Campbell v. Chase Card

MOTION TO DISMISS FOR FAILURE TO STATE A CLAIM

E.D. Pa.December 5, 2016

DMEAST #27599183 v7 IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT FOR THE EASTERN DISTRICT OF PENNSYLVANIA STEVE CAMPBELL, Plaintiff, v. CHASE CARD, Defendant. : : : : : : : : : : Civil Action No. 2:16-cv-06192-MAK MOTION TO DISMISS COMPLAINT BY DEFENDANT CHASE BANK USA, N.A. Defendant Chase Bank USA, N.A., improperly named as “Chase Card” (“Chase”), through its undersigned counsel, hereby moves to dismiss the complaint (“Complaint”) filed by Plaintiff Steve Campbell (“Plaintiff”) pursuant to Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 12(b)(6). Plaintiff attempts to sue Chase under a plethora of federal statutes that do not contain private rights of action. As for the remaining statutes cited by Plaintiff, the Complaint lacks any factual allegations stating a cause of action against Chase. Stated simply, the Complaint fails to put Chase on notice of Plaintiff’s claims, and each of Plaintiff’s claims fails as a matter of law. For these reasons, discussed in more detail in the accompanying Memorandum of Law, which is incorporated herein by reference, Chase respectfully requests that this Court dismiss Plaintiff’s Complaint. Case 2:16-cv-06192-MAK Document 4 Filed 12/05/16 Page 1 of 2 DMEAST #27599183 v7 2 Respectfully submitted, Dated: December 5, 2016 /s/ Jenny N. Perkins Beth Moskow-Schnoll (I.D. No. 52180) moskowb@ballardspahr.com Jenny N. Perkins (I.D. No. 306498) perkinsj@ballardspahr.com BALLARD SPAHR LLP 1735 Market Street 51st Floor Philadelphia, PA 19103-7599 Telephone: 215.861.7360 Facsimile: 302.252.4466 Attorneys for Defendant Chase Bank USA, N.A. Case 2:16-cv-06192-MAK Document 4 Filed 12/05/16 Page 2 of 2 DMEAST #27599183 v7 IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT FOR THE EASTERN DISTRICT OF PENNSYLVANIA STEVE CAMPBELL, Plaintiff, v. CHASE CARD, Defendant. : : : : : : : : : : Civil Action No. 2:16-cv-06192-MAK ORDER AND NOW, this ____ day of ____________ 2016, upon consideration of the Motion of Defendant Chase Bank USA, N.A. to Dismiss the Complaint, and any response thereto, it is hereby ORDERED that: 1. The Motion to Dismiss is GRANTED; and 2. The Complaint is DISMISSED WITH PREJUDICE. _________________________ Mark A. Kearney United States District Judge Case 2:16-cv-06192-MAK Document 4-1 Filed 12/05/16 Page 1 of 1 DMEAST #27599183 v7 IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT FOR THE EASTERN DISTRICT OF PENNSYLVANIA STEVE CAMPBELL, Plaintiff, v. CHASE CARD, Defendant. : : : : : : : : : : Civil Action No. 2:16-cv-06192-MAK MEMORANDUM OF LAW OF DEFENDANT CHASE BANK USA, N.A. IN SUPPORT OF ITS MOTION TO DISMISS COMPLAINT Dated: December 5, 2016 /s/ Jenny N. Perkins Beth Moskow-Schnoll (I.D. No. 52180) moskowb@ballardspahr.com Jenny N. Perkins (I.D. No. 306498) perkinsj@ballardspahr.com BALLARD SPAHR LLP 1735 Market Street 51st Floor Philadelphia, PA 19103-7599 Telephone: 215.861.7360 Facsimile: 302.252.4466 Attorneys for Defendant Chase Bank USA, N.A. Case 2:16-cv-06192-MAK Document 4-2 Filed 12/05/16 Page 1 of 14 DMEAST #27599183 v7 i TABLE OF CONTENTS Page I. INTRODUCTION .............................................................................................................. 1 II. PROCEDURAL HISTORY AND STATEMENT OF FACTS.......................................... 1 III. ARGUMENT ...................................................................................................................... 3 A. Standard for Dismissal under Rule 12(b)(6) ........................................................... 3 B. Plaintiff’s Claims Assume Rights of Action That Do Not Exist ............................ 3 1. The Federal Trade Commission Act ........................................................... 4 2. The Fair Credit Reporting Act .................................................................... 5 C. Plaintiff’s Remaining Claims Fail as a Matter of Law ........................................... 6 1. Fair Credit Reporting Act ........................................................................... 6 2. Fair Debt Collection Practices Act ............................................................. 7 IV. CONCLUSION. .................................................................................................................. 