Francese v. American Modern Insurance Group, Inc. et al

BRIEF in Opposition

D.N.J.May 11, 2017

David Van Leeuwen, Esq. (admitted pro hac vice) Frederic Aurelien, Esq. Peyrot & Associates, PC 62 William Street, 8th Floor New York, New York 10005 Telephone: (646) 650-2785 Facsimile: (646) 650-5109 Attorneys for Plaintiff ________________________________________________________________ IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT FOR THE DISTRICT OF NEW JERSEY LUIGI FRANCESE ) CIVIL ACTION Plaintiff ) v. ) NO.2:17-cv-2246 ) AMERICAN MORTGAGE INSURANCE ) GROUP, INC., AMERICAN MODERN HOME ) INSURANCE COMPANY, SPECIALIZED ) LOAN SERVICING LLC, and RESIDENTIAL ) CREDIT SOLUTIONS, INC. ) Defendants ) BRIEF IN OPPOSITON TO DEFENDANT SPECIALIZED LOAN SERVICING LLC’S MOTION TO DISMISS PLAINTIFF’S COMPLAINT PURSUANT TO FED. R. CIV. P 12(b)(6) Case 2:17-cv-02246-WJM-MF Document 23 Filed 05/11/17 Page 1 of 16 PageID: 338 2 TABLE OF CONTENTS TABLE OF AUTHORITES………………………………………………….…………3 PROCEDURAL AND FACTUAL BACKGROUND ……………….……….……….5 ARGUMENT………………………………………………………….………………...6 I. DEFENDANT SPECIALIZED LOAN SERVICING, LLC’S MOTION TO DISMISS SHOULD BE DENIED…………………………………………..………….6 A. STANDARD OF REVIEW ……………………………………………….……….6 B. DEFENDANT SLS’S WRONGFUL CONDUCT AS PLEAD IN THE COMPLAINT FALLS WITHIN THE PURVIEW OF NJCFA…………………..…....7 C. PLAINTIFF’S NJCFA CLAIMS MEET THE PLEADING REQUIREMENTS OF RULE 9(b) ……………………………………………………………………………...9 D. PLAINTIFF’S NJ CIVIL RICO CLAIMS SIMILARLY MEET THE PLEADING REQUIREMENTS OF RULE 9(b) ……………………………………..……………11 E. PLAINTIFF HAS A VALID CLAIM FOR UNJUST ENRICHMENT - MONEY HAD AND RECEIVED ………………………………………………………………..12 F. A SERVICER OF THE LOAN CAN BE LIABLE FOR BREACH OF CONTRACT AND BREACH OF THE COVENANT OF GOOD FAITH AND FAIR DEALING ……………………………………………………………………………...14 G. EVIDENCE IS IN THE EXCLUSIVE CONTROL OF THE MOVING PARTY..15 H. LEAVE TO AMEND PLEADINGS FREELY GRANTED ………………….…16 II. CONCLUSION ……………………………………………………………………..16 Case 2:17-cv-02246-WJM-MF Document 23 Filed 05/11/17 Page 2 of 16 PageID: 339 3 TABLE OF AUTHORITIES Cases Evancho v. Fisher, 423 F.3d 347, 350 (3d Cir. 2005)………………………………6 MCI Telecommunications Corp. v. Graphnet, Inc., 881 F. Supp. 126, 128 (D.N.J. 1995)…………………………………………………………………………………….6 Baldwin Cnty. Welcome Ctr. v. Brown, 466 U.S. 147, 149-50 n.3 (1984)……….6 Bell Atlantic v. Twombly, 550 U.S. 544, 563 n.8 (2007) …………………………..6 Scheuer v. Rhoades, 416 U.S. 232, 236 (1974) …………………………………..6 Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 556 U.S. 662, 684 (2009) ………………………………………..6 Fowler v. UPMC Shadyside, 578 F.3d 203, 210 (3d Cir. 2009) …………………6 Solo v. Bed Bath & Beyond, Inc., No. 06-1908, 2007 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 31088, *5 D.N.J. Apr. 26, 2007)………………………………………………………………….7 Bosland v. Warnock Dodge, Inc. 197 N.J. 543 (2009)…………………………….7 Cleveland v. O’Brien, 2010 WL 4703781 (D.N.J. Nov. 2010)…………………….7 Kugler v. Romain, 58 N.J. 522, 543 n. 4, 279 A.2d 640 (1971) ………………….7 Federal Trade Comm’n v. Sperry Hutchinson Co., 405 US 233 (1972)………….8 Tuxedo Beach Club v. City Federal Savings Bank, 479 F. Supp. 635 (D.NJ. 1990)………………………………………………………………………………..8,9, Lemelledo v. Beneficial Management, 150 N.J. 255 (N.J 1997)…….8, Santos v. Carrington Mortgage Servs., No. 2:2015cv00864 - Document 53 (D.N.J. 2015) ………………………………………………………………….8,9,10,11 Case 2:17-cv-02246-WJM-MF Document 23 Filed 05/11/17 Page 3 of 16 PageID: 340 4 Viking Yacht Co. v. Composites One LLC, 496 F. Supp.2d 462 (D.NJ.2007) .