28 Cited authorities

Hoffmann-La Roche Inc. v. Sperling
493 U.S. 165 (1989) Cited 3,025 times 19 Legal Analyses
Holding that district courts have discretion to implement § 216(b)
Mooney v. Aramco Servs. Co.
54 F.3d 1207 (5th Cir. 1995) Cited 1,271 times 1 Legal Analyses
Holding that "to show relevancy, Trial Plaintiffs had to show that the proffered anecdotal witnesses were sufficiently similar to themselves so that the witnesses' testimony would have a tendency to show `standard [discriminatory] operating procedure' and a `regular rather than unusual practice' of discrimination."
Thiessen v. Gen. Elec. Capital Corp.
267 F.3d 1095 (10th Cir. 2001) Cited 1,004 times 2 Legal Analyses
Holding as long as the EEOC and the company are aware of the nature and scope of the allegations, the purposes behind the administrative filing requirement are satisfied and no injustice or contravention of congressional intent occurs by allowing piggybacking
O'Brien v. Ed Donnelly Enters., Inc.
575 F.3d 567 (6th Cir. 2009) Cited 743 times 6 Legal Analyses
Holding that the district court erred when it "implicitly and improperly applied a Rule 23-type analysis" to the FLSA
Comer v. Wal-Mart Stores, Inc.
454 F.3d 544 (6th Cir. 2006) Cited 579 times 2 Legal Analyses
Holding that "the plaintiff must show . . . that his position is similar . . . to the positions held by the putative class members"
Dybach v. State of Fla. Dep't of Corrs.
942 F.2d 1562 (11th Cir. 1991) Cited 662 times
Holding that a probation officer not a professional because the job did not require an advanced degree in a specialized field of knowledge
White v. Baptist Mem'l Health Care Corp.
699 F.3d 869 (6th Cir. 2012) Cited 296 times 5 Legal Analyses
Holding that an automatic meal deduction system was lawful under the FLSA and explaining that compensation is necessary only "when an employee is required to give up a substantial measure of his time"
Anderson v. Cagle's, Inc.
488 F.3d 945 (11th Cir. 2007) Cited 319 times 1 Legal Analyses
Holding that, at the second stage, plaintiffs must present evidence beyond their own allegations and affidavits
Morisky v. Pub. Serv. Elec. & Gas Co.
111 F. Supp. 2d 493 (D.N.J. 2000) Cited 293 times 1 Legal Analyses
Finding that an exemption inquiry was "extremely individual and fact intensive," and deciding that "the individual nature of the inquiry required make collective treatment improper in this case"
White v. MPW Indus. Servs., Inc.
236 F.R.D. 363 (E.D. Tenn. 2006) Cited 171 times
Holding that affidavits submitted in support of motion for conditional certification need not meet same evidentiary standards as affidavits submitted in support of summary judgment motions
Rule 23 - Class Actions
Fed. R. Civ. P. 23 Cited 35,111 times 1237 Legal Analyses
Holding that, to certify a class, the court must find that "questions of law or fact common to class members predominate over any questions affecting only individual members"
Section 201 - Short title
29 U.S.C. § 201 Cited 21,014 times 103 Legal Analyses
Setting fourteen as the minimum age for most non-agricultural work
Section 216 - Penalties
29 U.S.C. § 216 Cited 16,456 times 141 Legal Analyses
Holding employers liable for “unpaid minimum wages, or their unpaid overtime compensation”
Section 203 - Definitions
29 U.S.C. § 203 Cited 6,822 times 274 Legal Analyses
Recognizing that "custom or practice" under a collective-bargaining agreement can make changing clothes noncompensable
Section 255 - Statute of limitations
29 U.S.C. § 255 Cited 4,553 times 8 Legal Analyses
Recognizing that not all FLSA wage and overtime claims are willful
Section 790.21 - Time for bringing employee suits
29 C.F.R. § 790.21 Cited 115 times 1 Legal Analyses
Providing that "a cause of action under the Fair Labor Standards Act for . . . unpaid overtime compensation . . . 'accrues' when the employer fails to pay the required compensation for any workweek at the regular pay day for the period in which the workweek ends"

Bradford v. Bolen et al

28 Cited authorities

Holding that district courts have discretion to implement § 216(b)

Holding as long as the EEOC and the company are aware of the nature and scope of the allegations, the purposes behind the administrative filing requirement are satisfied and no injustice or contravention of congressional intent occurs by allowing piggybacking

Holding that the district court erred when it "implicitly and improperly applied a Rule 23-type analysis" to the FLSA

Holding that "the plaintiff must show . . . that his position is similar . . . to the positions held by the putative class members"

Holding that a probation officer not a professional because the job did not require an advanced degree in a specialized field of knowledge

Holding that an automatic meal deduction system was lawful under the FLSA and explaining that compensation is necessary only "when an employee is required to give up a substantial measure of his time"

Holding that, at the second stage, plaintiffs must present evidence beyond their own allegations and affidavits

Finding that an exemption inquiry was "extremely individual and fact intensive," and deciding that "the individual nature of the inquiry required make collective treatment improper in this case"

Holding that affidavits submitted in support of motion for conditional certification need not meet same evidentiary standards as affidavits submitted in support of summary judgment motions

Holding that, to certify a class, the court must find that "questions of law or fact common to class members predominate over any questions affecting only individual members"

Setting fourteen as the minimum age for most non-agricultural work

Holding employers liable for “unpaid minimum wages, or their unpaid overtime compensation”

Recognizing that "custom or practice" under a collective-bargaining agreement can make changing clothes noncompensable

Recognizing that not all FLSA wage and overtime claims are willful

Providing that "a cause of action under the Fair Labor Standards Act for . . . unpaid overtime compensation . . . 'accrues' when the employer fails to pay the required compensation for any workweek at the regular pay day for the period in which the workweek ends"