48 Cited authorities

Arizona v. Washington
434 U.S. 497 (1978) Cited 1,826 times 2 Legal Analyses
Holding that a trial judge's failure to make an explicit finding of manifest necessity does not render the declaration of a mistrial constitutionally defective when the basis for that determination is adequately disclosed by the record
United States v. Jorn
400 U.S. 470 (1971) Cited 1,692 times 1 Legal Analyses
Holding that it was an abuse of discretion for trial judge to declare a mistrial without considering alternatives to the mistrial
Zumpano v. Quinn
2006 N.Y. Slip Op. 1245 (N.Y. 2006) Cited 415 times 2 Legal Analyses
Holding that a party must establish "subsequent and specific actions by defendants somehow kept them from timely bringing suit"
Matter of Holtzman v. Goldman
71 N.Y.2d 564 (N.Y. 1988) Cited 696 times
Finding that the plain language of the statute authorizing a trial order of dismissal "manifests the Legislature's intention only to grant the court the power to rule on insufficiency, not the power to terminate the proceedings by default"
Telegraphers v. Ry. Express Agency
321 U.S. 342 (1944) Cited 662 times 1 Legal Analyses
Holding the principles of J.I. Case apply to RLA cases
Allen v. United States
164 U.S. 492 (1896) Cited 2,811 times 3 Legal Analyses
Holding that a trial court may encourage a deadlocked jury to continue deliberating provided it does so noncoercively
People v. Buford
69 N.Y.2d 290 (N.Y. 1987) Cited 426 times
Holding that the trial court's reasons for its determination following a Buford inquiry should be placed on the record
Putter v. N Shore Univ Hosp
7 N.Y.3d 548 (N.Y. 2006) Cited 178 times 2 Legal Analyses
Holding equitable estoppel "inappropriate as a matter of law" because defendant's alleged misstatement "did not alter [plaintiff's] timely awareness of the facts requiring him to make further inquiry before the statute of limitations expired"
Matter of Schumer v. Holtzman
60 N.Y.2d 46 (N.Y. 1983) Cited 237 times
In Matter of Schumer v Holtzman (60 N.Y.2d 46, 55), a case involving removal, we held that generally a public prosecutor should not be removed unless necessary to protect a defendant from "actual prejudice arising from a demonstrated conflict of interest or a substantial risk of an abuse of confidence" (id.; see also, People v Herr, 86 N.Y.2d 638; People v Jackson, supra).
Matter of Edmead v. McGuire
67 N.Y.2d 714 (N.Y. 1986) Cited 203 times
In Edmead, the Court of Appeals stated that, "where the [administrative] determination is unambiguous and its effect certain, the statutory period commences as soon as the aggrieved party is notified" (id.).

In the Matter of Eric Smith, Respondent,v.Richard A. Brown, Appellant, Kenneth Holder, &c, et al., Respondents.

48 Cited authorities

Holding that a trial judge's failure to make an explicit finding of manifest necessity does not render the declaration of a mistrial constitutionally defective when the basis for that determination is adequately disclosed by the record

Holding that it was an abuse of discretion for trial judge to declare a mistrial without considering alternatives to the mistrial

Holding that a party must establish "subsequent and specific actions by defendants somehow kept them from timely bringing suit"

Finding that the plain language of the statute authorizing a trial order of dismissal "manifests the Legislature's intention only to grant the court the power to rule on insufficiency, not the power to terminate the proceedings by default"

Holding the principles of J.I. Case apply to RLA cases

Holding that a trial court may encourage a deadlocked jury to continue deliberating provided it does so noncoercively

Holding that the trial court's reasons for its determination following a Buford inquiry should be placed on the record

Holding equitable estoppel "inappropriate as a matter of law" because defendant's alleged misstatement "did not alter [plaintiff's] timely awareness of the facts requiring him to make further inquiry before the statute of limitations expired"

In Edmead, the Court of Appeals stated that, "where the [administrative] determination is unambiguous and its effect certain, the statutory period commences as soon as the aggrieved party is notified" (id.).