35 Cited authorities

Forrest v. Jewish Guild
3 N.Y.3d 295 (N.Y. 2004) Cited 1,321 times 1 Legal Analyses
Holding that the McDonnell Douglas framework applies to discriminatory discharge claims brought pursuant to the NYSHRL
Fitzpatrick v. Am. Honda Co.
78 N.Y.2d 61 (N.Y. 1991) Cited 470 times 2 Legal Analyses
Holding that "rather than mechanically applying only the 'four corners of the complaint' rule . . . the sounder approach is to require the insurer to provide a defense when it has actual knowledge of facts establishing a reasonable possibility of coverage"
Regal Cons. Corp. v. National Union Fire Ins. Co.
2010 N.Y. Slip Op. 4661 (N.Y. 2010) Cited 196 times 3 Legal Analyses
Finding that the alleged negligence arose on the part of the additional insured rather than the named insured was "of no consequence" as the additional insured's potential liability nonetheless "ar[ose] out of" the named insured's operation, and it was thus entitled to both defense and indemnification
Lang v. Hanover Ins. Co.
3 N.Y.3d 350 (N.Y. 2004) Cited 225 times 7 Legal Analyses
Holding that "[c]ompliance with these requirements [of Section 3420] is a condition precedent to a direct action against the insurance company"
Ugarriza v. Schmieder
46 N.Y.2d 471 (N.Y. 1979) Cited 479 times
In Ugarriza, the Court of Appeals determined that summary judgment should not be granted to the plaintiff, a passenger in a car driven by the defendant, where no affirmative act or omission constituting negligence had been alleged or proved.
Servidone Constr. v. Security
64 N.Y.2d 419 (N.Y. 1985) Cited 349 times 8 Legal Analyses
Holding that in New York “an insurer's breach of duty to defend does not create coverage and ... even in cases of negotiated settlements, there can be no duty to indemnify unless there is first a covered loss”
Maroney v. New York Cent. Mut. Fire Ins.
2005 N.Y. Slip Op. 7865 (N.Y. 2005) Cited 167 times 1 Legal Analyses
Applying this definition to a coverage exclusion denying claims that "arose out of" uninsured premises
In the Matter of Covert
97 N.Y.2d 68 (N.Y. 2001) Cited 123 times
Concluding that New York slayer's rule did not prevent proceeds of pension plans and insurance contracts from passing to alternative beneficiaries where insured/participant murdered primary beneficiary, his wife
Atlantic Mutual Insurance v. Terk Technologies Corp.
309 A.D.2d 22 (N.Y. App. Div. 2003) Cited 87 times
Holding that insurer had no duty to defend or indemnify where insured intentionally sold counterfeit goods, as insured's conduct fell within “known falsity” exclusion
Groves v. Land's End Housing Co., Inc.
80 N.Y.2d 978 (N.Y. 1992) Cited 75 times
In Groves, the Court of Appeals states that Rocovich made it clear that the Labor Law § 240(1) applies not simply "where the work is performed at heights but where the work involves risks related to differences in elevation," at 980, 592 N.Y.S.2d at 644, 607 N.E.2d at 791.
Appendix E to Part 380 - Hazardous Materials Endorsement Training Curriculum
49 C.F.R. § 380 app E to Part 380
Hazardous materials (H) endorsement applicants must complete the Hazardous materials curriculum, which apply to driver-trainees who intend to operate CMVs used in the transportation of hazardous materials (HM) as defined in §383.5. Driver-trainees seeking an H endorsement, as defined in §383.93(c)(4), must complete this curriculum in order to take the State-administered knowledge test for the H endorsement. There is no required minimum number of instruction hours for theory training, but the training

K2 Investment Group, LLC, et al., Respondents-Appellants,v.American Guarantee & Liability Insurance Company, Appellant-Respondent.

35 Cited authorities

Holding that the McDonnell Douglas framework applies to discriminatory discharge claims brought pursuant to the NYSHRL

Holding that "rather than mechanically applying only the 'four corners of the complaint' rule . . . the sounder approach is to require the insurer to provide a defense when it has actual knowledge of facts establishing a reasonable possibility of coverage"

Holding that "[c]ompliance with these requirements [of Section 3420] is a condition precedent to a direct action against the insurance company"

In Ugarriza, the Court of Appeals determined that summary judgment should not be granted to the plaintiff, a passenger in a car driven by the defendant, where no affirmative act or omission constituting negligence had been alleged or proved.

Holding that in New York “an insurer's breach of duty to defend does not create coverage and ... even in cases of negotiated settlements, there can be no duty to indemnify unless there is first a covered loss”

Applying this definition to a coverage exclusion denying claims that "arose out of" uninsured premises

Concluding that New York slayer's rule did not prevent proceeds of pension plans and insurance contracts from passing to alternative beneficiaries where insured/participant murdered primary beneficiary, his wife

Holding that insurer had no duty to defend or indemnify where insured intentionally sold counterfeit goods, as insured's conduct fell within “known falsity” exclusion

In Groves, the Court of Appeals states that Rocovich made it clear that the Labor Law § 240(1) applies not simply "where the work is performed at heights but where the work involves risks related to differences in elevation," at 980, 592 N.Y.S.2d at 644, 607 N.E.2d at 791.