Hugler v. Gaudin

BRIEF in Support re Motion to Dismiss

W.D. Pa.June 5, 2017

IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT FOR THE WESTERN DISTRICT OF PENNSYLVANIA EDWARD C. HUGLER, Acting Secretary of Labor, United States Department of Labor, Plaintiff, v. ROBERT GAUDIN, Individually and as Chief Executive Officer of Holland Acquisitions, Inc. Defendant. : : ELECTRONICALLY FILED : : No.: 2:17-cv-00366-MRH : : : Judge Mark R. Hornak : : : : : : MEMORANDUM OF LAW IN SUPPORT OF DEFENDANT’S MOTION TO DISMISS PLAINTIFF’S COMPLAINT Case 2:17-cv-00366-MRH Document 8 Filed 06/05/17 Page 1 of 15 TABLE OF CONTENTS Page -i- I. INTRODUCTION ............................................................................................................. 1 II. BACKGROUND ............................................................................................................... 2 III. ARGUMENT ..................................................................................................................... 3 A. Standard Of Review ............................................................................................... 3 B. Plaintiff’s Claims Should Be Dismissed For Failure To Allege Sufficient Facts ....................................................................................................................... 4 C. Plaintiff’s Claims Should Be Dismissed As Improper Claim-Splitting................. 7 IV. CONCLUSION ................................................................................................................ 10 Case 2:17-cv-00366-MRH Document 8 Filed 06/05/17 Page 2 of 15 ii TABLE OF AUTHORITIES Page(s) FEDERAL CASES Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 556 U.S. 662 (2009) ...............................................................................................................4, 7 Bell Atlantic Corp. v. Twombly, 550 U.S. 544 (2007) ...............................................................................................................3, 4 Davis v. Sun Oil Co., 148 F.3d 606 (6th Cir. 1998) .....................................................................................................8 Egli v. Strimel, No. 16-3693, 2017 WL 1508989 (E.D. Pa. Apr. 27, 2017) .......................................................9 Frederick Banks v. State Farm, No. 13-1152, 2013 WL 6058471 (W.D. Pa. Nov. 18, 2013) .....................................................9 Haybarger v. Lawrence Cty. Adult Probation & Parole, 667 F.3d 408 (3d Cir. 2012)...................................................................................................4, 5 Henry v. Farmer City State Bank, 808 F.2d 1228 (7th Cir. 1986) ...................................................................................................9 In re Enter. Rent-A-Car Wage & Hour Employment Practices Litig., 683 F.3d 462 (3d Cir. 2012).......................................................................................................4 Jochim v. Jean Madeline Educ. Ctr. of Cosmetology, Inc., No. 13-6564, 2014 WL 12606156 (E.D. Pa. July 30, 2014) .....................................................6 Lewis v. O’Donnell, --- F. App’x ---, No. 16-2820, 2017 WL 35711 (3d Cir. Jan. 4, 2017)......................................9 Mackereth v. Kooma, Inc., No. 14-4824, 2015 WL 2337273 (E.D. Pa. May 14, 2015) .......................................................5 McKenna v. City of Philadelphia, 304 F. App’x 89 (3d Cir. 2008) .................................................................................................8 Munsif v. Am. Bd. of Internal Med., No. 11-5949, 2012 WL 3962671 (E.D. Pa. Sept. 11, 2012) ......................................................9 Richardson v. Bezar, No. 15-0772, 2015 WL 5783685 (E.D. Pa. Oct. 5, 2015) .........................................................5 Case 2:17-cv-00366-MRH Document 8 Filed 06/05/17 Page 3 of 15 iii Robbins v. Gen. Motors De Mexico, 816 F. Supp. 2d 1261 (M.D. Fla. 2011) .....................................................................................8 Schneider v. United States, 301 F. App’x 187 (3d Cir. 2008) ...............................................................................................7 Sensormatic Sec. Corp. v. Sensormatic Elecs. Corp., 329 F. Supp. 2d 574 (D. Md. 2004) .......................................................................................7, 8 Thompson v. Real Estate Mortgage Network, 748 F.3d 142 (3d Cir. 2014).......................................................................................................6 Tracy v. NVR, Inc., 667 F. Supp. 2d 244 (W.D.N.Y. 2009) ......................................................................................6 VitalGo, Inc. v. Kreg Therapeutics, Inc., No. 16-5577, 2017 WL 1163741 (N.D. Ill. Mar. 29, 2017) ......................................................8 Walton v. Eaton Corp., 563 F.2d 66 (3d Cir. 1977)...................................................................................................8, 10 RULES Fed. R. Civ. P. 12(b)(6)............................................................................................................2, 3, 4 Fed. R. Civ. P. 15 .......................................................................................................................8, 10 Case 2:17-cv-00366-MRH Document 8 Filed 06/05/17 Page 4 of 15 1 I. INTRODUCTION The Department of Labor (“Plaintiff” or “DOL”) has brought this action against Defendant Robert Gaudin, Chief Executive Officer of Holland Acquisitions, Inc. (“Holland”) after litigating the identical causes of action against Holland and its Chief Operating Officer, Bryan Gaudin, for almost two years. See generally Perez v. Holland Acquisitions, Inc., et al., No. 2:15-cv-01094-MRH (W.D. Pa.) (“Holland”). In this case and in Holland, Plaintiff alleges that Holland misclassified certain workers as independent contractors rather than employees. Plaintiff seeks injunctive relief and back wages on behalf of these workers. Plaintiff brought this action against Robert Gaudin shortly after a March 15, 2017 settlement conference in the Holland litigation, during which it became apparent that additional defendants would be needed for Plaintiff to recover the inflated amounts it sought. In Holland, the deadline for amending pleadings expired in December 2015, Plaintiff already amended the complaint twice, this Court stated it was “sick and judicially tired of the United States Department of Labor trying to expand this case” and Magistrate Judge Kelly stated during a March 15, 2017 status conference that a motion for leave to file a third amended complaint naming any additional defendant would have to be submitted to the Court for approval. Holland, 3/15/17 Hearing Memo (ECF 97) at p.2. Instead of attempting to obtain leave to file a third amended complaint in Holland, likely knowing that such motion would not be well-received, Plaintiff filed this second action alleging the exact same causes of action against Robert Gaudin. Unfortunately for the Plaintiff, its attempt to evade the inevitable denial of a third motion to amend in the Holland case by filing this new case against Robert Gaudin cannot succeed, both because the Complaint is inadequately pled, and also because it violates the prohibition on claim- splitting. First, the single paragraph of allegations in the Complaint pertaining to Robert Gaudin fall far short of adequately pleading that Mr. Gaudin is individually liable under the Fair Labor Case 2:17-cv-00366-MRH Document 8 Filed 06/05/17 Page 5 of 15 2 Standards Act (“FLSA”), and so is subject to dismissal under Fed. R. Civ. P. 12(b)(6). Plaintiff’s allegations regarding Mr. Gaudin are boilerplate and wholly conclusory and the Complaint lacks any factual allegations showing involvement in day-to-day management of the business that would make individual liability against him plausible. Several other courts have dismissed almost identical complaints against individual defendants for failing to include factual allegations making individual liability plausible, and this Court should do the same. Second, it is clear that Plaintiff has engaged in improper claim splitting by prosecuting the same causes of action against Holland and Bryan Gaudin in the Holland case for two years, and now filing this separate action against Robert Gaudin alleging the same causes of action. For this reason as well, Plaintiff’s Complaint should be dismissed. II. BACKGROUND On August 20, 2015, Plaintiff instituted the Holland action against Holland and Bryan Gaudin. Holland, Complaint (ECF 1). Plaintiff sought injunctive relief and back wages on behalf of certain employees of Holland whom Plaintiff alleges were misclassified as independent contractors rather than employees. Id. The deadline for amending pleadings in Holland was December 15, 2015. Holland, Order (ECF 23). Plaintiff amended its complaint in Holland twice. Holland, ECF 21, 55, 57. At a hearing conducted in Holland after the second amendment, this Court expressed its frustration with Plaintiff, stating: “I am sick and judicially tired of the United States Department of Labor trying to expand this case . . . .” (Holland 11/18/16 hearing transcript at p. 12:17-19, attached