Don Henley et al v. Charles S Devore et al

MEMORANDUM in Opposition to MOTION to Dismiss Fourth & Fifth Causes of Action Under Rule 12

C.D. Cal.June 12, 2009

1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 11 12 13 14 15 16 17 18 19 20 21 22 23 24 25 26 27 28 ny-873973 CHARLES S. BARQUIST (CA SBN 133785) CBarquist@mofo.com MORRISON & FOERSTER LLP 555 West Fifth Street Los Angeles, California 90013-1024 Telephone: 213.892.5200 Facsimile: 213.892.5454 JACQUELINE C. CHARLESWORTH (pro hac vice) JCharlesworth@mofo.com KELVIN D. CHEN (pro hac vice) KChen@mofo.com MORRISON & FOERSTER LLP 1290 Avenue of the Americas New York, New York 10104 Telephone: 212.468.8000 Facsimile: 212.468.7900 PAUL GOLDSTEIN (CA SBN 79613) PGoldstein@mofo.com 559 Nathan Abbott Way Stanford, California 94305-8610 Telephone: 650.723.0313 Facsimile: 650.327.0811 Attorneys for Plaintiffs DON HENLEY AND MIKE CAMPBELL UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT CENTRAL DISTRICT OF CALIFORNIA DON HENLEY and MIKE CAMPBELL, Plaintiffs, v. CHARLES S. DEVORE and JUSTIN HART, Defendants. Case No. SACV09-0481 JVS (RNBx) Hon. James V. Selna MEMORANDUM OF POINTS AND AUTHORITIES IN OPPOSITION TO DEFENDANTS’ MOTION TO DISMISS Date: June 29, 2009 Time: 1:30 p.m. Courtroom: 10C Case 8:09-cv-00481-JVS-RNB Document 17 Filed 06/12/09 Page 1 of 31 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 11 12 13 14 15 16 17 18 19 20 21 22 23 24 25 26 27 28 ny-873973 i TABLE OF CONTENTS Page INTRODUCTION ..................................................................................................1 FACTUAL BACKGROUND ................................................................................2 ARGUMENT..........................................................................................................5 I. APPLICABLE LEGAL STANDARD.......................................................5 II. HENLEY’S LANHAM ACT CLAIM IS AMPLY SUPPORTED BY THE FACTS AND THE LAW....................................6 A. Dastar Does Not Eliminate “False Endorsement” Claims Under the Lanham Act.........................................................8 B. Henley Has More Than Adequately Alleged False Endorsement...................................................................................10 C. False Endorsement Applies to “Noncommercial” and “Political” Speech....................................................................16 III. HENLEY’S UCL CLAIM IS SOUND ....................................................19 A. Henley Has Standing Under the UCL as Amended by Proposition 64 ...........................................................................20 B. Henley’s UCL Claim is Not Preempted by Copyright Law................................................................................24 IV. CONCLUSION.........................................................................................25 Case 8:09-cv-00481-JVS-RNB Document 17 Filed 06/12/09 Page 2 of 31 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 11 12 13 14 15 16 17 18 19 20 21 22 23 24 25 26 27 28 ny-873973 ii TABLE OF AUTHORITIES Page(s) CASES Aagard v. Palomar Builders, Inc., 344 F. Supp. 2d 1211 (E.D. Cal. 2004) ........................................................19, 25 ARC Ecology v. United States Dep’t of the Air Force, 411 F.3d 1092 (9th Cir. 2005) ..............................................................................6 Bell Atl. Corp. v. Twombly, 550 U.S. 544 (2007)..............................................................................................6 Bosley Med. Inst. v. Kremer, 403 F.3d 672 (9th Cir. 2005) ........................................................................ 17-18 Browne v. McCain, No. CV 08-05334-RGK (Ex), 2009 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 18876 (C.D. Cal. Feb. 20, 2009) ........................................ 7-8, 10, 12, 18 Buckland v. Threshold Enters., Ltd., 155 Cal. App. 4th 798, 66 Cal Rptr. 3d 543 (2007) ...........................................23 Butler v. Adoption Media, LLC, 486 F. Supp. 2d 1022 (N.D. Cal. 2007)........................................................20, 23 Butler v. Target Corp., 323 F. Supp. 2d 1052 (C.D. Cal. 2004) .................................................. 10-13, 24 Campbell v. Acuff-Rose Music, Inc., 510 U.S. 569 (1994)..............................................................................................2 Center for Biological Diversity, Inc. v. FPL Group, Inc., No. RG04-183113, 2006 WL 3542514 (Cal. Super. Ct. Oct. 12, 2006)............23 Compco Corp. v. Day-Brite Lighting, Inc., 376 U.S. 234 (1964).....................................................................................14; n.3 Conversive, Inc. v. Conversagent, Inc., 433 F. Supp. 2d 1079 (C.D. Cal. 2006) ..............................................................19 Cortez v. Purolator Air Filtration Pdts. Co., 23 Cal. 4th 163, 96 Cal. Rptr. 518 (2000) ....................................................22 n.5 Case 8:09-cv-00481-JVS-RNB Document 17 Filed 06/12/09 Page 3 of 31 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 11 12 13 14 15 16 17 18 19 20 21 22 23 24 25 26 27 28 ny-873973 iii Dastar Corp. v. Twentieth Century Fox Film Corp., 539 U.S. 23 (2003)............................................................................................7, 9 Davis v. Blige, 505 F.3d 90 (2d Cir. 2007) ...........................................................................21 n.4 Downing v. Abercrombie & Fitch, 265 F.2d 994 (9th Cir. 2001) ..............................................................................13 Dr. Seuss Enters. v. Penguin Books USA, Inc., 109 F.3d 1394 (9th Cir. 1997) ...................................................................... 12-13 G&C Auto Body Inc. v. Geico Gen. Ins. Co., No. C06-04898 MJJ, 2007 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 91327 (N.D. Cal. Dec. 12, 2007) ..................................................... 22-23 Golden Door, Inc. v. Odisho, 646 F.2d 347 (9th Cir. 1980) ..............................................................................19 Goldstein v. California, 412 U.S. 546 (1973)......................................................................................14 n.3 Korea Supply Co. v. Lockheed Martin Corp., 29 Cal. 4th 1134, 131 Cal. Rptr. 2d 29 (2003) .......................................20, 24 n.6 Laws v. Sony Music Entm’t, Inc., 448 F.3d 1134 (9th Cir. 2006) ......................................................................25 n.7 Lozano v. AT&T Wireless Servs., Inc., 504 F.3d 718 (9th Cir. 2007) ........................................................................22 n.5 MasterCard Int’l Inc. v. Nader 2000 Primary Comm., Inc., No. 00 Civ. 6068 (GBD), 2004 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 3644 (S.D.N.Y. Mar. 8, 2004).......................................................... 16-17 McGary v. City of Portland, 386 F.3d 1259 (9th Cir. 2004) ..............................................................................5 Microsoft v. Evans, 2007 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 77088 (E.D. Cal. Oct. 17, 2007)...................................10 Midler v. Ford Motor Co., 849 F.2d 460 (9th Cir. 1988) .............................................................................21 Case 8:09-cv-00481-JVS-RNB Document 17 Filed 06/12/09 Page 4 of 31 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 11 12 13 14 15 16 17 18 19 20 21 22 23 24 25 26 27 28 ny-873973 iv New.Net, Inc. v. Lavasoft, 356 F. Supp. 2d 1090 (C.D. Cal. 2004) ..............................................................18 Overstock.com Inc. v. Gradient Analytics, Inc., 151 Cal. App. 4th 688 (Cal. Ct. App. 2007)................................................. 21-22 Rice v. Fox Broad. Co., 330 F.3d 1170 (9th Cir. 2003) ............................................................................18 Sears, Roebuck & Co. v. Stiffel Co., 376 U.S. 225 (1964).....................................................................................14; n.3 Sinatra v. Goodyear Tire & Rubber Co., 435 F.2d 711 (9th Cir. 1970) ..............................................................................14 Summit Mach. Tool Mfg. Corp. v. Victor CNC Sys., Inc., 7 F.3d 1434 (9th Cir. 1993) ................................................................................24 Tax Cap Comm. v. Save Our Everglades, Inc., 933 F. Supp. 1077 (S.D. Fla. 1996) ....................................................................17 In re Tobacco II Cases, 46 Cal. 4th 298, 93 Cal. Rptr. 3d 559 (2009) .....................................................22 United We Stand America, Inc. v. United We Stand, America New York, Inc., 128 F.3d 86 (2d Cir. 1997) ........................................................................... 