13277.008 3054024v2
JEFFREY G. KNOWLES*
JULIA D. GREER*
DAVID MEHRETU (DM 1747)
COBLENTZ PATCH DUFFY & BASS LLP
One Ferry Building, Suite 200
San Francisco, California 94111-4213
Telephone: 415.391.4800
Facsimile: 415.989.1663
* Admitted Pro Hac Vice
IRA JAY LEVY (IL 2632)
GOODWIN PROCTER, LLP
The New York Times Building
620 Eighth Avenue
New York, New York 10018
Telephone: 212.813.8800
Facsimile: 212.355.3333
Attorneys for Defendant
SPD SWISS PRECISION DIAGNOSTICS GmbH
UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
SOUTHERN DISTRICT OF NEW YORK
CHURCH & DWIGHT CO., INC., a Delaware
corporation,
Plaintiff,
v.
SPD SWISS PRECISION DIAGNOSTICS
GmbH, a Swiss Corporation,
Defendant.
Case No. 14-CV-585 (AJN) (GWG)
MEMORANDUM OF POINTS AND
AUTHORITIES IN SUPPORT OF SPD
SWISS PRECISION DIAGNOSTICS,
GMBH'S MOTION IN LIMINE TO
DISMISS ALL FALSE ADVERTISING
CLAIMS
The Hon. Alison J. Nathan
Trial Date: April 20, 2015
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TABLE OF CONTENTS
Page
INTRODUCTION ...........................................................................................................................1
PROCEDURAL HISTORY.............................................................................................................2
FACTUAL BACKGROUND..........................................................................................................4
I. The Weeks Estimator Product .................................................................................4
II. The Weeks Estimator Is A Medical Device Regulated By The FDA......................4
III. The FDA Applied Enhanced Scrutiny To The Product Labeling Due To Its
Finding Of A Risk Of Off-Label Use By Consumers..............................................5
IV. The FDA Controlled The Labeling And Marketing Of the Weeks
Estimator In Order To Avoid The Risks Forming The Basis For C&D's
Claims. .....................................................................................................................7
V. The FDA's Post-Launch Control of Week Estimator Advertising. .........................9
ARGUMENT.................................................................................................................................11
I. Legal Standard. ......................................................................................................11
II. C&D's False Advertising Claims Are Precluded Because They Challenge
Advertising Expressly Approved By The FDA. ....................................................11
A. The Law Bars Lanham Act Claims That Directly Conflict With
The FDA's Exercise Of Its Statutory Authority. ........................................11
B. The Supreme Court Decision In Pom Wonderful Reaffirmed
Preclusion Of Lanham Act Claims That Directly Conflict With
FDA Action................................................................................................18
III. C&D's False Advertising Claims Are Precluded Because They Seek To
Attack The FDA's Clearance Of The Weeks Estimator.........................................21
A. C&D's Deposition Testimony Made Clear That It Is Not Confining
Its Allegations Of Falsity To Particular Elements Of the
Advertising.................................................................................................22
B. C&D's Experts Opined That The Product Would Be Misleading
Regardless Of How The Product Is Marketed. ..........................................23
C. C&D's Claim Should Be Dismissed As An Effort To Revoke The
FDA's Clearance Of The Product. .............................................................25
CONCLUSION..............................................................................................................................25
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TABLE OF AUTHORITIES
Page(s)
Cases
American Home Products Corp. v. Johnson & Johnson,
672 F. Supp. 135 (S.D.N.Y 1987) ...............................................................................11, 12, 17
Catheter Connections, Inc. v. Ivera Med. Corp.,
No. 2:14-CV-70-TC, 2014 WL 3536573 (D. Utah July 17, 2014)..........................................19
Cytyc Corp. v. Neuromedical Systems, Inc.,
12 F. Supp. 2d 296 (S.D.N.Y. 1998)............................................................................12, 13, 15
Delaney v. Stryker Orthopaedics,
No. CIV.A. 08-03210DMC, 2009 WL 564243 (D.N.J. Mar. 5, 2009)....................................25
Drager v. PLIVA USA, Inc.,
741 F.3d 470 (4th Cir. 2014) ...................................................................................................25
Geier v. American Honda Motor Co.,
529 U.S. 861 (2000).................................................................................................................21
JHP Pharm., LLC v. Hospira, Inc.,
No. CV 13-07460 DDP JEMX, 2014 WL 4988016, at *10 (C.D. Cal. Oct. 7,
2014) ........................................................................................................................................19
Lovejoy-Wilson v. Noco Motor Fuels, Inc.,
242 F. Supp. 2d 236 (W.D.N.Y. 2003) ....................................................................................11
Luce v. United States,
469 U.S. 38 (1984)...................................................................................................................11
POM Wonderful LLC v. Coca-Cola Co.,
134 S. Ct. 2228 (2014)..................................................................................................... passim
Sandoz Pharm. Corp. v. Richardson-Vicks, Inc.,
902 F.2d 222 (3d Cir. 1990).....................................................................................................25
SmithKline Beecham Consumer Healthcare, L.P. v. Johnson & Johnson-Merck
Consumer Pharm. Co.,
No. 01 CIV. 2775 (DAB), 2001 WL 588846 (S.D.N.Y. June 1, 2001) aff'd, 19
F. App'x 17 (2d Cir. 2001).......................................................................................................23
SmithKline Beecham v Johnson & Johnson,
1996 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 7257 (S.D.N.Y May 26, 1996)...........................................................12
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13277.008 3054024v2 iii
United States v. Tokash,
282 F.3d 962 (7th Cir. 2002) ...................................................................................................11
Wright v. Kelly,
No. 95-CV-0688H, 1998 WL 912026 (W.D.N.Y. Oct. 16, 1998) ..........................................11
Statutes & Rules
21 U.S.C § 301 et seq...............................................................................................................22, 25
21 U.S.C. § 321(m)..........................................................................................................................6
21 U.S.C. §§ 332-334 ....................................................................................................................25
21 U.S.C. § 360c(i)(1)(E) ..........................................................................................................6, 12
21 U.S.C. § 360c(i)(1)(E)(ii)(III) ...............................................................................................7, 14
21 U.S.C. § 360c(a), et seq. .............................................................................................................5
21 U.S.C § 372...............................................................................................................................25
Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 12(b)(6) ..............................................................................1, 3, 13
Other Authorities
21 C.F.R. § 10.25(a).......................................................................................................................25
21 C.F.R. § 10.30 ...........................................................................................................................25
21 C.F.R. § 807.81 ...........................................................................................................................5
21 C.F.R. § 807.92 ...........................................................................................................................5
21 C.F.R. § 810.10 et seq...............................................................................................................25
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13277.008 3054024v2 1
INTRODUCTION
Plaintiff Church & Dwight Co., Inc.'s ("C&D") Lanham Act claim should be dismissed
prior to trial. First, the claim challenges advertising that was expressly approved – indeed
mandated – by the U.S. Food & Drug Administration (the "FDA") pursuant to its authority under
the U.S. Food, Drug and Cosmetic Act (the "FDCA"). Second, C&D's theory is untethered to
specific advertising and, instead, seeks to overturn the FDA's clearance of the Clearblue
Advanced Pregnancy Test with Weeks Estimator (the "Week Estimator" or the "Product") for
sale in the United States. The well-established doctrine of FDCA preclusion bars both theories.