9 Case 2:16-cv-06192-MAK Document 4-2 Filed 12/05/16 Page 2 of 14 DMEAST #27599183 v7 ii TABLE OF AUTHORITIES Page(s) FEDERAL CASES Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 129 S. Ct. 1937 (2009) ...............................................................................................................3 Bell Atl. Corp. v. Twombly, 550 U.S. 544 (2007) ...................................................................................................................3 Carpenter v. Kloptoski, No. 1:08-CV-2233, 2010 WL 891825 (M.D. Pa. Mar. 10, 2010) .............................................4 Jaramillo v. Experian Info. Solutions, Inc., 155 F.Supp. 2d 356 (E.D. Pa. 2001) ..........................................................................................6 Jones v. Select Portfolio Servicing, Inc., 2008 WL 1820935 (E.D. Pa. Apr. 22, 2008) .............................................................................6 Levy-Tatum v. Navient & Sallie Mae Bank, No. 15-3794, 2016 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 1548 (E.D. Pa. Jan. 7, 2016) ..........................................8 Lum v. Bank of Am., 361 F.3d 217 (3d Cir. 2004).......................................................................................................3 Morse v. Lower Merion Sch. Dist., 132 F.3d 902 (3d. Cir. 1997)......................................................................................................3 Mullarkey v. Best Buy Corp., 2007 WL 1816474 (E.D. Pa. June 21, 2007) .............................................................................7 Oshiver v. Levin, Fishbein, Sedran & Berman, 38 F.3d 1380 (3d Cir. 1994).......................................................................................................2 Palermo Gelato, LLC v. Pino Gelato, Inc., No. 2:12-CV-931, 2013 WL 285547 (W.D. Pa. Jan. 24, 2013) ................................................4 Pollice v. Nat’l Tax Funding, L.P., 225 F.3d 379 (3d Cir. 2000).......................................................................................................8 SimmsParris v. Countrywide Fin. Corp., 652 F.3d 355 (3d Cir. 2011).......................................................................................................5 Taggart v. GMAC Mortg., No. 12-CV-415, 2012 WL 5929000 (E.D. Pa. Nov. 26, 2012) .................................................4 Trump Hotels & Casino Resorts, Inc. v. Mirage Resorts, Inc., 140 F.3d 478 (3d Cir. 1998).......................................................................................................3 Case 2:16-cv-06192-MAK Document 4-2 Filed 12/05/16 Page 3 of 14 DMEAST #27599183 v7 iii Van Veen v. Equifax Info., 844 F. Supp.2d 599 (E.D. Pa. 2012) ......................................................................................5, 6 Vega v. United Recovery Systems, L.P., 2012 WL 458468 (D. N.J. Feb. 9, 2012) ...................................................................................8 FEDERAL STATUTES 15 U.S.C. § 45(a)(2) .........................................................................................................................4 15 U.S.C. § 1681a ............................................................................................................................6 15 U.S.C. § 1681i .............................................................................................................................6 15 U.S.C. § 1681i(a) ........................................................................................................................6 15 U.S.C. § 1681n ............................................................................................................................6 15 U.S.C. § 1681o ............................................................................................................................6 15 U.S.C. § 1681s-2(a) ....................................................................................................................5 15 U.S.C. § 1681s-2(b) ....................................................................................................................6 15 U.S.C. § 1681s-2(b)(1)(A-D) ......................................................................................................6 15 U.S.C. § 1681s-2(c) ....................................................................................................................5 15 U.S.C. § 