UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
SOUTHERN DISTRICT OF NEW YORK
HECTOR FIGUEROA, President, SEIU Local
32BJ, CTW, CLC,
Plaintiff,
– against –
HELEN DIANE FOSTER, Commissioner, New
York State Division of Human Rights,
Defendant.
No. 14-cv-8796 (GHW)
CORRECTED MEMORANDUM OF LAW IN OPPOSITION
TO PLAINTIFF’S MOTION FOR SUMMARY JUDGMENT AND
IN SUPPORT OF DEFENDANT’S CROSS-MOTION FOR SUMMARY JUDGMENT
ERIC T. SCHNEIDERMAN
Attorney General of the
State of New York
Attorney for Defendants
120 Broadway
New York, New York 10271
(212) 416-6696
ANGEL M. GUARDIOLA II
Assistant Attorney General
TABLE OF CONTENTS
Page
TABLE OF AUTHORITIES ......................................................................................................... iii
PRELIMINARY STATEMENT .................................................................................................... 1
LEGAL AND FACTUAL BACKGROUND ................................................................................. 1
A. Division Procedures ................................................................................................ 1
B. Local 32BJ Before the Division ............................................................................. 4
ARGUMENT .................................................................................................................................. 5
I. DEFENDANT IS ENTITLED TO SUMMARY JUDGMENT BECAUSE THE
FEDERAL DUTY OF FAIR REPRESENTATION DOES NOT PREEMPT
THE DIVISION’S ENFORCEMENT OF EMPLOYMENT DISCRIMINATION
STATUTES...................................................................................................................... 5
A. Congress Intended Discrimination Claims to Exist Independently of Duty
of Fair Representation Claims and for State Agencies to Take the Lead in
Enforcement of Discrimination Claims .................................................................. 6
B. The Supreme Court Has Never Held that the Duty of Fair Representation
Preempts State Substantive Law ........................................................................... 12
C. Circuit Court Decisions Holding that State Substantive Law Is Preempted
by the Duty of Fair Representation Are Not Supported by Supreme Court
Precedent ............................................................................................................... 15
D. District Courts Finding Preemption of State Law by the Duty of Fair
Representation Rely on Cases That Are Not Supported by Supreme Court
Precedent ............................................................................................................... 19
II. PLAINTIFF DOES NOT SATISFY THE REQUIREMENTS FOR GRANTING
A PERMANENT INJUNCTION .................................................................................. 20
A. Plaintiff Does Not Show that Local 32BJ Suffered Irreparable Harm ................. 21
B. The Balance of Equities Does Not Tip in Plaintiff’s Favor and the
Public Interest Weighs Against Granting a Permanent Injunction ....................... 22
i
III. YOUNGER ABSTENTION APPLIES TO THE PENDING ADMINISTRATIVE
ENFORCEMENT PROCEEDING ................................................................................ 23
IV. PLAINTIFF’S PROPOSED INJUNCTION IS UNNECESSARY BECAUSE THE
DIVISION ALREADY HAS A MECHANISM BY WHICH IT CAN IDENTIFY
CLAIMS IMPLICATING THE DUTY OF FAIR REPRESENTATION .................... 24
CONCLUSION ............................................................................................................................. 26
ii
TABLE OF AUTHORITIES
Cases Page(s)
14 Penn Plaza LLC v. Pyett,
556 U.S. 247 (2009) .................................................................................................................10
Adkins v. Mireles,
526 F.3d 531 (9th Cir. 2008) ...................................................................................................17
Agosto v. Correctional Officers Benevolent Ass’n,
107 F. Supp. 2d 294 (S.D.N.Y. 2000)......................................................................................10
Aledide v. Barr,
607 F. Supp. 281 (S.D.N.Y. 1985) ..........................................................................................19
Alexander v. Gardner-Denver Co.,
415 U.S. 36 (1974) .....................................................................................................................7
Allis Chalmers Corp. v. Lueck,
471 U.S. 202 (1985) .................................................................................................................17
Altria Group v. Good,
555 U.S. 70 (2008) .....................................................................................................................5
Amalgamated Ass’n of Street, Electric Railway & Motor Coach Employees of America v.
Lockridge,
403 U.S. 274 (1971) .................................................................................................................18
Amoco Production Co. v. Village of Gambell,
480 U.S. 531 (1987) .................................................................................................................20
Boykin v. Key Corp,
No. 03-CV-944S, 2005 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 5546 (W.D.N.Y. Mar. 28, 2005) ..........................24
Carter v. Smith Food King,
765 F.2d 916 (9th Cir. 1985) ...................................................................................................19
Celotex Corp. v. Catrett,
477 U.S. 317 (1986) ...................................................................................................................5
Cent. Rabbinical Cong. of U.S. & Can. v. N.Y.C. Dep’t of Health & Mental Hygiene,
763 F.3d 183 (2d Cir. 2014).....................................................................................................20
Condon v. Local 2944, United Steelworkers of America, AFL-CIO, CLC,
683 F.2d 590 (1st Cir. 1982) ..............................................................................................15, 17
iii
English v. General Electric Co.,
496 U.S. 72 (1990) .....................................................................................................................6
Farmer v. ARA Services, Inc.,
660 F.2d 1096 (6th Cir. 1981) .................................................................................................10
Farmer v. United Brotherhood of Carpenters & Joiners, Local 27,
430 U.S. 290 (1977) .................................................................................................................19
Ford Motor Co. v. Huffman,
345 U.S. 330 (1953) ...................................................................................................................7
Ford v. Bernard Fineson Development Center,
81 F.3d 304 (2d Cir. 1996).........................................................................................................8
Freightliner Corp. v. Myrick,
514 U.S. 280 (1995) ...................................................................................................................6
Fristoe v. Reynolds Metals Co.,
615 F.2d 1209 (9th Cir. 1980) .................................................................................................19
Fund v. City of New York,
No. 14 Civ. 2958 (KPF), 2014 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 68509 (S.D.N.Y. May 19, 2014) ...............23
Goodman v. Lukens Steel Co.,
482 U.S. 656 (1987) .................................................................................................................10
HSBC Bank USA v. N.Y.C. Commission on Human Rights,
673 F. Supp. 2d 210 (S.D.N.Y. 2009)................................................................................23, 24
Int’l Ass’n of Machinists v. Gonzales,
356 U.S. 617 (1958) ...........................................................................................................13, 16
J. & W. Seligman & Co. v. Spitzer,
No. 05 Civ. 7781 (KMW), 2007 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 71881 (S.D.N.Y. Sept. 27, 2007) ...........24
Jackson Hewitt Tax Service Inc. v. Kirkland,
455 F. App’x 16 (2d Cir. 2012) ...............................................................................................23
Kremer v. Chemical Construction Co.,
456 U.S. 461 (1982) .....................................................................................................7, 8, 9, 23
Lingle v. Norge Division of Magic Chef, Inc.,
486 U.S. 399 (1988) ...............................................................................................12, 16, 17, 18
Local 20, Teamsters, Chauffeurs & Helpers Union v. Morton
377 U.S. 252 (1964) .....................................................................................................15, 16, 17
iv
Local 761, Int’l Union of Electrical, Radio & Machine Workers, AFL-CIO v. NLRB,
366 U.S. 667 (1961) .................................................................................................................16
Lodge 76, Int’l Ass’n of Machinists & Aerospace Workers, AFL-CIO v. Wisconsin
Employment Relations Commission,
427 U.S. 132 (1976) .................................................................................................................16
Maynard v. Revere Copper Products, Inc.,
773 F.2d 733 (6th Cir. 1985) ...................................................................................................18
McDonald v. Santa Fe Trail Transportation Co.,
427 U.S. 273 (1976) .................................................................................................................10
Medtronic, Inc. v. Lohr,
518 U.S. 470 (1996) .........................................................................................................5, 6, 11
Merck & Co. v. Reynolds,
559 U.S. 633 (2010) .............................................................................................................7, 11
Metropolitan Life Insurance Co. v. Massachusetts,
471 U.S. 724 (1985) .................................................................................................................16
Mohasco Corp. v. Silver,
447 U.S. 807 (1980) .........................................................................................................7, 9, 22
Morris v. City of New York,
No. 05 Civ. 7368 (PKC), 2007 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 14765 (S.D.N.Y. Mar. 1, 2007) ................24
NLRB v. Miranda Fuel Co.
