Cross MOTION for Summary Judgment Continental Casualty Company's Cross-Motion for Summary Judgment, Opposition to Dillons Post Appeal Motion for Summary Judgment on the 2004 Policy and Memorandum of Points and Authorities in Support Thereof
575 U.S. 175 (2015) Cited 463 times 55 Legal Analyses
Holding in the context of a claim under Section 11 of the Securities Act of 1933 that whether a statement is "misleading" is determined from "the perspective of a reasonable investor"
Holding that a court may discount a "sham" declaration that "flatly contradicts" earlier deposition testimony, and was provided for the sole purpose of creating a genuine issue of material fact
Holding district court can apply sham affidavit rule to "prevent[] a party who has been examined at length on deposition from raising an issue of fact simply by submitting an affidavit contradicting h[er] own prior testimony." (quotations and alterations omitted)
Holding that party's failure "to lay a foundation for any exception to the hearsay rule" required that court ignore hearsay evidence on summary judgment
Holding that "[i]n view of the prevailing approach taken by courts in New Jersey and elsewhere to defining direct loss, in whatever type of policy that term arose, we adopt the conventional proximate cause test as the correct standard to apply when determining whether a loss resulted from the dishonest acts of an employee"
181 Cal.App.3d 532 (Cal. Ct. App. 1986) Cited 121 times
In Royal Globe Ins. Co. v. Whitaker (1986) 181 Cal.App.3d 532, 538, footnote 8 [ 226 Cal.Rptr. 435], the insurer conceded that emotional distress alleged in a complaint for fraud constituted bodily injury within the meaning of the policy.
Reversing grant of summary judgment because genuine issues of material fact remain "[n]ot-withstanding the fact that both sides moved for summary judgment and agreed that summary judgment was appropriate one way or the other"
Fed. R. Evid. 602 Cited 3,527 times 13 Legal Analyses
Stating that " witness may testify only if evidence is introduced sufficient to support a finding that the witness has personal knowledge of the matter"
Providing that “ qualified intermediary is a person who—... (B) Enters into a written agreement with the taxpayer (the ‘exchange agreement’) and, as required by the exchange agreement, acquires the relinquished property from the taxpayer, transfers the relinquished property, acquires the replacement property, and transfers the replacement property to the taxpayer.”