…8 Nicholls v. Portfolio Recovery Assocs., 2010 US Dist. LEXIS 29639 (D.N.J. Mar. 24, 2010). ……………………………………………………………………..………..8 Cox v. Sears Roebuck & Co., 138 N.J. 2, 17, 647 A.2d 454 (1994)……………..10 Digiacomo v. Statebridge Company LLC, et al., No. 1:2014cv06694 (D.N.J. 2015) …………………………………………………………………….……10,11, 14 Oshiver v. Levin, Fishbein, Sedran & Berman, 38 F.3d 1380 (3rd Cir. 1994) ….11 VRG Corp. v. GKN Realty Corp., 135 N.J. 539, 554, 641 A.2d 519 (1994)…12,13 Ellswith v. U.S. Bank, NA, 30 F.Supp 3rd 886 (N.D. Cal. 2014) ………..……….14 E & E Co., Ltd. v. Kam Hing Enterprises, Inc., 429 F.App’x 632, 633 (9th Cir. 2011) ………………………………………………………………………………….15 U.S. ex rel. Tamanaha v. Furukawa America, Inc., 2011 WL 3423788, *2 (9th Cir. Aug. 5, 2011)…………………………………………………. ……………………..15 United States ex rel. Lee v. SmithKline Beecham, Inc., 245 F.3d 1048, 1052 (9th Cir. 2001)…………………………………………………………………………..…15 Foman v. Davis, 371 U.S. 178, 83 S. Ct. 227, 9 L. Ed. 2d 222 (1962)……..…16 Phillips v. County of Allegheny, 515 F.3d 224, 236 (3d Cir. 2008) …………….16 Statutes Fed. R. Civ. P 12(b)(6)…………………………………………………………….1, 5 New Jersey Consumer Fraud Act (“NJCFA”) ……………………….……………5 New Jersey RICO (NJSA 2c:41-1, et seq.) ……………………………………….5 Fed.R.Civ.P. 15(a) ……………………………………………………………….. 16 Fed.R.Civ.P. 9(b) …………………………………………………………………9,11 Case 2:17-cv-02246-WJM-MF Document 23 Filed 05/11/17 Page 4 of 16 PageID: 341 5 PROCEDURAL AND FACTUAL BACKGROUND Plaintiff commenced this action in Superior Court of New Jersey, County of Bergen by a complaint dated February 10, 2017, seeking redress and judgment for damages incurred as against Defendants for, inter alia, relief permitted under the New Jersey Consumer Fraud Act (“CFA”), and New Jersey RICO (NJSA 2c:41-1, et seq.) See Complaint. As more specifically set forth in the complaint, Defendant Residential Credit Solutions, Inc. (hereinafter “RCS”) and Specialized Loan Servicing, LLC (hereinafter “SLS”) placed forced-placed insurance with the Defendant American Modern Insurance Group, Inc and Defendant American Modern Home Insurance Company (hereinafter collectively “AMIG Defendants”). There was an incident at the subject premises, owned by Plaintiff, which caused no less than $322,000.00 of damage. See Complaint ¶ 16; 17. Due to Defendant’s wrongdoing, Plaintiff has not been able to repair the subject premises nor obtain alternative insurance coverage due to the unrepaired damage. See Francese Decl. ¶ 5. The AMIG Defendants removed this matter to this Honorable Court on or about April 5, 2017. Despite the fact that Plaintiff has properly set forth causes of action as against Defendants, Defendants now move for dismissal. For the reasons set forth herein, the applications must be denied in its entirety. Case 2:17-cv-02246-WJM-MF Document 23 Filed 05/11/17 Page 5 of 16 PageID: 342 6 ARGUMENT I. DEFENDANT SPECIALIZED LOAN SERVICING, LLC’S MOTION TO DISMISS SHOULD BE DENIED A. STANDARD OF REVIEW When considering a motion to dismiss a complaint for failure to state a claim upon which relief can be granted pursuant to Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 12(b)(6), a court must accept all well-pleaded allegations in the claim