hereto as Ex. 1).1 Nonetheless, at a status 1 Such frustration with Plaintiff’s attempts to expand the Holland case was expressed by the Court on other occasions as well. See Holland 1/13/17 hearing transcript at p. 19 (“This case was filed over 18 months ago. State the claim. This is not a rolling lawsuit. . . . The Secretary of Labor does not get to litigate by we’ll figure it out as we go. It doesn’t work that way.”), p. 22 (“Secretary Perez, in the Court’s humble opinion, perhaps within the bounds of the law, has moved the line a couple of times . . . Usually I can state in my own mind in 25 words or less Case 2:17-cv-00366-MRH Document 8 Filed 06/05/17 Page 6 of 15 3 conference on March 15, 2017, Plaintiff indicated to Magistrate Judge Kelly that it might seek leave of court to add defendants. Holland, 3/15/17 Hearing Memo (ECF 97) at p. 2. Magistrate Judge Kelly wrote that “in light of the clear prior rulings of Judge Hornak” any such request would have to be submitted to Judge Hornak. Id. One week later, rather than moving to file a third amended complaint in Holland, Plaintiff filed this separate action against Robert Gaudin. The Complaint in this action contains the same, almost verbatim allegations that Holland misclassified certain employees as independent contractors rather than employees, and it seeks the same injunctive relief and backpay. Compare Complaint (ECF 1) with Holland, Second Amended Complaint (ECF 57). Moreover, the Complaint in this action contains just one short paragraph about Robert Gaudin containing three conclusory allegations purporting to show that he can be individually liable under the FLSA: Defendant Robert Gaudin has actively controlled and managed Holland Acquisitions, Inc., regulated the employment of persons employed at Holland Acquisitions, Inc., and acted directly and indirectly in the interest of the aforementioned corporation in relation to the employees, and is thus an employer of said employees within the meaning of Section 3(d) of the Act. Defendant Robert Gaudin set policies affecting hiring, scheduling, and terminating Holland employees . . . . Defendant Robert Gaudin is partially responsible for Holland’s policy of misclassifying its workers . . . as Independent Contractors and not paying the workers at issue in this matter a premium for overtime hours worked. Complaint (ECF 1) at 2. III. ARGUMENT A. Standard Of Review A Rule 12(b)(6) motion should be granted where the complaint does not allege “enough facts to state a claim to relief that is plausible on its face.” Bell Atlantic Corp. v. Twombly, 550 U.S. 544, 570 (2007). A “plaintiff’s obligation . . . requires more than labels and conclusions, what someone’s claims and defenses are in the 1500 civil cases I’ve had. I mean this one is like chasing jello across the kitchen table in terms of the Department of Labor’s claims.”) (attached hereto as Ex. 2). Case 2:17-cv-00366-MRH Document 8 Filed 06/05/17 Page 7 of 15 4 and a formulaic recitation of the elements of a cause of action will not do . . . .” Id. at 555. “Nor does a complaint suffice if it tenders naked assertions devoid of further factual enhancement.” Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 556 U.S. 662, 678 (2009) (internal quotations, citations and brackets omitted). Rather, in order to survive a motion to dismiss, “a complaint must contain sufficient factual matter, accepted as true, to state a claim to relief that is plausible on its face.” Id. (internal quotations omitted; emphasis added). For the reasons explained below, Plaintiff’s Complaint simply does not meet this standard. B. Plaintiff’s Claims Should Be Dismissed For Failure To Allege Sufficient Facts. Plaintiff’s claims against Robert Gaudin should be dismissed pursuant to Rule 12(b)(6) because the Complaint fails to allege sufficient facts showing that he can be held individually liable for the alleged misclassification by Holland. Robert Gaudin was the CEO of Holland. Complaint (ECF 1) at 1. An officer of a company only may be subject to FLSA liability “when he or she exercises ‘supervisory authority over the complaining employee and was responsible in whole or part for the alleged violation’ while acting in the employer’s interest.’” Haybarger v. Lawrence Cty. Adult Probation & Parole, 667 F.3d 408, 417 (3d Cir. 2012) (citations and quotations omitted). More specifically, the officer must “independently exercise[] control over the work situation” to be individually liable. Id. Courts examine several factors in determining whether an officer may be individually liable under the FLSA, including whether the individual