1681s-2(d) ....................................................................................................................5 15 U.S.C. § 1692a(6) .......................................................................................................................8 15 U.S.C. § 1692a(6)(F)(iii) ............................................................................................................8 15 U.S.C. § 1692c ............................................................................................................................7 15 U.S.C. § 1692d ............................................................................................................................7 15 U.S.C. § 1692e(2)(A) ..................................................................................................................8 15 U.S.C. § 1692f ............................................................................................................................7 15 U.S.C. § 1692g ............................................................................................................................7 15 U.S.C. § 1692i .............................................................................................................................7 15 U.S.C. § 1692j .............................................................................................................................7 Case 2:16-cv-06192-MAK Document 4-2 Filed 12/05/16 Page 4 of 14 DMEAST #27599183 v7 iv FEDERAL SESSION LAWS Fair Credit Reporting Act, Pub. L. No. 90-321, Title VI, as added Pub. L. No. 91-508, Oct. 26, 1970, 84 Stat. 1128, § 603............................................................................................6 Fair Credit Reporting Act, Pub. L. No. 90-321, Title VI, as added Pub. L. No. 91-508, Oct. 26, 1970, 84 Stat. 1128, § 611............................................................................................6 Fair Credit Reporting Act, Pub. L. No. 90-321, Title VI, as added Pub. L. No. 91-508, Oct. 26, 1970, 84 Stat. 1128, § 616............................................................................................6 Fair Credit Reporting Act, Pub. L. No. 90-321, Title VI, as added Pub. L. No. 91-508, Oct. 26, 1970, 84 Stat. 1128, § 617............................................................................................6 Fair Credit Reporting Act, Pub. L. No. 90-321, Title VI, as added Pub. L. No. 91-508, Oct. 26, 1970, 84 Stat. 1128, § 623............................................................................................5 Fair Debt Collection Practices Act, Pub. L. No. 90-321, Title VIII, as added Pub. L. No. 95-109, Sept. 20, 1977, 91 Stat. 874, § 805 ...............................................................................7 Fair Debt Collection Practices Act, Pub. L. No. 90-321, Title VIII, as added Pub. L. No. 95-109, Sept. 20, 1977, 91 Stat. 874, § 806 ...............................................................................7 Fair Debt Collection Practices Act, Pub. L. No. 90-321, Title VIII, as added Pub. L. No. 95-109, Sept. 20, 1977, 91 Stat. 874, § 808 ...............................................................................7 Fair Debt Collection Practices Act, Pub. L. No. 90-321, Title VIII, as added Pub. L. No. 95-109, Sept. 20, 1977, 91 Stat. 874, § 809 ...............................................................................7 Fair Debt Collection Practices Act, Pub. L. No. 90-321, Title VIII, as added Pub. L. No. 95-109, Sept. 20, 1977, 91 Stat. 874, § 811 ...............................................................................7 Fair Debt Collection Practices Act, Pub. L. No. 90-321, Title VIII, as added Pub. L. No. 95-109, Sept. 20, 1977, 91 Stat. 874, § 812 ...............................................................................7 RULES Fed. R. Civ. P. 8(a) ..........................................................................................................................1 Fed. R. Civ. P. 12(b)(6)................................................................................................................2, 3 Case 2:16-cv-06192-MAK Document 4-2 Filed 12/05/16 Page 5 of 14 Defendant Chase Bank USA, N.A., improperly named as Chase Card (“Chase”), by and through its undersigned counsel, submits this Memorandum of Law in support of its Motion to Dismiss Complaint (“Motion”). I. INTRODUCTION Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 8(a) requires that pleadings consist of a “short and plain” statement for relief so that a defendant may be reasonably apprised of the allegations against it and a plaintiff’s potential causes of action. Plaintiff Steve Campbell’s (“Plaintiff”) complaint certainly is short, because it contains virtually no facts. Instead, Plaintiff alleges that Chase violated the Fair Credit Reporting Act, 15 U.S.C. § 1681, et seq. (“FCRA”), the Federal Trade Commission Act, 15 U.S.C. § 41, et seq. (“FTCA”), and the Fair Debt Collection Practices Act, 15 U.S.C. § 1692, et seq. (“FDCPA”) by merely citing miscellaneous sections of these statutes with no explanation of how Chase allegedly violated them. The Plaintiff’s FTCA claims, and one of his FCRA claims, should be dismissed with prejudice because the statutes under which Plaintiff purports to sue Chase do not contain private rights of action. Plaintiff’s remaining FCRA claims should be dismissed because Plaintiff fails to allege that he has followed FCRA’s prerequisite conditions in order to make a private right of action available to him. Finally, Plaintiff’s FDCPA claims should be dismissed because the FDCPA only applies to debt collectors, and Chase is not a debt collector-nor does Plaintiff allege as much. Putting aside these claims’ lack of merit, Plaintiff’s Complaint is simply insufficient. Because Plaintiff’s Complaint does not contain a single particularized allegation that shows he is plausibly entitled to relief, and because each of his shotgun-style claims fails as a matter of law, Plaintiff’s Complaint should be dismissed. II. PROCEDURAL HISTORY AND STATEMENT OF FACTS Plaintiff initiated this action against Chase in the Magisterial District Court of Bucks Case 2:16-cv-06192-MAK Document 4-2 Filed 12/05/16 Page 6 of 14 2 County, Pennsylvania on October 24, 2016. Chase received notice of Plaintiff’s lawsuit on or about November 1, 2016 and timely filed its notice of removal with this Court on November 28, 2016. Plaintiff’s allegations, in their entirety, are as follows: Negligent and willful failure to reinvestigate the disputed entries and provide copy of any viable evidence bearing my signature in violation of: Section 611 (a), 616, and 617 of the FCRA, 15 U.S.C. 1681i (a) 1681n, 1681o. Non compliant with the Federal Trade Commission Act 15 U.S.C. 41, et seq. FCRA section 623 (a)(3), 15. U.S.C. 1681s-2, FCRA SECTION 807 (8) 15. U.S.C. 1962e, SECTION 603 (p) FDCPA 15 U.S.C. 1692f, SECTION 808 (1) SECTION 809 (a)(1) (2) (3) 809 (b) SECTION 808 (5) (b) 1692j 812 (a) (b) 605 (c) 805 (a)(1) 806, 811(a)(2) (REV) (sic).1 Compl. at ¶ 1-2 (emphasis in original). Plaintiff’s pleading is completely devoid of facts, including, critically, the dates of any alleged violations.2 Thus, it is impossible to discern from the Complaint how Plaintiff believes he has been harmed, or why Plaintiff believes Chase is 1 It is difficult to decipher Plaintiff’s citations, which, as to each claim, he makes to either a section of the United States Code, a section of the original act, or both. Furthermore, not all of his citations are accurate - the FCRA does not contain a section 807(8), Title 15 of the United States Code does not contain a section 1962e, and the FDCPA does not contain a section 605. 2 The propriety of Plaintiff’s claims in this action is further undermined by the nearly identical complaints he recently filed against four other entities. See, e.g., Campbell v. LJ Ross Associates Inc,, Docket No. 2:16-cv-05720-WB (E.D. Pa., filed November 2, 2016); Campbell v. Target Credit LLC, Docket No. 2:16-cv-06162-MAK (E.D. Pa., filed November 23, 2016); Campbell v. Capital One, Docket No. 2:16-cv-06181-LDD (E.D. Pa., filed November 23, 2016); and Campbell v. Kohls/Capone, Docket No. 2:16-cv- 06182-NIQA (E.D. Pa., filed November 23, 2016). The Court may take judicial notice of these actions. Oshiver v. Levin, Fishbein, Sedran & Berman, 38 F.3d 1380, 1385 n. 2 (3d Cir. 1994) (court may take judicial notice of matters of public record when adjudicating a motion to dismiss under Rule 12(b)(6)). Case 2:16-cv-06192-MAK Document 4-2 Filed 12/05/16 Page 7 of 14 3 responsible for his injuries, if any. III. ARGUMENT A. Standard for Dismissal under Rule 12(b)(6) A motion to dismiss under Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 12(b)(6) challenges whether the complaint states claims upon which relief can be granted. “To survive a motion to dismiss, a complaint must contain sufficient factual matter, accepted as true, to ‘state a claim to relief that is plausible on its face.’” Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 129 S. Ct. 1937, 1949 (2009) (quoting Bell Atl. Corp. v. Twombly, 550 U.S. 544, 555 (2007)). A complaint should be dismissed under Rule 12(b)(6) where no relief could be granted under any set of facts consistent with the allegations of the complaint. Trump Hotels & Casino Resorts, Inc. v. Mirage Resorts, Inc., 140 F.3d 478, 483 (3d Cir. 1998). When a complaint is challenged by a Rule 12(b)(6) motion, “a plaintiff’s obligation to provide the ‘grounds’ of his ‘entitlement to relief’ requires more than labels and conclusions, and a formulaic recitation of a cause of action’s elements will not do. Factual allegations must be enough to raise a right to relief above the speculative level on the assumption that all of the complaint’s allegations are true.” Lum v. Bank of Am., 361 F.3d 217, 222 (3d Cir. 2004) abrogated in part on other grounds by Twombly, 550 U.S. at 570. Thus, in order to defeat a motion to dismiss under Rule 12(b)(6), a plaintiff cannot rely on unsupported legal conclusions, legal conclusions couched as factual allegations, or conclusory factual allegations devoid of any reference to actual events. Morse v. Lower Merion Sch. Dist., 132 F.3d 902, 906 (3d. Cir. 1997). B. Plaintiff’s Claims Assume Rights of Action That Do Not Exist Two of Plaintiff’s claims must be dismissed because Plaintiff relies upon statutes that do not contain private rights of action. Obviously, without a right of action, no allegation can survive a challenge under Rule 12(b)(6). Case 2:16-cv-06192-MAK Document 4-2 Filed 12/05/16 Page 8 of 14 4 1. The Federal Trade Commission Act Plaintiff alleges that Chase violated the FTCA, 15 U.S.C. § 41 et seq. Compl. at ¶ 1. But no private right of action exists under the FTCA, which expressly provides that only the Federal Trade Commission (“FTC”) may initiate a civil lawsuit asserting violations of the Act. See, e.g., 15 U.S.C. § 45(a)(2) (“The Commission is hereby empowered and directed to prevent persons, partnerships, or corporations . . . from using unfair methods of competition in or affecting commerce and unfair or deceptive acts or practices in or affecting commerce.”) (emphasis added); see also Palermo Gelato, LLC v. Pino Gelato, Inc., No. 2:12-CV-931, 2013 WL 285547, at *2 (W.D. Pa. Jan. 24, 2013) (explaining that the FTCA “may only be enforced by the FTC, and does not create a private cause of action”); Taggart v. GMAC Mortg., No. 12-CV-415, 2012 WL 5929000, at *6 (E.D. Pa. Nov. 26, 2012) (“[P]rivate parties are not authorized to file [FTCA] enforcement actions, only the FTC has that authority.”); Carpenter v. Kloptoski, No. 1:08-CV- 2233, 2010 WL 891825, at *11 (M.D. Pa. Mar. 10, 2010) (“[The] Federal Trade Commission Act regulations do not create private rights. There is no private right of action under Federal Trade Commission Act. Rather, the act contains an exclusive administrative enforcement mechanism vested only in the Federal Trade Commission.”) (internal citations omitted). Accordingly, because Plaintiff is an individual and not the FTC, his claims under the FTCA must be dismissed with prejudice. Case 2:16-cv-06192-MAK Document 4-2 Filed 12/05/16 Page 9 of 14 5 2. The Fair Credit Reporting Act3 Plaintiff’s claim under 15 U.S.C. § 1681s-2(a) should be dismissed as a matter of law because there is no private right of action under this section of the FCRA. While sections 1681n-o provide a right of action to consumers for certain negligent or willful violations of the FCRA, the FCRA explicitly exempts section 1681s-2(a): “sections 1681n and 1681o of this title do not apply to any violation of . . . subsection (a) of this section, including any regulations issued thereunder.” 