UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
FOR THE DISTRICT OF COLUMBIA
____________________________________
)
ALI SAADALLAH BELHAS, )
et al., )
) No. 1:05-cv-2167 (PLF)
Plaintiffs, )
)
v. )
) HEARING REQUESTED
MOSHE YA’ALON, )
)
Defendant )
____________________________________)
MEMORANDUM OF POINTS AND AUTHORITIES
IN SUPPORT OF PLAINTIFFS’ OPPOSITION TO
DEFENDANT’S MOTION TO DISMISS THE COMPLAINT
Judith Brown Chomsky
Michael Poulshock
LAW OFFICES OF JUDITH BROWN
CHOMSKY
P.O. Box 29726
Elkins Park, PA 19027
Phone: (215) 782-8367
Fax: (215) 782-8368
Maria LaHood
Jennie Green
William Goodman
CENTER FOR CONSTITUTIONAL
RIGHTS
666 Broadway, 7th Floor
New York, NY 10012
Phone: (212) 614-6434
Fax: (212) 614-6499
James R. Klimaski (243543)
Klimaski & Associates, P.C.
1819 L Street NW, 7th Floor
Washington, DC 20036
Phone: (202) 296-5600
Fax: (202) 296-5601
Case 1:05-cv-02167-PLF Document 8 Filed 05/15/2006 Page 1 of 63
i
TABLE OF CONTENTS
TABLE OF AUTHORITIES ......................................................................................... iv
INTRODUCTION ........................................................................................................... 1
ARGUMENT ................................................................................................................... 3
I. THE STANDARD OF REVIEW AND PLAINTIFFS’
RIGHT TO DISCOVERY ................................................................................... 3
II. DEFENDANT IS LIABLE UNDER THE TVPA: THE FSIA
DOES NOT PROVIDE IMMUNITY FROM
PLAINTIFFS’ CLAIMS UNDER THE TVPA ................................................... 5
A. Defendant’s Burden of Proof .......................................................................... 5
B. Defendant Is Not Entitled to Immunity Even If He Acted
with Actual Authority .................................................................................... 6
C. The FSIA Does Not Provide Defendant with Immunity from
Claims under the ATS Because He Acted Outside the Scope
of His Authority ........................................................................................... 10
D. Defendant’s Conduct Was Not Within the Scope of his
Lawful Authority .......................................................................................... 12
1. Defendant acted outside the scope of his authority under
international law norms .......................................................................... 15
a. Attacks on the United Nations as war crimes .................................. 15
b. The prohibition against extrajudicial killing .................................... 17
c. Attacks on civilians as war crimes ................................................... 18
d. Crimes against humanity .................................................................. 19
2. Defendant acted outside the scope of his authority
under Israeli law ..................................................................................... 21
a. Israeli law incorporates customary international law ....................... 22
b. Israeli law cannot authorize conduct in derogation
of binding principles of international law (jus cogens) .................... 23
E. Discovery is Required to Permit Resolution of Factual
Disputes Raised by Defendant ..................................................................... 26
Case 1:05-cv-02167-PLF Document 8 Filed 05/15/2006 Page 2 of 63
ii
III. PLAINTIFFS’ CLAIMS DO NOT IMPLICATE THE
POLITICAL QUESTION DOCTRINE .......................................................... 28
A. Under the ATS, Courts Have Routinely Adjudicated
Claims Touching Upon Issues of Foreign Policy ...................................... 29
B. Courts Have Adjudicated Claims Relating to Political and
Military Decisions, the Middle East, and Other Sensitive
Regions of the World ................................................................................ 30
C. The Defendant Has Failed to Show that Any of the
Baker v. Carr Factors Are Present ............................................................ 35
1. There is a clear textual commitment of this issue
to the judicial branch ........................................................................... 36
2. There are judicially discoverable and manageable
standards for resolving the issues in this case ..................................... 37
3. Baker Factors Three Through Six ....................................................... 38
IV. THE ACT OF STATE DOCTRINE DOES NOT BAR
PLAINTIFFS’ CLAIMS ................................................................................. 40
A. Defendant Has Not Met His Burden to Prove an Act of State .................. 40
B. Defendant Has Failed to Prove that the Validity of an
Official “Act of State” Within Sovereign Territory Is at Issue ................. 40
1. The act of state doctrine does not apply because the act
alleged occurred outside of Israel’s sovereign territory ...................... 41
2. The act of state doctrine does not bar Plaintiffs’ claims
because Defendant failed to establish an “official” act of state .......... 42
3. The act of state doctrine does not bar plaintiffs’ claims
because they do not require the Court to declare an
official act invalid ............................................................................... 44
C. Even if an Act of State Were at Issue, the Sabbatino Factors
Would Counsel Against Application of the Doctrine ............................... 45
Case 1:05-cv-02167-PLF Document 8 Filed 05/15/2006 Page 3 of 63
iii
D. Defendant Need Not Have Ordered the Attack on the
United Nations Compound to Be Held Liable .......................................... 47
CONCLUSION .............................................................................................................. 48
Case 1:05-cv-02167-PLF Document 8 Filed 05/15/2006 Page 4 of 63
iv
TABLE OF AUTHORITIES
* Indicates those cases upon which Plaintiff chiefly relies
Federal Cases
A.T.&T. v. Iowa Utilities Bd., 525 U.S. 366 (1999) .......................................................... 8
Adickes v. S.H.Kress Co., 398 U.S. 144 (1970) ................................................................ 7
Aktepe v. US, 105 F.3d 1400 (11th Cir. 1997) ................................................................ 33
Alejandre v. Republic of Cuba, 996 F. Supp. 1239 (S.D. Fla. 1997) ....................... 17, 18
Alfred Dunhill of London, Inc. v. Republic of Cuba, 425 U.S. 682 (1976) ............. 40, 42
Alperin v. Vatican Bank, 410 F.3d 532 (9th Cir. 2005) ................................................ 30
American International Group, Inc. v. Islamic Republic of Iran, 493 F. Supp. 522
(D.D.C. 1980) ............................................................................................................ 15
Antolok v. United States, 873 F.2d 369 (D.C. Cir. 1989) ................................................ 30
Argentine Republic v. Amerada Hess Shipping Corp., 488 U.S. 428 (1989) ................. 25
Baglab Ltd. v. Johnson Matthey Bankers Ltd., 665 F.Supp. 289 (S.D.N.Y.1987) ........... 6
*Baker v. Carr, 369 U.S. 186 (1962) .................................................................. 28, 35, 38
Barnhart v. Sigmon Coal Company, 524 U.S. 438 (2002) ................................................ 8
Barrett v. United States, 646 F. Supp. 1345 (S.D.N.Y. 1986) ........................................ 28
Biton v. Palestinian Interim Self Gov't Auth., 310 F. Supp. 2d 172 (D.D.C. 2004) ("Biton
I") ................................................................................................................................. 30
Biton v. Palestinian Interim Self-Gov't Auth., 412 F. Supp. 2d 1 (D.D.C. 2005) ("Biton
II") .............................................................................................................. 31, 38, 41, 43
Brown v. United States, 12 U.S. (8 Cranch) 110 (1814) ................................................. 34
Byrd v. Corporacion Forestal y Indus. de Olancho S.A., 182 F.3d 380 (5th Cir. 1999) 10
Cabello v. Fernandez-Larios, 402 F.3d 1148 (11th Cir. 2005) ...................................... 48
Case 1:05-cv-02167-PLF Document 8 Filed 05/15/2006 Page 5 of 63
v
Cabiri v. Assasie-Gyimah, 921 F. Supp. 1189 (S.D.N.Y. 1996) ............................... 13, 14
Caminetti v. United States, 242 U.S. 470, 37 S.Ct. 192, 194, 61 L.Ed. 442 (1917) ......... 9
Carmichael v. United Tech. Corp., 835 F.2d 109 (5th Cir. 1988) .................................. 48
Central Trust Co., Rochester N.Y. v. Offical Creditors' Committee of
Geiger Co. Inc., 454 U.S. 354 (1982) .............................................................................. 9
Chicago & S. Air Lines, Inc. v. Waterman S.S. Corp., 333 U.S. 103 (1948) .................. 30
Chuidian v. Philippine Nat'l Bank, 912 F.2d 1095 (9th Cir. 1990) ................................ 10
Conley v. Gibson, 355 U.S. 41 (1957) .............................................................................. 4
Corrie v. Caterpillar, Inc., 403 F. Supp. 2d 1019 (W.D. Wash. 2005) .......................... 32
Crawford Fitting Co. v. J.T. Gibbons, Inc., 482 U.S. 437 (1987) .................................... 8
*Banco Nacional de Cuba v. Sabbatino, 376 U.S. 398 (1964) ....................... 40-41, 44-46
Daliberti v. Republic of Iraq, 97 F. Supp. 2d 38 (D.D.C. 2006) ....................................... 6
Denegri v. Republic of Chile, No. Civ. A. 86-3085, 1992 WL 91914
(D.D.C. Apr. 1992) ........................................................................................................ 25
Doe v. Israel, 400 F. Supp. 2d 86 (D.D.C. 2005) ................................................ 10, 11, 32
Doe I v. Liu Qi, 349 F. Supp. 2d 1258 (N.D. Cal. 2004) ................................................ 13
Doe v. Saravia, 348 F. Supp. 2d 1112 (E.D. Cal. 2002) ................................................. 17
Doe v. Unocal Corp., 963 F. Supp. 880 (C.D. Cal. 1997) ........................................ 43, 46
El-Fadl v. Central Bank of Jordan, 75 F.3d 668 (D.C. Cir. 1996) ........................... 10, 12
*El-Hadad v. Embassy of the United Arab Emirates, 69 F. Supp. 2d 69
(D.D.C. 1999) ................................................................................................................. 41
El-Shifa Pharmaceutical Ind. Co. v. United States, 402 F. Supp. 2d 267
(D.D.C. 2005) ........................................................................................................... 32, 33
Filartiga v. Pena-Irala, 630 F.2d 876 (2d Cir. 1980) .............................................. 37, 43
*Flatow v. Islamic Republic of Iran, 999 F. Supp. 1 (D.D.C. 1998) ........................ 41, 43
Case 1:05-cv-02167-PLF Document 8 Filed 05/15/2006 Page 6 of 63
vi
Flynt v. Rumsfeld, 245 F. Supp. 2d 94 (D.D.C. 2003) .................................................... 34
Ford ex rel. Estate of Ford v. Garcia, 289 F.3d 1283 (11th Cir. 2002) .......................... 47
Forti v. Suarez-Mason, 672 F. Supp. 1531 (N.D. Cal. 1987) ................................... 17, 47
Galu v. SwissAir, 873 F.2d 650 (2d Cir. 1989) ............................................................... 42
Gilmore v. Palestinian Interim Self-Gov’t Auth., -- F. Supp. 2d --,
2006 WL 711264 (D.D.C. 2006) ................................................................................... 31
Gordon v. National Youth Work Alliance, 675 F.2d 356 (D.C. Cir. 1982) ....................... 4
Gould v. Pechiney Ugine Kuhlmann, 853 F.2d 445 (6th Cir.1988) ................................ 26
Guidry v. Sheet Metal Workers Nat. Pension Fund., 493 U.S. 365 (1998) ...................... 8
Hamdi v. Rumsfeld, 542 U.S. 507 (2004) ........................................................................ 33
Hatahley v. United States, 351 U.S. 173 (1956) ............................................................... 7
Herbert v. National Academy of Sciences, 974 F.2d 192 (D.C.Cir.1992) ...................... 26
*Hilao v. Estate of Marcos, 25 F.3d 1467, 1472 (9th Cir. 1994) .................. 11, 13, 14, 17
Hilao v. Estate of Marcos, 103 F.3d 767 (9th Cir. 1996) .......................................... 47, 48
Hishon v. King & Spalding, 467 U.S. 69 (1984) ............................................................... 6