Extensive correspondence between SPD Swiss Precision Diagnostics, GmbH ("SPD")
and the FDA, which the Court was unable to consider on SPD's motion to dismiss, shows that the
FDA controlled every element of SPD's packaging and directed the messaging on other
promotional materials. Now that discovery is complete and the Court is no longer subject to the
procedural constraints of Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 12(b)(6), the record establishes that
C&D's challenge directly conflicts with the FDA's conclusion that SPD's marketing materials
will not mislead consumers.
Additionally, discovery has revealed that C&D's theory is not confined to the notion that
certain advertising for the Product is false or misleading: C&D is attacking the Product itself as
inherently misleading and unsafe. In other words, C&D is asking this Court to reverse the FDA
clearance because, according to C&D, the Product is providing inherently misleading
information to consumers. Again, this violates the FDCA's clear delegation of exclusive
authority to the FDA to determine whether a medical device such as the Weeks Estimator may be
sold in the United States.
The Supreme Court's decision in POM Wonderful LLC v. Coca-Cola Co., 134 S. Ct. 2228
(2014), decided after this Court ruled on SPD's motion to dismiss, reaffirmed the principle that
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Lanham Act claims directly conflicting with specific FDA judgments – in particular pre-
approvals of labeling – are barred. A Lanham Act claim constituting a direct assault on the
FDA's exercise of its authority under the FDCA, which is precisely what C&D is attempting
here, is the type of claim that courts continue to bar even after Pom Wonderful.
PROCEDURAL HISTORY
C&D's complaint, filed in January 2014, challenged the advertising for the Weeks
Estimator as unlawful because the advertising allegedly violated marketing restrictions imposed
by the FDA. (Dkts. 2 and 93 at 17.) On February 11, 2014, C&D filed a motion for a
preliminary injunction on the same theory. (Dkt. 20.)
In opposing the preliminary injunction application, SPD proffered detailed evidence,
including extensive correspondence between the FDA and SPD leading up to clearance of the
Product, showing that the FDA invoked special statutory authority to control SPD's packaging
and marketing materials and, after exhaustive review, ultimately approved it. (Dkt. 86.) This
review and approval process included imposition of mandatory disclosures the FDA considered
adequate to address risks that are a centerpiece of C&D's claims. SPD urged the Court to deny
C&D's motion under the doctrine of FDCA preclusion: when a Lanham Act claim invites a
court to usurp the authority of the FDA under the FDCA, the claim is barred.
SPD contemporaneously moved to dismiss the complaint under Rule12(b)(6) on the same
ground. (Dtk. 59.) SPD requested judicial notice of much of the correspondence submitted in
opposition to the preliminary injunction. (Dkt. 60.)
At the initial pretrial conference on April 4, 2014, the Court proposed to address first the
FDA issue raised in both the preliminary injunction papers and the motion to dismiss, followed
quickly – if necessary – by a trial on the merits. (Dkt. 42.) C&D repeatedly resisted that
proposal, making clear it sought to avoid the Court's early consideration of the FDA
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correspondence extrinsic to the complaint. (Knowles Decl., ¶ 8, Ex. G, p.1.)
Oral argument on both motions was held on May 22, 2014. (Dkt. 94.) There, C&D took
the position that the preliminary injunction motion was no longer at issue (and thus the Court
should not consider the extrinsic evidence submitted in opposition to that motion). (See Dkt. 93
["MTD Order"] at 30.) C&D also vigorously opposed SPD's request for judicial notice.
On June 3, 2014, the Court issued its opinion and order on the two motions, denying the
motion to dismiss and declining to reach the arguments raised in the preliminary injunction
briefing. (MTD Order.) The Court's decision not to reach the FDA issue in the context of the
preliminary injunction motion was based, in part, on the pendency of the Pom Wonderful
decision and, in part, on C&D's effective withdrawal of that motion at the hearing. (MTD Order
at 30.) Pursuant to Rule 12(b)(6), the Court declined to take judicial notice of the FDA record
submitted by SPD, and so did not consider that information in deciding the motion to dismiss.
Based on the limited record of C&D's allegations, the Court was not able to conclude that
the cases barring Lanham Act claims due to an "actual conflict" with FDA decision-making were
dispositive. The Court explained that "the regulatory scheme governing the Weeks Estimator
does not – in itself – provide a basis to conclude that he Weeks Estimator box, label or
advertising has been authorized by the FDA."1 [MTD Order at 21-22.] Similarly, "viewed in the
light most favorable to C&D, the Clearance Letter – standing alone – does not demonstrate that
the FDA has reviewed the Weeks Estimator box and labeling actually sold by SPD and
determined it will not mislead consumers as to the capabilities of the Weeks Estimator." (Order
at 23.) The Court concluded by stating:
In sum, and recognizing that this is a doctrine that does not lend
1 Unless otherwise indicated, all emphasis is added.
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itself to a simple application, the Court concludes that the
materials before the Court do not, as this time, warrant preclusion
of C&D's claims. The Court notes, however, that the questions
raised by this doctrine are often fact-intensive, and are frequently
resolved after the pleadings stage. As a result, it may be that SPD
is able to re-raise this argument at a later stage, if appropriate
given the development of the proceedings.
(MTD Order at 25 (citations omitted).)
FACTUAL BACKGROUND
I. The Weeks Estimator Product
The Weeks Estimator is a unique, scientifically advanced, and well-established product.
It has been launched in nearly 30 countries since July 2008 when it was first put on the market in
the UK and Ireland. (Dtk. 90 [Declaration of Mark Gittins ("Gittins Decl.")], ¶ 7.) The Weeks
Estimator differs from other home pregnancy tests in that, in addition to indicating whether or
not a woman is pregnant, a woman who obtains a “pregnant” result will receive an estimate of
how many weeks have passed since she ovulated (when an egg was released from her ovary). As
fertilization occurs less than 24 hours of ovulation, the estimate of weeks since ovulation
provides an estimate of when pregnancy started. The test's estimate is based on the level of
human chorionic gonadotropin ("hCG"), sometimes called the “pregnancy hormone,” in a
woman's urine. Levels of urinary hCG rise very quickly in early pregnancy, and reach
predictable levels at various stages. The test measures the hCG in the pregnant woman’s urine,
and depending on the level, digitally displays a result in the product window. When the result is
positive, the display reads "Pregnant" and, below that, estimates weeks: “1-2,” “2-3,” or “3+”
weeks. (Gittins Decl., ¶¶8-13.)
