section of the Code indicates Congress’ clear intent to abrogate
avoidance common law. In fact, the legislative history behind section 550 reveals that Congress
enacted this recovery provision — a then-novel concept in bankruptcy law — predominantly to
address the difficulties trustees encountered in recovering avoided transfers from subsequent, as
opposed to initial, transferees. Ralph Brubaker, Lien Avoidance “for the Benefit of the Estate”:
Textualism, Equitable Powers, and Code Common Law, 26 No. 1 Bankruptcy Law Letter (2006)
(citing S. Rep. No. 95-989, at 90 (1978); H.R. Rep. No. 95-595, at 376 (1977)). The legislative
history says nothing at all to suggest that Congress had a secondary goal of sanctioning
avoidance — but barring recovery — when the transferor has no existing creditors that will
benefit from avoidance.
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In fact, the statute itself suggests just the opposite. Section 550 sets up a two-step process
for avoiding and recovering transfers: a trustee must first successfully avoid a transfer under the
Bankruptcy Code’s avoidance provisions, and only then may it sue to recover the value of the
avoided transfer from an initial or subsequent transferee. In other words, the trustee’s ability to
avoid is a necessary prerequisite to (and, in fact, is itself a limitation on) its ability to recover. A
trustee cannot recover what it cannot first avoid. And because the common law — common law
that sections 544, 547 and 548 of the Bankruptcy Code have not abrogated — is clear that a
trustee can only bring an avoidance action when it will inure to the benefit of creditors, the
creditor-benefit limitation that courts and commentators have read into section 550 actually
derives not from the statute itself, but rather from avoidance common law. The limitation is one
and the same. Coleman’s statutory interpretation misses the point.33
Plaintiffs take Coleman’s erroneous statutory interpretation to an extreme, arguing that
Congress’ enactment of sections 544 and 550 of the Bankruptcy Code altogether negates the
jurisdictional requirement of standing in avoidance actions. This, they argue, allows a trustee to
avoid a transfer even when the debtor’s creditors — the real parties in interest — were not
injured by the transfer and, therefore, cannot benefit from avoidance thereof. Of course,
Congress simply does not have the power to modify or abrogate the jurisdictional requirements
of standing. Bennett v. Spear, 520 U.S. 154, 162 (1997) (recognizing that Congress cannot
abrogate the immutable requirement of constitutional standing). And again, there is no evidence
in the Bankruptcy Code or legislative history that it actually intended to do so.
33 As one law professor has disdainfully described the Coleman result: “[T]he debtor obtains the loan proceeds,
the debtor fraudulently grants a lien to the bank, and then the debtor herself (following the bankruptcy filing)
successfully attacks the lien as having been fraudulently granted (by herself), thus resulting in a possible surplus for
the debtor’s own benefit, while depriving the bank of its lien. . . . With a little doctoring, this plot line could make a
great screenplay: a scam artist intentionally engages in a fraudulent transfer (preferably with an innocent victim as
the transferee), files bankruptcy, pays off the creditors for pennies on the dollar, and then recovers the entire
fraudulent transfer from the hapless transferee. Only in bankruptcy could such a bizarre result occur.” Dan
Schechter, Debtor May Completely Avoid Lien As Fraudulent Transfer Based on Debtor’s Own Fraudulent Intent,
and Bankruptcy Court Cannot Limit Scope of Debtor’s Recovery, 2005 Comm. Fin. News. 84, 84 (2005).
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Despite the Fourth Circuit’s misguided decision in Coleman, the law remains now as it
did back in 1903: avoidance is a creditor remedy that can only be exercised to redress injuries
fraudulent or preferential transfers cause to the transferor’s creditors. As a result, because the
CCH Debtors have no injured creditors to benefit from avoidance, Plaintiffs have no standing to
raise their avoidance claims. They must be dismissed.
V. THE COURT SHOULD DISMISS PLAINTIFFS’ EQUITABLE
SUBORDINATION AND EQUITABLE DISALLOWANCE CLAIMS BECAUSE
PLAINTIFFS FAIL TO STATE A CLAIM UPON WHICH RELIEF CAN BE
GRANTED
A. Plaintiffs Equitable Subordination Claims Against The Non-Agent Lenders
Must Be Dismissed.