Hwang Geum Joo, 413 F.3d 45 (D.C. Cir. 2005) .......................................................... 32
*Ibrahim v. Titan Corp., 391 F. Supp. 2d 10 (D.D.C. 2005) .............................. 34, 35, 48
In re Agent Orange Product Liability Litigation, 373 F. Supp. 2d 7
(E.D.N.Y. 2005) ..................................................................................... 24, 34, 37, 38, 48
In re Yamashita, 327 U.S. 1 (1946) .......................................................................... 23, 47
Japan Whaling Ass'n v. American Cetacean Soc., 478 U.S. 221 (1986) ........................ 36
Jerome Stevens Pharms., Inc. v. FDA, 402 F.3d 1249 (D.C. Cir. 2005) ........................... 4
Jimenez v. Aristegueita, 311 F.2d 547 (5th Cir. 1962), cert. denied,
373 U.S. 914 (1963) ....................................................................................................... 43
Case 1:05-cv-02167-PLF Document 8 Filed 05/15/2006 Page 7 of 63
vii
*Jungquist v. Sheikh Sultan Bin Khalifa Al Nahyan, 115 F. 3d 1020
(D.C. Cir. 1997) ................................................................................................. 10-12, 26
*Kadic v. Karadzic, 70 F.3d 232 (2d Cir. 1995) ..................... 17-18, 29-30, 35-38, 43, 45
Keller v. Nigerian Bank, 277 F.3d 811 (6th Cir. 2003) ................................................... 13
Kilburn v. Socialist People's Libyan Arab Jamahiriyi, 376 F.3d 1123
(D.C. Cir. 2004) ............................................................................................................... 5
Kinetic Instruments, Inc. v. Lares, 802 F. Supp. 976 (S.D.N.Y. 1992) .......................... 27
Klieman v. Palestinian Authority, 2006 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 13797
(D.D.C. 2006) ..................................................................................................... 30, 36, 37
Klinghoffer v. S.N.C. Achille Lauro, 739 F. Supp. 854 (S.D.N.Y. 1990) ....................... 29
Klinghoffer v. S.N.C. Achille Lauro, 937 F.2d (S.D.N.Y. 1990) ........................ 31, 36-38
Knox v. PLO, 306 F. Supp. 2d 424 (S.D.N.Y. 2004) ...................................................... 31
Koohi v. United States, 976 F.2d 1328 (9th Cir. 1992) ................................................... 34
Kowal v. MCI Communications Corp., 16 F.3d 1271 (D.C. Cir. 1994) ........................... 6
Linde v. Arab Bank, 384 F. Supp. 2d 571 (E.D.N.Y. 2005) ............................................ 31
Linder v. Portocarrero, 963 F.2d 332 (11th Cir. 1992) ............................................ 35, 43
Liu v. Republic of China, 892 F.2d 1419 (9th Cir. 1989) .......................................... 42, 46
Mehinovic v. Vukovic, 198 F. Supp. 2d 1322 (N.D. Ga. 2002) ....................................... 24
Moran v. Saudi Arabia, 27 F.3d 169 (5th Cir. 1994) ...................................................... 26
Morton v. Mancari, 417 U.S. 535 (1974) .......................................................................... 8
Mujica v. Occidental Petroleum Corp., 381 F. Supp. 2d 1164 (C.D. Cal. 2005) ..... 17, 24
National Coalition Gov't of Union of Burma (NCGUB), 176 F.R.D. 329
(C.D. Cal. 1997) ....................................................................................................... 24, 44
Neitzke v. Williams, 490 U.S. 319 (1989) ......................................................................... 6
Case 1:05-cv-02167-PLF Document 8 Filed 05/15/2006 Page 8 of 63
viii
New v. Rumsfeld, 350 F. Supp. 2d 80 (D.D.C. 2004) ...................................................... 28
New York Times Co. v. United States, 403 U.S. 713 (1971) ........................................... 34
Oppenheimer Fund, Inc. v. Sanders, 437 U.S. 340 (1978) ............................................. 27
Park v. Shin, 313 F.3d 1138 (9th Cir. 2002) ................................................................... 12
The Paquete Habana, 175 U.S. 677 (1900) .............................................................. 25, 34
Paul v. Avril, 901 F. Supp. 330 (S.D. Fla. 1994) ............................................................ 47
*Phoenix Consulting Co. v. Republic of Angola, 216 F.3d 36 (D.C. Cir. 2000) .. 6, 26, 27
Pipefitters Local Union No. 562 v. United States, 407 U.S. 385 (1972) .......................... 9
Prakash v. American Univ., 727 F.2d 1174 (D.C. Cir. 1984) ..................................... 4, 27
Presbyterian Church of Sudan v. Talisman Energy, Inc., 244 F. Supp. 2d 289 (S.D.N.Y.
2003) ("Presbyterian I") ........................................................................ 18, 23, 35-39, 43
Presbyterian Church of Sudan v. Talisman Energy, Inc, 374 F. Supp. 2d 331 (S.D.N.Y.
2005) ("Presybterian II") .............................................................................................. 23
Princz v. Federal Republic of Germany, 26 F.3d 1166 (D.C. Cir. 1994) ......................... 6
Ramirez de Arellano v. Weinberger, 788 F.2d 762 (D.C. Cir. 1986) .............................. 34
Ramirez de Arellano v. Weinberger, 745 F.2d 1500 (D.C. Cir. 1984), vacated, 471 U.S.
1113 (1985) .................................................................................................................. 40
Rasul v. Bush, 542 U.S. 466 (2004) ................................................................................ 33
Republic of Austria v. Altmann, 541 U.S. 677 (2004) ................................................. 3, 41
Republic of Philippines v. Marcos, 862 F.2d 1355 (9th Cir. 1988),
cert. denied, 490 U.S. 1035 (1989) ................................................................................ 37
Risk v. Kingdom of Norway, 707 F. Supp. 1159 (N.D. Cal. 1989),
aff'd, 936 F. 2d 393 (9th Cir. 1991) ............................................................................... 42
Robinson v. Shell Oil Co., 519 U.S. 337 (1997) ............................................................... 8
Roe v. Unocal Corp., 70 F. Supp. 2d 1073 (C.D. Cal. 1999) .......................................... 44
Case 1:05-cv-02167-PLF Document 8 Filed 05/15/2006 Page 9 of 63
ix
Saltany v. Reagan, 702 F. Supp. 319 (D.D.C. 1988) ...................................................... 44
Sarei v. Rio Tinto Plc, 221 F. Supp. 2d 1116 (C.D. Cal. 2002) ...................................... 43
Saudi Arabia v. Nelson, 507 U.S. 349 (1993) ............................................................. 6, 25
Schneider v. Kissinger, 412 F.3d 190 (D.C. Cir. 2005) .................................................. 33
Sharon v. Time, 599 F. Supp. 538 (S.D.N.Y. 1984) ...................................... 31, 43, 45, 46
*Sosa v. Alvarez-Machain, 542 U.S. 692 (2004) .............................. 18, 26, 29, 30, 36, 45
Tachiona v. United States, 386 F.3d 205 (2d Cir. 2004) ............................................ 16-17
Taylor v. F.D.I.C., 132 F.3d 753 (D.C. Cir. 1997) ............................................................ 3
Tel-Oren v. Libyan Arab Republic, 726 F.2d 774 (D.C. Cir. 1984) ................................ 36
Trajano v. Marcos, 978 F.2d 493 (9th Cir. 1992) ..................................................... 13, 25
Transaero, Inc. v. La Fuerza Aero Boliviana, 30 F.3d 148 (D.C. Cir. 1994) ................. 25
Transamerican S.S. Corp. v. Somali Democratic Republic,
767 F.2d 998 (D.C. Cir. 1985) ......................................................................................... 6
Underhill v. Hernandez, 168 U.S. 250 (1897) .................................................... 40, 41, 43
Ungar v. Palestinian Liberation Org., 402 F. 3d 274 (1st Cir. 2005) ............................ 31
United States v. Montreal Trust Co., 358 F.2d 239 (2d Cir. 1966) ................................. 28
United States v. Estate of Romani, 523 U.S. 517 (1998) .................................................. 8
Velasco v. Government of Indonesia, 370 F.3d 392 (4th Cir. 2004) ............................. 10
W. S. Kirkpatrick & Co. v. Environmental Tectonics Corp., Int'l,
493 U.S. 400 (1990) ........................................................................................... 41, 44, 45
Warren v. District of Columbia, 353 F.3d 36 (D.C. Cir. 2004) ........................................ 4
Wilderness Soc. v. Griles, 824 F.2d 4 (D.C. Cir. 1987) .................................................... 4
Wiwa v. Royal Dutch Petroleum, 226 F.3d 88 (2d Cir. 2000) .................................. 17, 36
Xuncax v. Gramajo, 886 F. Supp. 162 (D. Mass. 1995) ..................... 13-14, 17-18, 35, 47
Case 1:05-cv-02167-PLF Document 8 Filed 05/15/2006 Page 10 of 63
x
Youngstown Sheet & Tube Co. v. Sawyer, 343 U.S. 579 (1952) ..................................... 33
Federal Statutes and Legislative History
*Alien Tort Statute (ATS) (28 U.S.C. § 1350) ........................................................ passim
Anti-Terrorism Act (ATA) (18 U.S.C. § 2331) .................................................. 36, 38, 39
Foreign Sovereign Immunities Act (FSIA) (28 U.S.C. §§ 1602-11) .......................... 3-27
S. Rep. No. 249, 102nd Cong., (1st Sess. 1991) ............................................. 9, 43, 47, 48
*Torture Victim Protection Act (TVPA) (28 U.S.C. § 1350 note) .......................... passim
Rules
*Fed. R. Civ. Proc., Rules 12(b)(1), (6) ........................................................ 3, 4, 6, 27, 40
Restatements
Restatement (Third) of Agency § 2.01 (Tentative Draft No. 2, 2001) ............................ 7
Restatement (Third) of Agency § 2.03 (Tentative Draft No. 2, 2001) ............................ 7
Restatement (Third) of Agency § 8.09 cmt. b (Tentative Draft No. 6, 2005) ................ 7
Restatement (Second) of Foreign Relations Law § 41 (1962) ........................................ 43
Restatement (Third) of Foreign Relations Law of the United States
§ 102 cmt. k. (1986) ....................................................................................................... 24
Restatement (Third) of Foreign Relations Law of the United States § 702(c) (1986) .... 17
Foreign and International Cases
Aita v. Regional Commander of Judea and Samaria, HCJ 69/81
(High Ct. 1983) (Israel) .................................................................................................... 22
Case 1:05-cv-02167-PLF Document 8 Filed 05/15/2006 Page 11 of 63
xi
The Beit Sourik Case, HCJ 2056/04 (High Ct.2004) (Israel) .......................................... 22
Mara'abe v. The Prime Minister of Israel, HCJ 7957/04 (High Ct. 2005) (Israel) ......... 22
Physicians for Human Rights, et al., v. Commander of the IDF Forces
in the Gaza Strip, HCJ 4764/04 (High Ct. 2004) (Israel) ................................................ 23
Yassin v. Commander of Kziot Military Camp, HCJ 5591/02 (High Ct. 2002) (Israel) . 22
Prosecutor v. Hadzihasanovic, IT-01-47-AR72 (ICTY) (16 July 2003) ........................ 47
International Documents
Additional Protocol to the Geneva Conventions of 12 August 1949,
and relating to the Protection of Victims of International Armed Conflicts,
8 June 1977 (Protocol I), available at http://www.genevaconventions.org/
(last visited May 14, 2006) ............................................................................. 1, 14, 19, 47
American Declaration of the Rights and Duties of Man, May 2, 1948, OEA/ser.L/V/II.23,
doc. 21, rev. 6 (1979) ................................................................................................... 17
Charter of the International Military Tribunal, Aug. 8, 1945, 82 U.N.T.S. 279 (1945), in
The Nurnberg Trial, 6 F.R.D. 69 (Int’l. Milit. Trib.1946) ........................................... 21
Charter of the United Nations (Oct. 24, 1945), available at http://www.un.org ............ 16
Control Council Law No. 10, Punishment of Persons Guilty of War Crimes, Crimes
Against Peace and Humanity, December 20, 1945, 3 Official Gazette Control Council
for Germany 50-55 (1946), quoted in United States v. Flick, 6 Trials of War Criminals
Before the Nuremberg Military Tribunals Under Control Council Law No. 10, 1191
(1949) ........................................................................................................................... 21
Convention on the Safety of United Nations and Associated Personnel (1994), G.A. res.