II. The Weeks Estimator Is A Medical Device Regulated By The FDA.
The FDCA, as amended by the Medical Devices Amendments of 1976, separates medical
devices into three categories for purposes of the level of regulatory scrutiny they receive. "Class
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I" devices present "no unreasonable risk of illness or injury" and therefore are subject to minimal
regulation. "Class II" devices present greater potential risk of harm and are therefore subject to
somewhat greater regulatory scrutiny. See generally, 21 U.S.C. § 360c(a), et seq.
Home pregnancy tests, such as the Weeks Estimator, are considered Class II medical
devices. (Gittins Decl., ¶ 21.) The FDA does not permit a new home pregnancy test to be
marketed unless the manufacturer has received clearance by the agency for the product to be
marketed for a particular "intended use." (Id. at ¶ 18.) The review process for a new home
pregnancy test product is commenced by the filing of a "premarket notification" submission to
the FDA (known as a 510(k) application). 21 C.F.R. § 807.81. The 510(k) application provides
a description of the new device, and a description of the intended use of the product, including "a
general description of the diseases or conditions that the device will diagnose, treat, prevent,
cure, or mitigate, including a description, where appropriate, of the patient population for which
the device is intended." 21 C.F.R. § 807.92.
The 510(k) application is intended to demonstrate to the FDA that the device is at least as
safe and effective as – i.e., "substantially equivalent" or "SE" to – a legally marketed predicate
device. 21 C.F.R. § 807.92. Before marketing a Class II device, the submitter must receive a
letter from the FDA that finds it to be substantially equivalent, and states that the device can now
be marketed in the US. This "clears" the device for commercial distribution, and so is generally
referred to as a "clearance letter" or "SE letter." (Gittins Decl., ¶ 19.) On December 10, 2012,
SPD received a clearance letter following submission of a 510(k) for the Weeks Estimator.
(Gittins Decl, ¶ 37, Ex. K [the FDA's December 10, 2012 Clearance Letter (the "Clearance
Letter")].)
III. The FDA Applied Enhanced Scrutiny To The Product Labeling Due To Its Finding
Of A Risk Of Off-Label Use By Consumers.
In the course of the FDA's review of the Product, the FDA's Office of In Vitro
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Diagnostics and Radiological Health ("OIVD") identified a concern about the Weeks Estimator
feature of the Product: that women could misinterpret its results and/or use the Product for
unintended purposes, with potentially adverse health consequences. (See Clearance Letter, p.1.)
It therefore invoked Section 513(i)(1)(E) of the FDCA, a statutory procedure under which the
FDA evaluates a new Class II medical device with heightened scrutiny and imposes marketing
limitations to address any identified risks of harm. Any resulting clearance is known as an "SE
(substantial equivalence) with limitations." (Gittins Decl. ¶¶ 23-26 & Ex. B.)
When section 513(i)(1)(E) is invoked, the Director of the FDA division primarily
responsible for the clearance of the product (in this case the Director of OIVD) has additional
power – and the obligation – to control the labeling and other advertising for the product for the
purpose of avoiding the identified risks.2 21 U.S.C. §360c(i)(1)(E).
Here, the FDA invoked Section 513(i)(1)(E) in what is known as a "hold letter." (Gittins
Decl., ¶ 22, Ex. A [the "Hold Letter"].) The September 12, 2012 Hold Letter notified SPD that
the FDA would place the 510(k) submission for the Weeks Estimator on hold pending receipt of
certain additional information, and directed SPD to submit updated proposed labeling containing
a revised “Indications for Use” (“IFU”) statement. (Id.)
The Hold Letter specified the FDA's concerns, which paralleled the risks later asserted in
C&D's Complaint. (Id.) The FDA noted that the Weeks Estimator result "is not aligned with
gestational aging done by healthcare professionals (i.e., it will under-estimate gestational age by
an average of 2 weeks)." (Id.) In particular, the FDA's concern was that users may:
misinterpret weeks results to be a substitution for gestational age
2The term "labeling" under the FDCA means all labels and other written, printed, or graphic
matter (1) upon any article or any of its containers or wrappers, or (2) accompanying such article.
21 U.S.C. § 321(m).
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determination or may misinterpret weeks results to mean they are
pregnant and their pregnancy is progressing in a healthy manner
(e.g., because they are moving from 1-2 weeks to 2-3 weeks to 3+
weeks according to device results). These misinterpretations may
cause the user to delay or forego necessary care by a healthcare
professional. For example, uses may not recognize symptoms of
ectopic pregnancy because of improper assumptions based on this
device output and may not seek appropriate medical care.
(Id.) The FDA was clear about how its concerns over harm from user misinterpretation of the
Weeks Estimator results should be resolved: it concluded that "[d]elay in appropriate care in
these situations is a harmful health impact that may be prevented given adequate device
labeling." (Id.; Gittins Decl. ¶ 23.) If the FDA had not determined that the risks could be
prevented with labeling, it would not have been permitted to clear the product, even “with
limitations.” 21 U.S.C. §360c(i)(1)(E)(ii)(III).
IV. The FDA Controlled The Labeling And Marketing Of the Weeks Estimator In
Order To Avoid The Risks Forming The Basis For C&D's Claims.
After invoking the SE with limitations process, the FDA and SPD engaged in weeks of
detailed dialogue about the limitations and disclosures to be required for the Weeks Estimator.
(Gittins Decl., ¶¶ 28-37, Exs. C-K.) The review was comprehensive. In the Hold Letter itself,
the FDA communicated the following to SPD about the box labeling alone:
"The front panel of your box labeling states 'Also Tells you How Far Along you
Are.' Please remove this statement from every area of your box labeling."
"You have provided some information regarding the accuracy of your 'Results 5
Days Sooner' claim, but this information is in small font towards the bottom
portions of your box labeling and is difficult to read. Please more prominently
place this information on your outer box labeling."
"Please remove the '99% accurate for pregnant or not pregnant result'
statements from your box labeling. This statement is misleading as it does not
capture the accuracy of the entire test (including the weeks estimator feature
which is significantly lower). Accuracy of the pregnant or not pregnant result
should also be removed from your package insert."
"We have noticed that a statement describing the minimum accuracy of the weeks
estimation indicator has been added to your box labeling. Please remove this
information from your box labeling. Accuracy of the weeks estimation
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indicator may be included in the package insert."
"You have included (4) steps on your box labeling:
1. Easy
2. Accurate
3. Clear
4. Tells you how far along you are
Please remove these steps from your box labeling and instead add a statement
referring the user to the package insert for test instructions and for more
information on the weeks [estimator] feature."
(Hold Letter.)
The Hold Letter also mandated that the packaging (inside and out), as well as all
"promotional materials," contain an FDA-crafted "Indications for Use" statement ("IFU") that
explained to consumers that the Product provides an estimate different from the one a doctor
might provide. The IFU provides additional information as well, all of which is aimed at
avoiding consumer confusion about the Product results or how the Product should be used.
