Doe v. Law School Admission Council, Inc.

MOTION to Dismiss for Lack of Jurisdiction

E.D. Pa.April 3, 2017

UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT EASTERN DISTRICT OF PENNSYLVANIA __________________________________________ ) JANE DOE, ) ) Plaintiff, ) ) Case No. 2:16-CV-03261 v. ) ) MOTION TO DISMISS LAW SCHOOL ADMISSION COUNCIL, ) ) Defendant. ) __________________________________________) Defendant Law School Admission Council (LSAC) hereby moves pursuant to Fed. R. Civ. P. 12(b)(1) and 12(b)(6) to dismiss this action. Plaintiff’s Complaint relates to LSAC’s denial of her request for testing accommodations on the Law School Admission Test (LSAT). To the extent Plaintiff is complaining about past administrations of the test, her claims are moot. The only relief available under Title III of the Americans with Disabilities Act (which is applicable to all of Plaintiff’s claims) is “preventive” injunctive relief, and no injunctive relief could prevent any discrimination that purportedly occurred with respect to past test administrations. To the extent her Complaint relates to future test administrations, her claims are not ripe. She is not currently registered to take the LSAT, she has not requested accommodations on any future test, and LSAC has not acted on any request for accommodations relating to a future test administration. Because her claims are either moot or not ripe, this Court lacks subject matter jurisdiction and her Complaint should be dismissed under Fed. R. Civ. P. 12(b)(1). In addition, her Complaint is subject to partial dismissal under Fed. R. Civ. P. 8(a) and 12(b)(6) even if the Court concludes that it has subject matter jurisdiction. Count I (“Unlawful Consideration Of Mitigation Measures”) and Count IV (“Coercion, Intimidation, Threats, Or Case 2:16-cv-03261-NIQA Document 10 Filed 04/03/17 Page 1 of 3 28169103.1 -2- Interference With ADA Rights”) of her Complaint fail to state ADA claims and should be dismissed. And all four Counts in her Complaint fail to state a claim insofar as they seek monetary damages, because damages cannot be recovered under Title III of the ADA. The grounds for this motion are set forth more fully in the Memorandum of Law filed herewith. Wherefore, Plaintiff’s Complaint should be dismissed in its entirety for lack of subject matter jurisdiction. In the alternative, and at a minimum, Counts I and IV should be dismissed for failure to state a claim, and all Counts should be dismissed to the extent they seek damages as relief, again for failure to state a claim. A proposed order is filed herewith. Dated: April 3, 2017 OF COUNSEL: Robert A. Burgoyne NORTON ROSE FULBRIGHT US LLP 799 9th St. NW, Suite 1000 Washington, D.C. 20001-4501 Telephone: 202-662-0200 Facsimile: 202-662-4643 robert.burgoyne@nortonrosefulbright.com Respectfully submitted, /s/ Andrea L. D’Ambra Andrea L. D’Ambra Pennsylvania Bar No. 93385 1301 Avenue of the Americas New York, NY 10019-6022 Telephone: 212-318-3000 Facsimile: 212-318-3400 andrea.dambra@nortonrosefulbright.com Case 2:16-cv-03261-NIQA Document 10 Filed 04/03/17 Page 2 of 3 28169103.1 -3- CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE I hereby certify that a true and correct copy of the foregoing Motion to Dismiss and its supporting documents (Memorandum of Law in Support of Motion to Dismiss; Declaration of Joan Van Tol and exhibits; Proposed Order) have been filed electronically on April 3, 2017, using the Court’s ECF system and are available for viewing and downloading from the ECF system. Copies also were served on April 3, 2017, by first class mail, postage prepaid on Plaintiff at the address listed on the summons in this action and the mailing address listed in her Complaint. /s/ Andrea L. D’Ambra Andrea L. D’Ambra Case 2:16-cv-03261-NIQA Document 10 Filed 04/03/17 Page 3 of 3 UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT EASTERN