326 F.2d 172 (2d Cir. 1963).....................................................................................................12
Ohio Civil Rights Commission v. Dayton Christian School, Inc.,
477 U.S. 619 (1986) .................................................................................................................23
Olguin v. Inspiration Consolidated Copper Co.,
740 F.2d 1468 (9th Cir. 1984) .................................................................................................19
Oliva v. Wine, Liquor & Distillery Workers Union, Local One,
651 F. Supp. 369 (S.D.N.Y. 1987) ..........................................................................................19
Parker v. Metropolitan Transportation Authority,
97 F. Supp. 2d 437 (S.D.N.Y. 2000)........................................................................................10
Red Earth LLC v. United States,
657 F.3d 128 (2d Cir. 2011).....................................................................................................20
Retail Clerks Int’l Ass’n, Local 1625, AFL-CIO v. Schermerhorn,
375 U.S. 96 (1963) .....................................................................................................................6
v
Rice v. Santa Fe Elevator Corp.,
331 U.S. 218 (1943) ...............................................................................................................1, 5
Richardson v. United Steelworkers of America,
864 F.2d 1162 (5th Cir. 1989) .................................................................................................15
Salinger v. Colting,
607 F.3d 68 (2d Cir. 2010).................................................................................................20, 22
San Diego Building Trades Council v. Garmon,
359 U.S. 236 (1959) ...........................................................................................................12, 15
Shaw v. Delta Air Lines,
463 U.S. 85 (1983) ...............................................................................................7, 9, 10, 22, 23
Sipes v. Vaca,
397 S.W.2d 658 (Mo. 1965) ..............................................................................................12, 13
Sprint Communications, Inc. v. Jacobs,
134 S. Ct. 584 (2013) ...............................................................................................................23
Terminix Int’l Co. v. Rocque,
210 F. Supp. 2d 97 (D. Conn. 2002) ........................................................................................24
Tisdale v. United Ass’n of Journeymen & Apprentices of Plumbing & Pipefitting Industry
of U.S. & Canada, Local 704,
25 F.3d 1308 (6th Cir. 1994) ...............................................................................................6, 18
Union Free School District No. 6 v. New York State Human Rights Appeal Board,
35 N.Y.2d 371 (1974) ................................................................................................................3
United Steelworkers of America, AFL-CIO-CLC v. Rawson,
495 U.S. 362 (1990) ...........................................................................................................17, 18
Vaca v. Sipes,
386 U.S. 171 (1967) .....................................................................................5, 12, 13, 14, 15, 17
Welch v. General Motors Corp., Buick Motor Division,
922 F.2d 287 (6th Cir. 1990) ...................................................................................................18
Winter v. Natural Res. Def. Council, Inc.,
555 U.S. 7 (2008) ...............................................................................................................20, 22
Wrobbel v. Asplundh Constr. Corp.,
549 F. Supp. 2d 868 (E.D. Mich. 2008) .....................................................................................6
Wyeth v. Levine,
555 U.S. 555 (2009) .......................................................................................................5, 14, 20
vi
Younger v. Harris,
401 U.S. 37 (1971) ...................................................................................................................23
Federal Statutes
29 U.S.C.
§ 157...................................................................................................................................12, 13
§ 158...................................................................................................................................12, 13
§ 185.........................................................................................................................................17
§ 623.........................................................................................................................................11
§ 625...........................................................................................................................................8
§ 633.....................................................................................................................................6, 11
42 U.S.C.
§ 2000e-2 .........................................................................................................................6, 7, 11
§ 2000e-4 ...................................................................................................................................7
§ 2000e-5 ...........................................................................................................6, 7, 8, 9, 23, 25
§ 2000e-6 ...................................................................................................................................7
§ 2000e-7 .............................................................................................................................6, 11
§ 2000e-8 .....................................................................................................................1, 7, 8, 22
§ 2000e-9 ...................................................................................................................................7
§ 12112.....................................................................................................................................11
§ 12117...................................................................................................................................7, 8
§ 12201.................................................................................................................................6, 11
Age Discrimination in Employment Act of 1967,
Pub. L. No. 90-202, 81 Stat. 602 ...............................................................................................7
Civil Rights Act of 1964,
Pub. L. No. 88-352, 78 Stat. 241 ...............................................................................................6
Labor Management Relations Act of 1947,
Pub. L. No. 80-101, 61 Stat. 136, 158–59 ...............................................................................16
§ 301.............................................................................................................................17, 18, 19
§ 303.........................................................................................................................................16
Federal Rules and Regulations
Fed. R. Civ. P. 56 .............................................................................................................................5
Federal Administrative Determinations
Miranda Fuel Co.,
140 N.L.R.B. 181 (1962) .........................................................................................................12
vii
Federal Administrative Publications
U.S. Equal Employment Opportunity Commission,
EEOC Charge Receipts by State (includes U.S. Territories) and Basis for 2014 ...................10
U.S. Equal Employment Opportunity Commission,
Jurisdictional Area.....................................................................................................................9
State Statutes
Michigan Compiled Laws Annotated
§ 37.1204..................................................................................................................................18
New York Executive Law
§ 296.....................................................................................................................................2, 11
§ 297.......................................................................................................................................2, 3
§ 298...............................................................................................................................3, 21, 25
State Rules and Regulations
9 N.Y.C.R.R.
§ 465.3 .......................................................................................................................................2
§ 465.4 .....................................................................................................................................21
§ 465.5 .......................................................................................................................................3
§ 465.8 .......................................................................................................................................3
State Administrative Publications
New York State Division of Human Rights,
Contact Us .................................................................................................................................9
viii
PRELIMINARY STATEMENT
The New York State Division of Human Rights (“Division”) is empowered by federal
and state statutes to investigate allegations of discriminatory conduct by labor organizations. In
this action, Service Employees International Union Local 32BJ (“Local 32BJ”) seeks to be
permanently exempted from the Division’s oversight in its dealings with bargaining unit
members, invoking the doctrine of federal preemption. Summary judgment in Defendant’s favor
should be granted because Local 32BJ cannot identify any federal statute evincing the “clear and
manifest purpose of Congress” that the judge-made duty of fair representation preempt the New
York State Human Rights Law (“Human Rights Law”). Rice v. Santa Fe Elevator Corp., 331
U.S. 218, 230 (1943). Moreover, Plaintiff’s request for a permanent injunction should be denied.
Local 32BJ is not suffering irreparable harm due to the Division’s activities. The harm to the
Division and individual union members in stripping the Division of its power to enforce the
Human Rights Law outweighs any harm to Local 32BJ. Finally, an injunction is not in the
public interest because it would deprive over 81,000 individuals working in New York from
bringing discrimination claims in the state forum, as intended by Congress.
LEGAL AND FACTUAL BACKGROUND
A. Division Procedures
Federal and state civil rights laws prohibit labor unions from discriminating against
individuals based on race, sex, or membership in any other protected class. An individual may
bring a discrimination claim both to the Division and to the Equal Employment Opportunity
Commission (“EEOC”), as the two agencies share jurisdiction over employment discrimination
claims. See, e.g., 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-8(b); Def.’s Ex. A.1 Pursuant to federal employment
1 Defendant’s Exhibits A–I were filed in opposition to Plaintiff’s motion for a preliminary injunction (see Docs. 21-
1 to 21-9).
discrimination statutes, the Division and the EEOC have entered into a Worksharing Agreement
to more efficiently process discrimination claims. See Def.’s Ex. A. By the terms of this
agreement, the Division and the EEOC receive, draft, and investigate discrimination charges on
each other’s behalf. Id. §§ II.A., II.C. When the Division receives a complaint that raises claims
under both federal and state law, the claim is considered dual-filed and receives both a federal
and state charge number. Id. § II.B.; Sobkowski Aff. ¶ 8.2 The agreement allocates initial claim-
handling responsibilities between the two agencies. Def.’s Ex. A, at § III.A.
A claim of unlawful discrimination may be filed against a labor organization, see N.Y.
Exec. Law § 296(1)(c), (1)(e), (1-a), (3)(a), (7), (19)(a), with one of the Division’s regional
offices, id. § 297(1); Sobkowski Aff. ¶ 10. An individual may file the complaint in person or by
mail, and may be assisted by Division personnel if not represented by counsel. 9 N.Y.C.R.R.