(Gittins Decl., ¶ 30, Ex. D.)
Over the course of the next several months, the FDA controlled everything from font size
to where certain language should be placed on the box and on the package insert. (See, e.g.,
Gittins Decl., ¶ 30, Ex. D ("We found it difficult to read blue font on a blue background and
consumers may find this difficult as well.").) The FDA review even controlled the name of the
Product. The Hold Letter directed that the new name should include the phrase "Weeks
Estimation Indicator." On October 2, 2012, SPD submitted responses to various FDA
requirements and requested leave to replace "Weeks Estimation Indicator" with "Weeks
Estimator." The FDA responded to SPD's proposed labeling on October 18, 2012, accepting
SPD's suggestion regarding the product name, but not other proposed changes. (Gittins Decl, ¶¶
29-30.) This extensive process not only makes clear that the FDA comprehensively controlled
the Product packaging, but that it did so with the express intent to ensure that it would not
mislead consumers with respect to the Weeks Estimator function of the Product. (Hold Letter;
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see Gittins Decl., ¶¶ 28-37, Exs. C-K.)
On November 20, 2012, SPD sent a final version of proposed labeling to the FDA. (Id. at
¶ 33, Ex. G.) On November 27, 2012, the FDA sent an approval email to SPD stating that the
labeling "appears to meet our requests." (Id. at ¶ 34, Exh. I.) On December 10, 2012, the FDA
issued its Clearance Letter, an SE With Limitations, clearing SPD to begin marketing the Weeks
Estimator. The Clearance Letter included a series of limitations on the Product's box and the
package insert (as well as other marketing materials) that were the result of the months-long
scrutiny of the label. (Clearance Letter, pp.1, 3.)
V. The FDA's Post-Launch Control of Week Estimator Advertising.
On October 10, 2013, C&D wrote to the FDA asking it to take "corrective action" against
SPD for having purportedly "violate[d] the labeling restrictions imposed in the Clearance Letter."
(Declaration of Jeffery Knowles ["Knowles Decl."], ¶ 2, Ex. A.) In that letter brief and a second
one on November 1, 2013, C&D attacked the same advertising it attacks here, on the same
theory. (Knowles Decl., ¶ 3, Ex. B at CD0000002, CD0000004, Ex. B at CD0000037 &
CD0000038.)
The FDA investigated C&D’s allegations, notifying SPD in November 2013 of its
intention to evaluate SPD's advertising, thus beginning the post-launch discussions detailed
below. (Gittins Decl., ¶ 43, Exh. M.) Although the FDA had authority to order SPD to stop
marketing the Product, to impose monetary penalties or simply to find officially that the
challenged advertising was misleading, it did none of those things. (Gittins Decl., ¶ 53.)
FDA's first step was to arrange a teleconference "to communicate our concerns and
receive further clarifications." (Gittins Decl., ¶ 43, Ex. M.) Not surprisingly, given the origin of
the inquiry, the concerns the FDA expressed paralleled certain aspects of the challenges C&D
advances in its complaint. (Id.) With respect to the Product carton, the FDA expressed concern
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13277.008 3054024v2 10
about the insertion of the word "weeks" in the depicted display window and required that it be
removed and replaced with the words "weeks along" outside the window – emphasizing that it
had approved the latter phrase in the clearance process. (Id. at ¶ 47, Ex. O, Attch. 1.) Notably,
the stated basis of the FDA's concern about the use of the word "weeks" inside the display
window was not that it conveyed a false message about the estimate but that the Product window
itself does not literally display the word "weeks" when it returns a positive result. That is, the
readout on the package did not accurately reflect the form of readout on the test sticks. (Id. at p.3
of 4.)
On November 22, 2013, SPD submitted an overall mitigation plan and drafts of
packaging that removed the word "weeks" from the display windows and replaced it with the
words "weeks along" beneath the display windows as originally approved by the FDA. (Id. at ¶
54, Ex. O, Attch. 2.) Except to request a revision to the font size of the phrase "weeks along,"
and to request an asterisk directing consumers to the IFU on the side of the pack, the FDA
approved the packaging. (Id. at ¶ 56, Ex. Q.) The packaging approved by the FDA after the
product launched is the same packaging currently in use.3 C&D is challenging the current carton
as false and misleading advertising as well. (Dkt. 140, p.23.)
The FDA also approved a video advertisement substantially similar to the Weeks
Estimator television commercial challenged by C&D. In December 2013, SPD submitted a
storyboard for an internet only version of the television commercial for FDA's review. (Gittins
Decl., ¶ 65, Ex. V.) The FDA approved the new commercial for internet use with only minor
changes. (Id. at ¶ 66, Ex. W.)
3 Notably, SPD offered to add a banner to each of the main panel's prominently displaying the
claim "Only Test To Estimate Weeks Since Ovulation." The FDA approved this banner claim.
(Gittins Decl., ¶ 54.)
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13277.008 3054024v2 11
ARGUMENT
I. Legal Standard.
The Court has inherent power to grant a motion in limine to preclude evidence or dismiss
claims, where preclusion or dismissal will serve to narrow the issues necessary to be tried. Luce
v. United States, 469 U.S. 38, 41, 105 (1984); Lovejoy-Wilson v. Noco Motor Fuels, Inc., 242 F.
Supp. 2d 236, 244 (W.D.N.Y. 2003) (considering evidence outside of the pleadings in ruling on
an in limine motion); Wright v. Kelly, No. 95-CV-0688H, 1998 WL 912026, at *2 (W.D.N.Y.
Oct. 16, 1998) (granting motion in limine to dismiss claims that were not legally cognizable);
United States v. Tokash, 282 F.3d 962, 968 (7th Cir. 2002).
II. C&D's False Advertising Claims Are Precluded Because They Challenge
Advertising Expressly Approved By The FDA.
A. The Law Bars Lanham Act Claims That Directly Conflict With The FDA's
Exercise Of Its Statutory Authority.
In the course of extensively considering the body of law addressed to the doctrine of
FDCA preclusion, the Court's MTD Order succinctly articulated the essence of the concept:
"courts refuse to usurp the FDA's role in the enforcement of the FDCA and the FDA's authority
under that statute." (See MTD Order at 14.) While the Court correctly observed that the cases
present "an array of diverse fact patterns," the clearest examples of when preclusion must apply
are when the claim being asserted directly conflicts with a fact-specific approval granted by the
FDA in the exercise of its exclusive authority under the FDCA.