DISTRICT OF PENNSYLVANIA __________________________________________ ) JANE DOE, ) ) Plaintiff, ) ) Case No. 2:16-CV-03261 v. ) ) MEMORANDUM OF LAW LAW SCHOOL ADMISSION COUNCIL, ) IN SUPPORT OF MOTION ) TO DISMISS Defendant. ) __________________________________________) Plaintiff “Jane Doe” (“Ms. Doe”)1 has filed a pro se Complaint alleging that the Law School Admission Council (“LSAC”) violated Title III of the Americans with Disabilities Act (“ADA”) in denying her requests for testing accommodations on the Law School Admission Test (“LSAT”). She seeks monetary damages and injunctive relief. LSAC denies that it violated Ms. Doe’s rights in any way. Ms. Doe has registered to take the LSAT multiple times since 2008, sometimes seeking accommodations and other times making no such request. She has taken the LSAT only once, in 2009. She is not currently registered for the test, and has not sought testing accommodations since submitting an incomplete request in 2015. Her Complaint should be dismissed. To the extent Ms. Doe is complaining about past administrations of the test, her claims are moot. The only relief available under Title III is “preventive” injunctive relief, and no injunctive relief could prevent any discrimination that purportedly occurred with respect to past test administrations. To the extent her Complaint relates to future test administrations, her 1 Ms. Doe filed an ex parte motion to proceed anonymously in this case, see Motion to Use Jane Doe (Dkt. 6), which the Court granted on August 30, 2016, before LSAC was served, see Order (Dkt. 8). Case 2:16-cv-03261-NIQA Document 10-1 Filed 04/03/17 Page 1 of 11 28153343.1 -2- claims are not ripe. She is not currently registered to take the LSAT, she has not requested accommodations on any future test, and LSAC has not acted on any request for accommodations relating to a future test administration. Because her claims are either moot or not ripe, this Court lacks subject matter jurisdiction and her Complaint should be dismissed under Fed. R. Civ. P. 12(b)(1). In addition, her Complaint is subject to partial dismissal under Fed. R. Civ. P. 8(a) and 12(b)(6) even if the Court concludes that it has subject matter jurisdiction. Count I (“Unlawful Consideration Of Mitigation Measures”) and Count IV (“Coercion, Intimidation, Threats, Or Interference With ADA Rights”) of her Complaint fail to state ADA claims and should be dismissed outright. And all four Counts in her Complaint fail to state a claim insofar as they seek monetary damages, because damages cannot be recovered under Title III of the ADA. BACKGROUND I. LSAC and the LSAT LSAC is a non-profit membership organization based in Newtown, Pennsylvania. LSAC provides services for its member schools and individuals who wish to attend law school, including developing and administering the LSAT examination. Law schools across the country rely upon LSAT scores as one factor among many in evaluating admission applications. The LSAT is a standardized test. With limited exceptions, all examinees take the LSAT under the same testing conditions, including standard testing time. The primary exception is for disabled individuals who need reasonable accommodations. LSAC conscientiously evaluates each accommodation request. It does so to ensure that “individuals with bona fide disabilities receive accommodations, and that those without disabilities do not receive accommodations that they are not entitled to, and which could provide Case 2:16-cv-03261-NIQA Document 10-1 Filed 04/03/17 Page 2 of 11 28153343.1 -3- them with an unfair advantage when taking the ... examination.” Powell v. Nat’l Bd. of Med. Examiners, 364 F.3d 79, 88-89 (2d Cir. 2004); see also Love v. Law School Admission Council, 513 F. Supp. 2d 206, 216 n.7 (E.D. Pa. 2007) (“research indicates that if you give someone extra time on a timed test like the GMAT or LSAT, their scores will