UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
SOUTHERN DISTRICT OF NEW YORK
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KENNETH GRIMES,
Plaintiff,
-v-
CAROLYN W. COLVIN, Acting Commissioner
of Social Security,
Defendant.
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13 Civ. 5052 (KBF)
MEMORANDUM
DECISION & ORDER
KATHERINE B. FORREST, District Judge:
Plaintiff pro se Kenneth Grimes seeks review of the decision by defendant
Commissioner of Social Security (“the Commissioner”) denying his disability
insurance benefits and supplemental security income (“SSI”) applications. In
August 2011, plaintiff filed his applications, which alleged that he had been
disabled since January 29, 2010 due to post-traumatic stress disorder (PTSD), back
injury, knee injury, and high blood pressure. (Tr. 92–106, 128, 132.) In September
2011, the Social Security Administration denied plaintiff’s applications (Tr. 48–54),
and plaintiff timely requested a hearing before an administrative law judge (“ALJ”)
(Tr. 56–58). ALJ Mark Solomon held a hearing on May 15, 2012 (Tr. 24–41) and
issued a written decision denying plaintiff’s applications on June 15, 2012 (Tr. 9–
23). The Appeals Council denied review on May 28, 2013. (Tr. 1–5.)
On July 16, 2013, plaintiff filed this action seeking judicial review of the
ALJ’s decision. (ECF No. 2.) Now before the Court is defendant’s December 23,
USDC SDNY
DOCUMENT
ELECTRONICALLY FILED
DOC #: _________________
DATE FILED: 03/19/2014
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2013 motion for judgment on the pleadings. (ECF No. 13.) Plaintiff filed no
opposition. For the reasons set forth below, defendant’s motion is GRANTED.
I. FACTUAL BACKGROUND
The Court recites here only those facts relevant to its review.1 The Court
reviews the ALJ’s decision to determine whether there is substantial evidence to
support his finding that plaintiff was not disabled because he could perform the
requirements of his past relevant work as a drug counselor.
In his September 2011 application, plaintiff stated that he had chronic
muscle spasms, nightmares, and severe headaches. (Tr. 143.) Plaintiff also stated
that he had unsteady balance during bathing; that he was unable to lift due to a
chronic back and neck condition; that he was unable to stand or sit for long periods;
that he needed a cane when walking long distances or up flights of stairs; and that
he had blurred vision due to headaches. (Tr. 143, 147–49.) Finally, plaintiff stated
that stated that he suffered from a lack of concentration, that he was paranoid and
distrustful, and that he had short-term memory loss. (Tr. 149, 150.)
In October 2009 and October 2010, Dr. Aerie Rim and chiropractor Raymond
H. Wolff assessed plaintiff as having chronic low back pain and mild or minimal
degenerative joint disease. (Tr. 231, 212.) Throughout 2009, plaintiff received
chiropractic treatments for low back pain, which helped relieve his pain; Dr. Rim
again referred plaintiff to a chiropractor in October 2010. (Tr. 221–22, 230–33, 238–
40, 212.) A January 2011 physical examination revealed minor pain in plaintiff’s
cervical spine and continued chronic neck and lower back pain; plaintiff was
1 A thorough summary of plaintiff’s medical history is set forth in the administrative record.
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discharged in stable condition. (Tr. 184.) In April 2011, plaintiff told Dr. Rim that
he was benefiting from his chiropractic treatments, that he was taking pain
medication as needed, and that he intended to file an SSI application. (Tr. 176.) In
May 2011, plaintiff told Dr. Rim that he wanted to restart chiropractic sessions.
(Tr. 175.) Dr. Rim noted that plaintiff’s gait was normal and that he had no motor
weakness. (Id.) An August 2011 CT scan of plaintiff’s cervical spine showed no
evidence of compression fracture. (Tr. 405.)