This Court has precluded claims on just this ground more than once. For example, in
American Home Products Corp. v. Johnson & Johnson, 672 F. Supp. 135, 145 (S.D.N.Y 1987),
McNeilab, the maker of Tylenol, claimed that American Home Products, the maker of Anacin
and Advil, engaged in false advertising under the Lanham Act. The FDA had mandated that the
packaging for Anacin contain a warning concerning the serious and even fatal risks of Reye
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Syndrome from giving Anacin to children and teenagers to treat symptoms of influenza and
chicken pox. Id. The labeling on packaging for Anacin, however, contained the word "SAFE"
in prominent letters on the front of the package with the FDA-required warning regarding the
risks of Reye Syndrome relegated to the "fine print" on the back. Granting American Home
Products' motion for summary judgment, the court explained:
It is true that the [Reye Syndrome] warning is buried in the fine
print on the back of the Anacin package, while the front bears in
large block letters the legend "SAFE, FAST PAIN RELIEF." This
obviously creates the possibility that Anacin could be administered
to a child or teenager with flu or chicken pox by a parent who
perceived only a message of safety without being alerted to the
danger, or taken by such a youngster on his or her own initiative
without any suspicion of hazard. The consequences of such a
mistake may be serious or even fatal. But this is a problem to be
addressed by the FDA and not by the courts in a Lanham Act
suit. Indeed, it is a problem which the FDA has already addressed,
when it specifically approved the Anacin label in its entirety.
American Home, 672 F. Supp. at 145 (all emphasis added).4
The teaching of American Home Products is that a competitor is precluded from
challenging the sufficiency of a product's label and marketing claims when the FDA has already
approved those claims fully cognizant the risk of potential harm resulting from consumer
misunderstanding about the label warnings and performance of the product.5
A second example is Cytyc Corp. v. Neuromedical Systems, Inc., 12 F. Supp. 2d 296
4 C&D may argue that some these cases are inapposite because they involve pharmaceuticals,
over which FDA usually has more power to regulate specific advertising language than over
medical devices. But in this case, FDA was issuing an SE with limitations, which, pursuant to
21 U.S.C. §360c(i)(1)(E), gives FDA not just the right but the obligation to dictate advertising
language protective of consumers. These cases are therefore directly on point.
5 See also SmithKline Beecham v Johnson & Johnson, 1996 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 7257, *21 n.10,
*41 (S.D.N.Y May 26, 1996) (court suggested that it would not substitute its "discretion for that
of the FDA in approving package labeling for over-the-counter medications" by second-guessing
the accuracy of those labels).
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13277.008 3054024v2 13
(S.D.N.Y. 1998). There, the plaintiff claimed that various statements made by Cytyc Corporation
about an alternative cervical cancer detection system it manufactured and marketed called
ThinPrep were factually false or misleading under the Lanham Act. This Court dismissed the
claims under Rule 12(b)(6) finding that "[m]any of Cytyc's statements that NSI's claims are false
or misleading are, in fact, consistent with the substantive claims approved by the FDA." Id. at
301. The Court held that because the challenged statements had been approved by the FDA, they
were "non-actionable." The Court went on the conclude that even though some of the
"statements do not correspond precisely to statements that the FDA has approved, the challenged
statements . . . are similar enough to the approved statements for the Court to conclude, as a
matter of law, that they are neither false nor misleading." Id. In sum, the Court held that
"[w]hatever the merits of NSI's contentions regarding purported deficiencies in the testing and
development of ThinPrep, representations by Cytyc that comport substantively with statements
approved as accurate by the FDA cannot supply the basis for NSI's claims." Id.
In the MTD Order, the Court acknowledged this line of "actual conflict" cases, but
concluded they did not control at the pleading stage of proceedings because:
[N]o such conflict is apparent from the current record.
Specifically, viewed in the light most favorable to C&D, the
Clearance Letter – standing alone – does not demonstrate that the
FDA has reviewed the Weeks Estimator box and labeling actually
sold by SPD and determined it will not mislead consumers as to
the capabilities of the Weeks Estimator . . . . In short, the Court
simply cannot determine, at this stage, the precise nature of any
conclusions the FDA may have made as to the Weeks Estimator.
(MTD Order, p.23.)
Now, of course, the Court may consider a full record, including the detailed
correspondence leading up to the Clearance Letter. The exhaustive review process under Section
513(i)(1)(E) shows not only that the FDA controlled every element of the Product packaging, but
that it did so with the express intent to ensure that consumer would not be misled about the
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13277.008 3054024v2 14
Weeks Estimator results. (See, e.g., Hold Letter ("We have concerns that users misinterpret the
weeks results to be a substitution for gestational age determination or may misinterpret weeks
results to mean they are pregnant and their pregnancy is progressing in a healthy manner……
Therefore, in accordance with Section 513(i)(1)(E) of the Act, the following limitations must
appear in the Indications for Use and in your device's labeling if your device is cleared.").) As a
matter of law, those steps necessarily mean that FDA concluded that these marketing
requirements were sufficient to prevent consumers from being confused and thereby harmed. 21
U.S.C. §360c(i)(1)(E)(ii)(III).
C&D will no doubt argue, as it has in the past, that the FDA's initial approval of the
packaging should be disregarded due to small deviations in the packaging actually launched from
the final version submitted to the FDA. But subsequent events debunk this contention. As
noted, there were two small changes in the launch packaging relative to the final iteration
provided to the FDA: (a) four readout window instead of two; and (b) replacement of the words
"weeks along" just outside the windows with "weeks" inside the windows.
When the FDA approached C&D in November 2013, it objected to placement of the
word "weeks" in the windows. As explained, however, this was not because it misled consumers
about what the estimate means, but because the Product readout itself does not contain such a
word. Ultimately, the FDA approved the use of all four windows, required removal of "weeks"
from the "Pregnant" windows and directed SPD to replace the words "weeks along" immediately
above these windows. Clearly, there is no reason to believe that the message communicated by
"weeks along" adjacent to the readout window is materially different from the presence of the
word "weeks" inside the readout window. Certainly C&D has made no attempt to show that the
difference between the launch packaging and the approved packaging has any impact whatsoever
on consumer perception of the Weeks Estimator's capabilities. Under these circumstances,
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13277.008 3054024v2 15
C&D's challenge to the launch package and the current package are barred. See Cytyc, 12 F.
Supp. 2d at 301 (statements that did not "correspond precisely to statements that the FDA has
approved" were still non-actionable where they were "similar enough to the approved
statements") .
In its MTD Order, the Court acknowledged that "the potential for conflict between the
FDA's views and a hypothetical judgment for C&D in this case exists, particularly given the
Clearance Letter's directive that 'performance of the Weeks Estimator should not be displayed on
your box labeling,'" but the Court noted that "this statement is ambiguous." The Court observed
that this directive "could mean many things including a directive that SPD remove specific
product claims that it had made in the proposed labeling." (MTD Order, p.24.)