improve whether they have a learning disability or not”). More than a thousand individuals request disability-based accommodations on the LSAT every year, and LSAC grants accommodations to most, but not all, of those individuals. II. Plaintiff’s Requests for Accommodations on the LSAT Ms. Doe alleges that she has been diagnosed “with numerous permanent disabilities including but not limited to ADHD [Attention Deficit Hyperactivity Disorder], a reading disorder, and a learning disability (dyslexia) and other learning disabilities.” Complaint ¶ 8. She claims to have been denied testing accommodations on the LSAT in 2008, 2009, 2015, and 2016. See id. ¶ 7. She states that “[t]his case is ONLY concerning the April 17, 2015-present and the upcoming October 2016 accommodation request.” Id.2 Ms. Doe submitted a request form for accommodations on the June 2015 administration of the LSAT, but her request was incomplete. See Declaration of Joan Van Tol (“Van Tol Decl.”) ¶¶ 6-7 and Ex. C-D. Under LSAC’s published accommodation policies, she was required to provide proof of testing accommodations on certain past standardized tests (in which event she would have been authorized to receive those same accommodations on the LSAT, subject to certain exceptions); or, if such documentation was unavailable, an evaluation form and supporting documentation from a qualified professional that confirmed her claimed impairments and addressed the level of any resulting functional limitations, as well as documentation 2 Ms. Doe’s Complaint was filed in July 2016. LSAC was not served until March 2017. Case 2:16-cv-03261-NIQA Document 10-1 Filed 04/03/17 Page 3 of 11 28153343.1 -4- regarding past accommodations she might have received in other contexts. See id. ¶ 7. She submitted none of this material, and LSAC therefore could not consider her request. See id. Ms. Doe ultimately did not sit for the June 2015 test. See id. ¶ 8. The LSAT was offered in September 2016 (not October 2016, as Ms. Doe alleges in the Complaint). Id. ¶¶ 13-14. Ms. Doe registered for this test but cancelled a few days before the testing date. Id. ¶ 13. She did not request accommodations on the September 2016 test. Id. Ms. Doe began the process to register for the June 2017 administration of the LSAT, but did not complete the process. See id. ¶ 15. She has not requested accommodations on this test. In addition to the upcoming June 2017 administration, the LSAT is offered in September and December 2017, and in February 2018. See id. Ms. Doe is not registered for any of these administrations of the LSAT, and she has not requested testing accommodations on these or any other future test administration dates. See id. ARGUMENT Ms. Doe asserts four claims against LSAC: (1) unlawful consideration of mitigation measures (Count I, citing 42 U.S.C. § 12102(4)(E)(1)(i)(I)), Complaint ¶¶ 13-19; (2) failure to ensure that exam measures ability rather than disability (Count II, citing 42 U.S.C. § 12189 and 28 C.F.R. § 36.309), id. ¶¶ 20-30; (3) denial of reasonable accommodation (Count III, citing 42 U.S.C. § 12189 and 28 C.F.R. § 36.309(b)(1)(iv)), id. ¶¶ 31-36; and (4) coercion, intimidation, threats, or interference with ADA rights (Count IV, citing 42 U.S.C. § 12203), id. ¶¶ 37-44. The court lacks subject matter jurisdiction over all of Ms. Doe’s claims, and they must be dismissed pursuant to Fed. R. Civ. P. 12(b)(1). In addition, Count I fails to state a claim for which relief can be granted, and must be dismissed pursuant to Fed. R. Civ. P. 8 and 12(b)(6). Ms. Doe’s claims also fail to the extent that she seeks monetary damages, as damages are not available to plaintiffs suing under Title III of the ADA. Case 2:16-cv-03261-NIQA Document 10-1 Filed 04/03/17 Page 4 of 11 28153343.1 -5- I. MOTION TO DISMISS STANDARDS Federal courts lack subject matter jurisdiction over moot cases. See Already, LLC v. Nike