§ 465.3(a)(1), (f). Many individuals file complaints without assistance from anyone, Sobkowski
Aff. ¶ 11, and the vast majority of complaints are filed pro se, id. ¶ 13; Joint 56.1 Statement of
Facts [“56.1 Statement”] ¶ 18. Once the Division receives a complaint, an intake specialist is
responsible for soliciting relevant information and documentation from the complainant and
entering the information into the Division’s database. Sobkowski Aff. ¶ 14. The intake
specialist is qualified to inform complainants about the investigative process but not to give legal
advice. Id. at ¶ 15.
The Division subsequently assigns an investigator to compile an administrative record.
Id. ¶ 16. The investigator must gather enough information to determine whether or not there is
probable cause to believe that a respondent has unlawfully discriminated against the
complainant. Def.’s Ex. K, at X-3. The investigator drafts the majority of a Final Investigation
2 The Affirmation of Erin Sobkowski was filed in opposition to Plaintiff’s motion for a preliminary injunction (see
Doc. 20).
2
Report and Basis for Determination, outlining the issues, the parties’ positions, the evidence, and
the reasons supporting a potential determination of probable cause. See, e.g., Pl.’s Exs. 6, 20,
36.3 Investigators cannot, however, make factual or legal conclusions. Sobkowski Aff. ¶¶ 16–
17. The regional director reviews the administrative record and the Final Investigation Report
and the Basis for Determination, to decide whether the Division has jurisdiction over the case
and whether there is probable cause to believe unlawful discrimination occurred. 9 N.Y.C.R.R.
§ 465.8(a); Sobkowski Aff. ¶ 18.
By statute, the Division has 180 days from the date the complaint is filed to determine
whether it has jurisdiction and whether there is probable cause to believe the respondent engaged
in unlawful discriminatory conduct. N.Y. Exec. Law § 297(2). However, the 180-day period is
not mandatory, and failure to meet the time limit does not deprive the Division of jurisdiction
over the case. See Union Free Sch. Dist. No. 6 v. N.Y. State Human Rights Appeal Bd., 35
N.Y.2d 371, 380–81 (1974). If a complaint is dismissed, the regional director issues a final
determination that informs the complainant of the right to appeal to the New York State Supreme
Court. 9 N.Y.C.R.R. § 465.5(d)(3). If a dual-filed complaint is dismissed, the regional director
also informes the complainant of the right to seek review by the EEOC. See, e.g., Pl.’s Ex. 2, at
3. If probable cause is found, the regional director recommends the case for a hearing. See, e.g.,
Pl.’s Exs. 6, 20. A probable cause determination is not a final order of the Division. Sobkowski
Aff. ¶ 34; cf. N.Y. Exec. Law § 298.
Some cases present unique or complicated legal issues about which the regional director
may need a legal opinion. Downey Aff. ¶ 36. In such an instance, the regional director may, at
any time before issuing a probable cause determination, request a legal opinion from the
3 Plaintiff’s Exhibits 1-46 were filed in support of Plaintiff’s motion for a preliminary injunction (see Docs. 11-1 to
11-40, 22-1 to 22-6).
3
Division’s Office of General Counsel. Id. An attorney would then review the case and issue the
requested opinion. Id.
B. Local 32BJ Before the Division
Plaintiff identifies twenty-three cases filed by pro se complainants with the Division
between 2009 and 2016 in which Local 32BJ has been a respondent. Pl.’s Exs. 1, 3, 5, 7, 9, 11,
13, 15, 17, 19, 21, 23, 25, 27, 29, 30, 34, 45, 55, 58, 61, 64, 67. Twenty-two of those cases
followed the process as described above, all but one being dual-filed. Pl.’s Exs. 1, 3, 5, 7, 9, 11,
13, 15, 17, 19, 21, 23, 25, 27, 29, 30, 45, 55, 58, 61, 64, 67. In each of those cases, Local 32BJ
made a written submission asserting that the duty of fair representation arising from the National
Labor Relations Act (“NLRA”) preempted the Division’s investigation and prosecution of the
administrative complaint and deprived it of jurisdiction. Pl.’s Exs. 31–33, 47–48, 56, 59, 62, 65.
However, the Division investigated the merits of the allegations in each case. Pl.’s Exs. 2, 4, 6,
8, 12, 14, 16, 18, 20, 22, 24, 26, 51–52, 57, 60, 63, 66; Def.’s Exs. H, I, U. In two of those cases,
the Division explicitly denied the challenge to its jurisdiction and found probable cause. Pl.’s
Exs. 6, 20. In the twenty-third case, the union was added as a respondent at the conclusion of the
investigatory stage, the day before the Division issued a probable cause determination. Pl.’s Exs.
34–36. As with the other cases, Local 32BJ made a written submission asserting that the duty of
fair representation preempted the Division’s jurisdiction, but the Division implicitly denied the
challenge to its jurisdiction by proceeding with the case. Cf. Def.’s Exs. F, R. This case was
later withdrawn, along with the cases for which the Division found probable cause. Def.’s Exs.
P, R, S, W. Two of the twenty-three cases are still in the investigation stage, Pl.’s Exs. 64, 67,
the rest having been withdrawn, dismissed, or otherwise discontinued, Pl.’s Exs. 2, 4, 8, 10, 12,
14, 16, 18, 22, 24, 26, 51–52, 57, 60, 63, 66; Def.’s Exs. H, I, P, R, S, U; Downey Aff. ¶ 51.
4
ARGUMENT
A court “shall grant summary judgment if the movant shows that there is no genuine
dispute as to any material fact and the movant is entitled to judgment as a matter of law.” Fed.
R. Civ. P. 56(a); Celotex Corp. v. Catrett, 477 U.S. 317, 323 (1986). In the instant action, no
factual dispute exists (see Doc. 34 (Joint 56.1 Statement of Undisputed Facts)). Thus, only legal
issues require determination.
State law is preempted only when congressional enactments demonstrate that preemption
is the “clear and manifest purpose of Congress.” Wyeth v. Levine, 555 U.S. 555, 565 (2009)
(quoting Medtronic, Inc. v. Lohr, 518 U.S. 470, 485 (1996)). Here, Plaintiff cannot show that the
judge-created4 duty of fair representation demonstrates the unequivocal intent of Congress to
preempt the Human Rights Law. Thus, the Court should grant Defendant’s cross-motion for
summary judgment and deny Plaintiff’s motion for summary judgment. Fed. R. Civ. P. 56(a).
I. DEFENDANT IS ENTITLED TO SUMMARY JUDGMENT BECAUSE THE
FEDERAL DUTY OF FAIR REPRESENTATION DOES NOT PREEMPT THE
DIVISION’S ENFORCEMENT OF EMPLOYMENT DISCRIMINATION
STATUTES
Courts “assum[e] that the historic police powers of the States [are] not to be superseded
by [a] Federal Act unless that was the clear and manifest purpose of Congress.” Wyeth, 555 U.S.
at 565 (2009) (quoting Medtronic, Inc., 518 U.S. at 485); accord Altria Group v. Good, 555 U.S.
70, 77 (2008) (quoting Rice v. Santa Fe Elevator Corp., 331 U.S. 218, 230 (1943)).
Congressional intent to preempt state law will be found only where (1) a statute contains an
express preemption provision, (2) “the scope of a statute indicates that Congress intended federal
law to occupy a field exclusively,” (3) “it is impossible for a private party to comply with both
4 See Vaca v. Sipes, 386 U.S. 171, 177 (1967) (explaining the judicial development of the duty of fair
representation).
5
state and federal requirements,” or (4) “state law stands as an obstacle to the accomplishment and
execution of the full purposes and objectives of Congress.” Freightliner Corp. v. Myrick, 514
U.S. 280, 287 (1995).
Plaintiff relies on the second form of preemption, known as “field preemption.”
Congress, however, did not “intend[] the Federal Government to occupy exclusively” the field
regulating a labor organization’s conduct as a collective bargaining representative. See English
v. Gen. Elec. Co., 496 U.S. 72, 79 (1990). Instead, Congress expressly prohibited unions from
discriminating against individuals for any reason, 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-2(c)(1), and authorized
state agencies to take the lead in enforcing employment discrimination laws, id. § 2000e-5(b),
(c). Congress also expressly exempted state employment discrimination laws from preemption.