49/59, 49 U.N. GAOR Supp. (No. 49) at 299, U.N. Doc. A/49/49 (1994) .................. 17
Geneva Conventions of Aug. 12, 1949, 6 U.S.T. 3516, 75 U.S.T.S. 287 (Convention for
the Amelioration of the Condition of the Wounded and Sick in Armed Forces in the
Field; Convention for the Amelioration of the Condition of Wounded, Sick and
Shipwrecked Members of Armed Forces at Sea; Convention Relative to the Treatment
of Prisoners of War; Convention Relative to the Protection of Civilian Persons in Time
of War) ......................................................................................................................... 18
Case 1:05-cv-02167-PLF Document 8 Filed 05/15/2006 Page 12 of 63
xii
* Geneva Convention for the Protection of Civilians in Time of War,
Aug. 12, 1949, 6 U.S.T. 3516 (Fourth Geneva Convention) ................................. passim
Hague Conventions (International Convention With Respect to the
Laws and Customs of War by Land (1899); Convention Concerning the
Laws and Customs of War on Land (1907)), available at
http://www.yale.edu/lawweb/avalon/lawofwar/hague04.htm .................................. 18, 20
International Committee of the Red Cross, Customary International Humanitarian Law
Study, II Jean-Marie Henckaerts & Louise Doswald-Beck, Customary International
Humanitarian Law: Practice (2005) ....................................................................... 16, 19
International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights, Dec. 16, 1966, G.A. Res. 2200,
U.N. GAOR, 21st Sess., Supp. No. 16, U.N. Doc. A/6316, 999 U.N.T.S. 171 ........... 15
International Military Tribunal (Nuremberg), Judgment and Sentences (1946), reprinted
in 41 Am. J. Int'l L. 172, 221 (1947) ............................................................................ 26
Rome Statute of the International Criminal Court (1998), U.N. doc. A/CONF. 183/9*,
July 17, 1998, available at http://www.icc-
cpi.int/library/about/officialjournal/Rome_Statute_120704-EN.pdf ..................... 16, 21
UN General Assembly, Res. 50/22 C, 25 April 1996 ..................................................... 15
UN Secretary-General, Report of the Secretary-General Pursuant to Paragraph 2 of
Security Council Resolution 808, U.N. Doc. S/25704 (May 3, 1993), adopted by the
Security Council, S.C. Res. 827 (May 25, 1993) ................................................... 19, 21
UN Secretary-General, Report dated 1 May 1996 of the Secretary-General’s Military
Adviser concerning the shelling of the United Nations compound at Qana on 18 April
1996, UN Doc. S/1996/337, 7 May 1996 ................................................................ 1, 21
UN Security Council, Res. 587, 23 September 1986 ...................................................... 16
UN Security Council, Res. 467, 24 April 1980 ............................................................... 16
Statute of the International Tribunal for the Former Yugoslavia, S/25704/Ann.1, 32
I.L.M. 1192, adopted S/Res/827, 32 I.L.M. 1203 (May 25, 1993) .............................. 18
Statute of the International Tribunal for Rwanda, S/RES/955/Ann.1, 33 I.L.M 1602 (Nov.
8, 1994) ........................................................................................................................ 21
Universal Declaration of Human Rights, Dec. 10, 1948, G.A. Res. 217A(III), U.N. Doc.
A/810 ............................................................................................................................ 17
Case 1:05-cv-02167-PLF Document 8 Filed 05/15/2006 Page 13 of 63
xiii
Vienna Convention on the Law of Treaties, May 23, 1969, 1155 U.N.T.S. 331 (entered
into force Jan. 27, 1980) .............................................................................................. 24
Other
M. Cherif Bassiouni, CRIMES AGAINST HUMANITY IN INTERNATIONAL CRIMINAL LAW
(1999) ........................................................................................................................... 15
M. Cherif Bassiouni, “Crimes Against Humanity” in Roy Gutman and David Rieff, eds.,
Crimes of War: What the Public Should Know, W.W. Norton (1999), available at
www.crimesofwar.org/ thebook/crimes-against-humanity.html (last visited May 11,
2006) ............................................................................................................................ 20
Derek Brown, “Gunners’ cover is blown,” The Guardian (May 11, 1996) .................... 27
Antonio Cassese, The Geneva Protocols of 1977 on the Humanitarian Law of Armed
Conflict and Customary International Law, 3 UCLA Pac. Basin L. J. 55 (1984) ........ 14
Commentary on the Additional Protocols to the Geneva Conventions, Theodor Meron,
The Geneva Conventions as Customary Law, 81 AM. J. INT'L L. 348 (1987) ................. 19
Barbara G.B. Ferguson, “US committed to peace process, Clinton assures Arab-
Americans,” Saudi Gazette (Aug. 8, 1996) .................................................................. 39
Christopher Greenwood, Customary Law Status of the 1977 Geneva Protocols, in
Humanitarian Law of Armed Conflict: Challenges Ahead 93 (Astrid J.M. Delissen &
Gerard J. Tanja eds., 1991) .......................................................................................... 14
Jean-Marie Henckaerts & Louise Doswald-Beck, Customary International Humanitarian
Law: Rules (2005) ........................................................................................................ 19
Law of War Booklet (Israel) (1986) ................................................................................. 19
Memorandum for the United States Submitted to the Court of Appeals for the Second
Circuit in Filártiga v. Peña-Irala, 19 I.L.M. 585, reprinted in 12 Hastings Int’l &
Comp. L. Rev. 34 (1988) ............................................................................................. 29
United States Air Force Pamphlet (1976) ....................................................................... 19
U.S. Dep’t of State Daily Press Briefing (Apr. 19, 1996), available at
http://www.hri.org/docs/statedep/ 1996/96-04-19.std.html ..................................... 5, 39
Case 1:05-cv-02167-PLF Document 8 Filed 05/15/2006 Page 14 of 63
1 Report dated 1 May 1996 of the Secretary General’s Military Advisor concerning the
shelling of the United Nations Compound on at Qana on 18 April 1996 and Addendum
dated 7 May 1996 at ¶3 (“Report to Security Council”).
2 Plaintiffs’ claims against Defendant are based on allegations of direct responsibility,
aiding and abetting liability, and command responsibility. Complaint at ¶¶ 2, 22.
-1-
INTRODUCTION
On April 18, 1996, shells were fired at the United Nations station in Qana,
Lebanon. Over one hundred villagers who had taken refuge there were killed and even
more were injured. Most of the civilians sheltered in the UN compound were women,
children, and elderly people. Fijian soldiers stationed with the UN mission were also
injured. A UN review of the incident concluded that it was “unlikely that the shelling of
the United Nations compound was the result of a gross technical and/or procedural
error.” Exhibit 1 to the Declaration of James Klimaski (Klimaski Dcl.) at ¶13.1 The
decision to attack the United Nations compound was made with the participation of
Defendant Moshe Ya’alon, who at that time was head of the intelligence branch of the
Israeli military.2 Intentional and indiscriminate attacks on civilians are a violation of the
law of nations and a war crime, as are attacks on UN facilities.
It is clear that the attack on the United Nations compound and upon the displaced
Lebanese civilians was prohibited by Israeli law and policies. Exhibit 1 at ¶8. Indeed,
the submissions by Defendant only seek to excuse it as accidental, an excuse which is
contradicted by the official UN report quoted above. Even if the assault on the United
Nations compound were accidental, the killing and injuring of the civilians there would
be war crimes because of failure to take “constant care” to spare civilians. Protocol
Additional to the Geneva Conventions of 12 August 1949 (“Protocol I”), Chap. IV, Art.
57, (Protocol I), June 8, 1977, 1125 U.N.T.S. 3 Nothing submitted by Defendant
Case 1:05-cv-02167-PLF Document 8 Filed 05/15/2006 Page 15 of 63
-2-
suggests that an attack on unarmed civilians and on a United Nations installation was
legal under either Israeli or international law.
Defendant’s recitation concerning the designation of Hezbollah as a terrorist
organization is irrelevant to the issue of the attack on a United Nations compound or the
killing of unarmed civilians who had taken refuge there. None of the diplomatic
activities alluded to by Defendant provided or were intended to provide a remedy for
those killed and injured at Qana. This case is not about the military conflict between
Hezbollah and Israel or about Israel’s occupation of Southern Lebanon. This case deals
only with the question of liability for an attack on a target which was prohibited by
international humanitarian law, which binds all nations and individuals without
exception. The complaint alleges that Defendant had direct, aiding and abetting and
command responsibility for the violations.
The fact that this incident occurred in the Middle East and the fact that Defendant
is a former head of Israeli military intelligence may generate strong emotions but it does
not create a nonjusticiable political question. The fact that, at other times and in other
places, Israelis suffer death and injury does not justify the intentional murder of Lebanese
civilians or the assault on a United Nations compound that had given them shelter and
humanitarian relief.
Despite Defendant Ya’alon’s repeated assertions to the contrary, he is not the
government of Israel and is not entitled to a presumption of immunity. Although
wrapped in rhetorical flourishes and references to events unrelated to the issue before the
Court, Defendant’s Motion raises three core issues. First, Defendant is not entitled to
immunity. The Torture Victim Protection Act (TVPA), 28 U.S.C. § 1350 (note),
Case 1:05-cv-02167-PLF Document 8 Filed 05/15/2006 Page 16 of 63
-3-
provides liability for extrajudicial killing even if Defendant’s conduct was authorized.
Further, the Foreign Sovereign Immunities Act (FSIA), 28 U.S.C. §§ 1602-11, does not
apply to those acting outside the scope of their authority under the applicable domestic
law or international law, and does not preclude claims against officials for war crimes,
crimes against humanity, extrajudicial killing, and cruel, inhuman, or degrading
treatment or punishment. Thus, Plaintiffs’ claims under the Alien Tort Statute (ATS), 28
U.S.C. § 1350, are justiciable. Second, this suit is not barred by the political question
doctrine because the issue of liability raised here is committed, by constitution and
statute, to the courts, and is otherwise justiciable. Third, the suit is not barred by the act
of state doctrine because the act occurred outside Israel’s sovereign territory and was not
an official act authorized by law.
ARGUMENT
I. THE STANDARD OF REVIEW AND PLAINTIFFS’ RIGHT TO
DISCOVERY.
Defendant moves to dismiss under Rule 12(b)(1), based on sovereign immunity
and political question grounds, and under Rule 12(b)(6), based on the act of state
doctrine, which is non-jurisdictional. See, Republic of Austria v. Altmann, 541 U.S. 676,
679 (2004) (contrasting act of state as a substantive defense with a claim of sovereign
immunity which is jurisdictional). For purposes of a motion to dismiss under Rule
12(b)(6), the well-pleaded factual allegations of the complaint are accepted as true, and
all inferences are drawn in favor of the plaintiffs. Taylor v. F.D.I.C, 132 F.3d 753, 762
(D.C. Cir. 1997). Dismissal is appropriate only when “it appears beyond doubt that the
plaintiff can prove no set of facts in support of his claim which would entitle him to
Case 1:05-cv-02167-PLF Document 8 Filed 05/15/2006 Page 17 of 63
3 Plaintiffs contend that much of the evidence upon which Defendant relies is
incompetent and/or irrelevant. Plaintiffs’ objections are filed concurrently with this
Memorandum.
-4-
relief.” Conley v. Gibson, 355 U.S. 41, 45-46 (1957); Warren v. District of Columbia,
353 F.3d 36, 37 (D.C. Cir. 2004). Thus, Defendant’s motion to dismiss based on the act
of state doctrine must be considered on the basis of the pleadings alone.
While the district court may consider materials outside the pleadings in deciding
whether to grant a motion to dismiss for lack of jurisdiction, the court must still accept all
of the factual allegations in the complaint as true. Jerome Stevens Pharms., Inc. v. FDA,
402 F.3d 1249, 1253-54 (D.C. Cir. 2005). When a court decides under either Rule
12(b)(1) or Rule 12(b)(6) to consider matters outside the pleadings, it should so inform
the parties and set a schedule for submitting additional affidavits and documents if the
parties wish. Gordon v. National Youth Work Alliance, 675 F.2d 356, 361 (D.C. Cir.