Inc., 133 S. Ct. 721, 726-27 (2013) (a moot case is no longer a “case” or “controversy” for purposes of Article III); Keitel v. Mazurkiewicz, 729 F.3d 278, 280 (3d Cir. 2013). Likewise, “[i]f a claim is not ripe, the court should dismiss it for lack of subject matter jurisdiction.” River Thames Ins. Co. v. 5329 West, Inc., 1995 WL 241490, at *2 (E.D. Pa. 1995). When a factual challenge to subject matter jurisdiction is raised, “‘the court may consider and weigh evidence outside the pleadings to determine if it has jurisdiction.’” Gordon v. East Goshen Township, 592 F. Supp. 2d 828, 837 (E.D. Pa. 2009) (citation omitted). The plaintiff bears the burden of establishing subject matter jurisdiction. See Lujan v. Defenders of Wildlife, 504 U.S. 555, 561 (1992). Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 8(a)(2) requires that a complaint contain a “short and plain statement of the claim showing that the pleader is entitled to relief.” While this requirement does not necessitate “detailed factual allegations,” it does require “more than unadorned, the-defendant-unlawfully-harmed-me accusations.” Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 556 U.S. 662, 678 (2009) (citing Bell Atlantic Corp. v. Twombly, 550 U.S. 544, 555 (2007)). “A pleading that offers ‘labels and conclusions’ or ‘a formulaic recitation of the elements of a cause of action will not do.’ Nor does a complaint suffice if it tenders ‘naked assertion[s]’ devoid of ‘further factual enhancement.’” Iqbal, 556 U.S. at 678 (quoting Twombly, 550 U.S. at 555, 557). To overcome a motion to dismiss under Rule 12(b)(6), a party must state a claim for relief that “allows the court to draw the reasonable inference that the defendant is liable….” Iqbal, 556 U.S. at 678. Such an inference cannot be drawn based on the pleading of facts suggesting “a sheer possibility that a defendant has acted unlawfully.” Id. (citation and internal Case 2:16-cv-03261-NIQA Document 10-1 Filed 04/03/17 Page 5 of 11 28153343.1 -6- quotation marks omitted). Furthermore, “when the allegations in a complaint, however true, could not raise a claim of entitlement to relief, ‘this basic deficiency should . . . be exposed at the point of minimum expenditure of time and money by the parties and the court.’” Twombly, 550 U.S. at 557 (internal quotation marks and citations omitted). A pro se plaintiff’s pleadings are liberally construed. See Douris v. Bucks Cty. Office of District Attorney, 2005 WL 226151, at *5 (E.D. Pa. 2005) (citations omitted). “A court may dismiss a pro se plaintiff’s complaint only when ‘it appears beyond doubt that the Plaintiff can prove no set of facts in support of his claim which would entitled him to relief.’” Id. (internal quotation marks and citation omitted). The court, however, “will not ‘become a surrogate attorney for the party, even one who is proceeding pro se.’” Id. (citations omitted). II. MS. DOE’S CLAIMS MUST BE DISMISSED A. The Court Lacks Subject Matter Jurisdiction over Ms. Doe’s Claims Ms. Doe’s first three claims, which challenge LSAC’s testing accommodation policies and its denial of her request for testing accommodations, all arise under Title III of the ADA. See 42 U.S.C. § 12189 (“Any person that offers examinations … related to applications … for postsecondary education … shall offer such examinations or courses in a place and manner accessible to persons with disabilities or offer alternative accessible arrangements for such individuals.”). Ms. Doe herself invokes this statutory provision in her Complaint. See Complaint ¶¶ 5, 20-36.3 Her fourth claim also challenges LSAC’s testing accommodation policies, and arises under a “miscellaneous” provision in Title IV of the ADA, 42 U.S.C. § 12203(b). 