In October 2009, psychologist Melissa Altman found that plaintiff had
significant symptoms of depression and symptoms of PTSD based on his military
service in Saudi Arabia. (Tr. 336, 337.) Dr. Altman found that plaintiff was
oriented in all spheres but seemed guarded and depressed. (Tr. 337.) She found no
evidence of psychomotor retardation, agitation, or psychosis. (Id.) Dr. Altman
diagnosed plaintiff with PTSD, dysthymic disorder, cocaine dependence, alcohol
dependence, high blood pressure, high cholesterol, and back and knee problems.
(Id.) She also found that plaintiff was able to care for activities of daily living. (Id.)
In November 2009 and February 2010, Dr. Martin Gluck evaluated plaintiff
for headaches and migraines. (Tr. 225–26, 221–22.) Dr. Gluck opined that
plaintiff’s headaches were possibly caused by muscular tension, and prescribed
medications. (Id.) At a May 2011 mental intake evaluation, plaintiff did not report
any acute psychiatric symptoms. (Tr. 175.) In July 2011, plaintiff stated that he
had been feeling depressed since he lost his job in January 2011 and that he had
sleeping problems. (Tr. 349.) Plaintiff did not report any past depressive episode,
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mania, psychotic symptoms, appetite change, fatigue, feelings of worthlessness, or
harmful ideations. (Id.) Plaintiff stated that he had experienced anxiety and
palpitation but not to the level of a panic attack, and he reported multiple stressful
events while in the military. (Id.) Plaintiff’s affect was mildly anxious, but
appropriate and full-range. (Tr. 350.) Plaintiff’s thought process was linear and
goal-directed. (Id.)
In December 2011, Dr. Rim completed a medical report in which she
diagnosed plaintiff with migraines, hypertension, PTSD, cervical pain, and low back
pain caused by degenerative disc disease. (Tr. 537.) According to Dr. Rim’s report,
plaintiff experienced pain from heavy lifting, pulling, and pushing; plaintiff could
sit for up to five hours in an eight-day workday, stand for up to four hours, and walk
for up to two hours. (Tr. 538, 539.) Plaintiff could never lift or carry more than five
pounds and could never bend, squat, or climb. (Tr. 539.) Dr. Rim opined that
plaintiff had multiple clinic appointments weekly that would prevent full-time
employment. (Tr. 541.)
In May 2012, plaintiff testified that he had worked as a drug counselor from
approximately 1998 to 2011, with his final position in 2011 lasting two months. (Tr.
28, 31, 39.) He stated that he quit his job because he felt that it was beyond his
expertise. (Tr. 30–31.) Plaintiff further testified that he had problems with
remembering and completing assignments, doing tasks, and developing
relationships, due to paranoia. (Tr. 32, 38, 40.) Plaintiff also stated that he was
taking pain medication and using a TENS machine to relieve neck and back pain
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and spasms. (Tr. 32, 40.) Plaintiff testified that he could only sit down for 45
minutes to an hour before he needed to stand, but that he could stand for a couple of
hours; when he was working as a drug counselor, plaintiff was behind a computer
for six or seven hours. (Tr. 37.) Finally, plaintiff testified that he was able to care
for his own personal needs, such as dressing, shaving, and bathing, and that his
girlfriend did all the personal chores. (Tr. 35, 36.)
In September 2012, a state agency consultant, B. Rury, found that plaintiff
could both stand and sit for up to six hours in an eight-hour workday and that he
should not frequently lift more than ten pounds. (Tr. 519, 523.) The consultant
found that plaintiff was capable of performing his past work and was not disabled.
(Tr. 522.) Also in September 2012, Dr. R. Altmansberger, a psychiatrist, opined
that plaintiff had mild restrictions in activities of daily living, moderate difficulties
in maintaining social functioning, and moderate difficulties in maintaining
concentration, persistence, and pace. (Tr. 514.) Dr. Altmansberger opined that
plaintiff could perform his past work and was not disabled. (Tr. 526.)