The Court may also dismiss Plaintiffs’ equitable subordination claim because they have
failed to state a claim against the CCH Non-Agent Lenders. Equitable subordination34 is an
unusual remedy that should be applied only in limited circumstances, none of which have been
alleged against the Non-Agent Lenders. See Le Cafe Creme, Ltd. v. Le Roux (In re Le Cafe
Creme, Ltd.), 244 B.R. 221, 235 (Bankr. S.D.N.Y. 2000);35 see also Official Comm. of Unsec.
34 As discussed in Part V.B of this brief, an action for equitable disallowance does not exist under the Bankruptcy
Code. In the event that the Court holds otherwise, and finds that the Bankruptcy Code does allow actions for
equitable disallowance, the CCH Non-Agent Lenders note that what little case law discusses equitable disallowance
at all indicates that the standards for obtaining equitable disallowance would be higher and more difficult to satisfy
than the standards for equitable subordination. See, e.g., In re Adelphia Commc’ns Corp, 365 B.R. at 73 (finding
that equitable subordination and equitable disallowance are not equally appropriate alternatives and that
disallowance plainly “is more draconian, and would be appropriate in just a few circumstances”). As such, the Non-
Agent Lender’s arguments regarding equitable subordination apply with even more force to Plaintiffs’ claim for
equitable disallowance.
35 Although the Le Cafe Creme Court eventually found that plaintiffs could equitably subordinate defendants’
claims, the defendants in Le Cafe Creme were insiders. In our case, the CCH Non-Agent Lenders are not alleged to
be insiders or fiduciaries. Courts have held that equitable subordination for non-insiders is even more rare. See,
e.g., Official Comm. of Unsec. Creds. of Sunbeam Corp. v. Morgan Stanley & Co. (In re Sunbeam Corp.), 284 B.R.
355, 364 (Bankr. S.D.N.Y. 2002) (“Few cases find that non-insider, non-fiduciary claims meet this standard [for
equitable subordination].”); 80 Nassau Assoc. v. Crossland Fed. Sav. Bank, (In re 80 Nassau Assocs.), 169 B.R. 832,
838 (Bankr. S.D.N.Y. 1994) (“[C]ases subordinating the claims of creditors that dealt at arm’s length with the debtor
are few and far between.”) (citation omitted). It is more difficult for courts to equitably subordinate non-insiders’
claims because “[i]n the case of non-insider claims, the proponent always bears the burden of proof” and there are
“fewer traditional grounds available” for equitable subordination. Id. at 839-840 n.5 (citations omitted). Some
courts even state a “higher level of proof is required to equitably subordinate the claim of a party that is neither an
insider of the debtor, nor a fiduciary to the debtor or other creditors.” In re Sunbeam Corp., 284 B.R. at 363-64
(citations omitted). Cf. Official Comm. of Unsec. Creds. of Lois/USA, Inc., v. Conseco Fin. Serv. Crop., (In re
Lois/USA, Inc.), 264 B.R. 69, 135 (Bankr. S.D.N.Y. 2001) (citation omitted).
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Creds. of Radnor Holdings Corp. v. Tennenbaum Capital Partners, LLC (In re Radnor Holdings
Corp.), 353 B.R. 820, 840 (Bankr. D. Del. 2006) (“[E]quitable subordination is a ‘drastic’ and
‘unusual’ remedy.”) (citation omitted); Cohen v. KB Mezzanine Fund II., LP (In re SubMicron
Sys. Corp), 291 B.R. 314, 327 (D. Del. 2003) (“Courts have recognized that equitable
subordination is an unusual remedy which should be applied only in limited circumstances.”
(citing Holt v. Fed. Deposit Ins. Corp., 868 F.2d 146, 148-49 (5th Cir.1989)); Waslow v. MNC
Commercial Corp. (In re M. Paolella & Sons, Inc.), 161 B.R. 107, 117 (E.D.Pa.1993)
(“[E]quitable subordination is an extraordinary departure from the ‘usual principles of equality of
distribution and preference for secured creditors’”) (citation omitted)). In order to state a claim
for equitable subordination against the CCH Non-Agent Lenders — which lenders are not
alleged to be insiders or fiduciaries — Plaintiffs must allege facts that the CCH Non-Agent
Lenders engaged in gross and egregious conduct that is tantamount to fraud, misrepresentation,
overreaching, spoliation or conduct involving moral turpitude.36 See, In re Sunbeam Corp., 284
B.R. at 355, 364 (Bankr. S.D.N.Y. 2002). Plaintiffs must allege facts that establish plausible
grounds for the claim that the CCH Non-Agent Lenders “committed fraud or some other illegal
action, or that the [CCH Non-Agent Lenders] breached some legal duty that [they] owed to the
debtor or its creditors.” Id.; see also Bell Atl. Corp. v. Twombly, 127 S. Ct. 1955, 1965 (2007).