Now that the full record is available, any ambiguity about this directive is removed. On
August 13, 2012, SPD submitted to the FDA a proposed carton for the Weeks Estimator that had
the following side panel:
(Declaration of Sarah Johnson ["Johnson Decl."], ¶¶ 3-4, Exs. A & B.) Thus, SPD
proposed to include information about the "performance" of the weeks estimator feature on the
outside of the box.6
6 In addition to the Clearance Letter itself, which sets forth a table by which "Weeks Estimator
performance" is to be presented, subsequent correspondence confirms that the FDA's references
to the "performance" of the Product refer to the comparison of the Weeks Estimator's results with
the estimates based on LMP. For example, on November 13, 2012, SPD proposed to include a
row in that table showing the level of agreement between the Weeks Estimator results and the
(footnote continued)
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13277.008 3054024v2 16
In the Hold Letter a few weeks later, the FDA observed that this panel included accuracy
information for the weeks estimator feature and directed SPD to "remove this information from
your box labeling. . . . Accuracy of the weeks estimation indicator may be included in the
package insert." (Hold Letter) SPD understood the FDA to be requiring removal of all of the
side panel information on Product performance, because claims about what the estimate means
without stating accuracy levels could mislead consumers into believing the Weeks Estimator
feature is 100% accurate. (Johnson Decl., ¶ 6.) SPD resubmitted the proposed carton to the
FDA and informed the FDA that the information had been deleted. (Gittins Decl., Ex. C at 3,
10-11.) After the FDA reviewed several more iterations of the label, during which it addressed
how Product "performance" should be described and displayed in the insert, the FDA included
among its label "limitations" the requirement that "Performance of the Weeks Estimator should
not be displayed on your box labeling." (Clearance Letter, p.1.)
In short, after SPD proposed to place information about the relationship between the
Product estimate and a doctor's estimate on the outside of the package, the FDA forbid such
placement. For C&D to contend now that this mandate is misleading to consumer is to attack the
FDA's explicit exercise of its judgment under the FDCA.
In the MTD Order, the Court also observed that "it may be that the box – even if
approved by the FDA when taken in conjunction with the package insert – is misleading to the
consumer at the time of purchase due to the unavailability of the package insert at that time."
(MTD Order, at 24.) In addition to the fact that the FDA mandated what information would go
time of ovulation based on established methods. (See Gittins Decl., Ex. G at 1.) The FDA
responded: "We do not agree with your proposal to include a 'How the Weeks Estimator agrees
with time since ovulation' row to the Weeks Estimator performance table in your labeling." (Id.)
The FDA directed SPD to remove that row, which SPD did. (Id.)
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13277.008 3054024v2 17
on the outside of the box and what information would go inside, the record is devoid of evidence
suggesting that consumers' buying decision is in any way influenced by the placement of some
information on the inside of the package rather than the outside. While C&D has speculated
several times about whether this could cause consumers to be misled – and there are methods
well known to C&D and to its experts to determine whether that speculation has any basis in fact
– C&D made no effort whatsoever to make such a showing. 7 This simply cannot be a reason to
overturn the FDA's considered determinations on this subject.
In short, on the full record, all doubt about the level of FDA control over the Weeks
Estimator marketing has been eliminated. That involvement was so extensive as to constitute
full control of the packaging even before its release. The involvement continued after launch,
when the FDA evaluated C&D's allegations. Rather than draw the conclusions C&D is now
asking this Court to draw – that the Product packaging, even after the small changes required by
the FDA, continues to mislead consumers – the FDA reached the opposite conclusion: that the
packaging is not likely to mislead consumers and thereby put them at risk.
C&D's claims are a naked attempt to challenge the FDA's determination that the Weeks
Estimator product labeling is not misleading. Just as it did in American Home Products, the
Court should reject this effort. American Home, 672 F. Supp. at 145(claim barred on preclusion
grounds because the FDA had pre-approved the Anacin label fully cognizant of the specific risks
of consumer confusion raised in McNeil's claims). A clearer case of "actual conflict" with a
7 This failure of proof also addresses the Court's footnoted observation that the difference
between interior and exterior disclosures highlights the differing purposes of the FDCA and the
Lanham Act: preservation of consumer safety vs. promotion of fair competition. That is, if there
is no evidence that buyers are influenced whether to purchase the Product by the presence or
absence of certain information on the outside of the package, this is not a factor bearing on
competition.
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13277.008 3054024v2 18
specific FDA judgment, exercised pursuant to express FDCA authority, is difficult to imagine.
B. The Supreme Court Decision In Pom Wonderful Reaffirmed Preclusion Of
Lanham Act Claims That Directly Conflict With FDA Action.
The Supreme Court's decision in POM Wonderful LLC v. Coca-Cola Co., 134 S. Ct. 2228
(2014), which this Court anticipated may provide guidance here, did nothing to erode the "actual
conflict" line of cases. To the contrary, the decision lends additional support to the long-standing
proposition that a Lanham Act claim that directly undermines the FDA's exercise of its statutory
authority is precluded.
At the threshold, it is important to recognize that the issue the Court addressed in Pom
Wonderful did not involve a claim in direct conflict with FDA review and approval of specific
labeling. Rather it was concerned with the effect of general regulations: "This Court granted
certiorari to consider whether a private party may bring a Lanham Act claim challenging a food
label that is regulated by the FDCA." Id. at 2236 The Court held that the FDCA does not
preclude a Lanham Act claim challenging the truth of food and beverage labeling merely because
the FDA has promulgated regulations that touch upon such labeling. Id. at 2241.
Here, of course, SPD is not contending that C&D's claims are barred merely because the
FDA regulates medical devices such as the Weeks Estimator. To the contrary, SPD's position
rests on the FDA's exhaustive review and advance approval of the specific labeling for the
Weeks Estimator product, under explicit statutory authority, a process that included mandatory
disclosures and other detailed limitations on marketing that C&D's action would necessarily
overturn.
The Pom Wonderful Court opinion emphasizes that it was not facing such a case:
Unlike other types of labels regulated by the FDA, such as drug
labels, see 21 U.S.C. § 355(d), it would appear the FDA does not
preapprove food and beverage labels under its regulations and
instead relies on enforcement actions, warning letters, and other
measures.
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Id. at 2239 (citations omitted)
Cases subsequent to the Supreme Court's decision in Pom Wonderful have recognized it
did not do away with the doctrine of FDCA preclusion. See JHP Pharm., LLC v. Hospira, Inc.,
No. CV 13-07460 DDP JEMX, 2014 WL 4988016, at *10 (C.D. Cal. Oct. 7, 2014) (passage
quoted above "suggests that, at a minimum, the Court might find a Lanham Act claim precluded
by the FDCA where it turns on the content of a drug label, especially if that drug lable were pre-
approved by the FDA"); Catheter Connections, Inc. v. Ivera Med. Corp., No. 2:14-CV-70-TC,
2014 WL 3536573, at *5 (D. Utah July 17, 2014) (distinguishing Pom Wonderful in precluding
claim for false advertising on the ground that the challenged medical device required 510(k)
clearance ).