had: “(1) authority to hire and fire employees; (2) authority to promulgate work rules and assignments, and set conditions of employment, including compensation, benefits, and hours; (3) day-to-day supervision, including employee discipline; and (4) control of employee records, including payroll, insurance, taxes, and the like.” In re Enter. Rent-A-Car Wage & Hour Case 2:17-cv-00366-MRH Document 8 Filed 06/05/17 Page 8 of 15 5 Employment Practices Litig., 683 F.3d 462, 469 (3d Cir. 2012); accord Haybarger, 667 F.3d at 418. Courts routinely dismiss FLSA claims against corporate officers where the complaint contains only conclusory allegations that these factors are met and lacks any specific factual allegations showing that day-to-day involvement in supervision or setting policy is plausible. In Richardson v. Bezar, No. 15-0772, 2015 WL 5783685 (E.D. Pa. Oct. 5, 2015), for example, the court dismissed a FLSA complaint against the President of a company because the complaint contained only conclusory allegations that were virtually identical to the allegations in the Complaint in this case. Specifically, the complaint alleged that the individual defendant “acted in the interest of an employer towards Plaintiffs and other similarly situated employees at all material times, including without limitation directly or indirectly controlling the terms of employment of Plaintiffs and other similarly situated employees . . . [and that he] manag[ed], own[ed] and/or operat[ed] [the company] . . . .” Id. at *2 (citation and quotations omitted). The complaint also alleged that he “regularly exercised the authority to hire and fire employees, determine the work schedules of employees, set the rate of pay of employees, and control the finances and operations of [the company].” Id. (quotations omitted). The court granted the President’s motion to dismiss because “[o]ther than these general allegations, the Complaint is void of any factual allegations by which we can conclude that Defendant is Plaintiffs’ joint employer under the FLSA.” Id.; see also Mackereth v. Kooma, Inc., No. 14-4824, 2015 WL 2337273, at *7 (E.D. Pa. May 14, 2015) (dismissing FLSA complaint against individual defendants where complaint contained only conclusory allegations that the defendants were “corporate officers who ‘exercise sufficient control over the labor policies and practices complained of herein to be considered the employers of Plaintiffs’ within the meaning of the Case 2:17-cv-00366-MRH Document 8 Filed 06/05/17 Page 9 of 15 6 FLSA.”); Jochim v. Jean Madeline Educ. Ctr. of Cosmetology, Inc., No. 13-6564, 2014 WL 12606156, at *8 (E.D. Pa. July 30, 2014) (dismissing FLSA complaint against owner of company where plaintiff failed to allege any facts showing “day-to-day control of employment operations” and instead contained only conclusory allegations that the owner “‘personally participated in the unlawful practices alleged herein’, ‘knew of, created and approved of the practices’, and ‘shared in the proceeds of the unlawful practices’”); Tracy v. NVR, Inc., 667 F. Supp. 2d 244, 247 (W.D.N.Y. 2009) (“mere boilerplate allegations that an individual meets the various prongs of the economic reality test stated solely upon information and belief and without any supporting details—essentially ‘a formulaic recitation of the elements of a cause of action’— are insufficient to raise plaintiffs’ right to relief ‘above a speculative level’ with respect to that individual’s liability as an employer under the FLSA”).2 Here, the allegations similarly are wholly conclusory and boilerplate and Plaintiff pleads no factual support that shows plausibility. CEOs typically are not involved in the day-to-day management of the business, and the Complaint contains no factual allegations showing any exception in this case. The Complaint alleges that “Defendant Robert Gaudin has actively controlled and managed Holland Acquisitions, Inc., regulated the employment of persons employed at Holland Acquisitions, Inc., and acted directly and indirectly in the interest of the aforementioned corporation in relation to the employees,” but provides not a single fact showing any involvement by Robert Gaudin in any of these activities. Complaint (ECF 1) at 2. The 2 By way of contrast, in Thompson v. Real Estate Mortgage Network, 748 F.3d 142, 153- 54 (3d Cir. 2014), the court held that the complaint sufficiently alleged individual liability because there were specific factual allegations that (1) “[w]hen a work or personnel issue arose . . . that Thompson’s immediate supervisor could not address alone, ‘the supervisor would consult with, among