The Court may not assume that Plaintiffs will prove facts they have not pleaded, and conclusory
allegations are not adequate. See Twombly, 127 S. Ct. at 1966 n.5; 1969 n.8. As the Amended
36 Plaintiffs have previously admitted in pleadings before the Bankruptcy Court that Plaintiffs are not alleging
gross and egregious conduct by the CCH Non-Agent Lenders. See, supra n.13. Instead Plaintiffs rely on a “tainted
debt” theory, the gist of which is that if one lender in the chain of transfers engages in any gross and egregious
conduct, then any lenders in the chain of transfers leading from that “bad” lender, are subject to equitable
subordination to the same extent as the “bad” lender. See Joint App., Ex. 14 ¶ 8 (Estimation Mot.) (stating that “[i]n
the Bank Action, there is no allegation that the Syndicate Banks individually did anything improper. Rather, the
only issue specific to the Syndicate Banks is whether as ‘after-market’ holders of Bank Claims under the Prepetition
Credit Facilities, their debt may be ‘tainted’ by the torts and other wrongful conduct of the Banks from whom they
purchased that debt.”). See also id. ¶ 40 (“[T]he complaint in the Bank Action does not allege that the Syndicate
Banks individually committed wrongdoing . . . .”); id. ¶ 67 (“In the Bank Action, there are no claims that any of the
‘after-market’ Syndicate Banks individually did anything improper. In fact, most of the Syndicate Banks are not
even banks.”). The CCH Non-Agent Lenders response to Plaintiffs’ tainted debt theory appears in Part II.D of this
brief.
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Complaint factually alleges only that the CCH Non-Agent Lenders purchased debt in arms-
length transactions with Adelphia and the Agents, Plaintiffs fail to meet this standard. The Court
should dismiss the claim for equitable subordination against the Non-Agent Lenders.
1. The Amended Complaint fails to allege plausible liability for equitable
subordination because Plaintiffs’ allegations make clear that the
necessary vehicle for the alleged fraud was the Rigas and Adelphia
established CMS, not the co-borrowing facilities.
Despite Plaintiffs “other” story of fraud at Adelphia via the co-borrowing facilities,
Plaintiffs’ pleadings make it clear that Adelphia’s CMS was the instrumentality that allowed the
Rigases to perpetrate their fraud. For example, Plaintiffs allege the CMS was the Rigas Family’s
personal piggy bank, and that the Rigas Family could, and did, change “ownership” of cash
simply through journal entries. See Background Facts, supra Part I.D.; see also Am. Compl. ¶¶
1005, 1012, 1234. Additionally, Plaintiffs allege that when the Rigas Family needed money,
they borrowed it — but not necessarily through a co-borrowing facility. “Beginning in 1998, the
Rigas Family found themselves without access to sufficient cash or credit that they needed to
maintain their lifestyles and achieve their personal business endeavors. The Rigas Family
worked closely with the Agent Banks and the Investment Banks to devise a scheme to use
Adelphia’s credit to obtain access to funds that the Rigas Family could use for their personal
benefit.” Id. ¶ 807. Although this allegation continues Plaintiffs’ story-line of “bad” lenders
scheming with the Rigases, the allegation shows that the Rigases did not need the Co-Borrowing
Facilities to perpetrate their alleged fraud. For example, an alleged need in early 1998 by the
Rigases for more credit, leveraged off of Adelphia, did not lead to the establishment of a Co-
Borrowing Facility.37 Instead, Adelphia, under the Rigases’ control, entered into the Non-Co-
Borrowing Parnassos Credit Facility in December of 1998. Subsequent to that, the Rigases and
Adelphia entered into the UCA/HH Co-Borrowing Credit Facility in May of 1999, and then
37 As stated in the Credit Agreements, the initial dates for each of the Credit Facilities is as follows:
FrontierVision, entered into on December 19, 1997; Parnassos, December 30, 1998; UCA/HHC, May 6, 1999;
Century-TCI, December 3, 1999; Century, April 14, 2000; CCH, September 28, 2001.