With respect to the Court's rationale that preclusion based on general regulation alone
could cause "the FDCA's protection of health and safety to result in less policing of misleading
food and beverage labels than in competitive markets for other products," id. at 2239, this case is
an excellent example of where such a concern does not exist. Here, not only did the FDA invoke
a special statutory procedure empowering and obligating the agency to review and pre-approve
the specific labeling at issue (a duty it then discharged very thoroughly), the FDA again invoked
that authority after clearance to enforce the limitations it imposed prior to clearance.
No doubt C&D will point to the passage of the Pom Wonderful opinion where the Court
addressed the Government's contention that preclusion should apply when FDA regulations
"specifically requir[ed] or authoriz[ed]" certain elements of the labeling – such as the name of
the product. But the reasons given by the Court for rejecting this argument are inapplicable here.
First, the Court expressed "practical concerns about drawing a distinction between regulations
that 'specifically authorize' a course of conduct and those that that merely tolerate that course . . .
." Here, no such concern exists: this case does not center on a regulation of general application
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13277.008 3054024v2 20
but on the FDA approval of the specific labeling for this Product. Moreover, it could not be
clearer from the correspondence that FDA controlled every element of the Product packaging.
There is simply no doubt that this label was not only specifically authorized; the FDA mandated
disclosures and limitations in all respects material to this lawsuit.
This also distinguishes the second basis for the Pom Wonderful Court's rejection of the
Government's position: the Government's assumption that the FDCA and its regulations are "a
ceiling on the regulation of food and beverage labeling." Id. at 2232. In addition to observing
that the Lanham Act and the FDCA were intended to "complement each other with respect to
food and beverage labeling," the Court emphasized that "the FDA explicitly encouraged
manufacturers to include material on their labels that is not required by the regulations." Id. at
2240. That is, the record reflected that the FDA itself did not consider its regulations a "ceiling."
Here, the opposite is true. The approval process itself made clear that the FDA would
accept no material deviation from the packaging that it pre-approved. Indeed, within a week of
receiving the Hold Letter, SPD inquired about the process. In response to SPD's inquiry about
whether it would have input on labeling limitations, the FDA said "[c]omments will be
considered; however FDA makes final determinations of labeling requirements for SE with
limitations decisions."8 (Gittins Decl., Ex. D at 7.) With respect to SPD's question about
whether future labeling changes were subject to the same criteria as a change under an SE
without limitations, FDA said: "No, the same criteria do not apply. Following a SE with
limitations decision, sponsors must submit a new 510(k) in order to make changes to the
8 Indeed, after several drafts of proposed labeling had passed between SPD and the FDA, FDA
rejected certain SPD proposals and said: "This is our final decision regarding presentation of
Weeks Estimator performance in your labeling. Please note that FDA makes final
determinations of labeling requirements for SE with limitations decisions." (Gittins Decl. Ex. G.)
Case 1:14-cv-00585-AJN Document 224 Filed 02/09/15 Page 24 of 30
13277.008 3054024v2 21
limitation labeling (and relevant material)." (Id.) Moreover, the post-clearance inquiry C&D
instigated eliminates any doubt on this point: FDA mandated that minor deviations from the
approved packaging be changed. FDA could not be clearer that its action represents a floor and
a ceiling when it comes to the labeling of this product.9
Finally, in rejecting the Government's position, the Court distinguished Geier v.
American Honda Motor Co., 529 U.S. 861 (2000) because there, the Court barred a private
lawsuit "because it directly conflicted with [a federal] agency's policy choice . . . ." Id. at 2241.
In contrast, "FDA has not made a policy judgment that is inconsistent with POM's Lanham Act
suit. . . . This is not a case where a lawsuit is undermining an agency judgment . . . ." Id.
Here, of course, FDA has made a policy judgment directly contradictory to C&D's
claims: that the Product packaging will not mislead consumers about what the Product does.
Any judgment in C&D's favor will necessarily undermine that agency determination, made
pursuant to express authority under the FDCA.
In sum, Pom Wonderful did not erode the principle that a Lanham Act claim that directly
conflicts with FDA's determinations are barred. Rather, it reaffirmed that principle in the
explicit distinctions it drew.
III. C&D's False Advertising Claims Are Precluded Because They Seek To Attack The
FDA's Clearance Of The Weeks Estimator.
Discovery has shown that C&D's Lanham Act claim is not only a direct assault on the
FDA conclusion that the marketing limitations it imposed are sufficient to prevent consumers
from being misled to their detriment, but that C&D's challenge is ultimately disconnected from
9 The FDA's prohibition on placing the LMP/ovulation conversion chart on the outside of the box
is an example of this. The FDA mandated that the chart be included in the packaging, but forbid
SPD from placing it on the outside of the box. Thus the inclusion mandate is a "floor," and the
prohibition on adding it to the outside of the box is a "ceiling."
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13277.008 3054024v2 22
any specific advertising and aimed at the Product itself. That is, C&D is contending that the
Weeks Estimator cannot be truthfully marketed at all. While C&D has sometimes pointed to
certain elements of the advertising as misleading, its challenge is not limited to those elements.
Moreover, its experts have directed their criticisms not to how the Product is specifically
marketed but to the fact that, in C&D's view, it uses an illegitimate reference point – ovulation –
for estimating how many weeks a woman has been pregnant. In short, C&D is asking this court
to overturn the FDA's clearance entirely because, in C&D's view, the Product is inherently
misleading. This position directly conflicts with FDA's exclusive statutory authority. 21 U.S.C
§ 301 et seq.
A. C&D's Deposition Testimony Made Clear That It Is Not Confining Its
Allegations Of Falsity To Particular Elements Of the Advertising.
In the course of her examination on the subject of the advertising C&D contends is false
or misleading, C&D's Rule 30(b)(6) witness Stacey Feldman made clear that the company is not
confining its challenge to particular advertising elements. Indeed, it is clear that the company's
objection stems from the use of ovulation as the starting point for an estimate of weeks at all.
When asked what it would take in the way of modifying the packaging to prevent it from
conveying a false message, Ms. Feldman initially said "I can't answer that." Pressed, she
volunteered: "I don't know for sure, but the name of the product, Pregnancy Test with Weeks
Estimator, is a misleading false name, so the whole proposition would need to be reworked."
(Knowles Decl., ¶ 4, Ex. C ["Feldman Dep."], 46:21-47:18.) Indeed, when asked about C&D's
contention that the presence of the word "weeks" in the display window depicted on the launch
packaging was deceptive, Ms. Feldman testified that any expression of a numerical estimate
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13277.008 3054024v2 23
based on ovulation rather than LMP "is wrong." ([Feldman Dep. at 51:8 – 52:13].10
Similarly, Ms. Feldman testified that the Weeks Estimator television commercial is false
and misleading because, among other things, it fails to state in the last three frames that the
estimate of weeks is based on ovulation. (Feldman Dep., 71:21-74:2.) When asked whether the
disclosures elsewhere in the commercial – disclosures that do state that the estimate of weeks is
based on ovulation – prevent the commercial from being misleading to consumers, Ms. Feldman
responded: "I don't think a consumer would understand that." (Feldman Dep., 74:3-8; 76:15-25.)