17-19 Waits v. Frito-Lay, Inc., 978 F.2d 1093 (9th Cir. 1992) ......................................................8, 11, 14 n.3, 21 Wendt v. Host Int’l, Inc., 125 F.3d 806 (9th Cir. 1997) ........................................................................ 10-11 White v. Samsung Elecs. Am., Inc., 971 F.2d 1395 (9th Cir. 1992) ........................................................................ 9-12 White v. Trans Union, LLC, 462 F. Supp. 2d 1079 (C.D. Cal. 2006) ........................................................ 22-23 Case 8:09-cv-00481-JVS-RNB Document 17 Filed 06/12/09 Page 5 of 31 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 11 12 13 14 15 16 17 18 19 20 21 22 23 24 25 26 27 28 ny-873973 v STATUTES 15 U.S.C. § 1051 et seq. ..................................................................................................2, 12 § 1125......................................................................................................6, 8, 9, 16 17 U.S.C. § 101 et seq. ....................................................................................................2, 12 § 106....................................................................................................................13 § 115....................................................................................................................15 § 301..................................................................................................12, 14 n.3, 24 § 512......................................................................................................................4 Cal. Bus. & Prof. Code § 17200...................................................................................................... 2, 19-20 § 17203.......................................................................................................... 22-23 § 17204................................................................................................................23 Case 8:09-cv-00481-JVS-RNB Document 17 Filed 06/12/09 Page 6 of 31 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 11 12 13 14 15 16 17 18 19 20 21 22 23 24 25 26 27 28 ny-873973 1 INTRODUCTION This action arises from the deliberate plan of Charles DeVore and Justin Hart to exploit valuable copyrighted songs and to capitalize on the celebrity of a world- famous recording artist to promote a political campaign. To generate publicity and support for DeVore’s ambition to win the Republican nomination to the U.S. Senate in 2010, DeVore, with the assistance of Hart, copied “The Boys of Summer,” a Grammy-winning, instantly recognizable rock song about a summer romance written by plaintiffs Don Henley and Mike Campbell, wrote new lyrics, and incorporated the song into a campaign ad, which the two posted on YouTube and elsewhere. When Henley objected to this exploitation of his copyrighted work by sending a takedown notice to YouTube, as authorized by law, DeVore reposted the video to another site and publicly vowed to use still other Henley works as part of his ongoing publicity spree. Indeed, DeVore and Hart made good on this threat when they fashioned a second video appropriating another widely-known song recorded by Henley, “All She Wants to Do Is Dance.” Evidently, DeVore and Hart believe that labeling their efforts as “parody” or “free speech” immunizes them from liability. But the law does not permit someone to copy another’s copyrighted musical work without permission, to add new lyrics, or to exploit the work over the Internet in a promotional video. Nor does the law permit one to promote his own goods or services by trading without permission on the celebrity and goodwill of a popular artist. These rules apply to politicians no less than to ordinary citizens. Indeed, in the political arena, such compelled speech, forcing an artist to lend his or her creative work or identity to support a cause that he or she does not wish to endorse, would violate the very “free speech” values DeVore and Hart themselves purport to espouse. This is not a case where a parodist has borrowed a few bars or phrases of a song in order to comment upon or criticize it. The videos produced by DeVore and Hart nowhere aim at, or spoof or ridicule, the original songs. Rather, made to Case 8:09-cv-00481-JVS-RNB Document 17 Filed 06/12/09 Page 7 of 31 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 11 12 13 14 15 16 17 18 19 20 21 22 23 24 25 26 27 28 ny-873973 2 advance DeVore and Hart’s interests and agenda, the videos address the actions of third parties, President Barack Obama and Senator Barbara Boxer. DeVore and Hart took virtually the entire musical works, note for note, to provide soundtracks for DeVore’s campaign ads. The videos are not parodies because – as the Supreme Court put it in a case defining legal parody – they have “no critical bearing on the substance or style” of the original songs, which songs were “merely use[d] to get attention.” Campbell v. Acuff-Rose Music, Inc., 510 U.S. 569, 580 (1994). Accordingly, Henley and Campbell have brought this action pursuant to the Copyright Act, 17 U.S.C. § 101 et seq., to halt further infringement of their copyrighted musical work. In addition, Henley seeks relief under the Lanham Act, 15 U.S.C. § 1051 et seq., and California Business & Professions Code, § 17200 et seq., to redress the misappropriation and misuse of his identity and reputation as a world-famous recording artist. FACTUAL BACKGROUND As relevant here, plaintiffs allege the following facts in their Complaint: Don Henley is a preeminent songwriter and recording artist. He is a founding member and lead singer of the Eagles, the band credited with recording the largest-selling album ever in the United States. (Compl. ¶ 18.) Henley co- wrote all of the Eagles’ top ten hits and was the lead singer for many of them. (Id.) In addition to his extraordinary success as a member of the Eagles, Henley has had a remarkable solo career. His multi-platinum solo album Building the Perfect Beast, released in 1984, included the hit song “The Boys of Summer,” in which the singer reminisces about his love for a woman during summer days gone by. Henley won a Grammy Award in 1985 for “The Boys of Summer.” (Id.¶ 19.) This same album also included Henley’s recorded performance of another hit song, “All She Wants to Do Is Dance,” written by Henley’s colleague, Danny Kortchmar. (Id. ¶ 37.) Case 8:09-cv-00481-JVS-RNB Document 17 Filed 06/12/09 Page 8 of 31 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 11 12 13 14 15 16 17 18 19 20 21 22 23 24 25 26 27 28 ny-873973 3 Plaintiff Mike Campbell, also a prominent songwriter, recording artist, and producer, is a founding member of the Grammy-winning rock band Tom Petty and the Heartbreakers. (Id. ¶ 20.) In addition to his work with Henley and Tom Petty, Campbell has co-written songs that have been recorded by other popular artists, including Stevie Nicks and John Prine. (Id.) He has co-produced a series of top- selling albums for Tom Petty and has also acted as a producer for Stevie Nicks, Roy Orbison, and Del Shannon. (Id.) Defendant Charles S. DeVore is a California State Assemblyman from Irvine. (Id. ¶ 15.) DeVore is now campaigning for the Republican nomination for the U.S. Senate seat currently held by Senator Boxer. (Id.) Defendant Justin Hart is the Director of Internet Strategies and New Media for DeVore’s campaign. (Id. ¶ 16.) In or about April 2009, DeVore, with support from Hart, devised a campaign strategy revolving around Henley and Campbell’s “The Boys of Summer.” (See id. ¶¶ 24-28.) In open disregard of Henley and Campbell’s intellectual property rights, DeVore and Hart copied almost all of Henley and Campbell’s copyrighted work, note for note, without permission. (Id. ¶¶ 1, 21, 25.) Substituting lyrics to suit their purpose and using a recorded performance of the work to simulate the original Henley recording, they produced and distributed a campaign advertising video featuring the song (the “Boys of Summer Video”). (Id. ¶ 1.) Titled “A Special Message from