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Adelphia, still under Rigas control, entered into another non-coborrowing facility, Century-TCI,
in December of 1999. As Plaintiffs allege, any Rigas Family “need” for credit could be met
through any credit facility, because “[a]ll of the funds drawn on Adelphia’s credit facilities were
deposited and co-mingled [sic] into Adelphia’s cash management system.” Id. ¶ 16.
If, as Plaintiffs’ Amended Complaint establishes, the CMS provided the Rigas Family
with the necessary tool to conduct their alleged fraud, then the plausibility of Plaintiffs’
allegations of a vast conspiracy between the Rigas Family and hundreds of the countries’ top
lending institutions falters. This is particularly so as to the CCH Non-Agent Lenders, against
whom the Amended Complaint alleges neither any special relationship with Adelphia or the
Rigas Family nor any facts indicating their knowledge of any illicit CMS transfers or deception
of the Independent Directors. Plaintiffs’ conclusory allegations against the Non-Agent Lenders
do not establish plausible liability and the Court should dismiss count 33 as against the Non-
Agent Lenders.
2. The Amended Complaint fails to allege plausible liability for the
equitable subordination of the CCH Non-Agent Lenders’ claims
because Plaintiffs make no factual allegations of gross and egregious
conduct on the part of the CCH Non Agent Lenders.
In support of their claim for equitable subordination of the CCH Non-Agent Lenders’
claims, Plaintiffs factually allege as follows: (1) each of the Co-Borrowing Facilities was
syndicated to a group of banks (the “Syndicate Banks” or Non-Agent Lenders) (see Am. Compl.
¶ 74), (2) Adelphia employees under the direction of the Rigases, and CCH Agent and
Investment Banks prepared the CCH Confidential Memo to solicit Non-Agent Lenders to
participate in the CCH Facility (see id. ¶ 882), (3) after the Independent Directors approved the
CCH Facility, the Agent and Investment Banks sent the Non-Agent Lenders the CCH
Confidential Memo in March 2000, which memorandum “made clear, the collateral put up by the
ACC co-borrowers was significantly greater than the collateral put up by RFE co-borrower
Highland Presitge” (id. ¶ 905), (4) the CCH Credit Agreement defined “leverage ratio” on a
combined basis for all CCH Borrowers (see id. ¶ 901), and (5) the Agent and Non-Agent Lenders
quarterly received compliance certificates from Adelphia, showing amounts outstanding under
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the CCH Facility and stating that the borrowers were in compliance with the CCH Credit
Agreement (see id. ¶¶ 882, 1026). Plaintiffs thus factually allege only that some Non-Agent
Lenders who participated in the CCH Credit Facility received information about the structure of
the CCH Credit Facility before deciding to purchase a syndicated portion of the debt,38 that the
CCH Credit Facility was approved by the Independent Directors of Adelphia, that the Non-Agent
Lenders knew that the credit-worthiness of the CCH Facility was based on a combined leverage
ratio of all of the CCH Borrowers, and that the CCH Borrowers provided information to the
Non-Agent Lenders, on a quarterly basis, stating the amount of the borrowings and informing the
Non-Agent Lenders that the CCH Borrowers were in compliance with the requirements of the
CCH Credit Facility.
Nowhere do Plaintiffs allege facts that the Non-Agent Lenders did anything other than
receive general information on a debt offering — information approved by Adelphia — and then
decide to participate in that debt paper. Notably, Plaintiffs’ lengthy allegations regarding the
alleged deception of the Independent Directors do not allege facts showing CCH Non-Agent
Lender participation in or knowledge of any such alleged deception. To the arms-length CCH
Non-Agent Lenders, the Adelphia Directors approved the structure and nature of the CCH Credit
Facilities. No duty existed on the part of the CCH Non-Agent Lenders who participated in the
CCH Credit Facility to second guess the business judgment of the Adelphia Directors — and
Plaintiffs do not even allege the existence of any such duty.
