46 Cited authorities

McCarthy v. Dun & Bradstreet Corp.
482 F.3d 184 (2d Cir. 2007) Cited 3,332 times
Holding that the district court did not abuse its discretion in denying leave to amend where "discovery had closed, defendants had filed for summary judgment, and nearly two years had passed since the filing of the original complaint"
Dillon v. City of New York
261 A.D.2d 34 (N.Y. App. Div. 1999) Cited 877 times 2 Legal Analyses
Holding that "[d]efamation has long been recognized to arise from the making of a false statement which tends to expose the plaintiff to public contempt, ridicule, aversion or disgrace, or induce an evil opinion of him in the minds of right-thinking persons, and to deprive him of their friendly intercourse in society."
Liberman v. Gelstein
80 N.Y.2d 429 (N.Y. 1992) Cited 1,023 times 5 Legal Analyses
Holding an interloper's statements to the party (potentially slanderous per se because "tend[ing] to injure [the counter-party] in his or her trade, business or profession") could subject the interloper to liability for tortious interference if the party declined to proceed with the transaction on that basis
Celle v. Filipino Reporter Enterprises
209 F.3d 163 (2d Cir. 2000) Cited 470 times 4 Legal Analyses
Holding that to recover in libel under New York law, the plaintiff must establish that the defamatory statement was, among other things, published to a third party through the defendant's negligence or actual malice
Davis v. Boeheim
2014 N.Y. Slip Op. 7083 (N.Y. 2014) Cited 297 times 6 Legal Analyses
Applying New York law
Wanamaker v. Columbian Rope Company
108 F.3d 462 (2d Cir. 1997) Cited 481 times
Holding that denying an employee the use of an office or telephone to conduct a job hunt once he had notice of his termination was not “sufficiently deleterious to constitute adverse employment action prohibited by the ADEA”
Albert v. Loksen
239 F.3d 256 (2d Cir. 2001) Cited 424 times 3 Legal Analyses
Holding that a plaintiff must allege "either that the statement complained of caused . . . 'special harm' or that it constituted slander 'per se.'"
Biro v. Nast
883 F. Supp. 2d 441 (S.D.N.Y. 2012) Cited 151 times 3 Legal Analyses
Holding that "the use of the terms ‘shyster,’ ‘con man,’ and finding an ‘easy mark’ is the type of rhetorical hyperbole and ‘imaginative expression’ that is typically understood as a statement of opinion"
Pure Power Boot Camp, Inc. v. Warrior Fitness Boot Camp, LLC
813 F. Supp. 2d 489 (S.D.N.Y. 2011) Cited 151 times 2 Legal Analyses
Holding that defendants' violation of SCA was neither willful nor intentional because there was no basis to conclude that defendants were "aware of the statute, or knew that their conduct was otherwise unlawful"
Front, Inc. v. Khalil
2015 N.Y. Slip Op. 1554 (N.Y. 2015) Cited 124 times 1 Legal Analyses
Holding that the privilege afforded to pre-litigation communication "should only be applied to statements pertinent to good faith anticipated litigation."
Section 74 - Privileges in action for libel
N.Y. Civ. Rights Law § 74 Cited 397 times 4 Legal Analyses
A civil action cannot be maintained against any person, firm or corporation, for the publication of a fair and true report of any judicial proceeding, legislative proceeding or other official proceeding, or for any heading of the report which is a fair and true headnote of the statement published. This section does not apply to a libel contained in any other matter added by any person concerned in the publication; or in the report of anything said or done at the time and place of such a proceeding

Giuffre v. Maxwell

46 Cited authorities

Holding that the district court did not abuse its discretion in denying leave to amend where "discovery had closed, defendants had filed for summary judgment, and nearly two years had passed since the filing of the original complaint"

Holding that to recover in libel under New York law, the plaintiff must establish that the defamatory statement was, among other things, published to a third party through the defendant's negligence or actual malice

Applying New York law

Holding that denying an employee the use of an office or telephone to conduct a job hunt once he had notice of his termination was not “sufficiently deleterious to constitute adverse employment action prohibited by the ADEA”

Holding that a plaintiff must allege "either that the statement complained of caused . . . 'special harm' or that it constituted slander 'per se.'"

Holding that "the use of the terms ‘shyster,’ ‘con man,’ and finding an ‘easy mark’ is the type of rhetorical hyperbole and ‘imaginative expression’ that is typically understood as a statement of opinion"

Holding that defendants' violation of SCA was neither willful nor intentional because there was no basis to conclude that defendants were "aware of the statute, or knew that their conduct was otherwise unlawful"

Holding that the privilege afforded to pre-litigation communication "should only be applied to statements pertinent to good faith anticipated litigation."