15 U.S.C. § 1681s-2(c). Instead, the statute leaves enforcement of section 1681s-2(a) to Federal and state agencies and officials. See 15 U.S.C. § 1681s-2(d). These principles are well established in this Circuit. Indeed, as the Third Circuit recently noted, “[t]he FCRA also has several provisions that create liability for violations of the Act. . . . These provisions, however, cannot be used by a private individual to assert a claim for a violation of § 1681s-2(a), as such claims are available only to the Government.” SimmsParris v. Countrywide Fin. Corp., 652 F.3d 355, 358 (3d Cir. 2011); see also Van Veen v. Equifax Info., 844 F. Supp.2d 599, 604 (E.D. Pa. 2012) (noting “[a] private consumer . . . may not bring a cause of action for an alleged violation of 1681s-2(a).”). Because there is no private right of action under 15 U.S.C. § 1681s-2(a), this claim fails as a matter of law and should be dismissed. 3 Plaintiff cites to both the United States Code and corresponding sections of the FCRA. Cf. 15 U.S.C. § 1681s-2 with Fair Credit Reporting Act, Pub. L. No. 90-321, Title VI, § 623, as added Pub. L. No. 91-508, Oct. 26, 1970, 84 Stat. 1128. In order to avoid duplication, this memorandum only addresses citations to the United States Code. However, the same arguments apply to Plaintiff’s claims under citations to the FCRA. Case 2:16-cv-06192-MAK Document 4-2 Filed 12/05/16 Page 10 of 14 6 C. Plaintiff’s Remaining Claims Fail as a Matter of Law 1. Fair Credit Reporting Act4 In addition to the nonexistent right of action discussed above, Plaintiff further alleges that Chase “[n]egligent[ly] and willful[ly]” violated the FCRA. These claims fail as a matter of law because Plaintiff has not alleged any facts that establish Chase’s obligation to Plaintiff under the FCRA. As an initial matter, Plaintiff alleges a violation of section 1681i(a), but this section merely outlines procedures that must be followed in the event a consumer contests information reported by a credit reporting agency; it contains no right of action. A consumer’s only potential right of action for alleged failures under section 1681i by furnishers like Chase is contained in section 1681s-2(b). However, section 1681s-2(b) provides no remedy for simply furnishing incorrect credit information. Van Veen, 844 F. Supp.2d at 604. To state a cause of action under 1681s-2(b), the complaint must assert that a consumer reporting agency notified a furnisher of a dispute pursuant to section 1681i(a)(2), so as to trigger a duty under section 1681s-2(b). Id. A plaintiff must, at minimum, allege that he or she notified a credit reporting agency of the dispute, the credit reporting agency then notified the furnisher of information and the furnisher of information failed to investigate or rectify the charge. See Jones v. Select Portfolio Servicing, Inc., 2008 WL 1820935, at *8 (E.D. Pa. Apr. 22, 2008) (citing 15 U.S.C. § 1681s-2(b)(1)(A-D)); see also Jaramillo v. Experian Info. Solutions, Inc., 155 F.Supp. 2d 356, 363 (E.D. Pa. 2001) (“to state a cause of action under 1681 s-2(b) requires a pleading that a consumer reporting agency notified a furnisher of a dispute, pursuant to 1681i(a)(2), so as 4 Plaintiff cites to both the United States Code and corresponding sections of the FCRA. Cf. 15 U.S.C. §§ 1681a, -i, -n, and -o with Fair Credit Reporting Act, Pub. L. No. 90-321, Title VI, §§ 603, 611, 616, and 617, as added Pub. L. No. 91-508, Oct. 26, 1970, 84 Stat. 1128. In order to avoid duplication, this memorandum only addresses citations to the United States Code. However, the same arguments apply to Plaintiff’s claims under citations to the FCRA. Case 2:16-cv-06192-MAK Document 4-2 Filed 12/05/16 Page 11 of 14 7 to trigger a duty under section 1681s-2(b).”). Courts have dismissed complaints where plaintiffs have failed to allege they first disputed the information with a credit reporting agency. Id. Moreover, a private plaintiff may not sue under section 1681s-2(b) unless he alleges that the furnisher of information has indeed received notice from a credit reporting agency. See Mullarkey v. Best Buy Corp., 2007 WL 1816474, at *2 (E.D. Pa. June 21, 2007). Plaintiff makes no such allegations and accordingly fails to state a cause of action. Furthermore, without Plaintiff establishing Chase’s obligation to investigate a dispute under 15 U.S.C. § 1681s-2(b), Chase cannot negligently or willfully fail to perform such an investigation under sections 1681n-o. Therefore, each of Plaintiff’s remaining FCRA claims must be dismissed as a matter of law. 2. Fair Debt Collection Practices Act5 Plaintiff’s claims that Chase is “[n]on compliant” with 15 U.S.C. §§ 1692c-d and f-g should be dismissed because these sections only apply to debt collectors, and Plaintiff fails to allege that Chase is a debt collector under the FDCPA, nor is Chase