29 U.S.C. § 633(a); 42 U.S.C. §§ 2000e-7, 12201(b). Furthermore, “the fact that the duty of fair
representation is a judicial creation tends to undermine the argument that Congress intended [the
duty] to supplant state law with a federal cause of action.” Wrobbel v. Asplundh Constr. Corp.,
549 F. Supp. 2d 868, 875 (E.D. Mich. 2008). “It should be self-evident that if Congress did not
preempt state civil rights actions by operation of federal civil rights law it could not have meant
to do so through federal labor law.” Tisdale v. United Ass’n of Journeymen & Apprentices of
Plumbing & Pipefitting Indus. of U.S. & Can., Local 704, 25 F.3d 1308, 1312 (6th Cir. 1994).
Moreover, Supreme Court precedent does not support Plaintiff’s preemption argument.
A. Congress Intended Discrimination Claims to Exist Independently of Duty of
Fair Representation Claims and for State Agencies to Take the Lead in
Enforcement of Discrimination Claims
“‘[T]he purpose of Congress is the ultimate touchstone’ in every pre-emption case.”
Medtronic, 518 U.S. at 485 (quoting Retail Clerks Int’l Ass’n, Local 1625, AFL-CIO v.
Schermerhorn, 375 U.S. 96, 103 (1963)). When Congress enacted the Civil Rights Act of 1964,
6
Pub. L. No. 88-352, 78 Stat. 241, and the Age Discrimination in Employment Act of 1967
(“ADEA”), Pub. L. No. 90-202, 81 Stat. 602, the duty of fair representation already existed, see
Ford Motor Co. v. Huffman, 345 U.S. 330 (1953). Nevertheless, “Congress thought it necessary
to afford the protections of Title VII against unions.” Alexander v. Gardner-Denver Co., 415
U.S. 36, 58 n.19 (1974) (citing 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-2(c)). At the time, no court had found that the
duty of fair representation preempted state substantive law. Cf. Pl.’s Mem. of Law 9–11. Thus,
there was no “relevant judicial precedent” around which Congress could have manifested any
intent to preempt state law. Merck & Co. v. Reynolds, 559 U.S. 633, 648 (2010). Moreover,
even had there been such precedent, Title VII “manifests a congressional intent to allow an
individual to pursue independently his rights under both Title VII and other applicable state and
federal statutes,” Alexander, 415 U.S. at 48, and “requires recourse to available state
administrative remedies,” Shaw v. Delta Air Lines, 463 U.S. 85, 101 (1983).
In affording employees the protection of employment discrimination statues against
unions, Congress expressly intended that state agencies take the lead in investigation and
enforcement in order “to give state agencies an opportunity to redress the evil at which the
federal legislation was aimed, and to avoid federal intervention unless its need was
demonstrated.” Mohasco Corp. v. Silver, 447 U.S. 807, 821 (1980). Accordingly, Congress
“guarantee[d] all States with fair employment practices laws an initial opportunity to resolve
charges of discrimination.” Kremer v. Chem. Constr. Co., 456 U.S. 461, 473 (1982); see 42
U.S.C. § 2000e-5(c) (requiring complainants to file charges with state or local agencies before
filing with the EEOC); id. § 12117(a) (incorporating Title VII enforcement mechanism of 42
U.S.C. §§ 2000e-4, -5, -6, -8, and -9). Significantly, in granting states this opportunity, “New
York’s fair employment laws were referred to in the congressional debates . . . as an example of
7
existing state legislation effectively combatting employment discrimination.” Kremer, 456 U.S.
at 473. Moreover, Congress required the EEOC to “accord substantial weight to final findings
and orders made by State or local authorities in proceedings commenced under State or local
law.” 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-5(b).
Congress additionally intended that the EEOC cooperate with state and local agencies,
allowing the EEOC to “utilize the services of such agencies and their employees, and . . . pay . . .
such agencies and their employees for services rendered to assist the Commission in carrying out
[Title VII]” of the Civil Rights Act of 1964. 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-8(b); id. § 12117(a)
(incorporating Title VII enforcement provisions into the Americans with Disabilities Act
(“ADA”)); see also 29 U.S.C. § 625(b) (empowering the EEOC to “cooperate with regional,
State, local, and other authorities . . . to aid in the enforcement of” the ADEA). “In furtherance
of such cooperative efforts, the [EEOC] may enter into written agreements with such State or
local agencies . . . .” 42 U.S.C.§ 2000e-8(b). Pursuant to these statutes, the Division and the
EEOC have entered into a Worksharing Agreement that empowers the Division to act as the
EEOC’s agent for receiving, drafting, processing, and resolving charges. See Def.’s Ex. A, at
§§ II.A., II.C., III.A.
Under the Worksharing Agreement, each agency “will process all Title VII, ADA, . . .
and ADEA charges that [it] originally receive[s].” Id. § III.A. Where charges are initially filed
with the EEOC, the Division waives its right under 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-5 of exclusive jurisdiction
for a 60-day period, id. § III.A.1., in order “to provide individuals with an efficient procedure for
obtaining redress of their grievances,” id. § I.B.; cf. Ford v. Bernard Fineson Dev. Ctr., 81 F.3d
304, 311–12 (2d Cir. 1996). The Worksharing Agreement also sets out the process by which the
Division provides pertinent information to the EEOC so that it may accord substantial weight to
8
the Division’s findings. Id. § V.B.
The Supreme Court has acknowledged the essential role that state agencies play in
enforcing federal civil rights laws. Shaw v. Delta Air Lines, 463 U.S. 85, 101 (1983). In Shaw,
the Court held that ERISA did not completely preempt the Human Rights Law, relying on clear
congressional intent to have state administrative agencies be the primary enforcers of workplace
discrimination laws. Id. at 101–02 (quoting 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-5(c)). In so holding, the Court
noted that the EEOC is required to accord substantial weight to the state agencies’
determinations. Id. at 102 (citing 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-5(b)). The Court also noted that
preemption “not only would eliminate a forum for resolving disputes that . . . may be more
convenient for the EEOC, but also would substantially increase the EEOC’s workload,”
especially since the developed administrative record that otherwise would come to the EEOC
from the state agency would necessarily have to be developed by the EEOC, causing less
thorough investigations or delays to each individual case. Id. at 102 n.23. Thus, preemption
would “disrupt[] . . . the enforcement scheme contemplated by Title VII.” Id. at 102.
Similarly, preemption of the Human Rights Law by the duty of fair representation would
significantly disrupt the enforcement scheme Congress intended for the federal employment
discrimination statutes and preclude their proper enforcement. Cf. Kremer, 456 U.S. at 473;
Mohasco Corp., 447 U.S. at 821. Under the Worksharing Agreement, the Division investigates
more than 4,000 dual-filed cases annually on behalf of the EEOC. Downey Aff. ¶ 10. Thus, the
Division’s twelve offices, see Contact Us, New York State Division of Human Rights,
http://www.dhr.ny.gov/contact-us (last visited June 3, 2015), greatly supplement the
investigative capacity of the EEOC’s two offices in New York, see Jurisdictional Area, U.S.
Equal Emp’t Opportunity Comm’n, http://www.eeoc.gov/field/newyork/area.cfm (last visited
9
June 3, 2015); EEOC Charge Receipts by State (includes U.S. Territories) and Basis for 2014,
U.S. Equal Emp’t Opportunity Comm’n, http://www1.eeoc.gov/eeoc/statistics/enforcement/
state_14.cfm (last visited June 3, 2015). As all but one of the cases that Plaintiff identifies was
dual-filed, Pl.’s Exs. 1, 3, 5, 8–9, 11, 13, 15, 17, 19, 21, 23, 25, 27, 29, 34, 45, 55, 58, 61, 64, 67,
preemption would cause significant inefficiencies and severely hamper an individual’s ability to
bring discrimination claims against his or her union. See Shaw, 463 U.S. at 102 & n.23.