3 As explained below, the first count of Ms. Doe’s complaint does not raise a stand-alone claim under the ADA, and should be read as also attempting to state a claim under Title III. See infra at 9. Case 2:16-cv-03261-NIQA Document 10-1 Filed 04/03/17 Page 6 of 11 28153343.1 -7- The remedies provision for Title III is found at 42 U.S.C. § 12188(a), which in turn adopts the remedies set forth in 42 U.S.C. § 2000a-3(a). Section 2000a-3(a) allows individuals to pursue “a civil action for preventive relief, including an application for a permanent or temporary injunction, restraining order, or other order ….” (Emphasis added.) The remedies provision at 42 U.S.C. § 12188(a) is also applicable to a “coercion” claim under 42 U.S.C. § 12203(b) asserted against an entity subject to Title III. See 42 U.S.C. § 12203(c). There is, however, no existing case or controversy between Ms. Doe and LSAC that would entitle her to any preventive injunctive relief, including the injunctive relief sought in her Complaint. See Complaint ¶¶ 17-19, 24-27, 36, 42 and Prayer for Relief Requests a-f.4 The Court therefore lacks subject matter jurisdiction over her claims. Ms. Doe’s ADA claims are moot as to any request she made for accommodations on a prior administration of the LSAT, see Complaint ¶ 7, because injunctive and declaratory relief would not prevent the harm she allegedly experienced with respect to any prior test administrations. See, e.g., Girard v. Lincoln College of New England, 27 F. Supp. 3d 289, 292- 93 (D. Conn. 2014); J.M. v. Nobel Learning Communities, Inc., 2013 WL 4833846, at *5-6 (E.D. Pa. 2013). And her ADA claims are not ripe with respect to any future administrations of the 4 Ms. Doe purports to seek relief, in part, under 42 U.S.C. § 1983. See Complaint Prayer for Relief e-f. LSAC is a private, non-profit corporation. It is not a state actor. Therefore, § 1983 is not applicable to LSAC. See generally Kach v. Hose, 589 F.3d 626, 646 (3d Cir. 2009). She also seeks an order requiring LSAC to provide her with a letter “explaining that her LSAT scores used for her law school applications during the relevant period may not have provided accurate measures of her acquired reading and verbal reasoning skills, because LSAC did not provide testing accommodations.” Complaint Prayer for Relief b. This is not “preventive” injunctive relief. Moreover, any such relief would necessarily relate to the LSAT which she took in 2009 (the only time she actually tested), which is well outside the two-year limitations period applicable to her ADA claims. See Burkhart v. Widener University, 70 Fed. Appx. 52, 53 (3d Cir. 2003) (holding that claims brought in Pennsylvania under Titles III and IV of the ADA are governed by a two-year limitations period); Katz v. Nat'l Bd. of Med. Examiners, 2016 WL 8222071, at *4 (M.D. Pa. 2016), adopted by 2017 WL 515006 (M.D. Pa. 2017). Case 2:16-cv-03261-NIQA Document 10-1 Filed 04/03/17 Page 7 of 11 28153343.1 -8- LSAT, because she is not currently registered for the test, nor has she requested accommodations on any such test. See Cunningham v. Univ. of N.M. Bd. of Regents, 531 Fed. Appx. 909, 916-18 (10th Cir. 2013) (holding that district court lacked subject matter jurisdiction over plaintiff’s Title III ADA complaint against a testing entity, because plaintiff did “not currently have any pending [accommodation] requests before the Board” and his claim “was not ripe for review”); Kober v. Nat’l Board of Medical Examiners, 2010 WL 2342480, at *2-3 (W.D. La. 2010) (dismissing under Rule 12(b)(1) Title III ADA complaint of individual who had requested accommodations on a licensing exam, where the testing entity made no final decision on a prior request for accommodations, and the plaintiff “currently has no request pending before the [testing entity]” for decision); see generally Douris, 2005 WL 226151, at *9 (“In determining whether an issue is ripe for review, courts must evaluate ‘both the fitness of the issues for judicial decision and the hardship to the parties of withholding court consideration.’”) (citation