as true and view them in the light most favorable to the claimant. Evancho v. Fisher, 423 F.3d 347, 350 (3d Cir. 2005); MCI Telecommunications Corp. v. Graphnet, Inc., 881 F. Supp. 126, 128 (D.N.J. 1995). It is well settled that a pleading is sufficient if it contains “a short and plain statement of the claim showing that the pleader is entitled to relief.” Fed. R. Civ. P. 8(a)(2). However, “[a]lthough the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure do not require a claimant to set forth an intricately detailed description of the asserted basis for relief, they do require that the pleadings give defendant fair notice of what the plaintiff’s claim is and the grounds upon which it rests.” Baldwin Cnty. Welcome Ctr. v. Brown, 466 U.S. 147, 149-50 n.3 (1984). A district court, in weighing a motion to dismiss, asks “not whether a plaintiff will ultimately prevail but whether the claimant is entitled to offer evidence to support the claims.” Bell Atlantic v. Twombly, 550 U.S. 544, 563 n.8 (2007) (quoting Scheuer v. Rhoades, 416 U.S. 232, 236 (1974)); see also Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 556 U.S. 662, 684 (2009) (“Our decision in Twombly expounded the pleading standard for ‘all civil actions’ . . ..”); Fowler v. UPMC Shadyside, 578 Case 2:17-cv-02246-WJM-MF Document 23 Filed 05/11/17 Page 6 of 16 PageID: 343 7 F.3d 203, 210 (3d Cir. 2009) (“Iqbal . . . provides the final nail-in-the-coffin for the ‘no set of facts’ standard that applied to federal complaints before Twombly.”). B. DEFENDANT SLS’S WRONGFUL CONDUCT AS PLEAD IN THE COMPLAINT FALLS WITHIN THE PURVIEW OF NJCFA The New Jersey Consumer Fraud Act (“NJCFA”) was enacted by the New Jersey legislature in 1960 to address rampant consumer complaints about fraudulent practices in the marketplace and to deter such conduct by merchants” and was amended in 1971 to “authorize private actions by injured parties.” Solo v. Bed Bath & Beyond, Inc., No. 06-1908, 2007 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 31088, *5 (D.N.J. Apr. 26, 2007). "[T]he history of the Act demonstrates a strong and consistent pattern of expanding rights of consumers and protecting them from a wide variety of marketplace tactics and practices deemed to be unconscionable." Bosland v. Warnock Dodge, Inc. 197 N.J. 543 (2009). A “violation of the act can be shown even though a consumer has not in fact been misled or deceived.” Cleveland v. O’Brien, 2010 WL 4703781 (D.N.J. Nov. 2010). “It is not necessary to show actual deceit or a fraudulent act, any unconscionable commercial practice is prohibited. Id. Given that "[t]he fertility of [human] invention in devising new schemes of fraud is so great . . .," Kugler v. Romain, 58 N.J. 522, 543 n. 4, 279 A.2d 640 (1971), the NJCFA could not possibly enumerate all, or even most, of the areas and practices that it covers without severely retarding its broad remedial Case 2:17-cv-02246-WJM-MF Document 23 Filed 05/11/17 Page 7 of 16 PageID: 344 8 power to root out fraud in its myriad, nefarious manifestations. See Federal Trade Comm’n v. Sperry Hutchinson Co., 405 US 233 (1972). The NJCFA’s definition of "merchandise" as "anything offered, directly or indirectly to the public for sale is broad and expansive. See Tuxedo Beach Club v. City Federal Savings Bank, 479 F. Supp. 635 (D.NJ. 1990) Insurance related practices and wrongdoing