Moreover, if a union discriminates against a member of the bargaining unit because of his
or her membership in a protected class such as race, sex, or age, the individual is not limited to
asserting a claim for a breach of the duty of fair representation. Instead, he or she may allege
violations of employment discrimination laws. See Goodman v. Lukens Steel Co., 482 U.S. 656,
668–69 (1987) (Title VII claim cognizable where union may have breached duty of fair
representation); McDonald v. Santa Fe Trail Transp. Co., 427 U.S. 273, 284–85 (1976) (Title
VII claim cognizable even if union also allegedly breached duty of fair representation); Farmer
v. ARA Servs., Inc., 660 F.2d 1096, 1104 (6th Cir. 1981) (holding that conduct resulting in breach
of duty of fair representation “also makes out a Title VII violation”). “It is well established that
a union’s breach of its duty of fair representation may subject it to liability under Title VII.”
Agosto v. Corr. Officers Benevolent Ass’n, 107 F. Supp. 2d 294, 303 (S.D.N.Y. 2000). Likewise,
the union may be liable under the ADA or the ADEA. Parker v. Metro. Transp. Auth., 97 F.
Supp. 2d 437, 448 (S.D.N.Y. 2000); accord 14 Penn Plaza LLC v. Pyett, 556 U.S. 247, 271–72
(2009) (citing Goodman v. Lukens Steel, 482 U.S. at 669) (union’s conduct can subject it to
liability under both duty of fair representation and ADEA). Thus, it follows that a union may be
subject to liability under the Human Rights Law, which is substantially equivalent to the federal
statutes. See Parker, 97 F. Supp. 2d at 448.
10
Finally, Congress intended that state discrimination laws not be preempted by federal law
where state laws do not “require or permit” conduct prohibited by Title VII, 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-
7, and where state laws provide “greater or equal protection” to ADA protection, 42 U.S.C.
§ 12201(b). For age discrimination claims, Congress additionally intended not to preclude state
agencies from investigating and holding hearings unless the individual filed a subsequent action
in the federal courts. 29 U.S.C. § 633(a) (ADEA). The Human Rights Law prohibits the exact
conduct that the federal statutes prohibit. Specifically, under state law a union may not “exclude
or . . . expel from its membership [an] individual or . . . discriminate in any way against any of its
members” because of membership in a protected class. N.Y. Exec. Law § 296(1)(c). Likewise,
under federal law a union may not (i) “exclude or . . . expel from its membership, or otherwise
. . . discriminate against, any individual because of his race, color, religion, sex, or national
origin,” 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-2(c)(1), (ii) “exclude or . . . expel from its membership, or otherwise
. . . discriminate against, any individual because of his age,” 29 U.S.C. § 623(c), or
(iii) “discriminate against a qualified individual on the basis of disability,” 42 U.S.C. § 12112(a).
As there was no preexisting judicial determination that state laws are preempted by the duty of
fair representation, see Merck & Co. v. Reynolds, 559 U.S. 633, 648 (2010), there is no clear and
manifest congressional intent to preempt the Human Rights Law, Medtronic, Inc. v. Lohr, 518
U.S. 470, 485 (1996).
Accordingly, preemption does not apply because Congress (i) intended to hold unions
liable for violations of employment discrimination statutes despite the preexistence of the duty of
fair representation, (ii) intended to have states take the lead in joint enforcement of these statutes,
and (iii) intended not to preempt state laws that are consistent with the federal employment
discrimination statutes. Moreover, as set forth below, the alleged completely preemptive force of
11
the duty of fair representation is not supported by Supreme Court precedent, which neither
discusses nor demonstrates congressional intent to preempt state laws. Vaca v. Sipes, 386 U.S.
171, 177 (1967).
B. The Supreme Court Has Never Held that the Duty of Fair Representation
Preempts State Substantive Law
In Vaca v. Sipes, the Supreme Court never mentioned state law or discussed the
preemption thereof. 386 U.S. 171 (1967), rev’g Sipes v. Vaca, 397 S.W.2d 658 (Mo. 1965).5
Instead, Vaca discussed a separate preemption doctrine known as Garmon preemption, id., which
is unique to labor law, see Lingle v. Norge Div. of Magic Chef, Inc., 486 U.S. 399, 409 n.8
(1988). Under Garmon preemption, where conduct at issue is arguably protected by 29 U.S.C.
§ 157 or arguably prohibited by 29 U.S.C. § 158 as an unfair labor practice, the National Labor
Relations Board (“NLRB”) has exclusive jurisdiction to consider the matter and both federal and
state courts lack subject matter jurisdiction. San Diego Bldg. Trades Council v. Garmon, 359
U.S. 236, 245 (1959). Since 1962, the NLRB has considered a breach of the duty of fair
representation to be an unfair labor practice under 29 U.S.C. § 158(b). See Miranda Fuel Co.,
140 N.L.R.B. 181 (1962), enforcement denied sub nom. NLRB v. Miranda Fuel Co., 326 F.2d
172 (2d Cir. 1963). Thus, Garmon preemption was at issue in Vaca v. Sipes. 386 U.S. at 176–
88.
In Vaca, a union member filed suit in Missouri state court alleging that after he was fired
due to his purportedly poor health, id. at 175, his union “‘arbitrarily, capriciously and without
just or reasonable reason or cause’ refused to take his grievance . . . to arbitration,” id. at 173. A
jury awarded compensatory and punitive damages against the union. Id. However, the trial
judge set aside the verdict on Garmon preemption grounds. Id. at 173–74; see also Sipes v.
5 The Missouri Supreme Court also did not mention or discuss the existence of a state law claim. 397 S.W.2d 658.
12
Vaca, 397 S.W.2d at 662. The intermediate state appellate court affirmed. Vaca v. Sipes, 386
U.S. at 173–74.
The Missouri Supreme Court reinstated the verdict, holding (i) that the jurisdiction of the
Missouri courts was not preempted because the union’s conduct was not an unfair labor practice,
397 S.W.2d at 664–65 (citing 29 U.S.C. §§ 157–158), and (ii) that there was sufficient evidence
supporting the jury’s determination that the plaintiff had a meritorious claim but the union had
refused to take the grievance to arbitration, id. at 665. In holding that preemption did not apply,
the court relied on Supreme Court case law finding that arbitrary, as opposed to discriminatory,
expulsion from union membership is not an unfair labor practice under federal law. Id. at 662
(quoting Int’l Ass’n of Machinists v. Gonzales, 356 U.S. 617, 620 (1958)); cf. id. at 664 (citing
29 U.S.C. § 158(b)(2) (“It shall be an unfair labor practice for a labor organization or its agents
. . . to cause or attempt to cause an employer to discriminate against an employee in violation of
subsection (a)(3) or to discriminate against an employee with respect to whom membership in
such organization has been denied or terminated on some ground other than his failure to tender
the periodic dues and the initiation fees uniformly required as a condition of acquiring or
retaining membership.”)). In upholding the verdict finding arbitrary union conduct, the court
discussed evidence of the plaintiff’s health that was presented to the jury instead of the
information available to the union at the time it decided not to arbitrate the grievance. Id. at 661,
665; see 386 U.S. at 193.
The Supreme Court “granted certiorari to consider whether exclusive jurisdiction lies
with the NLRB,” that is, whether Garmon preemption applied, 386 U.S. at 174, “and, if not,
whether the finding of [u]nion liability and the relief afforded [the plaintiff] are consistent with
governing principles of federal labor law,” 386 U.S. at 174. The Supreme Court began its
13
discussion of Garmon preemption by briefly outlining the development of the duty of fair
representation. Id. at 177. In so doing, the Court described the duty as “includ[ing] a statutory
obligation to serve the interests of all members without hostility or discrimination toward any, to
exercise its discretion with complete good faith and honesty, and to avoid arbitrary conduct.” Id.
The Court also noted that the “complaint alleged a breach by the [u]nion of a duty grounded in
federal statutes, and . . . federal law therefore governs his cause of action.” Id. at 177. The Court
then held that Garmon preemption was inapplicable because the duty of fair representation was
judicially developed long before the NLRB held that the duty’s breach was an unfair labor
practice, and because ousting the courts of jurisdiction would remove the traditional supervisory
jurisdiction of the courts that ensured impartial review of individuals’ complaints. Id. at 180–83.
In reviewing the finding of union liability, the Supreme Court described the appropriate
standard thus: “A breach of the statutory duty of fair representation occurs only when a union’s
conduct toward a member of the collective bargaining unit is arbitrary, discriminatory, or in bad
faith.” Id. at 190. The Supreme Court then determined that the plaintiff did not prove arbitrary or
bad faith conduct and that the Missouri Supreme Court had applied the wrong standard, id. at
193, because the Missouri court had focused on “whether the evidence supported [the plaintiff’s]
assertion that he had been wrongfully discharged regardless of the [u]nion’s good faith” in
determining that there was not enough medical evidence to take the grievance to arbitration, id.
at 189.