in fact a debt collector.6 The FDCPA prohibits the use of “unfair or unconscionable means to collect or attempt to collect any debt.” 15 U.S.C. § 1692f. Debt collectors may not use false, deceptive, or harassing debt collection practices, including falsely representing “the character, amount, or legal status of any 5 Like Plaintiff’s FCRA claim, Plaintiff cites to both the United States Code and corresponding sections of the FDCPA. Cf. 15 U.S.C. §§ 1692c, -d, -f, -g, -i, and -j with Fair Debt Collection Practices Act, Pub. L. No. 90-321, Title VIII, §§ 805, 806, 808, 809, 811, 812, as added Pub. L. No. 95-109, Sept. 20, 1977, 91 Stat. 874. In order to avoid duplication, this memorandum only addresses citations to the United States Code. However, the same arguments apply to Plaintiff’s claims under the citations to the FDCPA. 6 Plaintiff also purports to sue under 15 U.S.C. § 1692i. However, that provision merely establishes venue for legal actions by debt collectors against creditors, which is not relevant to Plaintiff’s lawsuit. Case 2:16-cv-06192-MAK Document 4-2 Filed 12/05/16 Page 12 of 14 8 debt,” 15 U.S.C. § 1692e(2)(A). The FDCPA defines a debt collector as a person “who uses any instrumentality of interstate commerce or the mails in any business the principal purpose of which is the collection of any . . . debts owed or due or asserted to be owed or due another.” 15 U.S.C. § 1692a(6). The statute does not apply to creditors like Chase, absent extraordinary circumstances. See Pollice v. Nat’l Tax Funding, L.P., 225 F.3d 379, 403 (3d Cir. 2000); 15 U.S.C. § 1692a(6)(F)(iii) (the FDCPA does not apply to any person attempting to collect money owed to them unless the debt was obtained while in default). Plaintiff does not, and cannot, allege any facts to establish that Chase is a debt collector within the meaning of the FDCPA. As such, the majority of Plaintiff’s FDCPA claims fails as a matter of law and should be dismissed. See Levy- Tatum v. Navient & Sallie Mae Bank, No. 15-3794, 2016 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 1548, at *21 (E.D. Pa. Jan. 7, 2016) (dismissing FDCPA claim with prejudice because complaint failed to include factual matter supporting its legal assertion that defendant was a debt collector within the meaning of the FDCPA). Plaintiff also alleges Chase violated 15 U.S.C. § 1692j, which prohibits the use of forms designed to make a consumer believe the person is collecting a debt, when in fact he or she is not. Since this section applies to entities other than debt collectors, it could conceivably apply to Chase. However, Plaintiff fails to allege any facts showing that Chase has postured itself as a debt collector. Therefore, this claim also fails as a matter of law and should be dismissed. See Vega v. United Recovery Systems, L.P., 2012 WL 458468, at *4 (D. N.J. Feb. 9, 2012) (dismissing 1692j claim due to plaintiff’s “conclusory allegation[s]”). Case 2:16-cv-06192-MAK Document 4-2 Filed 12/05/16 Page 13 of 14 9 IV. CONCLUSION. For all of the foregoing reasons, Defendant Chase Bank USA, N.A., improperly named as Chase Card, respectfully requests that Plaintiff’s Complaint be dismissed with prejudice. Respectfully submitted, Dated: December 5, 2016 Jenny N. Perkins Beth Moskow-Schnoll (I.D. No. 52180) moskowb@ballardspahr.com Jenny N. Perkins (I.D. No. 306498) perkinsj@ballardspahr.com BALLARD SPAHR LLP 1735 Market Street 51st Floor Philadelphia, PA 19103-7599 Telephone: 215.861.7360 Facsimile: 302.252.4466 Attorneys for Defendant Chase Bank USA, N.A. Case 2:16-cv-06192-MAK Document 4-2 Filed 12/05/16 Page 14 of 14 DMEAST #27599183 v7 CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE I hereby certify that on December 5, 2016, I caused a true and correct copy of the foregoing Motion to Dismiss and Memorandum of Law in Support thereof to be served by Certified Mail and E-mail upon the following: Steve Campbell P.O. Box 134 Yardley, PA 19067 socampbell451@aol.com Plaintiff Pro Se Dated: December 5, 2016 _/s/ Jenny N. Perkins__________________ Beth Moskow-Schnoll (I.D. No. 52180) moskowb@ballardspahr.com Jenny N. Perkins (I.D. No. 306498) perkinsj@ballardspahr.com BALLARD SPAHR LLP 1735 Market Street 51st Floor Philadelphia, PA 19103-7599 Telephone: 215.861.7360 Facsimile: 302.252.4466 Attorneys for Defendant Chase Bank USA, N.A. Case 2:16-cv-06192-MAK Document 4-3 Filed 12/05/16 Page 1 of 1