1982). See also, Wilderness Soc. v. Griles, 824 F.2d 4, 16 n.10 (D.C. Cir. 1987) (under
Rule 12(b)(1), a district court “must give the plaintiff the opportunity to discover
evidence relevant to his jurisdictional claim”); Prakash v. American Univ., 727 F.2d
1174, 1179-80 (D.C. Cir. 1984) (court must afford party not moving for subject-matter
dismissal “an ample opportunity to secure and present evidence relevant to the existence
of jurisdiction.”).
Herein, Defendant relies extensively on material outside the pleading to support
each of his grounds for dismissal.3 Much of his motion attempts to controvert facts
alleged in the Complaint. For example, Defendant argues that the attack on the United
Nations compound and the killing of the civilians who had taken refuge there was simply
Case 1:05-cv-02167-PLF Document 8 Filed 05/15/2006 Page 18 of 63
4 The statement by then President Clinton regretting the “tragic misfiring” (Memo. at 2)
was made before the United Nations investigation, which refuted the claim of accident,
was completed. In a subsequent statement, the White House denied that the U.S. had
reached a conclusion about Qana. See, e.g., “What the President did was, rather than
engage in any kind of blame-laying on one side or another, he underscored what's got to
happen now, looking proactively at the situation.” U.S. Department of State Daily Press
Briefing (Apr. 19, 1996), http://www.hri.org/docs/statedep/1996/96-04-19.std.html.
While the President spoke of the diplomatic role for the executive after the Qana
bombing, he never advocated or even suggested that the innocent victims of the Qana
bombing should not be compensated for their injuries or the deaths of family members.
Nothing in the President’s statements call for the judiciary to abdicate its role of deciding
questions of liability for an individual official involved in the attack.
5 Because the incident at Qana was the subject of an investigation by the military advisor
to the Secretary-General of the United Nations, Israel’s security would not be
compromised by discovery.
-5-
an unfortunate error.4 Memorandum of Points and Authorities in Support of Moshe
Ya’alon’s Motion to Dismiss the Complaint (Memo.) at 2, 6. Plaintiffs allege that it was
deliberate. Complaint at ¶¶ 18, 96. As set forth below, if the shelling of the compound
was deliberate or carried out in a manner inconsistent with the duty of constant care for
civilians, it violated both international and Israeli law. See infra at IID. Defendant’s
claim that he is entitled to immunity is entirely dependent on the assertion that he acted
within the scope of his authority. Thus, at the least, Plaintiffs should be entitled to
discover the factual basis of this claim.5
II. DEFENDANT IS LIABLE UNDER THE TVPA: THE FSIA DOES NOT
PROVIDE IMMUNITY FROM PLAINTIFFS’ CLAIMS UNDER THE
TVPA.
A. Defendant’s Burden of Proof.
“‘In accordance with the restrictive view of sovereign immunity reflected in the
FSIA,’ the defendant bears the burden of proving that the plaintiff's allegations do not
bring its case within a statutory exception to immunity.” Kilburn v. Socialist People’s
Case 1:05-cv-02167-PLF Document 8 Filed 05/15/2006 Page 19 of 63
-6-
Libyan Arab Jamahiriyi, 376 F.3d 1123, 1131 (D.C. Cir. 2004) quoting Phoenix
Consulting Co. v. Republic of Angola, 216 F.3d 36, 40 (D.C. Cir. 2000), quoting
Transamerican S.S. Corp. v. Somali Democratic Republic, 767 F.2d 998, 1002 (D.C. Cir.
1985); see also, Princz v. Federal Republic of Germany, 26 F.3d 1166, 1171 (D.C. Cir.
1994). In Daliberti v. Republic of Iraq, 97 F. Supp. 2d 38, 42-43 (D.D.C. 2006)
(Friedman, J.), this Court reviewed the burden of proof on a Rule12(b)(1) motion relying
on the FSIA.:
A court may dismiss a complaint brought under the FSIA only if it
appears beyond doubt that plaintiffs can prove no set of facts in support of
their claims that would entitle them to relief. See Neitzke v. Williams, 490
U.S. 319, 326-27 (1989) (quoting Hishon v. King & Spalding, 467 U.S.
69, 73 (1984); Kowal v. MCI Communications Corp., 16 F.3d 1271, 1276
(D.C. Cir. 1994); cf. Saudi Arabia v. Nelson, 507 U.S. at 351, 113 S.Ct.
1471 (in reviewing dismissal under FSIA, court accepts all factual
allegations as true). Once plaintiff has produced evidence that an
exception applies, defendant must produce evidence of its entitlement to
immunity; “[i]f any of the exceptions appears in the pleadings or is not
refuted by the foreign state asserting the defense, the motion to dismiss the
complaint must be denied.” Baglab Ltd. v. Johnson Matthey Bankers Ltd.,
665 F.Supp. 289, 294 (S.D.N.Y. 1987).
Again, Plaintiffs should be afforded the opportunity to take limited discovery of
issues raised under Rule 12(b)(1), including evidence of the factual and legal authority on
which Defendant relies to support his claim that he was acting within the scope of his
authority.
B. Defendant Is Not Entitled to Immunity Even If He Acted with Actual
Authority.
The unambiguous language of the TVPA provides for liability where an
“individual who, under actual or apparent authority or color of law, of any foreign
nation...subjects an individual to extrajudicial killing....” 28 U.S.C. § 1350 (note), Sec.
Case 1:05-cv-02167-PLF Document 8 Filed 05/15/2006 Page 20 of 63
-7-
2(a)(2) (emphasis added). Each term used in the statute to describe those who may be
liable under the TVPA has distinct meaning. The term “actual authority” has well-
established meaning (see, e.g., Hatahley v. United States, 351 U.S. 173, 180-181 (1956)):
actual authority “arises from a manifestation of consent from principal to agent.” As
described in the RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF AGENCY: “An agent acts with actual authority
when, at the time of taking action that has legal consequences for the principal, the agent
reasonably believes, in accordance with the principal’s manifestations to the agent, that
the principal wishes the agent so to act.” RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF AGENCY §§ 2.01
(TENTATIVE DRAFT NO. 2, 2001), 8.09 CMT. B (TENTATIVE DRAFT NO. 6, 2005).
On the other hand, “apparent authority” is the power held by an agent or other
actor to affect a principal’s legal relations with third parties when a third party reasonably
believes the actor has authority to act on behalf of the principal and that belief is
traceable to the principal’s manifestations. RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF AGENCY § 2.03
(TENTATIVE DRAFT NO. 2, 2001). “A private person acts ‘under color of’ a state statute
or other law when he, like the official, in some way acts consciously pursuant to some
law that gives him aid, comfort, or incentive; or when he acts in conjunction with a state
official.” Adickes v. S.H.Kress Co., 398 U.S. 144, 212 (1970). Thus, the TVPA
unambiguously intended to extend liability even to government officials with “actual
authority,” that is, to those who acted with the consent of the state or an agency of the
state.
In this context, even if Defendant were to provide evidence that he was
“authorized” to participate in an “extrajudicial killing” (i.e., that he had “actual”
authority) by the Israeli government, he would not be immune under the TVPA.
Case 1:05-cv-02167-PLF Document 8 Filed 05/15/2006 Page 21 of 63
-8-
Defendant offers no separate analysis of the terms of the TVPA and offers no
interpretation of the term “actual authority.” “Actual” authority cannot be read to mean
“outside the scope of authority.” Ignoring the explicit language of the TVPA, Defendant
argues that officials of foreign governments are immune from liability if they are acting
in their official capacities. Memo. at 10-16.
The Court’s role in interpreting an unambiguous statute is clear: “As in all
statutory construction cases, we begin with the language of the statute. The first step ‘is
to determine whether the language at issue has a plain and unambiguous meaning with
regard to the particular dispute in the case.’” Barnhart v. Sigmon Coal Company, 534
U.S. 438, 450 (2002), quoting Robinson v. Shell Oil Co., 519 U.S. 337, 340 (1997). The
inquiry ceases “if the statutory language is unambiguous and ‘the statutory scheme is
coherent and consistent.’” Id.
The FSIA makes no reference to the sovereign immunity of foreign officials.
It is a fundamental rule of statutory construction that a later, more specific statute will
trump a more general one. United States v. Estate of Romani, 523 U.S. 517, 530-33
(1998). See also, A.T.&T. v. Iowa Utilities Bd., 525 U.S. 366 410 (1999), quoting
Crawford Fitting Co. v. J.T. Gibbons, Inc., 482 U.S. 437, 445 (1987) (“Where there is no
clear intention otherwise, a specific statute will not be controlled or nullified by a general
one.”); Guidry v. Sheet Metal Workers Nat. Pension Fund. 493 U.S. 365.375 (1998)
quoting Morton v. Mancari, 417 U.S. 535, 550-551 (1974) (“It is an elementary tenet of
statutory construction that ‘[w]here there is no clear intention otherwise, a specific statute
will not be controlled or nullified by a general one...’”).
Case 1:05-cv-02167-PLF Document 8 Filed 05/15/2006 Page 22 of 63
-9-
Here, the TVPA specifically provides that those with actual authority (i.e.,
officials acting within the scope of their authority) can be sued, whereas the FSIA does
not specifically exclude officials (that meaning has been read into an “agency or
instrumentality of a foreign state”). On that basis alone, Defendant’s argument that
inferences drawn from the FSIA negate the clear language of the TVPA must be rejected.
Further, the TVPA is the later of the two statutes, and therefore should take precedence.
Defendant cannot rely on the legislative history to contradict the unambiguous
statutory language. Where the language is unambiguous, it is improper to look to
statements from particular representatives or senators. Such statements “cannot amend
the clear and unambiguous language of a statute.” Id. at 457. The court should not look
beyond the statute to provide an interpretation inconsistent with its plain meaning. “It is
elementary that the meaning of a statute must, in the first instance, be sought in the
language in which the act is framed, and if that is plain, and if the law is within the
constitutional authority of the law-making body which passed it, the sole function of the
courts is to enforce it according to its terms.” Central Trust Co., Rochester N.Y. v.
Official Creditors’ Committee of Geiger Co. Inc., 454 U.S. 354, 359-60 (1982), quoting,
Caminetti v. United States, 242 U.S. 470, 485 (1917). See also, Pipefitters Local Union
No. 562 v. U.S., 407 U.S. 385, 466 (1972). Even if it were necessary to look to the
legislative history, it confirms that “the phrase ‘actual or apparent authority or under
color of law’ is used to denote torture and extrajudicial killings committed by officials
both within and outside the scope of their authority.” S. Rep. No. 102-249, at 7 (1991).
Case 1:05-cv-02167-PLF Document 8 Filed 05/15/2006 Page 23 of 63
-10-
Only one case cited by Defendant involves claims under the TVPA, Doe v. Israel,
400 F. Supp. 2d 86 (D.D.C. 2005). That case involved claims under the ATS and the
TVPA against Israel, its agencies, Prime Minister Sharon and other officials in their
“official” and “individual” capacities, but it contained no distinct analysis of the
applicability of immunity to officials for claims under the TVPA. In the absence of any
analysis of the TVPA, Doe v. Israel cannot support an analysis of the TVPA which is so
at odds with its clear statutory meaning.
C. The FSIA Does Not Provide Defendant with Immunity from Claims
under the ATS Because He Acted Outside the Scope of His Authority.
In the circumstances of this case, where there was a lethal military attack on
unarmed civilians who were then internally displaced persons within the protection of the
United Nations, Defendant’s acts could not fall within the scope of his lawful authority.
Thus, he is not entitled to immunity pursuant to the FSIA.
The FSIA may immunize officials of foreign governments only where they act
within the scope of their lawful authority. Jungquist v. Sheikh Sultan Bin Khalifa Al
Nahyan, 115 F. 3d 1020, 1027 (D.C. Cir. 1997); El-Fadl v. Central Bank of Jordan, 75
F.3d 668, 671 (D.C. Cir. 1996). See also, Chuidian v. Philippine Nat’l Bank, 912 F.2d
1095, 1101-03 (9th Cir. 1990); Velasco v. Government of Indonesia, 370 F.3d 392, 398-
99 (4th Cir. 2004); Byrd v. Corporacion Forestal y Industrial de Olancho S.A., 182 F.3d
380, 388 (5th Cir. 1999).