omitted). All of her claims should therefore be dismissed. B. Ms. Doe’s Claims Fail to the Extent that She Seeks Monetary Damages All of Ms. Doe’s claims also fail as a matter of law insofar as she seeks monetary damages. See Complaint ¶¶ 15-16, 22-23, 28, 34-35, 40-41; Prayer for Relief Requests g-h. Monetary damages are not available to private individuals suing under Title III of the ADA. See 42 U.S.C. § 12188(a); Bowers v. Nat’l Collegiate Athletic Ass’n, 346 F.3d 402, 433 (3d Cir. 2003) (“Title III defendants cannot be liable for money damages.”); Powell v. Nat’l Bd. of Medical Exam’rs, 364 F.3d 79, 86 (2d Cir. 2004) (“Monetary relief … is not available to private individuals under Title III of the ADA.”); Adelman v. ACME Mkts. Corp., 1996 WL 156412, at *2 (E.D. Pa. 1996) (dismissing Title III complaint seeking compensatory and punitive damages, because “Title III … does not authorize a claim by a private individual for money damages”). Monetary damages also are unavailable to private individuals suing entities subject to Title III Case 2:16-cv-03261-NIQA Document 10-1 Filed 04/03/17 Page 8 of 11 28153343.1 -9- under the “coercion” provision in Title IV of the ADA. See 42 U.S.C. § 12203(c) (adopting remedies at 42 U.S.C. § 12188, which are limited to preventive injunctive relief). Therefore, if the Court concludes that it has subject matter jurisdiction over the Complaint, all of Ms. Doe’s claims should nevertheless be dismissed to the extent those claims seek any monetary relief. See Twombly, 550 U.S. at 557. C. Count I of the Complaint Fails to State a Claim In Count I of her complaint, Ms. Doe purports to assert a claim under 42 U.S.C. § 12102(4)(E)(1)(i)(I) of the ADA. Section 12102 is a definitional provision of the ADA. It defines the term “disability” for purposes of this statute. Section 12102(4) sets forth certain rules of construction regarding the definition of disability, and Section 12102(4)(E)(i)(I) (which Ms. Doe specifically cites in her complaint) provides, as one such rule of construction, that “[t]he determination of whether an impairment substantially limits a major life activity shall be made without regard to the ameliorative effects of mitigating measures such as … medication ….” Ms. Doe cannot pursue a claim based on an alleged violation of a definitional provision in the ADA. To the extent that Ms. Doe alleges that she was improperly denied testing accommodations on the LSAT, those claims are encompassed in Counts II and III of her complaint. Moreover, the vague and conclusory statements in her Complaint fail to allege any facts that show how LSAC purportedly violated her rights based on consideration of any “mitigation measures,” such as medication. Count I of the complaint therefore should be dismissed for failure to state a claim. See Iqbal, 556 U.S. at 678; Twombly, 550 U.S. at 557. Case 2:16-cv-03261-NIQA Document 10-1 Filed 04/03/17 Page 9 of 11 28153343.1 -10- D. Count IV of the Complaint Fails to State a Claim In Count IV, Ms. Doe purports to assert a claim under 42 U.S.C. § 12203(b), which makes it “unlawful to coerce, intimidate, threaten, or interfere with any individual in the exercise or enjoyment of, or on account of his or her having exercised or enjoyed, or on account of his or her having aided or encouraged any other individual in the exercise or enjoyment of, any right granted or protected by [the ADA].” See Complaint ¶¶ 37-44. She alleges no facts, however, that would “allow[ ] the court to draw the reasonable inference that the defendant is liable” for violating this provision of the ADA. See Iqbal, 556 U.S. at 678. Indeed, she alleges no facts whatsoever in this Count. She simply asserts, in conclusory fashion, that “LSAC’s policies and practices of requiring unreasonable types and amounts of documentation to support such testing accommodation violates the ADA, by unlawfully