No state-law claim had been alleged, and the Supreme Court did not mention or discuss
preemption of any state-law claims by the duty of fair representation. Id. at 173–98. Thus, Vaca
does not support the contention that Congress intended for the duty of fair representation to
preempt state substantive law. Wyeth v. Levine, 555 U.S. 555, 565 (2009).
14
C. Circuit Court Decisions Holding that State Substantive Law Is Preempted by
the Duty of Fair Representation Are Not Supported by Supreme Court
Precedent
Despite there being no mention of state law in Vaca, 386 U.S. at 173–98, Plaintiff relies
on Circuit Court cases holding that under Vaca the duty of fair representation preempts state
substantive law. For instance, the Fifth Circuit has stated: “In Vaca v. Sipes, . . . the [Supreme]
Court . . . held that th[e] federal duty of fair representation preempted state substantive law.”
Richardson v. United Steelworkers of Am., 864 F.2d 1162, 1166 (5th Cir. 1989) (citing Vaca, 386
U.S. at 188–93). In support of its statement, the Fifth Circuit quoted the dicta in Vaca explaining
that the duty of fair representation is grounded in federal statutes and governed by federal law.
Richardson, 864 F.2d at 1166 (quoting Vaca, 386 U.S. at 177). It also cited the section of Vaca
that merely explained the proper standard for determining arbitrariness in the duty of fair
representation context and rejected the idea that union members were entitled to have their
grievances taken to arbitration. Id. (citing Vaca, 386 U.S. at 189–93). Indeed, the Fifth Circuit
acknowledged that Vaca did not address preemption of state law, yet it nonetheless read such a
holding into Vaca. Id. at 1166 n.3 (citing Vaca, 386 U.S. at 180–93; Garmon, 359 U.S. 236).
The First Circuit likewise relied on dicta in Vaca when holding that the duty of fair
representation preempts state substantive law. See Condon v. Local 2944, United Steelworkers
of Am., AFL-CIO, CLC, 683 F.2d 590 (1st Cir. 1982). In Condon, the court held that “[a]
union’s rights and duties as the exclusive bargaining agent in carrying out its representational
functions” is an area in which “Congress has ‘occupied th[e] field and closed it to state
regulation.’” Id. at 594–95 (quoting Local 20, Teamsters, Chauffeurs & Helpers Union v.
Morton [hereinafter “Teamsters”], 377 U.S. 252, 258 (1964)) (citing Vaca, 386 U.S. at 177). As
explained above, however, Vaca does not support the First Circuit’s holding. 386 U.S. at 177.
15
Moreover, Teamsters had nothing to do with the duty of fair representation. 377 U.S. 262.
Instead, Teamsters involved a distinct preemption doctrine known as Machinists preemption.6
See Lodge 76, Int’l Ass’n of Machinists & Aerospace Workers, AFL-CIO v. Wis. Emp’t Relations
Comm’n, 427 U.S. 132, 145–47 (1976) (citing Teamsters, 377 U.S. at 258–60).
In Teamsters, a union attempted to discourage an employer’s customers from doing
business with the employer while union members were on strike. 377 U.S. at 253. At the time
of the strike, Section 303(a) of the Labor Management Relations Act of 1947 (“LMRA”), Pub. L.
No. 80-101, 61 Stat. 136, 158–59 (1947) (amended 1959), prohibited unions from encouraging
the customers’ employees to force their employers to cease doing business with the employer
against which there was a strike. Teamsters, 377 U.S. at 253 n.1. The statute did not preclude
unions from persuading a customer’s management to refrain from doing business with the
employer, id. at 259, but Ohio state law did forbid such conduct, id. at 255. In holding Ohio law
preempted, the Supreme Court noted that Congress “select[ed] which forms of economic
pressure should be prohibited,” id. at 258–59, thus striking a balance “between the union, the
employees, the employer and the community,” id. at 259 (citing Local 761, Int’l Union of Elec.,
Radio & Mach. Workers, AFL-CIO v. NLRB, 366 U.S. 667, 672 (1961)). Accordingly, Ohio
state law preventing the union’s contact with the customer’s management constituted “an
obstruction of federal policy” that allowed such conduct, id. at 260, and thus “Congress occupied
this field and closed it to state regulation,” id. at 258.
The Supreme Court did not mention the duty of fair representation in Teamsters. Id. at
253–62. Thus, Teamsters does not support the First Circuit’s holding that the duty of fair
6 Machinists preemption, as distinct from Garmon preemption, see Lingle v. Norge Div. of Magic Chef, Inc., 486
U.S. 399, 409 n.8 (1988) (citing Lodge 76, Int’l Ass’n of Machinists & Aerospace Workers, AFL-CIO v. Wis. Emp’t
Relations Comm’n, 427 U.S. 132 (1976)), preempts “state law and state causes of action concerning conduct that
Congress intended to be unregulated,” id. (quoting Metro. Life Ins. Co. v. Massachusetts, 471 U.S. 724, 749 (1985)).
16
representation was one of the “certain areas [where] state law may constitute an impermissible
obstacle to the accomplishment of the purposes of Congress by regulating conduct that federal
law has chosen to leave unregulated.” Condon, 683 F.2d at 594. In sum, the First Circuit took
language from an inapposite case, Teamsters, and applied it to a case that did not mention state
law or preemption thereof, Vaca, to support its holding that state substantive law was preempted
by the duty of fair representation. Condon, 683 F.2d at 594–95.
The Sixth and Ninth Circuit cases cited also do not support the contention that Congress
intended the duty of fair representation to preempt state law. The Ninth Circuit relied explicitly
on Condon when it held that the duty of fair representation “displaces state law that would
impose duties on unions by virtue of their status as the workers’ exclusive collective bargaining
representative.” Adkins v. Mireles, 526 F.3d 531, 539 (9th Cir. 2008). The Ninth Circuit also
relied on portions of United Steelworkers of America, AFL-CIO-CLC v. Rawson, 495 U.S. 362
(1990), wherein the Supreme Court acknowledged—while discussing whether a claim under
LMRA § 301, 29 U.S.C. § 185,7 was cognizable—that mere negligence did not create liability
under the duty of fair representation, Rawson, 495 U.S. at 373–74. In Rawson, however, the
Supreme Court did not hold that the duty of fair representation preempted state-law claims, but
instead held that § 301 preempted a state-law negligence claim because the duty allegedly
assumed by a union to inspect a mine arose from the terms of a collective bargaining agreement
and determining the extent of the duty to inspect required interpretation of the agreement. Id. at
368–72.
7 Another form of preemption under federal labor law is known as § 301 preemption. See Lingle v. Norge Div. of
Magic Chef, Inc., 486 U.S. 399, 403–10 (1988). LMRA § 301 grants jurisdiction to the federal courts over actions
claiming violations of collective bargaining agreements. 29 U.S.C. § 185(a). Thus, “state-law rights and obligations
that do not exist independently of private [collective bargaining] agreements, and that as a result can be waived or
altered by agreement of the private parties, are preempted by those agreements.” Allis Chalmers Corp. v. Lueck, 471
U.S. 202, 213 (1985). However, “as long as the state-law claim can be resolved without interpreting the agreement
itself, the claim is ‘independent’ of the agreement for § 301 preemption purposes.” Lingle, 486 U.S. at 410.