Chuck DeVore,” the video consists of a spoken introduction by Hart addressing potential supporters of the DeVore campaign, followed by DeVore and Hart’s rendition of Henley and Campbell’s song. (Id. ¶ 25.) The unauthorized use of Henley and Campbell’s copyrighted work is synchronized with a series of photographic images of DeVore, Hart, and President Obama, among others. (Id.) At the conclusion of the Boys of Summer Video, with the Henley and Campbell song still playing, a DeVore campaign ad slogan appears: “Time for Chuck DeVore.” (Id. ¶ 27.) Beneath the slogan, there is Case 8:09-cv-00481-JVS-RNB Document 17 Filed 06/12/09 Page 9 of 31 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 11 12 13 14 15 16 17 18 19 20 21 22 23 24 25 26 27 28 ny-873973 4 a notice – “paid for by DeVore for California” – even though no payment has been made to, nor permission sought from, Henley and Campbell for the music in the video, to which they own the rights. (Id.) Because such an extensive, promotional use of a musical work requires the consent of the copyright owner, viewers accessing the Boys of Summer Video through YouTube or other means could easily conclude that DeVore and Hart used “The Boys of Summer” with permission, even though Henley and Campbell did not, and in fact would not, authorize the use of their song for this purpose. (Id. ¶ 29.) Viewers familiar with Henley and Campbell’s well-known song might also conclude that Henley and Campbell are political supporters or sponsors of DeVore, which they are not. (Id.) DeVore and Hart’s avowed aim in producing the video was to build support for DeVore’s campaign for the Republican nomination for the Senate. (Id. ¶¶ 1, 26- 27.) To this end, DeVore and Hart posted the infringing Boys of Summer Video on the popular online video site YouTube and elsewhere, publicized their efforts through multiple media outlets, and also encouraged others to make infringing videos of Henley and Campbell’s work. (Id. ¶¶ 25, 28, 34.) Henley, who carefully selects the causes he wishes to endorse and selectively licenses his copyrights, did not authorize DeVore or Hart to use his copyrighted song, does not endorse DeVore’s campaign, and does not wish his name, work, or identity to be associated with DeVore or the DeVore campaign. (Id. ¶ 6.) Nor does Campbell wish his copyrighted work to be used by or associated with DeVore or DeVore’s campaign. (Id.) When he became aware of the Boys of Summer Video, Henley arranged to send a notice pursuant to the Digital Millennium Copyright Act, 17 U.S.C. § 512, to YouTube requesting that the Boys of Summer Video be removed. (Id. ¶ 30.) The video was taken down. (Id.) But, dismissive of Henley’s efforts to protect his intellectual property rights, DeVore publicly responded in an article on an Internet Case 8:09-cv-00481-JVS-RNB Document 17 Filed 06/12/09 Page 10 of 31 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 11 12 13 14 15 16 17 18 19 20 21 22 23 24 25 26 27 28 ny-873973 5 site: “And, it goes without saying that I’ll now be looking for every opportunity to turn any Don Henley work I can into a parody of any left tilting politician who deserves it . . . .” (Id. ¶ 33.) Further, DeVore provided a link to a different website where his infringing Boys of Summer Video could continue to be accessed, http://www.chuck76.com/nov. (Id. ¶ 34.) A user who clicked on this link and attempted to navigate from the Boys of Summer Video to www.chuck76.com was automatically redirected to a DeVore fundraising page captioned “SUPPORT Chuck DeVore for US Senate,” at http://tweetforchuck.com/tweet2. (Id. ¶ 35.) True to the promise made in DeVore’s Internet post, DeVore and Hart next appropriated and exploited yet another song widely associated with Henley, “All She Wants to Do Is Dance” (written by Danny Kortchmar and made famous by Henley), which they fashioned into another promotional video, this one criticizing Senator Boxer (the “Dance Video”). (Id. ¶¶ 4, 37.) Again, DeVore and Hart copied virtually the entire musical composition note for note, substituting lyrics to convey their campaign pitch, and using a recorded performance of the work to simulate the original Henley recording. (Id. ¶ 4.) As set forth in the Complaint, in making and distributing the videos, DeVore and Hart have willfully and intentionally appropriated not just Henley’s exclusive rights in a copyrighted work, but also his goodwill, identity, and persona by using well-known songs associated with him, one almost immediately after another, in campaign fundraising commercials. (See id. ¶ 5.) Such close identification of Henley with DeVore’s fundraising efforts is an egregious, intentional, false association that should be stopped. (Id.) ARGUMENT I. APPLICABLE LEGAL STANDARD On a motion to dismiss, the plaintiff’s allegations “are taken as true and construed in the light most favorable to the plaintiff.” McGary v. City of Portland, 386 F.3d 1259, 1261 (9th Cir. 2004). Dismissal of a claim is appropriate “only if it Case 8:09-cv-00481-JVS-RNB Document 17 Filed 06/12/09 Page 11 of 31 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 11 12 13 14 15 16 17 18 19 20 21 22 23 24 25 26 27 28 ny-873973 6 appears beyond doubt that the claimant can prove no set of facts in support of the claim which would entitle him to relief.” ARC Ecology v. United States Dep’t of the Air Force, 411 F.3d 1092, 1096 (9th Cir. 2005); see also Bell Atl. Corp. v. Twombly, 550 U.S. 544, 570 (2007). II. HENLEY’S LANHAM ACT CLAIM IS AMPLY SUPPORTED BY THE FACTS AND THE LAW Henley’s false endorsement claim under the Lanham Act, 15 U.S.C. § 1125(a), arising from the misuse of Henley’s goodwill and persona by DeVore and Hart to promote DeVore’s campaign, certainly cannot be dismissed as “clutter,” as DeVore and Hart suggest. (Defs.’ Mem. at 1.) As detailed above, in a blatant quest to generate attention and raise funds for their campaign efforts, DeVore and Hart focused on Henley as a world-famous recording artist and incorporated into their campaign ads appealing, instantly recognizable songs that are uniquely associated with Henley. In each case, the lyrics to the original song were rewritten, while the soundtrack was closely imitated to simulate Henley’s well-known performances and thus to suggest an association with Henley. It is understood by the public that permission is required to use someone’s song or performance for promotional purposes. Thus, a website visitor who watched the Boys of Summer and Dance Videos and recognized Henley’s creative work could easily believe that Henley granted such permission and therefore endorses the videos and the messages therein, which Henley does not. (Compl. ¶¶ 5, 29, 39.) Indeed, such a mistaken impression of Henley’s association with DeVore and Hart is all the more likely because the Boys of Summer and Dance Videos are not parodies, as DeVore and Hart assert. The videos do not criticize or comment upon the works they exploit. DeVore and Hart use the Henley-identified songs not to ridicule Henley’s creative talents, but simply as vehicles to present campaign- related subject matter. The lack of commentary on, or critical distance from, Case 8:09-cv-00481-JVS-RNB Document 17 Filed 06/12/09 Page 12 of 31 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 11 12 13 14 15 16 17 18 19 20 21 22 23 24 25 26 27 28 ny-873973 7 Henley’s creative work not only negates DeVore and Hart’s “parody” defense, but strongly reinforces the suggestion of Henley’s association with the videos. DeVore and Hart’s reliance on the Supreme Court’s decision in Dastar Corp. v. Twentieth Century Fox Film Corp., 539 U.S. 23 (2003), to seek dismissal of Henley’s false endorsement claim is misplaced. Dastar was a “reverse passing off” case – brought under the “origin of goods” provision of the Lanham Act – in which the plaintiff claimed that it should have been acknowledged as the source of “goods” when defendant included portions of plaintiff’s public domain television series in defendant’s own production. Id. at 26-28. Here, Henley does not seek attribution as the originator of DeVore and Hart’s campaign ads, but instead seeks to enforce his right not to be falsely associated with them. Far from eliminating this type of false endorsement claim, Dastar expressly recognized continued liability for falsely implying sponsorship or approval of a creative work under the separate “false association” branch of the Lanham Act. Id. at 36. Post-Dastar decisions have followed suit, including Judge Klausner’s recent holding in Browne v. McCain, No. CV 08-05334-RGK (Ex), 2009 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 18876, at *12 (C.D. Cal. Feb. 20, 2009) (upholding singer Jackson Browne’s Lanham Act false endorsement claim as well as his copyright infringement claim based on use of his song in campaign ad). DeVore and Hart also suggest that, notwithstanding their deliberate targeting of Henley and his creative works in order to generate publicity, and the simulation of Henley-identified works in their campaign materials, Henley has not adequately pled his false endorsement claim because he has not alleged the invocation of his name, image, or voice or other sufficiently “distinctive attribute” that could give rise to a Lanham Act claim. (Defs.’ Mem. at 5.) At the same time, DeVore and Hart admit that “use of a name or likeness is not specifically required” to assert a false endorsement claim. (Id.) Case 8:09-cv-00481-JVS-RNB Document 17 Filed 06/12/09 Page 13 of 31 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 11 12 13 14 15 16 17 18 19 20 21 22 23 24 25 26 27 28 ny-873973 8 Whether the unauthorized use in promotional campaign videos of works identified with Henley, including the use of simulations of well-known Henley recordings, would cause viewers to assume that Henley endorsed those videos – as Henley alleges it would – is a question of fact. In any event, the law is not as narrow as DeVore and Hart seek to portray it. Congress drafted the Lanham Act expansively to prohibit misleading the public through any “word, term, name, symbol, or device, or . . . combination thereof.” 15 U.S.C. § 1125(a)(1)(A). Moreover, in a leading false endorsement case brought by the singer Tom Waits, the Ninth Circuit explained that the term “device” is to be interpreted broadly and includes, inter alia, “distinctive sounds” if such sounds might confuse consumers as to a celebrity’s sponsorship or approval of a product. Waits v. Frito-Lay, Inc., 978 F.2d 1093, 1107, 1110 (9th Cir. 1992). Finally, DeVore and Hart attempt to carve a sweeping exception from the Lanham Act that would exempt any type of politically motivated activity from its reach on the ground that it is not “commercial.” But this Court and others have flatly rejected such an approach in light of the history and purpose of the Lanham Act, and the negative consequences that would flow from an inability to protect against false endorsements in the political arena. See, e.g., Browne, 2009 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 18876, at *12-13 (noting that courts have recognized that the Lanham Act applies to noncommercial or political speech). A. Dastar Does Not Eliminate “False Endorsement” Claims Under the Lanham Act In pertinent part, the Lanham Act imposes liability on [a]ny person who, on or in connection with any goods or services . . . uses in commerce any word, term, name, symbol, or device, or any combination thereof, or any false designation of origin, false or misleading description of fact, or false or misleading representation of fact, which . . . is likely to cause confusion, or to cause mistake, or to Case 8:09-cv-00481-JVS-RNB Document 17 Filed 06/12/09 Page 14 of 31 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 11 12 13 14 15 16 17 18 19 20 21 22 23 24 25 26 27 28 ny-873973 9 deceive as to the affiliation, connection or association of such person with another person, or as to the origin, sponsorship, or approval of his or her goods, services, or commercial activities by another person[.] 15 U.S.C. § 1125(a)(1)(A). To prevail on his Lanham Act claim, Henley must show that, in posting the videos at issue, DeVore and Hart “created a likelihood of confusion” concerning Henley’s association with the videos. White v. Samsung Elecs. Am., Inc., 971 F.2d 1395, 1399-1400 (9th Cir. 1992). Henley has alleged such likelihood of confusion in his complaint. (Compl. ¶¶ 29, 72.) In invoking the Supreme Court’s decision in Dastar, DeVore and Hart misapprehend the nature of Henley’s claim. Two distinct types of claims arise under the provision of the Lanham Act set forth above: a claim that a defendant has falsely represented the origin of its goods, and a claim that the defendant has falsely suggested that the plaintiff endorses or is otherwise associated with the defendant’s goods. Dastar addressed an “origin of goods” claim. 539 U.S. at 37. The present case, by contrast, concerns a “false endorsement” claim. To read Dastar as do DeVore and Hart would effectively eliminate the “false endorsement” cause of action permitted under the Lanham Act. Dastar cannot be so interpreted. In Dastar, the defendant incorporated substantial portions of the plaintiffs’ public domain television series into a new video production and sold DVDs of the production as its own. Id. at 26-27. Invoking a “reverse passing off” theory, the plaintiffs claimed that, as the producers of the earlier television series, they should have received credit as the source of the “goods.” Id. at 27, 31. However, construing “origin” as meaning the source of tangible goods such as DVDs, rather than the “communicative works” that the goods embody, the Supreme Court ruled that attribution of the plaintiffs’ creative work was not required. Id. at 37. Notably, in reaching this conclusion, the Supreme Court expressly distinguished, and acknowledged the possibility of, a Lanham Act claim for falsely implying a Case 8:09-cv-00481-JVS-RNB Document 17 Filed 06/12/09 Page 15 of 31 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 11 12 13 14 15 16 17 18 19 20 21 22 23 24 25 26 27 28 ny-873973 10 creator’s “‘sponsorship or approval’” of a communicative work – i.e., the object of Henley’s claim here. See id. at 36 (citing 15 U.S.C. § 1125(a)(1)(A)). Post-Dastar decisions confirm the continued force of false endorsement causes of action, including those involving copyrighted works. For example, in a case currently pending in the Central District that bears a striking resemblance to this one, well-known singer-songwriter Jackson Browne sued former presidential candidate John McCain for the unauthorized use in a campaign commercial of Browne’s song “Running on Empty.” Browne, 2009 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 11876, at *1-2. Ruling on a motion to dismiss, the Court upheld not only Browne’s copyright claim, but also Browne’s Lanham Act false endorsement claim based on the assertion that viewers would be confused as to Browne’s association with McCain. Id. at *11, *18; see also Butler v. Target Corp., 323 F. Supp. 2d 1052, 1059 (C.D. Cal. 2004) (Lanham Act claim based on “distortion” of copyrighted song permitted because it “differs from a copyright claim as it refers to possible consumer confusion as to the plaintiffs’ sponsorship or approval of the product”); Microsoft v. Evans, No. 1:06-cv-01745-AWI-SMS, 2007 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 77088, at *25 (E.D. Cal. Oct. 17, 2007) (damages can be recovered where “a single act” has violated both the Lanham Act and the Copyright Act “because two separate wrongs have been committed”) (citing Nintendo of Am., Inc. v. Dragon Pacific Int’l, 40 F.3d 1007, 1010-11 (9th Cir. 1994), cert. denied, 515 U.S. 1107 (1995)). B. Henley Has More Than Adequately Alleged False Endorsement The essence of a false endorsement claim by a famous plaintiff is the defendant’s invocation of some aspect of the celebrity’s persona such that there is a likelihood that the public will be confused as to whether the celebrity endorses or is associated with defendant’s product. White, 971 F.2d at 1399-1400; see Wendt v. Host Int’l, Inc., 125 F.3d 806, 812 (9th Cir. 1997). Case 8:09-cv-00481-JVS-RNB Document 17 Filed 06/12/09 Page 16 of 31 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 11 12 13 14 15 16 17 18 19 20 21 22 23 24 25 26 27 28 ny-873973 11 The defendant need not employ any particular characteristic of the plaintiff, for it is well recognized that “[t]he identities of the most popular celebrities are not only the most attractive for advertisers, but also the easiest to evoke without resorting to obvious means such as name, likeness or voice.” White, 971 F.2d at 1399. Rather, as provided in the Lanham Act, it is sufficient if the device chosen by the defendant to evoke the celebrity’s image gives rise to a likelihood of confusion as to the celebrity’s association