43 Cited authorities

Celotex Corp. v. Catrett
477 U.S. 317 (1986) Cited 217,065 times 40 Legal Analyses
Holding that a movant's summary judgment motion should be granted "against a [nonmovant] who fails to make a showing sufficient to establish the existence of an element essential to that party's case, and on which that party will bear the burden of proof at trial"
Reeves v. Sanderson Plumbing Prods., Inc.
530 U.S. 133 (2000) Cited 21,176 times 22 Legal Analyses
Holding that, since the 58-year-old plaintiff was fired by his 60-year-old employer, there was an inference that "age discrimination was not the motive"
Monell v. New York City Dept. of Social Services
436 U.S. 658 (1978) Cited 67,582 times 15 Legal Analyses
Holding that "local government ... are 'persons'" for purposes of 42 U.S.C. § 1983
Bragdon v. Abbott
524 U.S. 624 (1998) Cited 1,645 times 5 Legal Analyses
Holding that DOJ's administrative guidance on ADA compliance is entitled to deference
McKennon v. Nashville Banner Publ'g Co.
513 U.S. 352 (1995) Cited 1,183 times 9 Legal Analyses
Holding that, under the ADEA, neither reinstatement nor front pay is appropriate when, subsequent to the statutory violation, the plaintiff's employment has been terminated for legitimate reasons
Fuentes v. Perskie
32 F.3d 759 (3d Cir. 1994) Cited 3,779 times 2 Legal Analyses
Holding that a plaintiff can challenge a legitimate reason for an employment action by showing, inter alia, that the employer treated other, similarly situated persons not of her protected class more favorably
Moore v. City of Philadelphia
461 F.3d 331 (3d Cir. 2006) Cited 1,506 times 3 Legal Analyses
Holding that plaintiffs statement, complaining about fellow employee's specific comments and made to that employee's supervisor in front of that employee, constitutes protected conduct
Burton v. Teleflex Inc.
707 F.3d 417 (3d Cir. 2013) Cited 960 times
Holding the defendant must "offer a legitimate non-discriminatory justification for the adverse employment action."
Lichtenstein v. Univ. of Pittsburgh Med. Ctr.
691 F.3d 294 (3d Cir. 2012) Cited 713 times
Holding that whether the case could proceed under a mixed-motive instruction was not relevant because the case could proceed under "the more taxing McDonnell Douglas standard"
Woodson v. Scott Paper Co.
109 F.3d 913 (3d Cir. 1997) Cited 1,092 times
Holding that the Civil Rights Act of 1991's addition of § 2000e–2(m)'s "motivating-factor" standard of causation does not apply to Title VII retaliation claims
Section 12112 - Discrimination
42 U.S.C. § 12112 Cited 13,592 times 159 Legal Analyses
Recognizing failure to accommodate as form of discrimination
Section 12203 - Prohibition against retaliation and coercion
42 U.S.C. § 12203 Cited 3,396 times 12 Legal Analyses
Providing that "No person shall discriminate against any individual because . . . such individual made a charge . . . under [the ADA]" and making it unlawful for an employer to retaliate against an employee because the employee requested an accommodation
Section 12113 - Defenses
42 U.S.C. § 12113 Cited 403 times 16 Legal Analyses
Providing an employer may have "a requirement that an individual shall not pose a direct threat to the health or safety of other individuals in the workplace"
Section 1630.2 - Definitions
29 C.F.R. § 1630.2 Cited 8,355 times 141 Legal Analyses
Holding that major life activity is substantially limited if plaintiff is "significantly restricted in the ability to perform either a class of jobs or a broad range of jobs in various classes as compared to the average person having comparable training, skills and abilities"

Engle v. Physician Landing Zone

43 Cited authorities

Holding that a movant's summary judgment motion should be granted "against a [nonmovant] who fails to make a showing sufficient to establish the existence of an element essential to that party's case, and on which that party will bear the burden of proof at trial"

Holding that, since the 58-year-old plaintiff was fired by his 60-year-old employer, there was an inference that "age discrimination was not the motive"

Holding that "local government ... are 'persons'" for purposes of 42 U.S.C. § 1983

Holding that DOJ's administrative guidance on ADA compliance is entitled to deference

Holding that, under the ADEA, neither reinstatement nor front pay is appropriate when, subsequent to the statutory violation, the plaintiff's employment has been terminated for legitimate reasons

Holding that a plaintiff can challenge a legitimate reason for an employment action by showing, inter alia, that the employer treated other, similarly situated persons not of her protected class more favorably

Holding that plaintiffs statement, complaining about fellow employee's specific comments and made to that employee's supervisor in front of that employee, constitutes protected conduct

Holding the defendant must "offer a legitimate non-discriminatory justification for the adverse employment action."

Holding that whether the case could proceed under a mixed-motive instruction was not relevant because the case could proceed under "the more taxing McDonnell Douglas standard"

Holding that the Civil Rights Act of 1991's addition of § 2000e–2(m)'s "motivating-factor" standard of causation does not apply to Title VII retaliation claims

Recognizing failure to accommodate as form of discrimination

Providing that "No person shall discriminate against any individual because . . . such individual made a charge . . . under [the ADA]" and making it unlawful for an employer to retaliate against an employee because the employee requested an accommodation

Providing an employer may have "a requirement that an individual shall not pose a direct threat to the health or safety of other individuals in the workplace"

Holding that major life activity is substantially limited if plaintiff is "significantly restricted in the ability to perform either a class of jobs or a broad range of jobs in various classes as compared to the average person having comparable training, skills and abilities"