17
Finally, the Sixth Circuit failed to cite any statute, regulation, or case standing for the
proposition that “[t]he duty of fair representation relates to an area of labor law which has been
so fully occupied by Congress as to foreclose state regulation.” Maynard v. Revere Copper
Prods., Inc., 773 F.2d 733, 735 (6th Cir. 1985), quoted in Welch v. Gen. Motors Corp., Buick
Motor Div., 922 F.2d 287, 294 (6th Cir. 1990). The Sixth Circuit likewise failed to cite any
precedent for the proposition that the Michigan Handicappers’ Civil Rights Act8 “created no new
rights for an employee and imposed no duty on a union not already clearly present under existing
federal labor law.” Maynard, 773 F.2d at 735. Instead, the court cited Amalgamated Association
of Street, Electric Railway & Motor Coach Employees of America v. Lockridge, 403 U.S. 274,
299 (1971), when asserting that determining whether a union breached the duty of fair
representation is a question of federal law, Maynard, 773 F.2d at 735. In Lockridge, however,
preemption was determined under Garmon, not on duty of fair representation grounds. 403 U.S.
at 282–97. Moreover, the Sixth Circuit classified duty of fair representation claims as arising
under LMRA § 301. Welch, 922 F.2d at 288, 294; Maynard, 773 F.2d at 734. However, the
Supreme Court clarified that preemption under § 301 occurs only when interpretation of a
collective bargaining agreement is required. Rawson, 495 U.S. at 368–72; Lingle, 486 U.S. at
410. Thus, the Sixth Circuit subsequently held that state discrimination claims are not
preempted, as they “arise[] from an independent body of state substantive rights and do[] not
invoke any legal ground that has been preempted by federal labor law.” Tisdale v. United Ass’n
of Journeymen & Apprentices of Plumbing & Pipefitting Indus. of U.S. & Can., Local 704, 25
F.3d 1308, 1311 (6th Cir. 1994).
Accordingly, the Circuit Court cases upon which Plaintiff relies do not demonstrate that
8 See M.C.L.A. § 37.1204(d): “A labor organization shall not: . . . (d) Fail to fairly and adequately represent a
member in a grievance process because of a member’s handicap.”
18
Congress intended for the duty of fair representation to preempt state substantive law.
D. District Courts Finding Preemption of State Law by the Duty of Fair
Representation Rely on Cases that Are Not Supported by Supreme Court
Precedent
The District Court cases that Plaintiff cites likewise do not demonstrate that Congress
intended for the duty of fair representation to preempt state substantive law. For instance, in
Oliva v. Wine, Liquor & Distillery Workers Union, Local One, the district court held state-law
claims preempted by the duty of fair representation. 651 F. Supp. 369, 371 (S.D.N.Y. 1987).
However, the Oliva court based its holding on another district court case, Aledide v. Barr, that
found removal from state court of “a one sentence complaint” proper because it stated a duty of
fair representation claim, but “d[id] not mean to imply that [the complaint] cannot also state a
pendent state law claim.” 607 F. Supp. 281, 284 (S.D.N.Y. 1985). The Oliva court also relied
on a Ninth Circuit case affirming the dismissal of state-law age and race discrimination claims
against a union for failure to exhaust administrative remedies, not because of preemption. Carter
v. Smith Food King, 765 F.2d 916, 921–22 (9th Cir. 1985). Although the Ninth Circuit in Carter
found that state tort claims were preempted because they were based on the same conduct
forming the basis of a hybrid § 301/duty of fair representation claim against the plaintiff’s
employer and union, id. at 921, the Circuit relied on a Supreme Court case finding Garmon
preemption inapplicable to a state-law claim for outrageous conduct, id. (citing Farmer v. United
Bhd. of Carpenters & Joiners, Local 27, 430 U.S. 290, 305 (1977)), and on two circuit court
cases dealing with preemption or removal based solely on LMRA § 301, id. (citing Olguin v.
Inspiration Consol. Copper Co., 740 F.2d 1468, 1474–75 (9th Cir. 1984); Fristoe v. Reynolds
Metals Co., 615 F.2d 1209, 1212 (9th Cir. 1980)).
From the cases cited in Carter to the conclusion in Oliva, there are too many inferential
19
steps to demonstrate any congressional intent to preempt state law. Moreover, the other district
court cases that Plaintiff cites relied upon Oliva, previously discussed Circuit Court cases, see
supra Part I.C., or each other to support findings of preemption. Because those opinions are
unsupported by Supreme Court precedent, not one demonstrates that Congress intended to
occupy the field exclusively for federal jurisdiction and foreclose state enforcement of
discriminatory conduct by unions. See Wyeth v. Levine, 555 U.S. 555, 565 (2009).
Accordingly, the Court should grant summary judgment in favor of Defendant.
II. PLAINTIFF DOES NOT SATISFY THE REQUIREMENTS FOR GRANTING A
PERMANENT INJUNCTION
The standards for a preliminary injunction and a permanent injunction are “essentially the
same,” except that a permanent injunction requires actual, instead of the likelihood of, success on
the merits. Amoco Prod. Co. v. Vill. of Gambell, 480 U.S. 531, 546 n.12 (1987). Where an
injunction “will affect government action taken in the public interest pursuant to a statutory or
regulatory scheme,” Cent. Rabbinical Cong. of U.S. & Can. v. N.Y.C. Dep’t of Health & Mental
Hygiene, 763 F.3d 183, 192 (2d Cir. 2014) (quoting Red Earth LLC v. United States, 657 F.3d
128, 143 (2d Cir. 2011)), “[a] plaintiff seeking a [permanent] injunction must establish . . .
succe[ss] on the merits, that he is likely to suffer irreparable harm in the absence of preliminary
relief, that the balance of equities tips in his favor, and that an injunction is in the public
interest.” Winter v. Natural Res. Def. Council, Inc., 555 U.S. 7, 20 (2008); accord Salinger v.
Colting, 607 F.3d 68, 77–80 (2d Cir. 2010). “An injunction is a matter of equitable discretion; it
does not follow from success on the merits as a matter of course.” Winter, 555 U.S. at 32
(citation omitted). As discussed above, Plaintiff’s argument that the duty of fair representation
preempts the Human Rights Law is not supported by Supreme Court case law. Thus, Plaintiff
cannot succeed on the merits. Furthermore, Plaintiff fails to establish irreparable harm or that
20
the equities and the public interest favor granting an injunction.
A. Plaintiff Does Not Show that Local 32BJ Suffered Irreparable Harm
Local 32BJ has not suffered irreparable harm. Because the Division has jurisdiction to
enforce the Human Rights Law against Local 32BJ, the time and effort expended by Local 32BJ
to defend itself before the Division caused no harm. The substance and depth of investigations
and other preparations that Plaintiff describes as constituting irreparable harm demonstrate little
more than Local 32BJ’s employees fulfilling the functions of their positions. Cf. Pl.’s Mem. of
Law 12–16. Regardless, none of the administrative cases that Plaintiff identifies proceeded to an
administrative hearing. Pl.’s Exs. 2, 4, 8, 10, 12, 14, 16, 18, 22, 24, 26, 51–52, 57, 60, 63, 66;
Def.’s Exs. H, I, P, R, S, U. Thus, Local 32BJ has merely submitted documentation to the
Division.
To the extent the Division may have failed to meet the directory 180-day timeframe for
completing investigations, Plaintiff fails to show that any delays caused additional expenditures
of Local 32BJ’s resources. See Pl.’s Mem. of Law 12–13. A delay in requesting further
information, Baker Decl. ¶¶ 4–7, does not demonstrate that the Division’s investigator would not
have asked for such information had he or she contacted Local 32BJ within the defined period.
Furthermore, if the Division’s conduct in processing any case was arbitrary or violated lawful
procedure,9 Local 32BJ’s remedy is to seek judicial review “of the proceeding and of the
questions determined therein” by filing a petition in state court, in the event it is “aggrieved” by
“an order after hearing, a cease and desist order, an order awarding damages,” or an order that
“makes a final disposition of [the] complaint.” N.Y. Exec. Law § 298.
9 Concerning the case in which there was an amendment adding Local 32BJ as a respondent, state regulations grant
“[t]he [D]ivision or the complainant . . . the power reasonably and fairly to amend the complaint.” 9 N.Y. C.R.R.
§ 465.4(a). The rule allows amendments after investigations are concluded—even while hearings are ongoing. Id.
Moreover, “amendments made after a probable cause determination are not subject to any further investigations or
determinations of probable cause.” Id. § 465.4(d).
21
In sum, Local 32BJ has suffered no harm, nor will it suffer harm, by responding to
administrative complaints filed before the Division. Thus, an injunction should be denied.
B. The Balance of Equities Does Not Tip in Plaintiff’s Favor and the Public
Interest Weighs Against Granting a Permanent Injunction
“[T]he balance of equities and consideration of the public interest . . . are pertinent in
assessing the propriety of any injunctive relief, preliminary or permanent.” Winter v. Natural
Res. Def. Council, Inc., 555 U.S. 7, 32 (2008); see also Salinger v. Colting, 607 F.3d 68, 78 n.7
(2d Cir. 2010) (finding no reason to ignore the balance of equities when injunction sought “in
any type of case”). Both weigh against granting an injunction.