Jungquist makes clear that foreign officials who act within the authority of their
official positions but contrary to law, are not immune. In Jungquist, 115 F.3d at 1028,
the court found that a defendant was not entitled to immunity under the FSIA for entering
Case 1:05-cv-02167-PLF Document 8 Filed 05/15/2006 Page 24 of 63
-11-
into a contract to pay for medical treatment through a government program in exchange
for the plaintiff’s silence. Although that defendant was authorized to enter into a contract
for medical care, his “corrupt bargain” for silence could not have been authorized. The
mere fact that the conduct was within the powers of Defendant’s official position does
not mean that such conduct was within the scope of his lawful authority. Thus, under
Jungquist, the first step in the analysis of defendant’s claim to immunity is whether the
conduct alleged was within the lawful scope of his authority.
Defendant relies heavily on Doe v. Israel to argue that an official must act from
personal motive to place his conduct outside the scope of his authority. However,
Jungquist clearly mandates that the “relevant inquiry in determining whether an
individual was acting in an official capacity focuses on the nature of the individual's
alleged actions, rather than the alleged motives underlying them.” 115 F.3d at 1028. The
analysis required by Jungquist is binding on the Court. As a policy matter, the subjective
test would create a standard difficult to interpret. Under a subjective standard, the court
would have been required to determine if Marcos’ authorization of torture was motivated
by his desire for personal power or his understanding of the needs of the state. However,
in Hilao, 25 F.3d at 1472, the court concluded that Marcos' acts of torture, execution, and
disappearance were not consistent with Philippine laws and therefore were clearly acts
outside of his authority as President. The court should more properly consider the nature
of the conduct and whether or not the conduct at issue was a lawful exercise of
defendant’s authority. The distinction between private and public function made in
Jungquist cannot be based on motive because Jungquist specifically rejected that
subjective standard. Jungquist is best read as distinguishing between conduct which is
Case 1:05-cv-02167-PLF Document 8 Filed 05/15/2006 Page 25 of 63
-12-
authorized by law and official policy and that which is not. In Jungquist, the Court
assumed that defendant’s “corrupt bargain” was contrary to Saudi policy and law.
El-Fadl, and Park v. Shin, 313 F.3d 1138, 1144 (9th Cir. 2002), on which
Defendant relies, are inapposite to this case. At issue in El-Fadl was a wrongful
termination claim and a dispute regarding whether the terminating official was acting in
his governmental capacity or in his private capacity with a privately owned bank to
which he had been appointed to in order to liquidate the subsidiary. 75 F.3d at 670-71.
The Court concluded that there was no evidence that the conduct at issue was not taken
within the defendant’s capacity as a government official. Id. at 670. In Park, the court
concluded that a deputy consular official was not acting in his official capacity when “ he
hired [a domestic servant] as a personal family employee, paid her with family funds, and
required her to perform work benefitting the Consulate only on a few days each month.”
Neither El-Fadl nor Park addressed the issue of whether, acting as a government official,
defendant was properly authorized to do the alleged acts. The issue herein, as in
Jungquist, is the nature of the official’s conduct, that is, whether it was authorized by
law.
D. Defendant’s Conduct Was Not Within the Scope of his Lawful Authority.
It is clear that, according to the facts alleged, Defendant’s participation in the
attack on the United Nations compound, which had given refuge to unarmed villagers,
was outside the scope of his authority because the attack violated the law of nations and
the laws of Israel. An attack on unarmed civilians is a war crime and one of the crimes
against humanity recognized as binding on all nations. Defendant has failed to present
evidence that acts alleged were within the scope of his lawful authority.
Case 1:05-cv-02167-PLF Document 8 Filed 05/15/2006 Page 26 of 63
-13-
In Hilao v. Estate of Marcos, the court determined that the acts of former
Philippine president Marcos were not immunized by the FSIA because they “were not
taken within any official mandate.” 25 F.3d at 1470. The court concluded that “the
illegal acts of a dictator are not ‘official acts’ unreviewable by federal courts.” Id. at
1471. See also, Trajano v. Marcos, 978 F.2d 493, 496-77 (9th Cir. 1992); Xuncax v.
Gramajo, 886 F. Supp. 162, 175-76 (D. Mass. 1995); Keller v. Central Bank of Nigeria,
277 F.3d 811, 815 (6th Cir. 2002); Cabiri v. Assasie-Gyimah, 921 F. Supp. 1189, 1197
(S.D.N.Y. 1996).
In Cabiri, the court found that the FSIA does not apply to a foreign government
official alleged to have committed torture, as torture could not fall with the scope of his
authority, nor be permitted by domestic law, since no government asserts a right to
torture. 921 F. Supp. at 1198. In Doe I v. Liu Qi, 349 F. Supp. 2d 1258 (N.D. Cal. 2004),
Chinese government officials were found not to be immune under the FSIA because the
alleged conduct – torture – was inconsistent with Chinese law. An officer actions
beyond the limitations of state law are to be considered individual and not sovereign
actions; the officer is not empowered by the sovereign to commit those acts. Id. Qi
explicitly addressed the issue of whether a government could authorize conduct which
was contrary to its own law. Qi concluded that ultra vires actions are not subject to
sovereign immunity and that only acts within the official legal grant of authority can be
immunized. Id. at 1287. Thus, even if the defendant had provided competent evidence
that he was authorized or directed to commit the alleged violations of the law of nations,
his burden would not be met. Defendant must show that he had legal authority.
Although Qi looked to domestic law to determine whether the official acted within the
Case 1:05-cv-02167-PLF Document 8 Filed 05/15/2006 Page 27 of 63
-14-
scope of his authority, Id. at 1283, other courts have looked to both domestic and
international law, finding that officials cannot be authorized to commit jus cogens
violations. See, e.g., Hilao, 25 F.3d at 1472; Cabiri, 921 F. Supp. at 1198; Xuncax, 886
F. Supp. at 176.
In Qi, Cabiri, and Hilao, the events at issue involved purely domestic conduct,
to wit, the treatment by foreign officials of their own citizens within that state’s borders.
Here, however, the conflict was international and the events at issue occurred outside
Israel’s borders. International law, including international humanitarian law, the Geneva
Convention Relative to the Protection of Civilian Persons in the Time of War of August
12, 1949 (“Fourth Geneva Convention”), and Additional Protocol I to the Geneva
Conventions of 12 August 1949, all of which constitute customary international law,
govern international conflicts. See, Fourth Geneva Convention, Art. 2; Antonio Cassese,
The Geneva Protocols of 1977 on the Humanitarian Law of Armed Conflict and
Customary International Law, 3 UCLA PAC. BASIN L. J. 55, 70-71, 108 (1984)
(Additional Protocol I constitutes customary international law); Christopher Greenwood,
CUSTOMARY LAW STATUS OF THE 1977 GENEVA PROTOCOLS, IN HUMANITARIAN LAW OF
ARMED CONFLICT: CHALLENGES AHEAD 93 (Astrid J.M. Delissen & Gerard J. Tanja eds.,
1991) (same). Thus, Defendant’s conduct must be considered in the context of
international law. However, even under Israeli law, Defendant’s attack of unarmed
civilians and on the United Nations compound violated Israeli law and policy.
Case 1:05-cv-02167-PLF Document 8 Filed 05/15/2006 Page 28 of 63
6 See Declaration of William Aceves, filed concurrently, at 10-14, on the international
humanitarian law protecting humanitarian facilities and peacekeeping missions.
-15-
1. Defendant acted outside the scope of his authority under
international law norms.
The illegality of the attack on Qana under international law was recognized by the
United Nations General Assembly. See, General Assembly Resolution, A/RES/50/22 C,
25 April 1996, condemning “the Israeli military attacks against the civilian population in
Lebanon, especially against the United Nations base at Qana, which violate the rules of
international humanitarian law pertaining to the protection of civilians, and expresses its
grave concern and sorrow over the loss of lives and serious injuries to innocent men,
women and children” (Attached as Exhibit 2 to Klimaski Dcl.). Such a resolution by the
General Assembly is evidence of international customary law. See, e.g., American
International Group, Inc. v. Islamic Republic of Iran, 493 F. Supp. 522, 524 (D.D.C.
1980). Defendant was acting outside the scope of his authority if his conduct violated
customary international law. This is so under both international and Israeli law. See,
infra. Indeed because the conduct alleged violated jus cogens norms, Israel could not
derogate from them.
a. Attacks on the United Nations as war crimes.6
The attack on the United Nations facility and personnel is a clear violation of
international law. The inviolability of envoys is so ancient a principle that it was
acknowledged by Herodotus in the 5th century BC. M. Cherif Bassiouni, CRIMES
AGAINST HUMANITY IN INTERNATIONAL CRIMINAL LAW 49, 50 (1999) (quoting Coleman
Phillipson, 1 THE INTERNATIONAL LAW AND CUSTOM OF ANCIENT GREECE AND ROME 59
(1911) (citing Herodotus, History)) (“[T]he slaughter of the Persian envoys by the
Case 1:05-cv-02167-PLF Document 8 Filed 05/15/2006 Page 29 of 63
-16-
Athenians and Spartans was confessedly a transgression of the [laws of men], as a law of
the human race generally”).
The doctrine finds modern expression in the Charter of the United Nations, Art.
2(4), which states that, “All Members shall refrain...from the...use of force in
any...manner inconsistent with the Purposes of the United Nations.” Certainly,
deliberately attacking a UN facility is “inconsistent” with those purposes. The Rome
Statute of the International Criminal Court (1998), Art. 8(2), which codified war crimes,
included within that definition “intentionally direct[ed] attacks against personnel,
installations, material, units or vehicles involved in a...[United Nations] peacekeeping
mission.” Under Article 7(1) of the 1994 Convention on the Safety of United Nations
and Associated Personnel, “United Nations and associated personnel, their equipment
and premises shall not be made the object of attack or of any action that prevents them
from discharging their mandate.” G.A. Res. 49/59, 49 U.N. GAOR Supp. (No. 49) at
299, U.N. Doc. A/49/49 (1994). Numerous Security Council (SC) Resolutions have
condemned attacks on UN peacekeeping operations, including specifically attacks on the
UNIFIL mission in Lebanon. See, e.g., UN Security Council, Res. 467, 24 April 1980, §
2 (condemning attacks on UNIFIL); UN Security Council Res. 587, 23 September 1986,
§§ 1 and 2 (referring to attacks on UNIFIL as “criminal”); II Jean-Marie Henckaerts &
Louise Doswald-Beck, CUSTOMARY INTERNATIONAL HUMANITARIAN LAW: PRACTICE
(2005) Ch. 9, §§ 1-127 (authoritative compilation of the International Committee of the
Red Cross cataloging sources of law indicative of norm prohibiting attacks on personnel
and objects involved in peacekeeping missions). See also, Tachiona v. United States,
Case 1:05-cv-02167-PLF Document 8 Filed 05/15/2006 Page 30 of 63
7 International instruments proscribing extrajudicial killings, to cite only a few, include
the following: Universal Declaration of Human Rights, Dec. 10, 1948, art. 3, G.A. Res.
217A(III), U.N. Doc. A/810; International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights, Dec.
16, 1966, art. 6(1), G.A. Res. 2200, U.N. GAOR, 21st Sess., Supp. No. 16, U.N. Doc.
A/6316, 999 U.N.T.S. 171; American Declaration of the Rights and Duties of Man, May
2, 1948, art. I, OEA/ser.L/V/II.23, doc. 21, rev. 6 (1979).
-17-
386 F.3d 205, 221-23 (2d Cir. 2004) (holding that it is universally recognized that, under
international law, envoys are inviolable from attacks on their person.
b. The prohibition against extrajudicial killing.
Extrajudicial killings (summary executions) have long been recognized as a
violation of the law of nations. See, Kadic, 70 F.3d at 243; Mujica v. Occidental
Petroleum Corp., 381 F. Supp. 2d 1164, 1179 (C.D. Cal. 2005); Doe v. Saravia, 348 F.