are subject to the NJCFA. See Lemelledo v. Beneficial Management, 150 N.J. 255 (N.J. 1997) (lender packaging); Santos v. Carrington Mortgage Servs., No. 2:2015cv00864 - Document 53 (D.N.J. 2015) (forced lender insurance). Defendant SLS in their moving papers claim that Plaintiff is not a consumer and did not purchase merchandize. In support of this claim, they cite cases involving inter-business related wrongdoing and debt collection, which are completely irrelevant, namely Viking Yacht Co. v. Composites One LLC, 496 F. Supp.2d 462 (D.NJ.2007) and Nicholls v. Portfolio Recovery Assocs., 2010 US Dist. LEXIS 29639 (D.N.J. Mar. 24, 2010). As stated above, the insurance related wrongdoing certainly falls within the expansive term “merchandise” as interpreted by the NJCFA. See Lemelledo v. Beneficial Management, 150 N.J. 255 (N.J. 1997) (lender packaging); Santos v. Carrington Mortgage Servs., No. 2:2015cv00864 - Document 53 (D.N.J. 2015) (forced placed lender insurance). Defendant SLS also claims that it was RCS that purchased the policy at issue in this case. This claim is misleading. Defendants failed to mention that, Case 2:17-cv-02246-WJM-MF Document 23 Filed 05/11/17 Page 8 of 16 PageID: 345 9 and what is not controverted in this matter, is that RCS obtained the policy with the funds of the Plaintiff. See Francese Decl. ¶ 6. In fact the NJCFA specifically contemplates indirect purchases and has been applied to forced placed lender insurance. See Tuxedo Beach Club v. City Federal Savings Bank, 749 F. Supp. 635 , 649 n. 13 (D.N.J. 1990). Santos v. Carrington Mortgage Servs., No. 2:2015cv00864 (D.N.J. 2015). As such, Defendant SLS’s application must be denied in its entirety. C. PLAINTIFF’S NJCFA CLAIMS MEET THE PLEADING REQUIREMENTS OF RULE 9(b) Defendant RCS claims that Plaintiff has failed to meet the pleading requirements in connection with Plaintiff’s NJCFA claims. However, Plaintiff has satisfied the pleading standard and the application must be similarly be denied in this regard. "Unlawful practice" under the NJCFA can be affirmative acts, knowing omissions, or regulation violations. Cox v. Sears Roebuck & Co., 138 N.J. 2, 17, 647 A.2d 454 (1994). As recited in more detail above, the NJCFA is broad and expansive in its application. Plaintiff here has alleged with sufficient particularity a fraudulent scheme wherein Defendants led Plaintiff to believe that his higher force-placed insurance premiums were necessary to provide him coverage, when they were actually used to provide kickbacks and/or commissions. See Complaint. These Case 2:17-cv-02246-WJM-MF Document 23 Filed 05/11/17 Page 9 of 16 PageID: 346 10 kickbacks and/or commissions were not disclosed to Plaintiff and qualify as a material omission in communications with Plaintiff. As this court has already set forth in a case where the AMIG Defendants were also defendants in an alleged forced-placed insurance scheme, the failure to disclose the kickbacks and/or commissions constituted a material omission for the purpose of NJCFA. See Digiacomo v. Statebridge Company LLC, et al., No. 1:2014cv06694 (D.N.J. 2015); see also Santos v. Carrington Mortgage Servs., No. 2:2015cv00864 (D.N.J. 2015) (AMIG Defendants also named in forced place insurance scheme). Unsurprisingly, Defendants do not produce any correspondence sent to Plaintiff disclosing that the higher premiums