coercing, intimidating, threatening, or interfering with Jane Doe’s exercise or enjoyment of her right to reasonable accommodation on the LSAT.” Complaint ¶ 39. As the Supreme Court has made clear, a “pleading that offers ‘labels and conclusions’ or ‘a formulaic recitation of the elements of a cause of action will not do.’” Iqbal, 556 U.S. at 678 (quoting Twombly, 550 U.S. at 555, 557). Count IV should therefore be dismissed for failure to state a claim under 42 U.S.C. § 12203. See, e.g., Ward v. City of Erie Sch. Dist., 2014 WL 546708 (W.D. Pa. 2014) (dismissing pro se plaintiff’s 42 U.S.C. § 12203 claim, among others, under Rule 12(b)(6)); Manuel v. City of Philadelphia, 2010 WL 3566767 (E.D. Pa. 2010) (same). Case 2:16-cv-03261-NIQA Document 10-1 Filed 04/03/17 Page 10 of 11 28153343.1 -11- CONCLUSION Ms. Doe’s Complaint should be dismissed in its entirety for lack of subject matter jurisdiction. In the alternative, and at a minimum, Counts I and IV should be dismissed for failure to state a claim, and all Counts should be dismissed to the extent they seek damages as relief, again for failure to state a claim. Dated: April 3, 2017 OF COUNSEL: Robert A. Burgoyne NORTON ROSE FULBRIGHT US LLP 799 9th St. NW, Suite 1000 Washington, D.C. 20001-4501 Telephone: 202-662-0200 Facsimile: 202-662-4643 robert.burgoyne@nortonrosefulbright.com Respectfully submitted, /s/ Andrea L. D’Ambra Andrea L. D’Ambra Pennsylvania Bar No. 93385 1301 Avenue of the Americas New York, NY 10019-6022 Telephone: 212-318-3000 Facsimile: 212-318-3400 andrea.dambra@nortonrosefulbright.com Case 2:16-cv-03261-NIQA Document 10-1 Filed 04/03/17 Page 11 of 11 Case 2:16-cv-03261-NIQA Document 10-2 Filed 04/03/17 Page 1 of 4 Case 2:16-cv-03261-NIQA Document 10-2 Filed 04/03/17 Page 2 of 4 Case 2:16-cv-03261-NIQA Document 10-2 Filed 04/03/17 Page 3 of 4 Case 2:16-cv-03261-NIQA Document 10-2 Filed 04/03/17 Page 4 of 4 Case 2:16-cv-03261-NIQA Document 10-3 Filed 04/03/17 Page 1 of 5 Case 2:16-cv-03261-NIQA Document 10-3 Filed 04/03/17 Page 2 of 5 Case 2:16-cv-03261-NIQA Document 10-3 Filed 04/03/17 Page 3 of 5 Case 2:16-cv-03261-NIQA Document 10-3 Filed 04/03/17 Page 4 of 5 Case 2:16-cv-03261-NIQA Document 10-3 Filed 04/03/17 Page 5 of 5 Case 2:16-cv-03261-NIQA Document 10-4 Filed 04/03/17 Page 1 of 2 Case 2:16-cv-03261-NIQA Document 10-4 Filed 04/03/17 Page 2 of 2 Case 2:16-cv-03261-NIQA Document 10-5 Filed 04/03/17 Page 1 of 6 Case 2:16-cv-03261-NIQA Document 10-5 Filed 04/03/17 Page 2 of 6 Case 2:16-cv-03261-NIQA Document 10-5 Filed 04/03/17 Page 3 of 6 Case 2:16-cv-03261-NIQA Document 10-5 Filed 04/03/17 Page 4 of 6 Case 2:16-cv-03261-NIQA Document 10-5 Filed 04/03/17 Page 5 of 6 Case 2:16-cv-03261-NIQA Document 10-5 Filed 04/03/17 Page 6 of 6 Case 2:16-cv-03261-NIQA Document 10-6 Filed 04/03/17 Page 1 of 2 Case 2:16-cv-03261-NIQA Document 10-6 Filed 04/03/17 Page 2 of 2 UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT EASTERN DISTRICT OF PENNSYLVANIA __________________________________________ ) JANE DOE, ) ) Plaintiff, ) ) Case No. 2:16-CV-03261 v. ) ) [PROPOSED] ORDER LAW SCHOOL ADMISSION COUNCIL, ) ) Defendant. ) __________________________________________) This matter is before the Court on the motion of Defendant Law School Admission Council (LSAC) pursuant to Fed. R. Civ. P. 12(b)(1) and 12(b)(6) to dismiss this action for lack of subject matter jurisdiction or, in the alternative, for partial dismissal for failure to state a claim. Upon consideration of the parties’ papers and the entire record in this matter, the Court finds that it lacks subject matter jurisdiction in this action, and therefore GRANTS LSAC’s motion to dismiss. Plaintiff’s Complaint is DISMISSED. IT IS SO ORDERED. Dated: ___________________________ _____________________________________ Nitza I. Quiñones Alejandro United States District Judge Case 2:16-cv-03261-NIQA Document 10-7 Filed 04/03/17 Page 1 of 1