Supp. 2d 1112, 1153 (E.D. Cal. 2002); Xuncax, 886 F. Supp. at 184; Forti v. Suarez-
Mason, 672 F. Supp. 1531, 1542 (N.D. Cal. 1987); Wiwa v. Royal Dutch Petroleum Co.,
No. 96 Civ. 8386, 2002 WL 319887 at **4, 6 (S.D.N.Y. 2002); RESTATEMENT (THIRD)
OF FOREIGN RELATIONS LAW OF THE UNITED STATES § 702(c) (1986) (“A state violates
[customary] international law if, as a matter of state policy, it practices, encourages, or
condones ... the murder or causing the disappearance of individuals.”). See also, Hilao,
25 F.3d at 1475 (describing the “prohibition against summary execution” as a “similarly
universal, definable, and obligatory” norm).
So widespread is the consensus against extrajudicial killing that “every
instrument or agreement that has attempted to define the scope of international human
rights has ‘recognized a right to life coupled with a right to due process to protect that
right.’”7 Alejandre v. Republic of Cuba, 996 F. Supp. 1239, 1252 (S.D. Fla. 1997),
Case 1:05-cv-02167-PLF Document 8 Filed 05/15/2006 Page 31 of 63
8 See Declaration of William Aceves, filed concurrently, at 1-10, on the international
humanitarian law protecting civilian populations.
9
The four Geneva Conventions of 1949 have been ratified by over 190 nations, including
the United States. Convention for the Amelioration of the Condition of the Wounded and
Sick in Armed Forces in the Field; Convention for the Amelioration of the Condition of
Wounded, Sick and Shipwrecked Members of Armed Forces at Sea; Convention Relative
to the Treatment of Prisoners of War; Convention Relative to the Protection of Civilian
Persons in Time of War, Aug. 12, 1949, 6 U.S.T. 3516, 75 U.S.T.S. 287 (Fourth Geneva
Convention).
10 The Hague Conventions include the 1899 International Convention With Respect to the
Laws and Customs of War by Land and the 1907 Convention Concerning the Laws and
Customs of War on Land.
11 See footnote 9.
12 Protocol on the Protection of Victims of International Armed Conflicts; Protocol on the
Protection of Victims of Non-International Armed Conflicts.
-18-
citing Xuncax, 886 F. Supp. at 185 (citation omitted). The ban on extrajudicial killing
thus rises to the level of jus cogens, a norm of international law so fundamental that it is
binding on all members of the world community. Alejandre, 996 F. Supp. at 1252.
Indeed, in Alejandre, the court looked to several factors to conclude that the killings
occurred in a context applicable here: they were premeditated and intentional, outside of
[the state’s] territory, wholly disproportionate, and executed without warning or process.
Id. at 1253.
c. Attacks on civilians as war crimes.8
The prohibition against war crimes has long been recognized as a human rights
norm. Sosa v. Alvarez-Machain, 542 U.S. 692, 762 (2004) (Breyer, J., concurring);
Kadic, 70 F.3d 232 at 242; Presbyterian Church of the Sudan, 244 F. Supp. 2d at 305.
That prohibition provides for the protection of civilians.9 These protections are largely
codified in the Hague Conventions,10 the Fourth Geneva Convention11 and the two
Protocols.12 These basic international agreements detailing the laws of war have
Case 1:05-cv-02167-PLF Document 8 Filed 05/15/2006 Page 32 of 63
-19-
“beyond a doubt become part of customary international law.” Report of the Secretary-
General Pursuant to Paragraph 2 of Security Council Resolution 808, U.N. Doc.
S/25704 at 9, ¶ 35 (May 3, 1993), adopted by the Security Council, S.C. Res. 827 (May
25, 1993); II Jean-Marie Henckaerts & Louise Doswald-Beck, CUSTOMARY
INTERNATIONAL HUMANITARIAN LAW: PRACTICE (2005) at 2061-2105; Theodor Meron,
The Geneva Conventions as Customary Law, 81 AM. J. INT'L L. 348 (1987). As further
evidence of their customary law status, many of the rules governing the conduct of war
have also been incorporated into domestic laws around the world. The prohibition of war
crimes has been included in the military manuals throughout the world including
specifically in the United States, Air Force Pamphlet (1976) §§5-3 (a)1(a) and 5-3(b) and
in Israel, Law of War Booklet (1986), ch. 13.
As noted above, the prohibition against war crimes includes the duty of constant
care. Chap. IV, Art. 57, Protocol I. See also I Jean-Marie Henckaerts & Louise Doswald-
Beck, CUSTOMARY INTERNATIONAL HUMANITARIAN LAW: RULES (2005) at 51-52; II
Jean-Marie Henckaerts & Louise Doswald-Beck, CUSTOMARY INTERNATIONAL
HUMANITARIAN LAW: PRACTICES (2005) at 336-44 (summarizing international and
national laws and practice). "An indiscriminate attack amounts in practice to an attack
on civilians….” I Jean-Marie Henckaerts & Louise Doswald-Beck, CUSTOMARY
INTERNATIONAL HUMANITARIAN LAW: RULES (2005) at 189. Launching an attack
without attempting to aim properly at a military target or in such a manner as to hit
civilians amounts to an indiscriminate attack." Id.
d. Crimes against humanity.
Case 1:05-cv-02167-PLF Document 8 Filed 05/15/2006 Page 33 of 63
-20-
The prohibition of crimes against humanity is longstanding and widely accepted
among the community of nations. Indeed, according to international law expert, Cherif
Bassiouni, Crimes Against Humanity, in Roy Gutman and David Rieff, eds., CRIMES OF
WAR: WHAT THE PUBLIC SHOULD KNOW, (1999), available at www.crimesofwar.org/
thebook/crimes-against-humanity.html (last visited May 11, 2006):
crimes against humanity have existed in customary international law for
over half a century and are also evidenced in prosecutions before some
national courts. The most notable of these trials include those of Paul
Touvier, Klaus Barbie, and Maurice Papon in France, and Imre Finta in
Canada. But crimes against humanity are also deemed to be part of jus
cogens - the highest standing in international legal norms. Thus, they
constitute a non-derogable rule of international law.
“The term [crimes against humanity] originated in the 1907 Hague Convention
preamble, which codified the customary law of armed conflict.” Id. In 1945, the Allied
Powers drafted the Nuremberg Charter for the International Military Tribunal, Charter of
the International Military Tribunal, Aug. 8, 1945, art. 6(c) 1544, 1547, 82 U.N.T.S. 279,
288 (1945) (Nuremberg Charter) and enacted Control Council Law No. 10, Punishment
of Persons Guilty of War Crimes, Crimes Against Peace and Humanity, December 20,
1945, 3 Official Gazette Control Council for Germany 50-55 (1946), which condemned
crimes against humanity and set forth basic definitional requirements. The Nuremburg
Tribunals established that crimes against humanity encompass:
atrocities and offenses, including but not limited to murder, extermination,
enslavement, deportation, imprisonment, torture, rape, or other inhumane
acts committed against any civilian population, or persecutions on
political, racial or religious grounds . . .
Case 1:05-cv-02167-PLF Document 8 Filed 05/15/2006 Page 34 of 63
13 E.g., Charter of the International Military Tribunal, Art. 6(c), in The Nurnberg Trial, 6
F.R.D. 69, 130 (Int’l. Milit. Trib.1946); Statute of the International Tribunal for Rwanda,
Art. 3, S/RES/955/Ann.1, 33 I.L.M 1602, 1603 (Nov. 8, 1994); Statute of the
International Tribunal For the Former Yugoslavia, Art. 5, S/25704/Ann.1, 32 I.L.M.
1192, 1194, adopted S/Res/827, 32 I.L.M. 1203 (May 25, 1993); Rome Statute of the
International Criminal Court, U.N. doc. A/CONF. 183/9*, July 17, 1998, Article 7.
-21-
Control Council Law No. 10, Art. II(1)(c), quoted in United States v. Flick, 6 Trials of
War Criminals Before the Nuremberg Military Tribunals Under Control Council Law
No. 10, 1191 (1949). Time and again, the international community has defined crimes
against humanity in virtually identical terms to those used in Control Council Law No.
10.13
The conduct alleged, attacking a United Nations peacekeeping force and killing
unarmed civilians, constitutes summary execution, war crimes and crimes against
humanity in violation of international law. If, as alleged, Defendant violated
international law, Defendant could not have acted within the scope of his lawful
authority.
2. Defendant acted outside the scope of his authority under Israeli
law.
Applying the laws of Israel would reach the same conclusion. In their statements
to the investigator appointed by the Secretary General, “Israeli officials emphasized that
it was not Israeli policy to target civilians or the United Nations.” UN Secretary-General,
Report dated 1 May 1996 of the Secretary-General’s Military Adviser concerning the
shelling of the United Nations compound at Qana on 18 April 1996, UN Doc.
S/1996/337, 7 May 1996, §§ 7-8. See also, Addendum at 2.g.
Case 1:05-cv-02167-PLF Document 8 Filed 05/15/2006 Page 35 of 63
14 Mara'abe v. The Prime Minister of Israel, HCJ 7957/04, para. 14 (High Ct. 2005)
(Israel) (available at
http://elyon1.court.gov.il/files_eng/04/570/079/a14/04079570.a14.pdf).
15 Aita v. Regional Commander of Judea and Samaria, HCJ 69/81, para. 12 (High Ct.
1983) (Israel) (available at
http://elyon1.court.gov.il/files_eng/81/690/000/z01/81000690.z01.pdf).
16 Mara be, CJ 2506/04, para. 57; The Beit Sourik Case, HCJ 2056/04, paras. 23-24 (High
Ct.2004) (Israel) (available at http://elyon1.court.gov.il/files_eng/04/560/020/a28/
04020560.a28.pdf); Yassin v. Commander of Kziot Military Camp, HCJ 5591/02, para. 12
(High Ct. 2002) (Israel) (available at http://elyon1.court.gov.il/files_eng/02/910/055/
a03/02055910.a03.pdf) (Fourth Geneva Convention applies).
-22-
a. Israeli law incorporates customary international law.
Under Israeli law, customary international law constrains the conduct of Israeli
officials. As the Israeli High Court of Justice (HCJ) held: “Indeed, every Israeli soldier
carries in his pack the rules of customary public international law regarding the law of
war, and the fundamental rules of Israeli administrative law.”14 Israel’s incorporation of
customary international law into Israeli law is automatic, unless customary international
law conflicts with an existing domestic statute; if there is a conflict, statutes are to be
read, whenever possible, as consistent with international law.15 Defendant presents no
evidence that any such conflicting statute exists. Israel also observes the humanitarian
portions of the Fourth Geneva Convention.16
Defendant violated standards of conduct imposed by customary international law
and these specific instruments. Specifically, as explained by the High Court of Justice,
Israeli military personnel are under an affirmative duty, based on the Fourth Geneva
Case 1:05-cv-02167-PLF Document 8 Filed 05/15/2006 Page 36 of 63
17 Physicians for Human Rights, et al., v. Commander of the IDF Forces in the Gaza
Strip, HCJ 4764/04 paras. 19-22, 58, 66-68 (High Ct. 2004) (Israel) (available at
http://elyon1.court.gov.il/files_eng/04/640/047/a03/ 04047640.a03.pdf).; accord, In re
Yamashita, 327 U.S. 1, 16 (1946) (commander had “an affirmative duty to take such
measures as were within his power and appropriate in the circumstances to protect
prisoners of war and the civilian population”).
18 See, e.g., Presbyterian Church, 244 F.Supp.2d at 345 (war crimes and extrajudicial
killing are jus cogens violations); Presbyterian Church, 374 F.Supp.2d 331, n.2
-23-
Convention, to protect civilians from harm.17 The assault on the United Nations
compound and unarmed civilians is clearly contrary to the laws which Israel itself views
as binding. As such, Defendant acted outside the scope of his lawful authority and is not
immune.