II. STANDARDS OF REVIEW
A. Judgment on the Pleadings
“After the pleadings are closed—but early enough not to delay trial—a party
may move for judgment on the pleadings.” Fed. R. Civ. P. 12(c). The Court reviews
Rule 12(c) motions for judgment on the pleadings under the same standard as Rule
12(b)(6) motions to dismiss. Bank of N.Y. v. First Millennium, Inc., 607 F.3d 905,
922 (2d Cir. 2010). “To survive a Rule 12(c) motion, the complaint must contain
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sufficient factual matter, accepted as true, to state a claim to relief that is plausible
on its face.” Id. (internal quotation marks omitted).
Even where a motion stands unopposed, the Court does not embrace default
judgment principles. “Although the failure to respond may allow the district court
to accept the movant’s factual assertions as true, the moving party must still
establish that the undisputed facts entitle him to a judgment as a matter of law.”
Vt. Teddy Bear Co. v. 1800 Beargram Co., 373 F.3d 241, 246 (2d Cir. 2004)
(citations and internal quotation marks omitted); see also Martell v. Astrue, No. 09
Civ. 1701 (NRB), 2010 WL 4159383, at *2 n.4 (S.D.N.Y. Oct. 20, 2010) (applying the
same standard in a pro se unopposed SSI appeal).
The Court “liberally construe[s] pleadings and briefs submitted by pro
se litigants, reading such submissions to raise the strongest arguments they
suggest.” Bertin v. United States, 478 F.3d 489, 491 (2d Cir. 2007) (citation and
internal quotation marks omitted).
B. The Disability Standard
The Commissioner will find a claimant disabled under the Social Security Act
(“the Act”) if he or she demonstrates an “inability to engage in any substantial
gainful activity by reason of any medically determinable physical or mental
impairment which can be expected to result in death or that has lasted or can be
expected to last for a continuous period of not less than 12 months.” 42 U.S.C. §
423(d)(1)(A). The claimant’s impairment must be “of such severity that he is not
only unable to do his previous work but cannot, considering his age, education, and
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work experience, engage in any other kind of substantial gainful work which exists
in the national economy.” 42 U.S.C. § 423(d)(2)(A).
The Commissioner uses a five-step process when making disability
determinations. See 20 C.F.R. §§ 404.1520, 416.920. The Second Circuit has
described the process as follows:
First, the Commissioner considers whether the claimant is currently engaged
in substantial gainful activity. Where the claimant is not, the Commissioner
next considers whether the claimant has a “severe impairment” that
significantly limits her physical or mental ability to do basic work activities.
If the claimant suffers such an impairment, the third inquiry is whether,
based solely on medical evidence, the claimant has an impairment that is
listed in 20 C.F.R. Part 404, Subpart P, App. 1 [“Appendix 1”]. Assuming the
claimant does not have a listed impairment, the fourth inquiry is whether,
despite the claimant’s severe impairment, she has the residual functional
capacity [“RFC”] to perform her past work. Finally, if the claimant is unable
to perform her past work, the burden then shifts to the Commissioner to
determine whether there is other work which the claimant could perform.
Tejada v. Apfel, 167 F.3d 770, 774 (2d Cir. 1999).
C. Review of the ALJ’s Judgment
The Commissioner and ALJ’s decisions are subject to limited judicial review.
“A district court may set aside the Commissioner’s determination that a
claimant is not disabled only if the factual findings are not supported by
‘substantial evidence’ or if the decision is based on legal error.” Shaw v. Chater, 221
F.3d 126, 131 (2d Cir. 2000) (quoting 42 U.S.C. § 405(g)). The factual “findings of
the [Commissioner] are conclusive unless they are not supported by substantial
evidence.” Diaz v. Shalala, 59 F.3d 307, 312 (2d Cir. 1995) (citing 42 U.S.C. §
405(g)). “Substantial evidence is more than a mere scintilla. It means such
relevant evidence as a reasonable mind might accept as adequate to support a
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conclusion.” Halloran v. Barnhart, 362 F.3d 28, 31 (2d Cir. 2004) (internal
quotation marks omitted).