and lower coverage were because of kickbacks and/or commissions that were paid. Since there is little question, which the Defendants have not contested in this application, as to whether Plaintiff has properly alleged an ascertainable loss or the casual relationship between the unlawful conduct and the loss, Plaintiff will not address those elements further herein. Therefore, Defendant SLS’s application must be denied in its entirety. Case 2:17-cv-02246-WJM-MF Document 23 Filed 05/11/17 Page 10 of 16 PageID: 347 11 D. PLAINTIFF’S NJ CIVIL RICO CLAIMS SIMILARLY MEET THE PLEADING REQUIREMENTS OF RULE 9(b) In addition, AMIG Defendants also claim that Plaintiff has failed to meet the pleading requirements in connection with Plaintiff’s NJ Civil Rico claims. However, Plaintiff has satisfied the pleading standard and the application must also be denied in this regard. In the complaint, each Defendant has been alleged to have acted in racketeering conduct, as an enterprise, and engaged in a pattern of racketeering activity. See Complaint. Each defendant has been alleged to have participated in the enterprises affairs, AMIG Defendants sold the insurance and paid the servicer Defendants RCS and SLS the kickbacks and/or commissions. Id. Moreover, it is not disputed that Plaintiff was issued forced placed warning letters on multiple occasions, including on January 24, 2014 and April 1, 2016. See Francese Decl. ¶ 6 Exhibits A & B. The court has the authority to incorporate these letters and other similar forced place warning letters into the complaint by reference. Oshiver v. Levin, Fishbein, Sedran & Berman, 38 F.3d 1380 (3rd Cir. 1994); Santos v. Carrington Mortgage Servs., No. 2:2015cv00864 (D.N.J. 2015). This court denied similar motions to dismiss Rico claims as against AMIG Defendants in two (2) forced-placed insurance cases with the same set of facts, and as such, denial of the motions to dismiss in the instant matter is also appropriate. See Diagiacomo v. Statebridge Company LLC, et al., No. Case 2:17-cv-02246-WJM-MF Document 23 Filed 05/11/17 Page 11 of 16 PageID: 348 12 1:2014cv06694 (D.N.J. 2015); see also Santos v. Carrington Mortgage Servs., No. 2:2015cv00864 (D.N.J. 2015). As such, Defendant SLS’s motion to dismiss must be denied in its entirety. E. PLAINTIFF HAS A VALID CLAIM FOR UNJUST ENRICHMENT - MONEY HAD AND RECEIVED In order for a party to establish a claim for unjust enrichment/money had and received they must show that “defendant(s) received a benefit and that retention of that benefit without payment would be unjust.” VRG Corp. v. GKN Realty Corp., 135 N.J. 539, 554, 641 A.2d 519 (1994). The claim “requires that [a] plaintiff show that it expected remuneration from the defendant at the time it performed or conferred a benefit on defendant and that the failure of remuneration enriched defendant beyond its contractual rights.” Id. Defendant SLS claims that the existence of an agreement between the parties precludes recovery based on money had and received. This argument is clever, but misleadingly so. Not only does it allow Defendant SLS and Defendant RCS the proverbial “two bites at the apple” by arguing collectively what each could not argue pursuant to restrictions of judicial estoppel; namely, that there is no agreement and simultaneously that unjust enrichment is precluded by an agreement. But more significantly, it