others, [the individual defendants]” and (2) the plaintiff specifically asked one of the individual defendants about overtime compensation, and the individual defendant responded that he “‘did not pay overtime to underwriters.’” Case 2:17-cv-00366-MRH Document 8 Filed 06/05/17 Page 10 of 15 7 Complaint also contains the conclusory allegation that “Defendant Robert Gaudin set policies affecting hiring, scheduling, and terminating Holland employees,” but it does not contain a single example of a policy Robert Gaudin “set” or any other facts making this conclusory allegation plausible. Id. Similarly, the complaint alleges that “Defendant Robert Gaudin is partially responsible for Holland’s policy of misclassifying its workers . . . as Independent Contractors and not paying the workers at issue in this matter a premium for overtime hours worked,” but it alleges no facts at all about his “partial responsibility” for these policies. Id. These boilerplate allegations are the very definition of “naked assertions devoid of further factual enhancement,” and they are not sufficient to state a claim of individual liability against Robert Gaudin. Iqbal, 556 U.S. at 678. Therefore, because the complaint entirely lacks any factual allegations showing that Robert Gaudin exercised any day-to-day supervisory authority at Holland that would satisfy the Enterprise factors, the Court should grant Defendant’s motion and dismiss the Complaint in its entirety. C. Plaintiff’s Claims Should Be Dismissed As Improper Claim-Splitting. Plaintiff’s Complaint also should be dismissed because Plaintiff has engaged in blatant and improper claim-splitting. It is well-established that a district court has “power to administer its docket and dismiss a suit that is duplicative of another suit in federal court.” Schneider v. United States, 301 F. App’x 187, 190 (3d Cir. 2008) (district court did not err in dismissing complaint that was “nearly identical” to complaint in prior action); see also, e.g., Sensormatic Sec. Corp. v. Sensormatic Elecs. Corp., 329 F. Supp. 2d 574, 579 (D. Md. 2004) (“It is undisputed that it is within a district court’s power to . . . dismiss a suit that is duplicative of another federal court suit.”). This rule against duplicative litigation is “referred to as ‘claim splitting,’” and is the Case 2:17-cv-00366-MRH Document 8 Filed 06/05/17 Page 11 of 15 8 “‘other action pending’ facet of the res judicata doctrine.’” Sensormatic, 329 F. Supp. 2d at 579 (quoting Davis v. Sun Oil Co., 148 F.3d 606, 613 (6th Cir. 1998)). “Like res judicata, claim splitting prohibits a plaintiff from prosecuting its case piecemeal, and requires that all claims arising out of a single wrong be presented in one action.” Sensormatic, 329 F. Supp. 2d at 579 (quotations omitted). Accordingly, the Third Circuit has held that a plaintiff clearly has “no right to maintain two separate actions involving the same subject matter at the same time in the same court and against the same defendant.” Walton v. Eaton Corp., 563 F.2d 66, 70 (3d Cir. 1977). Further, the Third Circuit expressly has directed district courts to “carefully insure[ ] that [a] plaintiff does not use the tactic of filing two substantially identical complaints to expand the procedural rights he would have otherwise enjoyed. In particular, the court must insure that the plaintiff does not use the incorrect procedure of filing duplicative complaints for the purpose of circumventing the rules pertaining to the amendment of complaints, Fed. R. Civ. P. 15 . . . .” Id. at 71. “Parallel complaints need not be completely identical to fall under Walton, which proscribes ‘substantially identical complaints.’” McKenna v. City of Philadelphia, 304 F. App’x 89, 92 (3d Cir. 2008) (citation omitted). With respect to the “same defendant” requirement, “[i]n a claim splitting case, as with the traditional res judicata analysis, the second suit will be barred if the claim involves the same parties or their privies and “arises out of the same transaction or series of transactions” as the first claim. Sensormatic, 329 F. Supp. 2d at 579 (emphasis added); accord Robbins v. Gen. Motors De Mexico, 816 F. Supp. 2d 1261, 1264 (M.D. Fla. 2011) (in claim-splitting analysis, “[c]ourts borrow the test for claim preclusion and consider whether to bar the second suit if it involves ‘the same parties or their privies’ and ‘arises out of the same transaction or series of transactions’ as the first suit”); VitalGo, Inc. v. Kreg Therapeutics, Inc., Case 2:17-cv-00366-MRH Document 8 Filed 06/05/17 Page 12 of 15 9 No. 16-5577, 2017 WL 1163741, at *7 (N.D. Ill. Mar. 29, 