The Court must consider the record as a whole in making this determination,
but it is not for this Court to decide de novo whether the plaintiff is disabled. See
Veino v. Barnhart, 312 F.3d 578, 586 (2d Cir. 2002) (“Where the Commissioner's
decision rests on adequate findings supported by evidence having rational probative
force, we will not substitute our judgment for that of the Commissioner.”); Schaal v.
Apfel, 134 F.3d 496, 501 (2d Cir. 1998).
The Court must uphold the Commissioner’s decision upon a finding of
substantial evidence, even when contrary evidence exists. See DeChirico v.
Callahan, 134 F.3d 1177, 1182–83 (2d Cir. 1998); Alston v. Sullivan, 904 F.2d 122,
126 (2d Cir. 1990) (“Where there is substantial evidence to support either position,
the determination is one to be made by the factfinder.”).
III. DISCUSSION
The ALJ correctly conducted the five-step analysis required by 20 C.F.R. §§
404.1520 and 416.920. First, the ALJ determined that plaintiff had not engaged in
substantial gainful activity since his alleged onset date of January 29, 2010. (Tr.
14.) At step two, the ALJ found that plaintiff’s mild lumbar and cervical disc
disease and his PTSD constituted “severe” impairments, because they imposed more
than minimal limitations on plaintiff’s ability to perform basic work activity, but
that his migraine headaches, depression, and alcohol and drug abuse were not
severe. (Tr. 14, 15.) At step three, the ALJ determined that plaintiff did not have
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an impairment or a combination of impairments that met or medically equaled the
severity of one of the listed impairments in Appendix I. (Tr. 15.) The ALJ then
found that plaintiff had the RFC to perform “light work,” which involves lifting no
more than 20 pounds at a time with frequent lifting or carrying of objects weighing
up to 10 pounds. See 20 C.F.R. §§ 404.1567(b), 416.967(b). (Tr. 16.) Finally, at step
four, the ALJ concluded that plaintiff could perform his past relevant work as a
drug counselor, which the U.S. Department of Labor’s Dictionary of Occupational
Titles (“DOT”) defines as a “sedentary skilled job.” (Tr. 20.)
Substantial evidence supported each of the ALJ’s determinations.
First, substantial evidence supported the ALJ’s findings that plaintiff’s
migraines, depression, and alcohol and drug abuse were not severe impairments.
Plaintiff carried the burden of presenting evidence that his impairments were not
severe. Melville v. Apfel, 198 F.3d 45, 51 (2d Cir. 1999). The ALJ noted that, while
plaintiff claimed he had migraine headaches, there was no mention of “intractable
migraine” or “status migrainosus,” a migraine lasting over 72 hours. (Tr. 15.)
Plaintiff alleged a long history of headaches, but also stated that he was able to
work from 1998 to 2011. (Tr. 153, 177.) Furthermore, plaintiff had not returned to
see Dr. Gluck for follow-up appointments for headaches (Tr. 226). See Arnone v.
Bowen, 882 F.2d 34, 39 (2d Cir. 1989) (explaining that the ALJ “properly attributed
significance to [the plaintiff’s] failure to seek any medical attention”). While
plaintiff showed symptoms of depression in 2009 (Tr. 336, 337), no record evidence
indicated that plaintiff was being treated for depression, and plaintiff did not report
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depressive episodes in July 2011 (Tr. 349). Finally, plaintiff had not used alcohol or
cocaine since 1997. (Tr. 31, 335, 509.)2
Second, plaintiff failed to prove that his lumbar and cervical disc disease and
his PTSD met or equaled a listed impairment. Plaintiff also carried the burden of
proving that his impairments met or equaled a listing in Appendix 1. Bowen v.