None of the materials submitted by Defendant support the contention that the
assault on the Qana United Nations compound and the civilian internally displaced
persons within it was within the scope of Israeli law or policy. At most, Israeli
authorities claim that the violations were the result of an accident. See, e.g. Memo. at 13,
n.16. The UN report found that the physical evidence was inconsistent with the Israeli
official descriptions of the event. Exhibit 1 at ¶13a. As already mentioned, the report
further found that it was “unlikely that the shelling of the United Nations compound was
the result of a gross technical and/or procedural error.” Exhibit 1, Addendum to Report
at 13. Of course, at this stage, this Court cannot and need not resolve the differing
versions of the event since none of those versions claim that the conduct was consistent
with Israeli or international law.
b. Israeli law cannot authorize conduct in derogation of binding
principles of international law (jus cogens).
Because, as noted above at Section II D(1), the conduct alleged violates jus
cogens norms, Israel could not have authorized it.18 Since at least Nuremberg, it has been
Case 1:05-cv-02167-PLF Document 8 Filed 05/15/2006 Page 37 of 63
(S.D.N.Y. 2005) (extrajudicial killing); Mujica v. Occidental, 381 F.Supp.2d 1164 (C.D.
Cal. 2005) (murder); NCGUB v. Unocal, 176 F.R.D. 329 (C.D. Cal. 1997) (murder); see
also, Mehinovic v. Vukovic, 198 F. Supp. 2d 1322, 1351-52 (grave breaches, or non-
derogable war crimes, include willful killing, torture or inhuman treatment, willfully
causing great suffering).
19 Assuming that any one of these norms is “customary” but not jus cogens, it could be
modified within a state by subsequent legislation or a treaty. In Re: Agent Orange, 373
F. Supp. at 131. However, Israel has not abrogated the norm against extrajudicial
killings, war crimes, crimes against humanity, or cruel inhuman and degrading treatment,
and applies customary international law. See supra, sec. II.B.2.
-24-
clear that foreign officials can be called to account for violations of the law of nations.
The Nuremberg Trial 1946, 6 F.R.D. 69, 110 (1946, 1947) (“The principle of
international law, which under certain circumstances, protects the representatives of a
state, cannot be applied to acts which are condemned as criminal by international law.
The authors of these acts cannot shelter themselves behind their official position in order
to be freed from punishment in appropriate proceedings.”)
The controlling status of certain international laws was described in In re: “Agent
Orange” Product Liability Litigation, 373 F. Supp. 2d 7, 131 (E.D.N.Y. 2005). “A
peremptory [jus cogens] norm, which by definition permits no derogation, prevails over
and invalidates any prior conflicting international agreements or other rules of
international law, and ‘can be modified only by a subsequent norm of general
international law having the same character.’” Id., citing the Vienna Convention on the
Law of Treaties, May 23, 1969, art. 53, 1155 U.N.T.S. 331, 344 (entered into force Jan.
27, 1980); RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF THE FOREIGN
RELATIONS LAW OF THE UNITED STATES § 102 cmt. k. Because the conduct alleged
violates jus cogens norms,19 Israel could not authorize the acts alleged.
With regard to Defendant’s assertion that the FSIA immunizes officials acting at
Case 1:05-cv-02167-PLF Document 8 Filed 05/15/2006 Page 38 of 63
-25-
the behest of governments who violate international human rights law, he erroneously
cites cases involving immunity available to the state itself. Memo. at 9-10. Saudi Arabia
v. Nelson, 507 U.S. 349 (1993), involved a claim against the government of Saudi
Arabia, a state agency of the government and a U.S. company which acted as its agent.
Although the Court found that the government and the agency were entitled to sovereign
immunity but it did not extend immunity to the U.S. agent. Id. at 375. Transaero, Inc. v.
La Fuerza Aero Boliviana, 30 F.3d 148, 153 (D.C. Cir. 1994), was a suit against the
Bolivian air force. Argentine Republic v. Amerada Hess Shipping Corp., 488 U.S. 428,
436 (1989), involved a claim against the government of Argentina. Denegri v. Republic
of Chile, No. Civ. A. 86-3085, 1992 WL 91914 (D.D.C. Apr. 1992), involved claims
against the Republic of Chile and its armed forces. Another case cited by Defendant,
Trajano v. Marcos, found that the individual defendant admitted that she had acted
without official authority. Memo. at 10; Trajano, 978 F.2d at 498. None addresses the
issue raised by Defendant’s claim that he, as a former government official, is immune
under U.S. law without regard to prohibitions of international law. To the contrary,
“[i]nternational law is part of our law, and must be ascertained and administered by the
courts of justice of appropriate jurisdiction as often as questions of right depending upon
it are duly presented for their determination.” The Paquete Habana, 175 U.S. 677, 700
(1900).
This position is bolstered by the Supreme Court’s determination that the “Alien
Tort Statute by its terms does not distinguish among classes of defendants, and it of
course has the same effect after the passage of the FSIA as before with respect to
defendants other than foreign states.” Argentine Republic v. Amerada Hess Shipping
Case 1:05-cv-02167-PLF Document 8 Filed 05/15/2006 Page 39 of 63
-26-
Corp., 488 U.S. 428, 438 (1989) (emphasis added) (deciding that jurisdiction over a
foreign state must be under the FSIA). The ATS provides jurisdiction for claims of
violations of international law norms with no less definite content and acceptance among
civilized nations than when it was enacted. Sosa, 542 U.S. at 731-32. International law
did not and does not extend immunity to government officials who violate the law of
nations. Indeed, the sovereign immunity defense raised by Nazi war criminals at the
Nuremberg trials was rejected. International Military Tribunal (Nuremberg), Judgment
and Sentences (1946), reprinted in 41 Am. J. Int'l L. 172, 221 (1947) (“The principle of
international law, which under certain circumstances, protects the representatives of a
state, cannot be applied to acts which are condemned as criminal by international law”).
Following Amerada Hess, an official, even one acting within the scope of his authority, is
no more entitled to immunity for violations of the law of nations than those tried at
Nuremberg.
E. Discovery is Required to Permit Resolution of Factual Disputes Raised by
Defendant.
Defendant’s FSIA challenge to the subject matter jurisdiction of the Court raises a
mixed question of law and fact. See Phoenix Consulting Co, 216 F.3d at 41, citing,
Foremost-McKesson, 905 F.2d at 448-49 (dispute whether person alleged to have harmed
plaintiff was agent of sovereign). As the Court in Phoenix noted:
Thus, the court must resolve any disputed issues of fact the resolution of
which is necessary to a ruling upon the motion to dismiss. See Jungquist,
115 F.3d at 1027-28; Foremost-McKesson, 905 F.2d at 448-49; see also,
Filetech, 157 F.3d at 932; Moran v. Saudi Arabia, 27 F.3d 169, 172 (5th
Cir. 1994); Gould v. Pechiney Ugine Kuhlmann, 853 F.2d 445, 451 (6th
Cir. 1988); cf. Herbert v. National Academy of Sciences, 974 F.2d 192,
Case 1:05-cv-02167-PLF Document 8 Filed 05/15/2006 Page 40 of 63
20 As noted above, Defendant’s conduct would still be a war crime if the assault was
launched without “constant care” to safety of the civilian population. Defendant admitted
that he was aware that civilians in southern Lebanon had been taking refuge in UN
compounds. Complaint at ¶ 46; see also, Derek Brown, “Gunners’ cover is blown,”
Guardian, May 11, 1996, attached as Exhibit 2 to Klimaski Dcl. (Ya’alon stated that the
“fact that civilians are evacuated from the villages into U.N. facilities was known to us
from the second day of the operation. In the intelligence wing there was no discussion of
whether there were two or six hundred civilians in Qana…. The relevant question is, was
it correct to open fire in such circumstances?”).
-27-
197-98 (D.C.Cir. 1992) (affirming district court's resolution of disputed
facts necessary for subject matter jurisdiction under Copyright Act).
Id. at 40.
If Defendant’s challenge raises genuine issues of fact relevant to the issue of
immunity, plaintiffs must be given “ample opportunity to secure and present evidence
relevant to the existence of jurisdiction” under the FSIA. Phoenix, 216 F.3d at 40,
quoting Prakash v. American University, 727 F.2d 1174, 1179-80 (D.C. Cir. 1984); see
also, Oppenheimer Fund, Inc. v. Sanders, 437 U.S. 340, 351 n.13, (1978) (“discovery is
available to ascertain the facts bearing on [jurisdictional] issues”). For the purpose of his
motion to dismiss under Rule 12(b)(1), Defendant does not dispute the fact of the attack
on the United Nations compound or the presence of civilians who had taken refuge there.
He does not and cannot claim that this attack was consistent with any applicable law.
Thus, his entire defense of sovereign immunity lies in his claim that the shelling was
accidental.20 At a minimum, this question of fact must be subject to discovery.
A decision on jurisdiction should be deferred until the completion of discovery
since the jurisdictional issues are so intertwined with the issues of Defendant’s liability.
In Kinetic Instruments, Inc. v. Lares, 802 F. Supp. 976 (S.D.N.Y. 1992), the court
deferred determination of personal jurisdiction until after all discovery was completed
Case 1:05-cv-02167-PLF Document 8 Filed 05/15/2006 Page 41 of 63
-28-
because the “inquiries into jurisdiction and liability can become entwined, and it is clear
that jurisdictional discovery will substantially overlap with general discovery....” Id. at
988; see also, Barrett v. USA, 646 F. Supp. 1345, 1350 (S.D.N.Y. 1986) (even after
discovery was complete, the court found that “[s]ince the question of jurisdiction and the
merits of this action are so intertwined, plaintiff should not be required to establish
jurisdiction by [a preponderance of the evidence] before trial”), citing United States v.
Montreal Trust Co., 358 F.2d 239, 242 (2d Cir. 1966).
III. PLAINTIFFS’ CLAIMS DO NOT IMPLICATE THE POLITICAL
QUESTION DOCTRINE.
The Supreme Court made clear in Baker v. Carr that: “[I]t is error to suppose that
every case or controversy which touches foreign relations lies beyond judicial
cognizance.” 369 U.S. 186, 211 (1962). As this Court explained in New v. Rumsfeld,
350 F. Supp. 2d 80, 96 (D.D.C. 2004) (Friedman, J.): “Baker makes clear that the proper
application of the doctrine turns not on the political nature of the action or decision being
challenged, but on the nature of the particular legal challenge itself.” Nonetheless,
Defendant argues that the controversial nature of the Israeli-Palestinian conflict renders
the issues in this case political questions. However controversial that conflict may be,
the shelling of the United Nations’ Qana compound, which was known to be sheltering
civilians, has been condemned by the United Nations. This case is about Defendant’s
liability for participating in the decision to launch that attack and his command
responsibility, including the obligation to report and punish wrongdoers. Through the
ATS and the TVPA, Congress committed such matters to the judiciary. An examination
of the factors established in Baker makes evident that Defendant cannot meet his burden
Case 1:05-cv-02167-PLF Document 8 Filed 05/15/2006 Page 42 of 63
21 Memorandum for the United States Submitted to the Court of Appeals for the Second
Circuit in Filártiga v. Peña-Irala, 19 I.L.M. 585, 602-04, reprinted in 12 HASTINGS INT’L
& COMP. L. REV. 34, 45-46 (1988) (footnote omitted).
-29-
of establishing that the claims against him are precluded by the political question
doctrine. 369 U.S. at 217.
A. Under the ATS, Courts Have Routinely Adjudicated Claims Touching
Upon Issues of Foreign Policy.
Defendant cites no authority for his argument that the political question doctrine
has “particular force” in the area of foreign policy. As described below, numerous cases
touching various aspects of U.S. foreign affairs have held to the contrary. See, Kadic, 70
F.3d at 249 ( J]udges should not reflexively invoke doctrines to avoid difficult and
somewhat sensitive decisions in [the] context of human rights. . There is a difference
between issues of foreign policy and decisions courts are highly competent to make
regarding liability for violations of law. See, e.g., Klinghoffer v. S.N.C. Achille Lauro,
739 F. Supp. 854, 860 (S.D.N.Y. 1990).
As clearly stated by the U.S. Government in the landmark Filártiga case, “there is
little danger that judicial enforcement will impair our foreign policy efforts” given that
“courts are properly confined to determining whether an individual has suffered a denial
of rights guaranteed him as an individual by customary international law.”21 The
Government stressed that, “to the contrary, a refusal to recognize a private cause of
action in these circumstances might seriously damage the credibility of our nation’s
commitment to the protection of human rights.” Id.