with the defendant’s enterprise. See, e.g., Butler v. Target, 323 F. Supp. 2d at 1057-59 (distorted song lyrics); Waits, 978 F.2d at 1107 (imitation of singer’s voice); White, 971 F.2d at 1399-1401 (depiction of plaintiff as robot). As the Ninth Circuit has explained, the legislative history of the amendments codifying false endorsement under the Lanham Act makes clear that “Congress approved the broad judicial interpretation of” the terms symbol and device in the Act and intended these terms to include “distinctive sounds.” Waits, 978 F.2d at 1107 (citing S. REP. NO. 10[0]-515, at 44 (1988)). Whether there exists a likelihood of confusion, in turn, is a fact-bound inquiry to be conducted in accordance with the Ninth Circuit’s well-established eight-part test based on the Sleekcraft factors. Wendt, 125 F.3d at 812 (test applies in “celebrity endorsement” cases) (citing Newton v. Thomason, 22 F.3d 1455, 1462 (9th Cir. 1994) and AMF, Inc. v. Sleekcraft Boats, 599 F.2d 341 (9th Cir. 1979)). Following Ninth Circuit precedent, the ultimate question in this case is whether “ordinary consumers” would be confused about Henley’s association with DeVore or his campaign. Waits, 978 F.2d at 1111. Henley has clearly alleged that a likelihood of confusion exists as a result of DeVore and Hart’s promotional use of songs closely associated with him in their campaign ads. (Compl. ¶¶ 5, 29, 72.) The close simulation – rhythmically, sonically, stylistically – of Henley’s familiar instrumental backing tracks for “The Boys of Summer” and “All She Wants to Do Is Dance” could easily be mistaken for the original renditions and thus give rise to the inference that Henley licensed, Case 8:09-cv-00481-JVS-RNB Document 17 Filed 06/12/09 Page 17 of 31 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 11 12 13 14 15 16 17 18 19 20 21 22 23 24 25 26 27 28 ny-873973 12 and therefore approved, the content and message of the Boys of Summer and Dance Videos. (See Compl. ¶ 29); cf. White, 971 F.2d at 1399-1401 (noting likelihood of consumer confusion due to assumption that game show hostess Vanna White must have approved the ads in which she was represented as a robot); Butler v. Target, 323 F. Supp. 2d at 1059 (“distorted” use of elements of plaintiffs’ song may give rise to consumer confusion). Further, DeVore and Hart’s labeling their efforts a “parody” does not bar a finding of perceived endorsement. See White, 971 F.2d at 1400-01 (even if robot ad was intended as a “spoof,” defendants may have “also intended to confuse consumers regarding endorsement”). DeVore and Hart make much of the fact that Henley bases his false endorsement claim on the use of creative works that are the subject of copyright protection. According to DeVore and Hart, this should preclude Henley’s ability to protect his image and reputation for fear of creating “a species of mutant copyright law.” (Defs.’ Mem. 9.)1 That the two claims under 17 U.S.C. § 101 et seq. and 15 U.S.C. § 1051 et seq. can coexist is confirmed by the Copyright Act itself, which provides: “Nothing in this title annuls or limits any rights or remedies under any other Federal statute.” 17 U.S.C. § 301(d); see also Butler v. Target, 323 F. Supp. 2d at 1058 (“[T]he federal Copyright Act does not preempt the federal Lanham Act, or vice versa.”) (internal citation and quotation omitted). Moreover, DeVore and Hart’s assertion is belied by this Court’s ruling in the Browne case, in which a copyright and Lanham Act claims are proceeding together. Browne, 2009 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 18876, at *18; see also Dr. Seuss Enters. v. Penguin Books USA, Inc., 109 F.3d 1394, 1403, 1406 (9th Cir. 1997) (upholding injunction against claimed 1 DeVore and Hart compare Henley’s false endorsement claim to a claim brought by Shakespeare based on a false association with Shakespeare’s public domain works. (Defs.’ Mem. at 9.) In addition to the fact that the works at issue here are not in the public domain, it is difficult to imagine that consumers would think that Shakespeare was endorsing products from the grave. Case 8:09-cv-00481-JVS-RNB Document 17 Filed 06/12/09 Page 18 of 31 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 11 12 13 14 15 16 17 18 19 20 21 22 23 24 25 26 27 28 ny-873973 13 CAT IN THE HAT “parody” after finding likelihood of success on both copyright and Lanham Act claims).2 Henley’s copyright and Lanham Act claims rest on different operative facts: the first arises from the reproduction, distribution, derivative use, and public performance of “The Boys of Summer” as a copyrighted musical work, activities that violate Henley and Campbell’s exclusive rights under the Copyright Act, see 17 U.S.C. § 106, whereas the Lanham Act claim stems from the factually distinct conduct of repurposing Henley-identified works to promote DeVore’s political aspirations. Cf. Downing v. Abercrombie & Fitch, 265 F.2d 994, 1003-05 (9th Cir. 2001) (distinguishing claim based on publication of copyrightable photograph depicting plaintiffs from claim based on misuse of plaintiffs’ identities); Butler v. Target, 323 F. Supp. 2d at 1057-58, 1059 (in contrast to licensed use of plaintiffs’ sound recording, “distortion” of copyrighted work for promotional purposes supports Lanham Act claim). Significantly, the copyright claim would exist regardless of whether the works used by DeVore and Hart had been exploited in a misleading manner. But here, as is alleged in the Complaint, DeVore and Hart “willfully and intentionally appropriated not just Henley’s exclusive right under the Copyright Act, but also his goodwill, identity and persona.” (Compl. ¶ 5; accord ¶ 33 (“‘And, it goes without saying that I’ll now be looking for every opportunity to turn any Don Henley work I can into a parody of any left tilting politician who deserves it . . . .’”) (quoting DeVore).) Moreover, the copyright and Lanham Act claims address entirely different harms: invasion of one’s intellectual property interest, on the one hand, versus 2 Indeed, it would be improvident to embrace a rule that would encourage bad actors to shield themselves from false endorsement claims by using copyrighted properties to evoke a celebrity’s image, as in many cases the injured party does not control the copyright in the work with which he or she is associated, and thus would be left without a remedy. Case 8:09-cv-00481-JVS-RNB Document 17 Filed 06/12/09 Page 19 of 31 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 11 12 13 14 15 16 17 18 19 20 21 22 23 24 25 26 27 28 ny-873973 14 economic damage to one’s public persona, on the other. Henley’s Lanham Act claim seeks not to halt the reproduction, distribution, derivative use or public performance of his copyrighted work (as Henley’s copyright infringement claim does), but rather to enjoin “further conduct [by DeVore and Hart] that falsely suggests an association between Henley and Campbell and their creative works, on the one hand, and DeVore, Hart and the DeVore campaign, on the other.” (Compl. ¶ 42; accord Compl. Prayer for Relief (Fourth and Fifth Claims for Relief) ¶ 2).) Such a false endorsement claim is plainly outside the province of copyright. Rather than looking to the recent Browne decision or other leading precedent under the Lanham Act, DeVore and Hart reach back to a dated common law case to support their argument, Sinatra v. Goodyear Tire & Rubber Co., 435 F.2d 711 (9th Cir. 1970), cert. denied, 402 U.S. 906 (1971), in which plaintiff Nancy Sinatra, who had recorded the song “These Boots Are Made for Walking,” asserted an unfair competition claim against Goodyear for the licensed use of a different recording of that song for a commercial. The court, relying heavily on the Supreme Court’s now inapposite preemption decisions in Sears, Roebuck & Co. v. Stiffel Co., 376 U.S. 225 (1964), and Compco Corp. v. Day-Brite Lighting, Inc., 376 U.S. 234 (1964),3 held that Sinatra’s claim was not viable. Sinatra, 435 F.2d at 717. But even if Sinatra were still good law, a critical distinction between Sinatra and Henley’s case – aside from the fact that Sinatra predates the Lanham Act cause of action at issue here – is that, in Sinatra the defendants had properly licensed the use of the song. Id. at 716. In the court’s view, Sinatra had the opportunity to control further exploitation of the song via her contractual relationships, but failed 3 In Goldstein v. California, 412 U.S. 546 (1973), the