is factually and legally inaccurate as the law Case 2:17-cv-02246-WJM-MF Document 23 Filed 05/11/17 Page 12 of 16 PageID: 349 13 permits the existence of an agreement, but the key question is whether “a failure of remuneration enriched defendant beyond its contractual rights”. VRG Corp. v. GKN Realty Corp., 135 N.J. 539, 554, 641 A.2d 519 (1994)(emphasis supplied). There are two (2) significant actions of wrongdoing that relate to the insurance proceeds paid to servicers by AMIG Defendants. Upon information and belief, $22,468.72 of the insurance proceeds were applied to the principal balance of the loan, which was the first action of wrongdoing related to the insurance proceeds and in fact conferred a benefit beyond the contractual rights. See Francese Decl. ¶ 7. It should also be noted, that this is not permitted by the mortgage agreement. SLS’s Exhibit 1 ¶ 5. It appears that the wrongdoing would be attributable to Defendant RCS, but the remedy would be addressed to Defendant SLS, who was not a party to the agreement at the time but who is the current assignee and as such the claim for money had and received is indeed proper. It should also be noted that upon information and belief, Defendant RCS and Defendant SLS failed to disclose the existence of an additional insurance proceeds in the sum $74,076.25 until after the filing of the complaint in this action (in addition to the $25,750.62 and $22,468.72 referenced in the complaint). See Francese Decl. ¶ 9. Again, it appears that the wrongdoing would be attributable to Defendant RCS, but the remedy would be addressed to Defendant SLS, who was not a party to the agreement at the time but who is the current assignee and as such the claim for money had and received is once Case 2:17-cv-02246-WJM-MF Document 23 Filed 05/11/17 Page 13 of 16 PageID: 350 14 again indeed proper. Thurs, Defendant SLS’s application must be denied in its entirety. F. A SERVICER OF THE LOAN CAN BE LIABLE FOR BREACH OF CONTRACT AND BREACH OF THE COVENANT OF GOOD FAITH AND FAIR DEALING Defendant SLS seeks to dismiss Plaintiff’s claims for breach of contract and breach of the covenant of good faith and fair dealing. However, this application is without merit and must be denied. “A loan servicer can become a party to a mortgage agreement between lender and borrower via assignment, and whether or not such an assignment occurred is an issue of fact.” See Digiacomo v. Statebridge Company LLC, et al., No. 1:2014cv06694 (D.N.J. 2015); citing Ellsworth v. U.S. Bank, N.A., 30 F.Supp. 3d 886 (N.D. Cal. 2014). Similarly, loan servicer can be liable under the covenant of good faith and faith dealing in the facts alleged in the instant matter. See Digiacomo v. Statebridge Company LLC, et al., No. 1:2014cv06694 (D.N.J. 2015) Defendant SLS claims that the language of the mortgage precludes recovery on breach of contract. Not only is this inaccurate based on the wrongdoing related to forced lender placed insurance as more completely set forth above, it is also erroneous in connection with Defendant’s inaccurate reading of the mortgage agreement. In essence, Defendant SLS claims that payment of the insurance proceeds to the borrower only after the repairs have been performed and after an inspection has taken place. The language clearly states that the proceeds should be paid in a single Case 2:17-cv-02246-WJM-MF