11 Cited authorities

Kronos, Inc. v. AVX Corp.
81 N.Y.2d 90 (N.Y. 1993) Cited 722 times
Holding that plaintiffs' cause of action sounding in tort accrued in 1988 when plaintiff suffered damages, even though breach occurred in 1984
Aetna Life & Casualty Co. v. Nelson
67 N.Y.2d 169 (N.Y. 1986) Cited 197 times
Holding that a claim accrues when "all of the facts necessary to the cause of action have occurred so that the party would be entitled to obtain relief in court"
Flanagan v. Mt. Eden Gen. Hosp
24 N.Y.2d 427 (N.Y. 1969) Cited 225 times
Holding that "[when] a foreign object is left in a patient's body . . . no claim can be made that the patient's action may be feigned or frivolous . . . there is no possible causal break between the negligence of the doctor or hospital and the patient's injury . . . the danger of belated, false or frivolous claims is eliminated"
Blanco v. AT&T Co.
90 N.Y.2d 757 (N.Y. 1997) Cited 73 times
Holding that personal injury claim arising from repetitive stress injuries accrued at the time the plaintiffs began experiencing symptoms, but not at the time they discovered the nature of their injuries
Schmidt v. Merchants Despatch Trans. Co.
270 N.Y. 287 (N.Y. 1936) Cited 379 times
In Schmidt v. Merchants Despatch Transportation Co., 270 N.Y. 287, 200 N.E. 824 (1936), the Court of Appeals affirmed dismissal of an action as time-barred where plaintiff's employment ceased and his exposure to the toxic material ended more than three years before the commencement of the action.
Matter of Higby v. Mahoney
48 N.Y.2d 15 (N.Y. 1979) Cited 81 times
Submitted August 29, 1979 Decided September 4, 1979 Appeal from the Appellate Division of the Supreme Court in the Fourth Judicial Department, FRANK R. BAYGER, J. Richard T. Sullivan and Arthur A. Russ for appellant. T.J. Szymanski, County Attorney (Roger D. Avent of counsel), for respondents. Per Curiam. By this proceeding petitioner seeks to have validated a designating petition filed with the Erie County Board of Elections for the purpose of having his name placed on the official Republican Party
LaBarbera v. New York Eye & Ear Infirmary
91 N.Y.2d 207 (N.Y. 1998) Cited 35 times
In Labarbera v New York Eye and Ear Infirmary, 91 NY2d 207 (1998) the Court of Appeals concluded that a plastic stent placed in plaintiff's nose was not a foreign object.
Fleishman v. Lilly
62 N.Y.2d 888 (N.Y. 1984) Cited 48 times
In Fleishman v Lilly Co. (62 N.Y.2d 888, 890), the Court of Appeals refused to alter the old accrual rule and said, "Any departure from the policies underlying these well-established precedents is a matter for the Legislature and not the courts" (supra, at 890).
Rodriguez v. Medical Group
77 N.Y.2d 217 (N.Y. 1990) Cited 37 times
Holding that "this Court in Flanagan v. Mount Eden Gen. Hosp. recognized a narrow exception . . . in cases where a "foreign object," such as surgical clamps, had accidentally been left inside the patient's body"
Goldsmith v. Howmedica, Inc.
67 N.Y.2d 120 (N.Y. 1986) Cited 40 times
In Goldsmith v Howmedica, Inc. (67 N.Y.2d 120), where a total hip implant broke, plaintiffs did not raise either the foreign object or the continuous treatment exception to the medical malpractice Statute of Limitations (CPLR 214-a).

Marie Dennehy, et al., Respondents,v.Alan B. Copperman, M.D., et al., Appellants.

11 Cited authorities

Holding that plaintiffs' cause of action sounding in tort accrued in 1988 when plaintiff suffered damages, even though breach occurred in 1984

Holding that a claim accrues when "all of the facts necessary to the cause of action have occurred so that the party would be entitled to obtain relief in court"

Holding that personal injury claim arising from repetitive stress injuries accrued at the time the plaintiffs began experiencing symptoms, but not at the time they discovered the nature of their injuries

In Schmidt v. Merchants Despatch Transportation Co., 270 N.Y. 287, 200 N.E. 824 (1936), the Court of Appeals affirmed dismissal of an action as time-barred where plaintiff's employment ceased and his exposure to the toxic material ended more than three years before the commencement of the action.

In Labarbera v New York Eye and Ear Infirmary, 91 NY2d 207 (1998) the Court of Appeals concluded that a plastic stent placed in plaintiff's nose was not a foreign object.

In Fleishman v Lilly Co. (62 N.Y.2d 888, 890), the Court of Appeals refused to alter the old accrual rule and said, "Any departure from the policies underlying these well-established precedents is a matter for the Legislature and not the courts" (supra, at 890).

Holding that "this Court in Flanagan v. Mount Eden Gen. Hosp. recognized a narrow exception . . . in cases where a "foreign object," such as surgical clamps, had accidentally been left inside the patient's body"

In Goldsmith v Howmedica, Inc. (67 N.Y.2d 120), where a total hip implant broke, plaintiffs did not raise either the foreign object or the continuous treatment exception to the medical malpractice Statute of Limitations (CPLR 214-a).