Plaintiffs make one additional unsupported allegation against the CCH Non-Agent
Lenders in the text of Count 33 itself. There, Plaintiffs allege that if any of the CCH Non-Agent
Lenders did not know of or consciously avoided knowledge of the alleged fraud, then the alleged
knowledge and wrongful conduct of the Agent Banks should be imputed to such Lenders “by
virtue of the agency relationship among them.” Id. ¶ 1373. This conclusory, legal allegation
38 Plaintiffs’ allegations regarding the CCH Confidential Memo suggest that such information was allegedly
provided only to the Syndicate Banks, and not the Assignees.
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occurs on page 393 of Plaintiffs’ 475 page Amended Complaint and represents the first and only
mention of any alleged agency relationship between the Agent and Non-Agent Banks. Such
conclusory, legal statements “unsupported by factual assertions fail[] even the liberal standard of
Rule 12(b)(6).” DeJesus v. Sears, Roebuck & Co., Inc., 87 F.3d 65, 70 (2d Cir. 1996) (citation
omitted). See also Maung Ng We v. Merrill Lynch & Co., Inc., No. 99 Civ. 9687, 2000 WL
1159835, at *6 (S.D.N.Y. Aug. 15, 2000) (holding that “plaintiffs’ conclusory statements” that
parties were agents of each other “do not allege an agency relationship sufficient to withstand
dismissal under” Rule 12(b)(6)); Daventree Ltd. v. Republic of Azerbaijan, 349 F. Supp. 2d 736,
763 (S.D.N.Y. 2004) (finding that plaintiff failed to allege facts sufficient to establish an agency
relationship). And in fact, the CCH Credit Facility itself is unambiguous in its repeated
statements refuting the establishment of any such agency relationship. See Background Facts,
supra Part I; see also Global Entm’t Inc. v. N.Y. Tel. Co., No. 00 Civ. 2959, 2000 WL 1672327,
at *6 (S.D.N.Y. Nov. 6, 2000) (finding that plaintiff did not sufficiently plead agency because
contract between parties “negate[d] any control by one party over the other” and plaintiff also
did not plead any other facts that supported allegation of an agency relationship.)
The CCH Non-Agent Lenders are lenders who purchased a portion of the CCH Credit
Facility debt paper, in arms-length transactions, either at inception of the Facility or in the
secondary market. Plaintiffs’ factual allegations do not suggest anything different. As such,
Plaintiffs have utterly failed to allege facts establishing plausible liability against the CCH Non-
Agent Lenders to equitably subordinate their claims, and this Court should dismiss the equitable
subordination claim.39
39 Additionally, certain of the CCH Non-Agent Lenders did not receive distributions on their claims under the
Plan. Instead, they sold their claims against the CCH Debtors before the Plan’s effective date. Because these CCH
Non-Agent Lenders did not receive a Plan distribution on account of their now non-existent claims, they are not
bound by the Plan’s disgorgement provisions and, as a result, their claims (or rights to distribution thereon) cannot
be equitably subordinated or, for that matter, equitably disallowed.
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B. Plaintiffs’ Equitable Disallowance Claims Against The Non-Agent Lenders
Must Also Be Dismissed.
Plaintiffs also assert against the CCH Non-Agent Lenders a claim for “equitable
disallowance,” a cause of action they claim the Supreme Court created in Pepper v. Litton, 308
U.S. 295 (1938).40 In Pepper, the Supreme Court disallowed an insider’s sham claim on account
of the insider’s “planned and fraudulent scheme” to defraud creditors. Id. at 311. In discussing
whether the insider’s claim should be equitably disallowed on account of his wrongdoing, the
Court analyzed the following factors:
• Whether the insider disregarded the corporate entity for his own purpose;
• Whether the insider breached the fiduciary standards of conduct he owed
to the corporation, stockholders or creditors;
• Whether the insider used insider information and his strategic position for
his own benefit; and
• Whether the insider used his power for personal advantage.
In applying these factors, the Court found that the insider’s claim should be disallowed:41
On such a test the action of the District Court in disallowing or
subordinating Litton’s claim was clearly correct. Litton allowed his salary
claims to lie dormant for years and sought to enforce them only when his
debtor corporation was in financial difficulty. Then he used them so that
the rights of another creditor were impaired. Litton as an insider utilized
his strategic position for his own preferment to the damage of Pepper.
