Johnson v. United States

Holding residual clause unconstitutionally vague

Bousley v. United States

Holding that the rule announced in Bailey v. United States, 516 U.S. 137, 116 S.Ct. 501, 133 L.Ed.2d 472, which narrowed the scope of the term "use" in § 924(c), applied retroactively

Welch v. United States

Holding that Johnson , which invalidated the Armed Career Criminal Act's residual clause, announced a new substantive rule

Schriro v. Summerlin

Holding "[n]ew substantive rules generally apply retroactively"

United States v. Addonizio

Holding time limits in prior version of Rule 35 are jurisdictional

United States v. Batchelder

Holding that the imposition of different imprisonment terms under different, but partially overlapping, firearm-possession statutes does not violate equal protection

Saffle v. Parks

Holding that a new rule prohibiting an antisympathy jury instruction did not fall under Teague's first exception

United States v. Foote

Holding that a subsequently-nullified career offender designation did not constitute a fundamental defect such that the nullified designation could serve as a basis for vacating the sentence, where defendant had been sentenced under an advisory sentencing scheme and neither the offense of conviction nor the state convictions used as predicates for career offender status had been vacated

Spencer v. United States

Holding a federal prisoner cannot collaterally attack his sentence based on a misapplication of the advisory guidelines

Price v. United States

Holding that because Johnson's rule “prohibit ‘a certain category of punishment for a class of defendants because of their status' ... [t]here is no escaping the logical conclusion that the [Supreme] Court itself has made Johnson categorically retroactive to cases on collateral review”

Section 2255 - Federal custody; remedies on motion attacking sentence

Adopting one-year limitations period for §2255 motions

Section 924 - Penalties

Holding that conviction for eluding police, under Maine statute which provides that "[w]hoever, after being requested or signaled to stop, attempts to elude a law enforcement officer by driving a vehicle at a reckless rate of speed which results in a high-speed chase between the operator's vehicle and any law enforcement vehicle using a blue light and siren is guilty" of a felony-level crime, involves conduct that presents a serious potential risk of physical injury to another for purposes of 18 U.S.C. § 924(e)

Section 2113 - Bank robbery and incidental crimes

Providing separate and greater punishment for bank robberies accomplished through 'use of a dangerous weapon or device'

Section 569.030 - [Repealed] Transferred