Supreme Court limited the reach of Sears and Compco, id. at 567-70, and Congress subsequently introduced a new test for federal copyright preemption with the passage of the 1976 Copyright Act, see 17 U.S.C. § 301. See also Waits, 978 F.2d at 1099, 1100 (observing Supreme Court’s retreat from “broad pre-emptive principle” of Sears and Compco). Case 8:09-cv-00481-JVS-RNB Document 17 Filed 06/12/09 Page 20 of 31 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 11 12 13 14 15 16 17 18 19 20 21 22 23 24 25 26 27 28 ny-873973 15 to do so. Id. Of course, such is not the case here, where DeVore and Hart do not pretend to be relying on a license. Finally, DeVore and Hart search for support in the Copyright Act’s compulsory license provision that permits “cover” recordings of musical works to be made upon payment of a compulsory license fee, 17 U.S.C. § 115. In fact, Section 115 only underlines the gravity of the misconduct at issue here. First, contrary to DeVore and Hart’s assertions, the Section 115 compulsory license is a narrow exception to the exclusive rights otherwise conferred by the Copyright Act on the copyright owner to control the use of his or her works. It applies only to audio recordings of previously recorded works (not audiovisual recordings), and only when such cover recordings are to be distributed to the public for private use (not for public and commercial use). 17 U.S.C. § 115(a)(1). Section 115’s compulsory license does not encompass the creation of derivative works based upon the licensed work (such as by substituting lyrics or producing a synchronized audiovisual work, as here), and expressly provides that the licensee is precluded from altering the “fundamental character of the work” (as DeVore and Hart did here). 17 U.S.C. § 115(a)(2). In sum, Section 115 definitively protects copyright owners against the very types of misuse of their works at issue in this case. Although, as DeVore and Hart point out, cover recordings authorized under Section 115 are common, and it is possible that “the public does not believe that a re-make must have been endorsed by an earlier performer[,]” (Defs.’ Mem. at 10- 11), the recordings here are neither “covers” nor authorized. DeVore and Hart did not simply re-record the same songs, but instead altered and integrated them into promotional videos. Such video exploitations bear no relationship to what the public would perceive as ordinary, audio cover recordings intended for private consumption, which is all that Section 115 allows. It is the fact that the exploitations are so clearly not cover recordings that gives rise to the inference that they were authorized by Henley. Case 8:09-cv-00481-JVS-RNB Document 17 Filed 06/12/09 Page 21 of 31 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 11 12 13 14 15 16 17 18 19 20 21 22 23 24 25 26 27 28 ny-873973 16 C. False Endorsement Applies to “Noncommercial” and “Political” Speech In their attempt to distance their conduct from the reach of the Lanham Act, DeVore and Hart repeatedly misread and conflate different causes of action provided under the Act. As shown above, Henley’s false endorsement claim arises under 15 U.S.C. § 1125(a), which imposes liability on a defendant who “on or in connection with any goods or services . . . uses in commerce any word, term, name, symbol, or device” so as to falsely suggest a plaintiff’s association with the defendant or the defendant’s goods or services. 15 U.S.C. § 1125(a)(1)(A). Unlike a case brought under a different provision of the Lanham Act, such as the Federal Trademark Dilution Act (“FDTA”), 15 U.S.C. § 1125(c) – which expressly exempts “noncommercial use of a mark,” 15 U.S.C. § 1125(c)(3)(C) – there is no exception for “noncommercial speech” in the false endorsement context. See 15 U.S.C. § 1125(a). Thus, even if it is assumed that DeVore and Hart’s videos could be characterized as “noncommercial” or “political” speech, this would not suffice to immunize DeVore and Hart from Henley’s false endorsement claim. Indeed, one of the cases relied upon by DeVore and Hart, MasterCard Int’l Inc. v. Nader 2000 Primary Comm., Inc., No. 00 Civ. 6068 (GBD), 2004 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 3644 (S.D.N.Y. Mar. 8, 2004), drew such a distinction in the course of construing the FTDA’s “noncommercial” exemption. See id. at *25-26 & *26 n.2. As that court explained, unlike the FTDA, the different Lanham Act provision at issue in the United We Stand America, Inc. case (based on use of a trademark in connection with “goods and services”) “does not have a commercial activity requirement, nor does it exempt from liability noncommercial use of a mark.” Id. at *25. Consequently, the MasterCard court declined to apply a “commercial activity” requirement in reviewing the plaintiff’s claims under 15 U.S.C. § 1125(a). Compare id. at *5-14 (assessing question of consumer confusion for purposes of Case 8:09-cv-00481-JVS-RNB Document 17 Filed 06/12/09 Page 22 of 31 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 11 12 13 14 15 16 17 18 19 20 21 22 23 24 25 26 27 28 ny-873973 17 15 U.S.C. § 1125(a) claim) with id. at *18-30 (analysis of FTDA claim). DeVore and Hart simply overlook this critical point. (See Defs.’ Mem. at 12-13.) Moreover, courts agree that the more general reference to use “in commerce” that appears in 15 U.S.C. § 1125(a) and elsewhere in the Lanham Act is jurisdictional, rather than substantive, in nature: “The history and text of the Lanham Act show that ‘use in commerce’ reflects Congress’s intent to legislate to the limits of its authority under the Commerce Clause, rather than to limit the Lanham Act to profit-seeking uses of a trademark.” United We Stand America, Inc. v. United We Stand, America New York, Inc., 128 F.3d 86, 92 (2d Cir. 1997); accord Bosley Med. Inst. v. Kremer, 403 F.3d 672, 677 (9th Cir. 2005) (“‘Use in commerce’ is simply a jurisdictional predicate to any law passed by Congress under the Commerce Clause.”) (internal citations omitted). Similarly, DeVore and Hart’s reliance on Tax Cap Comm. v. Save Our Everglades, Inc., 933 F. Supp. 1077 (S.D. Fla. 1996), is misplaced. In that case, in which the plaintiff alleged confusion arising from defendant’s use of similarly designed petition forms for Florida ballot initiatives, the protected activity was confined to the solicitation of signatures on paper petitions. Indeed, the court emphasized that the defendant “solicit[ed] no funds, no volunteers, and no supporters” and that defendant’s acts were confined to the State of Florida. Id. at 1081 (distinguishing contrary holding in Brach Van Houten Holding, Inc. v. Save Brach’s Coal. for Chicago, 856 F. Supp. 472 (N.D. Ill. 1994), on ground that Brach defendant was “engaged in soliciting donations, preparing press releases, holding public meetings and press conferences, etc.”) Here, DeVore and Hart produced promotional videos and posted them to the Internet as part of a full-fledged publicity campaign for DeVore, which was tied to the solicitation of supporters and donations. (Compl. ¶¶ 5, 23, 35.) Even if Tax Cap constituted authoritative precedent in this Circuit – which it does not – it is easily distinguishable based on the conduct alleged here. Case 8:09-cv-00481-JVS-RNB Document 17 Filed 06/12/09 Page 23 of 31 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 11 12 13 14 15 16 17 18 19 20 21 22 23 24 25 26 27 28 ny-873973 18 Finally, DeVore and Hart’s attempt to find support in Bosley Medical Institute fails, for Bosley concerned whether the defendant was a competitor of the plaintiff, as is required for standing to bring a false advertising – not a false endorsement – claim under the Lanham Act. 403 F.3d at 677, 679. Nor does this case bear any resemblance to New.Net, Inc. v. Lavasoft, 356 F. Supp. 2d 1090 (C.D. Cal. 2004), also a false advertising case, which turned on whether the plaintiff software company was a competitor of the defendant. Id. at 1116-17. Rice v. Fox Broad. Co., 330 F.3d 1170 (9th Cir. 2003), yet another false advertising case, is also irrelevant, because it concerned the question of whether the defendant was actually engaged in advertising. Id. at 1181. In marked contrast to the inapposite authority cited by DeVore and Hart stands this Court’s recent ruling in the Browne case, in which the Court rejected the very same “political speech” argument in response to Browne’s claim of false endorsement arising out of the infringing