Jackson v. County of Los Angeles

Holding that the doctrine of judicial estoppel should apply when: " the same party has taken two positions; the positions were taken in judicial or quasi-judicial administrative proceedings; the party was successful in asserting the first position (i.e., the tribunal adopted the position or accepted it as true); the two positions are totally inconsistent; and the first position was not taken as a result of ignorance, fraud, or mistake."

People v. Castillo

Holding the Attorney General was judicially estopped from disavowing a stipulation calling for imposition of a two-year term of civil commitment of a sexually violent predator notwithstanding a change in intervening law (The Sexual Punishment and Control Act: Jessica's law, Proposition 83) that called for sexually violent predators to be committed indefinitely, even though "a stipulation similar to the one we consider in the present case now could not properly be negotiated, entered into, and enforced"

Bowden v. Robinson

Concluding that, in enacting § 25401, the Legislature's intent was to "conspicuously [avoid] the requirement of 'actual reliance'" and provide a remedy to a victim of securities fraud without the "formidable task of proving common law fraud"

Snider v. Snider

In Snider v. Snider, supra, this court observed, "In the summary judgment procedure, the party opposing the motion cannot rely on a verified pleading alone. [Citations.] If such party cannot do so directly, she cannot do so indirectly by merely restating the verified pleading in her counteraffidavit."

Osmond v. EWAP, Inc.

Requiring some meaningful allegation of responsibility for statement

Gallin v. Superior Court

Hunt v. United Bank Trust Co.

In Hunt v. United Bank Trust Co., 210 Cal. 118 [ 291 P. 184, 188], after referring to the case of Newson v. Hawley, supra, it is said: "If, in the opinion of the court, the evidence is unreliable, it is its duty to grant a new trial, and it may grant such new trial even where there is substantial evidence to sustain the verdict, if it believes that the evidence preponderates against the verdict."

Kaluzok v. Brisson

In Kaluzok v. Brisson, supra, 27 Cal.2d 760, plaintiffs alleged that in reliance on defendants' fraudulent representations they were induced to purchase real property and to execute and deliver a note secured by a trust deed, as a result of which they suffered damages.

Armstrong v. Smith

In Armstrong v. Smith, 49 Cal.App.2d 528 [ 122 P.2d 115], the contention that venue may be determined by an implied agreement as to the place of performance of a contract was expressly rejected and an order denying a motion for a change of venue to the county of the defendant's residence was reversed.

Caffrey v. Tilton