Yuckert, 482 U.S. 137, 146 n.5 (1985). The ALJ considered the listing for
musculoskeletal impairment (Tr. 15), but appropriately found that the record
contained evidence of only mild limitations on plaintiff’s motion, strength, and
neurological condition (Tr. 175, 212). Rather, plaintiff’s treatment was conservative
and consisted of medications and chiropractic care. (Tr. 175, 184.) Similarly, the
ALJ properly found that plaintiff’s PTSD did not cause more than a moderate
impairment in social functioning and mild limitations in activities of daily living
and concentration. (Tr. 15, 16.)
Third, substantial evidence supported the ALJ’s findings concerning
plaintiff’s RFC, namely that plaintiff could perform light work involving sitting for
up to six hours, standing for up to four hours, and walking for up to two hours per
day, but without working around large crowds and without lifting more than five
pounds frequently or ten pounds occasionally. (Tr. 16–19.) The ALJ’s RFC
determination was slightly more restrictive than Dr. Rury’s opinion, which stated
that plaintiff could stand and sit for up to six hours and should not frequently lift
2 Even if the ALJ had erred at step one, any such error would be legally harmless, because the ALJ
proceeded to step two and thus plaintiff’s “claim proceeded through the sequential evaluation
process.” Stanton v. Astrue, 370 F. App’x 231, 233 n.1 (2d Cir. 2010). Furthermore, the ALJ here
“considered the combination of impairments and the combined effect of all symptoms in making his
determination,” as in Stanton. Id.
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more than ten pounds (Tr. 519), but was slightly less restrictive than the opinion of
Dr. Rim, who opined that plaintiff could sit for up to five hours (Tr. 539.)
The ALJ reasonably accorded greater weight to the opinions of the state
consultants than to that of Dr. Rim. (Tr. 19.) Consultants’ opinions constitute
substantial evidence, and may “override treating sources’ opinion provided they are
supported by evidence in the record.” Diaz, 59 F.3d at 313 n.5. Meanwhile, the ALJ
appropriately found that other record evidence contradicted Dr. Rim’s restrictive
opinion. (Tr. 19.) Such a determination was well within the ALJ’s discretion. See
Alston, 904 F.2d at 126 (“Where there is substantial evidence to support either
position, the determination is one to be made by the factfinder.”).
Finally, substantial evidence supported the ALJ’s conclusion that plaintiff
retained the ability to perform his past relevant work as a drug counselor. (Tr. 20.)
Plaintiff carried the burden to prove “an inability to return to his former type of
work and not just to his former job.” See, e.g., Villa v. Heckler, 79 F.2d 794, 798
(9th Cir. 1986). Here, the ALJ appropriately found that plaintiff’s RFC did not
preclude him from meeting the physical and mental demands of his past relevant
work as a drug counselor. (Tr. 20.) Plaintiff described his previous job as involving
office work performed sitting down and requiring six to seven hours per day on a
computer, and not involving any exposure to crowds. (Tr. 37.) Similarly, the DOT
describes the job of drug counselor as requiring sedentary work and does not
mention exposure to crowds. Because plaintiff could perform his past relevant
work, he was not disabled within the meaning of the statute. (Tr. 20.)
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Thus, the ALJ properly conducted the five-step sequential analysis, and
substantial evidence supported his determinations at each step. The Court
therefore must uphold his finding that plaintiff was not disabled. See, e.g., Shaw,
221 F.3d at 131.
IV. CONCLUSION
For these reasons, defendant’s motion for judgment on the pleadings is
GRANTED. The Clerk of Court is directed to close the motion at ECF No. 13 and to
terminate this action.
SO ORDERED.
Dated: New York, New York
March 19, 2014
KATHERINE B. FORREST
United States District Judge
CC:
Kenneth Grimes
101-125 West 147th Street
Apartment 19J
New York, NY 10039
PRO SE
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