This is in line with Mr. Fedlman's declaration, submitted in connection with C&D's preliminary
injunction motion, in which she opines that women generally would not be interested in a
pregnancy test that estimates when they last ovulated. (Dkt. 22, ¶ 26.) That is, C&D's position is
that this is simply meaningless information.
B. C&D's Experts Opined That The Product Would Be Misleading Regardless
Of How The Product Is Marketed.
Both of C&D’s survey experts, Dr. Bruce Isaacson, and Hal Poret, based their surveys on
the assumption that any suggestion that the Product estimates “Weeks Pregnant” is of necessity
incurably inconsistent with “weeks since ovulation,” and the Product can likely therefore never
be lawfully marketed.
Expert surveys of this sort virtually always evaluate two groups of consumers: one that is
exposed to the advertisement under scrutiny and one that is exposed to a "control" advertisement.
The purpose of the control advertisement is to account for (i.e., "control for") factors that are not
being measured by the survey, such as preexisting beliefs, elements of the advertisement not
considered deceptive or other "noise." SmithKline Beecham Consumer Healthcare, L.P. v.
10 This is consistent with C&D's position that the current package, which prominently displays a
banner proclaiming that the Product is the "Only Test That Estimates Weeks Since Ovulation," is
nevertheless deceptive. (Dkt. 140, p. 21-23.)
Case 1:14-cv-00585-AJN Document 224 Filed 02/09/15 Page 27 of 30
13277.008 3054024v2 24
Johnson & Johnson-Merck Consumer Pharm. Co., No. 01 CIV. 2775 (DAB), 2001 WL 588846,
at *12 (S.D.N.Y. June 1, 2001) aff'd, 19 F. App'x 17 (2d Cir. 2001).
Dr. Isaacson has acknowledged in his report that “The control is an item that is as similar
as possible to the original stimulus, but removes the objectionable elements.” (Knowles Dec., ¶
5, Ex. D [Isaacson Dep., Ex. 6 at 1].) Dr. Isaacson’s choice of “control” for his survey
illuminates the issue of what C&D is contending "objectionable" here: he used a commercial for
an entirely different product – one that does not have a Weeks Estimator or any other dating
feature. Dr. Isaacson was candid in explaining why he chose a control that advertised a
pregnancy test without a dating feature: "[b]ecause I believe that my control was the appropriate
approach, which is we still have – we have an objectionable element, and that objectionable
element is the providing of – of a Weeks – of a product called 'Weeks Estimator' in conjunction
with 'pregnancy test.' And so my commercial – the – the control commercial that I used
removes that objectionable element, and so I think that's an important baseline for the research."
(Knowles Dec., ¶ 6, Ex. E [Isaacson Dep.] 83:10-19.) In other words, the "objectionable
element" is not the advertising but the Weeks Estimator feature itself.
Similarly, C&D's expert reproductive endocrinologist, Dr. Pasquale Patrizo, was very
clear in his deposition that he believes there is no way to safely market the Product. Dr. Patrizio
was asked: "Is it the case in your opinion that there is a risk of the misuse of this product
regardless of what disclosures are made about it? A. There is a risk, yes, of using -- this product
being – producing misleading, giving misleading information because when you read one to two,
two to three, and you think that you are one to two, three to three weeks pregnant, that's not the
same way that the doctors date a pregnancy. And that can cause misleading – misleading
information." (Knowles Decl., ¶ 7, Ex. F [Patrizio Dep.] 243:16-25; 244:3-244:9 ("Q. So do you
agree that this risk, that is, the risk of the misuse of the product to monitor pregnancy or the risk
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13277.008 3054024v2 25
that somehow someone would use the result to delay going to the doctor, cannot be totally
eliminated no matter what the advertising is? A. Okay. Q. You agree with that?"] Indeed, he
testified that the Weeks Estimator "probably should not be on the market." (Id. 251:12-20.)
C. C&D's Claim Should Be Dismissed As An Effort To Revoke The FDA's
Clearance Of The Product.
Under the FDCA, the FDA has virtually exclusive authority to regulate medical devices.
21 U.S.C § 301 et seq; Delaney v. Stryker Orthopaedics, No. CIV.A. 08-03210DMC, 2009 WL
564243, at *2 (D.N.J. Mar. 5, 2009). The FDA is charged with investigating potential violations,
21 U.S.C §372, and has a number of enforcement powers. See 21 U.S.C. §§332-334; 21 C.F.R.
§ 810.10 et seq. In addition, citizens may petition the FDA to take action. 21 C.F.R. §§10.25(a),
10.30. Under section 337 of the FDCA, however, enforcement power resides exclusively with
the FDA and the U.S. Department of Justice. There is no private right of action to enforce the
FDCA. Sandoz Pharm. Corp. v. Richardson-Vicks, Inc., 902 F.2d 222, 231 (3d Cir. 1990).
Against this background, C&D's frontal assault on the Product itself is clearly in direct
conflict with exclusive agency authority. In clearing a pregnancy test with a dating feature based
on ovulation for sale in the U.S., the FDA authoritatively rejected C&D's position that such a
Product is inherently misleading. Under the cases cited above, such a claim must be dismissed.
See also Drager v. PLIVA USA, Inc., 741 F.3d 470, 479 (4th Cir. 2014) (rejecting breach of
express warranty claim that urged that Metoclopramide was unreasonably dangerous such that no
warnings would have been sufficient, holding that such a challenge conflicts with the FDA's
exclusive authority to approve drugs and drug labels).
CONCLUSION
For the foregoing reasons, C&D's false advertising claims under the Lanham Act and
related state law should be dismissed as precluded by the FDCA.
Case 1:14-cv-00585-AJN Document 224 Filed 02/09/15 Page 29 of 30
13277.008 3054024v2 26
DATED: February 3, 2015 Respectfully submitted,
By: /s/ Jeffrey G. Knowles
COBLENTZ PATCH DUFFY & BASS LLP
Jeffrey G. Knowles*
Julia D. Greer*
David Mehretu (DM 1747)
One Ferry Building, Suite 200
San Francisco, CA 94111
Telephone: 415.391.4800
Facsimile: 415.989.1663
Email: ef-jgk@cpdb.com
ef-jdg@cpdb.com
ef-dxm@cpdb.com
* Admitted Pro Hac Vice
GOODWIN | PROCTER LLP
Ira J. Levy (IL 2632)
The New York Times Building
620 Eighth Avenue
New York, NY 10018-1405
Telephone: 212.459.7478
Facsimile: 212.355.3333
Email: ilevy@goodwinprocter.com
Attorneys for Defendant
SPD SWISS PRECISION DIAGNOSTICS GMBH
Case 1:14-cv-00585-AJN Document 224 Filed 02/09/15 Page 30 of 30