use of Browne’s song in a commercial: [C]ontrary to [defendant’s] assertions, courts have recognized that the Lanham Act applies to noncommercial (i.e. political) and commercial speech. . . . Indeed, the Act’s purpose of reducing consumer confusion supports application of the Act to political speech, where the consequences of widespread confusion as to the source of such speech could be dire. 2009 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 18876, at *12-13 (emphasis in original) (internal citations omitted). In reaching this conclusion, the Court acknowledged the Second Circuit’s influential holding in United We Stand, in which that Court held that the activities of a political organization in support of a presidential candidate constituted “services” within the meaning of the Lanham Act. Id. at *11-15 (citing United We Stand America, Inc., 128 F.3d at 89-92). As the Second Circuit explained, “[t]he suggestion that the performance of such functions is not within the scope of ‘services in commerce’ seems to us to be not only wrong but extraordinarily Case 8:09-cv-00481-JVS-RNB Document 17 Filed 06/12/09 Page 24 of 31 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 11 12 13 14 15 16 17 18 19 20 21 22 23 24 25 26 27 28 ny-873973 19 impractical for the functioning of our political system.” 128 F.3d at 90 (internal citations omitted). That is to say, if it is permissible to take others’ identities at will to further the cause of one’s choice, no one will know what is actually supported by whom. Indeed, this is Henley’s very concern here. III. HENLEY’S UCL CLAIM IS SOUND DeVore and Hart readily acknowledge that it is permissible to pursue a cause of action under California’s unfair competition law, Business & Professions Code § 17200 (“UCL”), in tandem with a Lanham Act claim. (Defs.’ Mem. at 14); see also Golden Door, Inc. v. Odisho, 646 F.2d 347, 352 (9th Cir. 1980) (California law extends “greater protection” than is available under the Lanham Act); Conversive, Inc. v. Conversagent, Inc., 433 F. Supp. 2d 1079, 1093-94 (C.D. Cal. 2006) (same). And, as discussed below, a UCL claim can accompany a copyright claim. See Aagard v. Palomar Builders, Inc., 344 F. Supp. 2d 1211, 1217 (E.D. Cal. 2004). In an effort to overcome Henley’s UCL claim, however, DeVore and Hart resort to the argument that Henley lacks standing to pursue it as a result of Proposition 64. Henley is not suing on behalf of the public, however, to prevent a generalized harm. Rather, he has brought his UCL claim as an individual to protect his identity and property interests from further injury at the hands of DeVore and Hart. Because the UCL authorizes injunctive relief to halt such harm to Henley and his property, there is no question that Henley has standing to bring the state law claim. In addition to their standing argument, DeVore and Hart suggest – but do not quite assert – that Henley’s claim could be preempted by the Copyright Act. (Defs.’ Mem. at 14.) So that there is no doubt on this score, claims such as Henley’s, involving the misuse of a copyrighted work that also constitutes an unfair business practice, have been held not to be preempted because they include elements not encompassed by federal law. Case 8:09-cv-00481-JVS-RNB Document 17 Filed 06/12/09 Page 25 of 31 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 11 12 13 14 15 16 17 18 19 20 21 22 23 24 25 26 27 28 ny-873973 20 A. Henley Has Standing Under the UCL as Amended by Proposition 64 The heart of Devore and Hart’s challenge to Henley’s UCL claim is their contention that Proposition 64, passed by California voters in 2004, deprives Henley of standing. Although DeVore and Hart baldly assert that Henley has failed to plead a loss of money or property as required under the amended UCL, they utterly fail to explain why the diminution of Henley’s property rights in his valuable creative works and public persona is not actionable. In pertinent part, the UCL prohibits “unlawful, unfair or fraudulent business act[s] or practice[s].” Cal. Bus. & Prof. Code § 17200; see also Korea Supply Co. v. Lockheed Martin Corp., 29 Cal. 4th 1134, 1143, 131 Cal. Rptr. 2d 29, 37 (2003). The UCL covers “a wide range of conduct,” embracing “anything that can properly be called a business practice and that at the same time is forbidden by law.” Korea Supply Co., 29 Cal. 4th at 1143, 131 Cal. Rptr. 2d at 37 (internal quotation omitted). Pursuant to Proposition 64, members of the general public are no longer able to sue for violations of the UCL; rather, a plaintiff must have “‘suffered injury in fact and [have] lost money or property as a result of . . . unfair competition.’” Butler v. Adoption Media, LLC, 486 F. Supp. 2d 1022, 1061 (N.D. Cal. 2007) (citing Cal. Bus. & Prof. Code § 17203, as amended by Prop. 64 § 2; id. § 17204, as amended by Prop. 64 § 3). On the face of the complaint, Henley clearly meets the requirements for a cause of action under the UCL. He alleges that he has “suffered substantial injury as a result of DeVore and Hart’s wrongful acts,” (Compl. ¶ 80), which include the unlawful appropriation of Henley’s identity and persona, as well as the taking and misuse of Henley’s copyrighted property, to create the false impression that Henley is associated with Devore’s campaign. (E.g., Compl. ¶¶ 5, 42). Such conduct is specifically alleged to have devalued Henley’s property interests as a co-copyright owner of “The Boys of Summer” and the performing artist of “All She Wants to Do Case 8:09-cv-00481-JVS-RNB Document 17 Filed 06/12/09 Page 26 of 31 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 11 12 13 14 15 16 17 18 19 20 21 22 23 24 25 26 27 28 ny-873973 21 is Dance” because Henley derives “substantial income and economic value from licensed uses” of those works, and “[t]he association . . . with DeVore’s campaign and views will make these works less attractive to be licensed for other legitimate, income-producing purposes, such as for film, television and commercials.” (Id. ¶ 41.) In addition to Henley’s property interests in his creative works,4 the law recognizes that Henley has a personal property right in his celebrity persona. Waits, 978 F.2d at 1100 (singer Tom Waits’ state law claim for misuse of his identity in a commercial was an invasion of his “personal property right”); see also Midler v. Ford Motor Co., 849 F.2d 460, 463 (9th Cir. 1988) (common law rights in celebrity’s identity are “property rights”). Henley has plainly alleged harm to his identity as a result of DeVore and Hart’s unlawful acts, including injury to “[himself], his reputation and goodwill.” (Id. ¶ 80.) In sum, Henley has alleged injury in fact, including the loss of property and income, as a result of DeVore and Hart’s tortious conduct. Henley seeks injunctive relief to restore his property interests. (Id. ¶ 7.) These allegations more than suffice to give him standing to sue under the UCL. Contrary to what DeVore and Hart appear to contend, it is clear that standing under the UCL does not require that the property in question be either tangible or reduced to a “sum certain.” For example, in Overstock.com Inc. v. Gradient Analytics, Inc., 151 Cal. App. 4th 688, 61 Cal. Rptr. 3d 29 (Cal. Ct. App. 2007), a case involving defendant’s manipulation of stock prices through false statements, the court held that the plaintiff had standing to sue based on the “diminution in value of [its] assets and decline in its market capitalization[.]” 151 Cal. App. 4th at 4 “Copyright, of course, is a federal grant of a property interest in the production, replication, publication, and distribution of certain classes of ‘original works of authorship fixed in any tangible medium of expression.’” Davis v. Blige, 505 F.3d 90, 98 (2d Cir. 2007) (citing 17 U.S.C. § 102(a)). Case 8:09-cv-00481-JVS-RNB Document 17 Filed 06/12/09 Page 27 of 31 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 11 12 13 14 15 16 17 18 19 20 21 22 23 24 25 26 27 28 ny-873973 22 716, 61 Cal. Rptr. 3d at 51. Similarly, in White v. Trans Union, LLC, 462 F. Supp. 2d 1079 (C.D. Cal. 2006), the court upheld plaintiffs’ UCL claim based on their allegation that they suffered loss of money or property due to defendants’ faulty credit reporting practices.5 Id. at 1083-84. Seeking to bolster their argument, DeVore and Hart further assert that, after Proposition 64, standing under the UCL is strictly limited to claims for which the remedy is “restoration of . . . money or property under Section 17203 [of the UCL].” (Defs.’ Mem. 16.) This is an erroneous view of the statute. As the California Supreme Court recently confirmed in In re Tobacco II Cases, 46 Cal. 4th 298, 93 Cal. Rptr. 3d 559 (2009), Proposition 64 did not limit the remedies provision of the UCL , which provides that “[t]he court may make such orders or judgments . . . as may be necessary to prevent the use or employment by any person of any practice which constitutes unfair competition, as defined in this chapter, or as may be necessary to restore to any person in interest any money or property, real or personal, which may have been acquired by means of such unfair competition. 17 U.S.C. § 17203 (emphasis added); In re Tobacco Cases II, 46 Cal. 4th at 319, 93 Cal. Rptr. 3d at 575 (“T]he primary form of relief available under the UCL to protect consumers from unfair business practices is an injunction, along with ancillary relief in the form of . . . restitution.”). Because the statute permits parties to sue for both injunctive relief and restitution, the narrow reading of the UCL advanced by DeVore and Hart has been rejected by this Court and others. For example, in G&C Auto Body Inc. v. Geico Gen. Ins. Co., No. C06-04898 MJJ, 2007 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 91327 (N.D. Cal. Dec. 5 Similarly, other UCL cases have found standing based on intangible vested interests. E.g., Cortez v. Purolator Air Filtration Pdts. Co., 23 Cal. 4th 163, 177- 78, 96 Cal. Rptr. 518, 528-29 (2000) (standing based on vested interest in withheld overtime pay); Lozano v. AT&T Wireless Servs., Inc., 504 F.3d 718, 733-34 (9th Cir. 2007) (standing based on vested interest in free mobile phone minutes). Case 8:09-cv-00481-JVS-RNB Document 17 Filed 06/12/09 Page 28 of 31 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 11 12 13 14 15 16 17 18 19 20 21 22 23 24 25 26 27 28 ny-873973 23 12, 2007), in which it was asserted that insurers’ low reimbursement rates harmed auto repair shops, the court permitted plaintiffs to proceed on the basis of their claim for injunctive relief to halt the insurers’ practices. Id. at *5, *14. The court found “no basis to presume that the People of California, when adopting Proposition 64, meant for the new Section 17204 standing requirements to track the requirements established for obtaining restitution under Section 17203.” Id. at *13. Moreover, in the court’s view, an interpretation of the UCL limiting standing to those who seek restitution would be untenable because it would mean that a plaintiff would “lack standing to seek . . . injunctive relief.” Id. at *12. Likewise, in White v. Trans Union, LLC, a case challenging the defendant’s credit reporting practices, this Court, too, held that the plaintiffs could proceed based on a claim for nonmonetary injunctive relief; they were not required to show that defendant “took money directly from them” or that “the losses in question were the product of the defendant’s wrongful acquisition of the plaintiffs [sic] property.” Id. at 1083-84. The sole federal decision relied upon by DeVore and Hart in support of their strained reading of the UCL, Butler v. Adoption Media LLC, is easily distinguished from this case, because the Butler plaintiffs had not “previously identified any loss of money or property in connection with their [UCL] claims, and cannot now attempt to establish such a loss.” 486 F. Supp. 2d at 1062. Similarly, in Buckland v. Threshold Enters., Ltd., 155 Cal. App. 4th 798, 66 Cal Rptr. 3d 543 (2007), in which the plaintiff attempted to manufacture standing by purchasing defendant’s skin cream, the court’s dismissal was based on plaintiff’s failure to allege “lost money or property” as required under the statute. 486 F. Supp. 2d at 815-16, 818, 66 Cal. Rptr. 3d at 555-56, 558. Finally, in Center for Biological Diversity, Inc. v. FPL Group, Inc., No. RG04-183113, 2006 WL 3542514 (Cal. Super. Ct. Oct. 12, 2006), the court concluded that plaintiff lacked standing to bring a claim based on the killing of wildlife, an “abstract interest owned commonly by all members of the public” rather than “individually” by the plaintiff. Id. Clearly, none of these Case 8:09-cv-00481-JVS-RNB Document 17 Filed 06/12/09 Page 29 of 31 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 11 12 13 14 15 16 17 18 19 20 21 22 23 24 25 26 27 28 ny-873973 24 holdings applies here, for Henley has alleged the loss of protectable, personal property. In any event, to the extent these cases suggest that standing under the UCL is limited to those who assert claims for specific types of restitution, they are in conflict with language of the statute as well as a recent decision of the California Supreme Court.6 B. Henley’s UCL Claim is Not Preempted by Copyright Law Finally, Henley’s UCL claim is not preempted by copyright law, as DeVore and Hart appear to suggest in passing. (Defs.’ Mem. at 14.) That is because a state law claim is not preempted when it requires proof of an “extra element” not required by federal law. Summit Mach. Tool Mfg. Corp. v. Victor CNC Sys., Inc., 7 F.3d 1434, 1439-40 (9th Cir. 1993); see also 17 U.S.C. § 301(b) (preserving state law claims involving rights not equivalent to those covered by the Copyright Act). As discussed above, supra § II.B, such additional elements are plainly present here, where Henley’s UCL claim arises not only from the misappropriation of exclusive rights under the Copyright Act, but from the alteration and misuse of works closely associated with Henley improperly to suggest that Henley endorses DeVore. Courts have declined to find preemption in circumstances such as these. For example, in Butler v. Target, plaintiffs alleged, inter alia, that the defendant distorted the lyrics of plaintiffs’ song and used the distorted lyrics in an advertising campaign. 323 F. Supp. 2d at 1057. This Court held this UCL claim was not preempted because it alleged an “extra element”: that the altered lyrics led consumers mistakenly to believe that plaintiffs endorsed defendant’s products. Id. (noting that Section 301 of Copyright Act “‘is not intended to preempt common law 6 In Korea Supply Co., discussed at length by DeVore and Hart, the California Supreme Court held that “nonrestitutionary disgorgement of profits is not an available remedy in an individual action under the UCL.” 29 Cal. 4th at 1152, 131 Cal. Rptr. 2d at 44. But that case involved the type of restitution available under the UCL, not standing. In any event, Henley is not seeking disgorgement here. Case 8:09-cv-00481-JVS-RNB Document 17 Filed 06/12/09 Page 30 of 31 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 11 12 13 14 15 16 17 18 19 20 21 22 23 24 25 26 27 28 ny-873973 25 protection . . . even where the subject matter involved comes within the scope of the copyright statute’”) (quoting H.R. REP. NO. 94-1476, at 133 (1976)). Likewise, in Aagard, a case involving the misappropriation of copyrighted home design plans, the court reasoned that the defendants’ UCL counterclaim was not preempted because the defendants alleged the plaintiff had capitalized on defendants’ reputation to promote her own interests. 344 F. Supp. 2d at 1217. Here, as in Butler v. Target, Henley has alleged that the alteration and misuse of his works could lead consumers to believe that he endorses, is affiliated with, or supports DeVore and his campaign. (Compl. ¶¶ 29, 40, 78.) And, like the counterclaims in Aagard, Henley has alleged that DeVore and Hart have unlawfully capitalized on his reputation, fame, and popularity. (Id. at ¶¶ 38, 80.) Such allegations clearly constitute “extra elements” demonstrating that Henley’s UCL claim is not preempted and should go forward.7 IV. CONCLUSION Accordingly, for all of the reasons set forth herein, Henley and Campbell respectfully request that this Court deny DeVore and Hart’s motion to dismiss. Dated: June 12, 2009 MORRISON & FOERSTER LLP CHARLES S. BARQUIST JACQUELINE C. CHARLESWORTH KELVIN D. CHEN PAUL GOLDSTEIN By: /s/ Charles S. Barquist Attorneys for Plaintiffs DON HENLEY and MIKE CAMPBELL 7 Laws v. Sony Music Entm’t, Inc., 448 F.3d 1134 (9th Cir. 2006), a right of publicity case cited by DeVore and Hart, is inapposite, for in that case – unlike here – the defendant had obtained a license from the plaintiff’s record label to use plaintiff’s sound recording. Id. at 1140-41. Case 8:09-cv-00481-JVS-RNB Document 17 Filed 06/12/09 Page 31 of 31