If a preliminary injunction is granted, the Division will be prevented from making
determinations that under both federal and state laws it has the statutory authority to make. See
supra Part I.A. Such an order would revoke the Division’s “opportunity to redress the evil at
which the federal legislation was aimed, and to avoid federal intervention unless its need was
demonstrated.” Mohasco Corp. v. Silver, 447 U.S. 807, 821 (1980). It would also lead to delays
in processing and resolving discrimination claims. See Shaw v. Delta Air Lines, 463 U.S. 85,
100–03 (1983). The Division’s harm, balanced against the fact that there is no constitutional
harm to Local 32BJ, weighs against granting an injunction.
The public interest likewise weighs against granting an injunction. Winter, 555 U.S. at
20. The Division exists to provide an administrative forum for employees and residents of the
State of New York to bring complaints of unlawful discrimination—including the over 81,000
individuals represented by Local 32BJ who work in New York. First Am. Compl. ¶ 21. The
statutory joint federal-state enforcement scheme, 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-8(b), as effected by the
Worksharing Agreement, is meant to “provide individuals with an efficient procedure for
obtaining redress for their grievances.” Def.’s Ex. A, § I.B. An injunction would curtail the
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rights of these individuals to have their federal and state discrimination claims investigated as
Congress intended, undermining the joint enforcement scheme created by Congress, see Kremer
v. Chem. Constr. Co., 456 U.S. 461, 473 (1982). It would also hamper the efficiency
contemplated by statute, see Shaw, 463 U.S. at 100–03, and prevent individuals from achieving
redress of their alleged wrongs in a forum expressly allowed by federal law, 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-
5(b). Thus, it is not in the public interest to grant an injunction.
Accordingly, an injunction should not be granted.
III. YOUNGER ABSTENTION APPLIES TO THE PENDING ADMINISTRATIVE
ENFORCEMENT PROCEEDING
Younger abstention applies to this action to the extent that Plaintiff seeks to enjoin the
case currently pending before the Division. See Younger v. Harris, 401 U.S. 37 (1971). Under
the Younger abstention doctrine, courts should not enjoin state administrative proceedings
“initiated to sanction the federal plaintiff . . . for some wrongful act.” Sprint Commc’ns, Inc. v.
Jacobs, 134 S. Ct. 584, 592 (2013) (citations omitted). Such proceedings include those brought
to enforce state or local anti-discrimination laws, see, e.g., Ohio Civil Rights Comm’n v. Dayton
Christian Sch., Inc., 477 U.S. 619 (1986); Jackson Hewitt Tax Serv. Inc. v. Kirkland, 455 F.
App’x 16 (2d Cir. 2012) (applying Younger abstention to action seeking judgment declaring that
National Banking Act preempts proceeding before the New York State Division of Human
Rights against tax preparer), whether filed by an individual or the administrative agency, see
Fund v. City of New York, No. 14 Civ. 2958 (KPF), 2014 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 68509, at *2, *6
(S.D.N.Y. May 19, 2014), even if the agency does not follow up initial investigations by filing a
more formal complaint before the agency or a court, id. at *6–7; see also id. at *13–20.
Plaintiff cannot avoid Younger abstention by asserting that the preemption claim is
facially conclusive. Cf. HSBC Bank USA v. N.Y.C. Comm’n on Human Rights, 673 F. Supp. 2d
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210, 215 (S.D.N.Y. 2009); J. & W. Seligman & Co. v. Spitzer, No. 05 Civ. 7781 (KMW), 2007
U.S. Dist. LEXIS 71881, at *12 & n.4 (S.D.N.Y. Sept. 27, 2007); Terminix Int’l Co. v. Rocque,
210 F. Supp. 2d 97, 102 (D. Conn. 2002). Precedent does not support a finding of preemption,
see supra Part I., while the need to determine the impact of the relationship between the duty of
fair representation and the joint-enforcement provisions of the federal civil rights statutes, see
supra Part I.A., demonstrates that significant “unresolved legal . . . issues . . . exist,” see HSBC
Bank USA, 673 F. Supp. 2d at 216. Thus, Younger abstention is appropriately applied to the case
currently pending before the Division.
IV. PLAINTIFF’S PROPOSED INJUNCTION IS UNNECESSARY BECAUSE THE
DIVISION ALREADY HAS A MECHANISM BY WHICH IT CAN IDENTIFY
CLAIMS IMPLICATING THE DUTY OF FAIR REPRESENTATION
If the Court finds that the duty of fair representation preempts the Human Rights Law, the
Court need not devise any procedure for the Division to follow. The Division will comply with
such a holding with respect to complaints filed against Local 32BJ, subject to the right to appeal.
The process outlined in the Affirmation of Caroline Downey would suffice to guarantee prompt
review of any administrative complaint by a Division attorney. See Downey Aff. ¶¶ 36–41, 43,
48.
When a complainant files charges against Local 32BJ with the Division, the investigator
would identify the case as possibly implicating the duty of fair representation.10 Id. ¶ 37. The
investigator would bring the case to the attention of the regional director, who would forward the
complaint to the General Counsel’s office for review. Id. ¶ 38. An attorney would then review
the complaint to determine whether some or all of the allegations implicate the duty of fair
10 Local 32BJ should also identify the issue for the Division, just as the Division must raise its immunity from suit
before the federal courts. See, e.g., Morris v. City of New York, No. 05 Civ. 7368 (PKC), 2007 U.S. Dist. LEXIS
14765, at *3 (S.D.N.Y. Mar. 1, 2007) (Division moved to dismiss § 1983 claims on sovereign immunity grounds);
Boykin v. Key Corp, No. 03-CV-944S, 2005 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 5546, at *1–2, *29–30 (W.D.N.Y. Mar. 28, 2005)
(same).
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representation. Id. ¶¶ 36, 39.
Where the face of the complaint is inadequate to identify all the legal issues, the case
would be referred back to the regional office for investigation, to gather information sufficient to
determine the nature of the allegations. Id. ¶ 40. The attorney in the General Counsel’s office
would then determine whether the allegations implicate the duty of fair representation. Id.
Where only Local 32BJ is named and all the allegations against it implicate the duty, the
case would be transferred to the EEOC for processing pursuant to the Worksharing Agreement.
Def.’s Ex. A, at § II.C.; Downey Aff. ¶ 39. Where some allegations against Local 32BJ
implicate the duty while others do not, the Division would investigate the case as to the non-
preempted allegations. Downey Aff. ¶ 48. In any determination issued, the Division would state
that it lacks jurisdiction over the preempted allegations. Id. The Division’s finding would be
subject to judicial review insofar as there are findings under state law. Id.; see N.Y. Exec. Law
§ 298. The Division would also provide the EEOC with the entire administrative record,
pursuant to the Worksharing Agreement, for a determination of reasonable cause under federal
law. Downey Aff. ¶ 48; Def.’s Ex. A, at § V. The EEOC would give substantial weight to the
Division’s findings but determine on its own how to deal with any preempted allegations, which
are still cognizable under the federal employment discrimination statutes. 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-
5(b); Downey Aff. ¶ 48. Where Local 32BJ is not the only respondent, the Division would sever
the case against Local 32BJ from the other respondents, if necessary, Downey Aff. ¶ 43, and
proceed with the process as described above, id. ¶¶ 36–40, 43, 48.
This process is sufficient to ensure Local 32BJ that it will not be held liable under state
law for any act committed in its capacity as a collective bargaining representative. Plaintiff’s
proposed protocol would unnecessarily alter established state procedures to achieve the same
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outcome. Cf. id. ¶ 41.
CONCLUSION
For the foregoing reasons, Defendant’s motion for summary judgment should be granted
and Plaintiff’s motion for summary judgment should be denied in its entirety. An injunction
should not issue.
Dated: New York, New York ERIC T. SCHNEIDERMAN
April 6, 2016 Attorney General of the
State of New York
By: /s/ Angel M. Guardiola II
ANGEL M. GUARDIOLA II
Assistant Attorney General
120 Broadway, 24th floor
New York, New York 10271
Tel.: (212) 416-6696
Fax: (212) 416-6009
angel.guardiola@ag.ny.gov
Attorneys for New York State Division of
Human Rights
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