2017) (“If new parties are in privity with the parties in the original action, the doctrine of claim splitting will apply.”). Officers of a corporation are in privity with the corporation for purposes of claim splitting or claim preclusion. See Lewis v. O’Donnell, --- F. App’x ---, No. 16-2820, 2017 WL 35711, at *2 n.5 (3d Cir. Jan. 4, 2017) (individual defendants were in privity with company sued in prior action because “‘directors, officers, employees and attorneys of the [company] are in privity with the [company] for purposes of res judicata’”) (quoting Henry v. Farmer City State Bank, 808 F.2d 1228, 1235 n.6 (7th Cir. 1986)); see also Egli v. Strimel, No. 16-3693, 2017 WL 1508989, at *4 (E.D. Pa. Apr. 27, 2017) (privity existed between corporation and chairman of board, particularly where that relationship “provides the basis for Plaintiff’s claims against [chairman],” and thus res judicata barred subsequent claim against chairman of board); Munsif v. Am. Bd. of Internal Med., No. 11-5949, 2012 WL 3962671, at *12 (E.D. Pa. Sept. 11, 2012) (holding that first action against officers barred second action against corporation because corporation and its officers are privies). “When a district court becomes aware that two actions commenced by the same plaintiff are virtually identical, the court can either dismiss the second complaint without prejudice or stay the proceedings in the second lawsuit until judgment is entered in the first action.” Frederick Banks v. State Farm, No. 13-1152, 2013 WL 6058471, at *3 (W.D. Pa. Nov. 18, 2013) (dismissing duplicative complaint that inappropriately split claims under Walton, even though complaint added new defendant). Here, all of the elements of improper claim-splitting are met, and the complaint should be dismissed on this basis as well. The Holland complaint and the complaint in this case contain almost verbatim allegations and causes of action based on Holland’s alleged misclassification of Case 2:17-cv-00366-MRH Document 8 Filed 06/05/17 Page 13 of 15 10 certain workers as independent contractors. The only substantive difference between the allegations in the two complaints is the addition of the boilerplate and conclusory allegations regarding Robert Gaudin in this action discussed supra. Thus, it is clear that both complaints allege “the same subject matter at the same time in the same court” under Walton. 563 F.2d at 70. The claims also satisfy the “same parties” prong of the claim-splitting test, given that Robert Gaudin is CEO of Holland and is in privity with Holland. See cases cited supra at pp. 7-8. Plaintiff’s attempt at claim splitting here is particularly egregious, as it was clearly an attempt to circumvent Fed. R. Civ. P. 15 and avoid the necessity of filing a third motion to amend the complaint in Holland, when it was evident such motion to amend would not be well received. Accordingly, Plaintiff’s filing of this action constitutes improper claim-splitting, and the Court should dismiss it for this reason as well. IV. CONCLUSION For the reasons stated above, Plaintiff’s Complaint lacks any specific factual allegations making individual FLSA liability against Robert Gaudin plausible and it falls far below the standard for pleading in federal court. Moreover, Plaintiff’s Complaint constitutes improper claim-splitting and it should be dismissed on this basis as well. As a result, Plaintiff’s Complaint should be dismissed in its entirety. Dated: June 5, 2017 Respectfully submitted, MORGAN, LEWIS & BOCKIUS LLP /s/ Stephanie R. Reiss Stephanie R. Reiss (PA ID #88316) Lauren E. Marzullo (PA ID #306459) One Oxford Centre – 32nd Floor Pittsburgh, PA 15219 (412) 560-3300 Fax (412) 560-7001 stephanie.reiss@morganlewis.com Case 2:17-cv-00366-MRH Document 8 Filed 06/05/17 Page 14 of 15 11 lauren.marzullo@morganlewis.com Christopher A. Parlo (pro hac vice forthcoming) 101 Park Avenue New York, NY 10178-0600 (212) 309-6062 Fax (212) 309-6001 chris.parlo@morganlewis.com Attorneys for Defendant Robert Gaudin Case 2:17-cv-00366-MRH Document 8 Filed 06/05/17 Page 15 of 15 Case 2:17-cv-00366-MRH Document 8-1 Filed 06/05/17 Page 1 of 3 Case 2:17-cv-00366-MRH Document 8-1 Filed 06/05/17 Page 2 of 3 Case 2:17-cv-00366-MRH Document 8-1 Filed 06/05/17 Page 3 of 3 Case 2:17-cv-00366-MRH Document 8-2 Filed 06/05/17 Page 1 of 6 Case 2:17-cv-00366-MRH Document 8-2 Filed 06/05/17 Page 2 of 6 Case 2:17-cv-00366-MRH Document 8-2 Filed 06/05/17 Page 3 of 6 Case 2:17-cv-00366-MRH Document 8-2 Filed 06/05/17 Page 4 of 6 Case 2:17-cv-00366-MRH Document 8-2 Filed 06/05/17 Page 5 of 6 Case 2:17-cv-00366-MRH Document 8-2 Filed 06/05/17 Page 6 of 6