Holding that, because "[w]e will grant a writ of mandamus only when the petitioner demonstrates that its right to the writ is clear and indisputable," there was no need to "intimate . . . view as to the merits of Terra's claims of privilege and other limitations on discovery"
Holding that "there is good cause [for a protective order under Fed.R.Civ.P. 26] when a party shows that disclosure will result in a clearly defined, specific and serious injury but that broad allegations of harm are not sufficient to establish good cause"
Holding that where the employer failed to keep records of work performed, workers' “admittedly inexact or approximate evidence” was sufficient to meet their burden of showing that they performed work not properly compensated for a prima facie case; if the employee makes a credible showing, the burden then shifts to the employer to come forward with evidence to negate the reasonableness of the inference and “the employer cannot be heard to complain that the damages lack the exactness and precision of measurement that would be possible had he kept records in accordance with the requirements of” the Act
Finding waiver of attorney-client privilege when party attached privileged communications to motion for protective order and served the documents on the defendants