Litton as the dominant influence over Dixie Splint Coal Company used his
power not to deal fairly with the creditors of that company but to
manipulate its affairs in such a manner that when one of its creditors came
to collect her just debt the bulk of the assets had disappeared into another
Litton company. Litton, though a fiduciary, was enabled by astute legal
maneuvering to acquire most of the assets of the bankrupt not for cash or
other consideration of value to creditors but for bookkeeping entries
40 Whether an “equitable disallowance” claim even exists at all has been extensively briefed before this Court. See
Joint App., Ex. 17 at 4-10 (Joint Appellant’s Br. of Certain Lenders); see also Joint App., Ex. 18 at 1-7 (Joint Reply
Br. of Certain Lender Appellants). The CCH Non-Agent Lenders agree with those parties who have argued that
neither Pepper v. Litton nor any subsequent case creates a cause of action for equitable disallowance and
incorporates those arguments as if set forth fully herein. That said, even if Plaintiffs’ rendition of the claim exists,
Plaintiffs simply cannot maintain it against the CCH Non-Agent Lenders because they have not alleged facts
sufficient to state a cause of action against them.
41 Based on the facts as recited in Litton, it appears that regardless of whether the Court subordinated or disallowed
Litton’s claim, it would have led to the same result: Litton would have received nothing.
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representing at best merely Litton’s appraisal of the worth of Litton’s
services over the years.
Id. at 311-12 (emphasis added). While the issue of whether Pepper creates a viable “equitable
disallowance” claim is the subject of ongoing debate in this case, to the extent such a claim does
exist, Pepper does make one thing clear: equitable disallowance is an extraordinary remedy
limited to situations where an insider engages in extreme wrongdoing to the detriment of a
creditor. As a result, this claim cannot lie against the Non-Agent Lenders.
First, the Non-Agent Lenders simply are not insiders (nor are they alleged to have any
special relationship with Adelphia). The Bankruptcy Code defines an insider as officer, director,
person in control, relative or partner of a debtor. 11 U.S.C. § 101(31). The Non-Agent Lenders
— banks or other funds that invested in the CCH Credit Facility — are none of the above.
Plaintiffs themselves concede as much. See generally Am. Compl. ¶¶ 146-791 (identifying Non-
Agent Lenders but failing to allege any insider relationship with the CCH Debtors).
Moreover, Plaintiffs do not allege any facts against the CCH Non-Agent Lenders that
would rise to the level of wrongdoing necessary to invoke equitable disallowance. In fact,
Plaintiffs do not assert any allegations of wrongdoing against the CCH Non-Agent Lenders at all.
See supra Part V.1. Accordingly, even if equitable disallowance does exist as a viable cause of
action, Plaintiffs do not — and, given the CCH Non-Agent Lenders’ peripheral role as syndicate
lenders, cannot — allege the corporate control, deception and wrongdoing necessary to maintain
the claim against the Non-Agent Lenders.
Finally, to the extent a claim for equitable disallowance exists, it exists for the benefit of
creditors. As discussed extensively herein, the CCH Debtors do not have any creditors that
would benefit if the court equitably disallowed the CCH Non-Agent Lenders’ claims. Because
there are no creditors, Plaintiffs have no standing to bring their purported equitable disallowance
claim. The claim should be dismissed.
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CONCLUSION
For the foregoing reasons, the CCH Non-Agent Lenders respectfully request that the
Court dismiss Counts 5, 6, 7, 8, 33, 41, and 50 of Plaintiffs’ Amended Complaint as to the CCH
Non-Agent Lenders without leave to amend.
Dated: December 21, 2007
/s/ Richard L. Wynne
KIRKLAND & ELLIS LLP
Citigroup Center
153 East 53rd Street
New York, New York 10022-4675
Richard L. Wynne (RW 5630)
Bennett L. Spiegel (BS 7153)
-and-
777 South Figueroa Street
Los Angeles, California 90017
Telephone: (213) 680-8400
Facsimile: (213) 680-8500
Melissa D. Ingalls (admitted pro hac vice)
Erin Brady (pro hac vice motion pending)
Laura Thomas (admitted pro hac vice)
Attorneys for The Non-Agent Lenders
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