Document 23 Filed 05/11/17 Page 14 of 16 PageID: 351 15 payment up front or progress payments as work is completed. See Defendant SLS’s Exhibit 1 ¶ 5. Any other reading of the mortgage would be unreasonable and/or unconscionable as it would be impossible for a borrower to advance large sums of money to effectuate repairs. The mortgage agreement reads in relevant part: “Unless the Lender and Borrower otherwise agree in writing, any insurance proceeds…shall be applied to the restoration of the property…Lender may disburse proceeds for the repairs in a single payment or in a series of progress payments as the work is completed.” See Defendant SLS’s Exhibit 1 ¶ 5. (emphasis supplied). As such, Defendant SLS’s application must be denied in its entirety. G. EVIDENCE IS IN THE EXCLUSIVE CONTROL OF MOVING PARTY The analysis of the Complaint in this action under Rule 9(b) would be subject to the relaxed standard that is applied to claims where evidence “lies within [Defendants’] exclusive possession” and specific citation to each instance of fraudulent conduct should not be required. E & E Co., Ltd. v. Kam Hing Enterprises, Inc., 429 F.App’x 632, 633 (9th Cir. 2011); U.S. ex rel. Tamanaha v. Furukawa America, Inc., 2011 WL 3423788, *2 (9th Cir. Aug. 5, 2011); (citing United States ex rel. Lee v. SmithKline Beecham, Inc., 245 F.3d 1048, 1052 (9th Cir. 2001). Case 2:17-cv-02246-WJM-MF Document 23 Filed 05/11/17 Page 15 of 16 PageID: 352 16 H. LEAVE TO AMEND PLEADINGS FREELY GRANTED In the unlikely event this court finds the pleadings insufficient, Plaintiff hereby requests leave to amend. Under Fed.R.Civ.P. 15(a), leave to amend a complaint shall be freely given in the absence of circumstances such as undue delay, bad faith or dilatory motive, undue prejudice to the opposing party or futility of amendment. See Foman v. Davis, 371 U.S. 178, 83 S. Ct. 227, 9 L. Ed. 2d 222 (1962). “[I]f a complaint is vulnerable to 12(b)(6) dismissal, a district court must permit a curative amendment, unless an amendment would be inequitable or futile.” Phillips v. County of Allegheny, 515 F.3d 224, 236 (3d Cir. 2008) (emphasis supplied). II. CONCLUSION Defendant SLS’s motion to dismiss must be denied in its entirety, together with other such further relief the court may deem just and proper. Respectfully submitted, PEYROT & ASSOCIATES, P.C. /s/ Frederic Aurelien By: Frederic Aurelien, Esq., David Van Leeuwen, Esq. (admitted pro hac vice) Attorneys for Plaintiff 62 William Street, 8th Floor New York, New York 10005 (646) 650-2785 david.vanleeuwen@peyrotlaw.com Dated: May 11, 2017 Case 2:17-cv-02246-WJM-MF Document 23 Filed 05/11/17 Page 16 of 16 PageID: 353 Case 2:17-cv-02246-WJM-MF Document 23-1 Filed 05/11/17 Page 1 of 9 PageID: 354 Case 2:17-cv-02246-WJM-MF Document 23-1 Filed 05/11/17 Page 2 of 9 PageID: 355 Case 2:17-cv-02246-WJM-MF Document 23-1 Filed 05/11/17 Page 3 of 9 PageID: 356 Case 2:17-cv-02246-WJM-MF Document 23-1 Filed 05/11/17 Page 4 of 9 PageID: 357 Case 2:17-cv-02246-WJM-MF Document 23-1 Filed 05/11/17 Page 5 of 9 PageID: 358 Case 2:17-cv-02246-WJM-MF Document 23-1 Filed 05/11/17 Page 6 of 9 PageID: 359 Case 2:17-cv-02246-WJM-MF Document 23-1 Filed 05/11/17 Page 7 of 9 PageID: 360 Case 2:17-cv-02246-WJM-MF Document 23-1 Filed 05/11/17 Page 8 of 9 PageID: 361 Case 2:17-cv-02246-WJM-MF Document 23-1 Filed 05/11/17 Page 9 of 9 PageID: 362