Sosa explicitly limited ATS jurisdiction to universally accepted norms in part to
avoid risks of adverse foreign policy consequences. 542 U.S. at 728. Defendant’s
Case 1:05-cv-02167-PLF Document 8 Filed 05/15/2006 Page 43 of 63
-30-
position that the political question doctrine applies with “particular force” to claims
involving foreign policy is inconsistent with Sosa’s endorsement of case-specific
deference. 542 U.S. at 733 n.21. Defendant’s reliance on Chicago & S. Air Lines, Inc. v.
Waterman S.S. Corp., 333 U.S. 103 (1948), is misplaced. Memo. at 17-18. That case,
dealing with airline routes, related to the inappropriateness of judicial review of orders,
promulgated by the U.S. president, that were based upon classified intelligence; it did not
involve violations of the law of nations.
In short, a “politically charged” context does not transform claims into political
questions. See Kadic, 70 F.3d at 249; Alperin v. Vatican Bank, 410 F.3d 532, 542, n.6
(9th Cir. 2005) (the “potential overtones that this case may have on relations with the
[state] leadership do not…warrant dismissal”) (citing Antolok v. United States, 873 F.2d
369, 392 (D.C. Cir. 1989) (Wald, C.J., concurring in judgment) (“focus should be on the
particular issue presented” not “the ancillary effects…on political actors”).
B. Courts Have Adjudicated Claims Relating to Political and Military
Decisions, the Middle East, and Other Sensitive Regions of the World.
Courts have recognized the justiciability of human rights claims for incidents
occurring in the context of the Israel-Palestinian conflict. In Klieman v. Palestinian
Authority, 2006 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 13797 at **19-24 (D.D.C. 2006) (Friedman, J.), this
court found “unconvincing” the “basic argument...[that the lawsuit]...would burden the
‘long running Middle East peace process.’” Similarly, in Biton v. Palestinian Interim
Self Gov’t, 310 F. Supp. 2d 172, 184 (D.D.C. 2004) (Biton I), the Court stated that:
“Although the backdrop for this case – i.e., the Israeli-Palestinian conflict – is extremely
politicized, this circumstance alone is insufficient to make the plaintiffs’ claims
Case 1:05-cv-02167-PLF Document 8 Filed 05/15/2006 Page 44 of 63
-31-
nonjusticiable.” See also, Biton v. Palestinian Interim Self-Government Auth., 412 F.
Supp. 2d 1, 6 (D.D.C. 2005) (Biton II)(“the basic elements of the claim lie in tort, not in
the relations between Palestine and Israel”); Gilmore v. Palestinian Interim Self-Gov’t
Auth., -- F. Supp. 2d --, 2006 WL 711264, at **2-3 (D.D.C. 2006) (no political question
for “ordinary tort suit” brought under a statute “specifically designed to provide a civil
cause of action in federal court”); Knox v. PLO, 306 F. Supp. 2d 424, 448-49 (S.D.N.Y.
2004) (no political question because court need not answer “intractable political
questions which form the background to this lawsuit”); Klinghoffer v. S.N.C. Achille
Lauro, 937 F.2d 44 at 49 (2d Cir. 1991) (“The fact that the issues before us arise in a
politically charged context does not convert what is essentially an ordinary tort suit into a
non-justiciable political question.”); Sharon v. Time, 599 F. Supp. 538, 552 (S.D.N.Y.
1984) (libel suit regarding Sharon’s role in the massacre of Palestinians was justiciable,
even though the litigation touched upon “sensitive foreign affairs concerns”); Linde v.
Arab Bank, 384 F. Supp. 2d 571 (E.D.N.Y. 2005) (allowing claims by terror victims in
Israel against bank used by Hamas).
In Ungar v. Palestinian Liberation Org., 402 F. 3d 274, 280 (1st Cir. 2005), the
court found no political question problem where the family of a U.S. citizen killed in
Israel sued the Palestinian Authority:
The reality is that, in these tempestuous times, any decision of a United
States court on matters relating to the Israeli-Palestinian conflict will
engender strong feelings. Be that as it may, the capacity to stir emotions
is not enough to render an issue nonjusticiable. For jurisdictional
purposes, courts must be careful to distinguish between political questions
and cases having political overtones.
Case 1:05-cv-02167-PLF Document 8 Filed 05/15/2006 Page 45 of 63
-32-
Defendant relies heavily on Doe v. Israel (Memo. at 18-20), in which that court
held the case non-justiciable on political question grounds where plaintiffs sought
damages, injunctive relief, and a declaration that Israel’s “self-defense policies are
tantamount to terrorism.” 400 F. Supp. 2d at 112. In contrast, Plaintiffs here ask this
Court to determine liability of a single former official for an act which is contrary to
Israeli as well as international law. Defendant also cites Corrie v. Caterpillar, Inc., 403
F. Supp. 2d 1019 (W.D. Wash. 2005), appeal docketed, No. 05-36210 (9th Cir. Dec. 21,
2005), which found a political question because the court was asked to enjoin the sale of
bulldozers to a foreign country where the political branches had refused to impose a ban.
This case does not seek injunctive relief, nor relief contrary to any political branch
decision.
Defendant next argues that courts have “avoided entanglement” (Memo. at 18) in
cases involving political and military decisions, citing cases that, unlike this case, involve
the U.S. military and implicating decisions textually committed to the executive. Memo.
at 18-22. One case cited was against a foreign sovereign and concerned broad policy
challenges to conduct during World War II. See Memo. at 17-18 and fn 23, citing
Hwang Geum Joo v. Japan, 413 F.3d 45, 48-52 (D.C. Cir. 2005). However, the court in
Joo held that the claims were non-justiciable because there had already been war claims
settlement agreements by the U.S. political branches that explicitly resolved all claims
arising out of Japan’s actions during World War II. Defendant also cited El-Shifa
Pharmaceutical Ind. Co. v. U.S., 402 F. Supp. 2d 267 (D.D.C. 2005), an FTCA case
(court held that U.S. government’s decision to bomb Sudanese pharmaceutical plant was
textually committed to executive and to allow suit would intrude on executive’s war
Case 1:05-cv-02167-PLF Document 8 Filed 05/15/2006 Page 46 of 63
22 See also, Bancoult v. McNamara, 2006 U.S. App. LEXIS 10065, at *25 (D.C. Cir.
2006) (wide-ranging tort claims against U.S. government and officials for depopulating
the island of Diego Garcia dismissed on political question grounds because “the political
branches must ‘determine whether drastic measures should be taken in matters of foreign
policy and national security,’” quoting Schneider v. Kissinger, 412 F.3d at 197). In
contrast to the case at bar, the decisions concerning matters of broad U.S. foreign policy
and national security are committed to the executive branch. Herein issues of liability for
violations of the law of nations by an individual foreign official in a single incident is
committed to the courts by the enactment of the TVPA and ATS.
-33-
powers). The court made passing reference to “law of nations” claims and stated only
that plaintiffs “implicitly assert jurisdiction pursuant to 28 U.S.C. 1350,” id at 272; the
court did not analyze its ability to rule on questions of international law, which might
have been applicable to this case. In contrast to the instant case, in which there is
publicly available information such as the United Nations report, the El-Shifa court stated
that there was no judicially discoverable information and that the court could not evaluate
the truthfulness of the U.S. executive’s own intelligence. Id. at 273. Similarly, in
Aktepe v. US, 105 F.3d 1400, 1404 (11th Cir. 1997), a case brought under two U.S.
statutes, the Public Vessels Act and the Death on the High Seas Act, that court held that it
could not rule on the parameters of training procedures for the U.S. forces in a negligence
claim against U.S. on behalf Turkish sailors injured during NATO exercise.22
U.S. courts have adjudicated claims arising in the context of U.S. military
operations when they are not constitutionally committed to the Executive. See, Rasul v.
Bush, 542 U.S. 466 (2004); Hamdi v. Rumsfeld, 542 U.S. 507, 534 (2004) (finding that
“[t]he Constitution’s allocation of war powers to the President and Congress does not
exclude the courts from every dispute that can arguably be connected to ‘combat’” or
from reviewing military decision-making in connection with an ongoing conflict”);
Youngstown Sheet & Tube Co. v. Sawyer, 343 U.S. 579, 587 (1952) (judicial rejection of
Case 1:05-cv-02167-PLF Document 8 Filed 05/15/2006 Page 47 of 63
-34-
executive’s claimed powers to seize steel mills during the Korean War); New York Times
Co. v. U.S., 403 U.S. 713 (1971) (rejecting foreign relations objections to publication of
the Pentagon Papers); Brown v. U.S., 12 U.S. (8 Cranch) 110 (1814) (rejecting executive
power to seize domestic property of enemy alien during War of 1812); Flynt v. Rumsfeld,
245 F. Supp. 2d 94, 106-107 (D.D.C. 2003) (Friedman, J.) (reviewing Department of
Defense guidelines regarding journalists’ access to theater of war).
U.S. courts have often adjudicated damage claims arising in the context of U.S.
military operations. See, e.g., The Paquete Habana, 175 U.S. 677 (reviewing the seizure
of two Spanish ships by U.S. forces during Spanish American War); Ramirez de
Arellano v. Weinberger, 745 F.2d 1500, 1511-15 (D.C. Cir. 1984), vacated, 471 U.S.
1113 (1985), dismissed on other grounds, 788 F.2d 762 (D.C. Cir. 1986) (U.S. military’s
construction and operation of training camp on plaintiff’s property in Honduras did not
present political question); Ibrahim v. Titan Corp., 391 F. Supp. 2d 10, 16 (D.D.C. 2005)
(no political question for torture and war crimes claims against U.S. military
contractors); Koohi v. United States, 976 F.2d 1328, 1331 (9th Cir. 1992) (holding that
“federal courts are capable of reviewing military decisions, particularly when those
decisions cause injury to civilians” where heirs of passengers of Iranian civilian aircraft
shot down by the U.S. military during the Iran-Iraq war sued U.S.); In re Agent Orange,
373 F. Supp. 2d at 64 (political question did not bar claims against U.S. corporations that
manufactured and supplied herbicides to the U.S. and South Vietnam governments and
that directly implicated military decisions).
Courts have also refused to dismiss claims on political question grounds even
Case 1:05-cv-02167-PLF Document 8 Filed 05/15/2006 Page 48 of 63
-35-
when the claims arise during ongoing wars. See, e.g., Ibrahim, 391 F. Supp. 2d at 17;
(Iraq); Kadic, 70 F.3d at 249-250 (former Yugoslavia); Presbyterian Church, 244 F.
Supp. 2d at 347 (Sudan civil war). This is true even where the litigation had the potential
to embarrass the U.S. and its allies. See, Linder v. Portocarrero, 963 F.2d 332, 337 (11th
Cir. 1992) (complaint for the killing of a civilian by the Nicaraguan contras justiciable
since it “challenges neither the legitimacy of the United States foreign policy toward the
contras, nor does it require the court to pronounce who was right and who was wrong in
the Nicaraguan civil war”); Todd v. Panjaitan, No. 92-12255, 1994 WL 827111 (D.
Mass. Oct. 26, 1994) (judgment against Indonesian general for massacre in East Timor);
Xuncax, 886 F. Supp 162 (judgment against Guatemalan general for murder, kidnaping,
and torture). U.S. courts, then, have been willing to adjudicate claims involving foreign
military decisions, and this is consistent with ATS jurisprudence, as claims for genocide,
crimes against humanity, and war crimes – all recognized in cases brought under that
statute – generally do not occur in the absence of some sort of military operation.
C. The Defendant Has Failed to Show that Any of the Baker v. Carr Factors
Are Present.
Baker lists six factors which can give rise to a political question if they are
“inextricable” from the case. 369 U.S. at 217. The burden is on the party invoking the
political question doctrine to demonstrate that at least one of the Baker factors is present.
Id. Here, Defendant does not meet his burden of proving that any Baker factor would
render this case nonjusticiable. Considering these factors in turn, it is clear that dismissal
is not warranted.
Case 1:05-cv-02167-PLF Document 8 Filed 05/15/2006 Page 49 of 63
-36-
1. There is a clear textual commitment of this issue to the judicial
branch.
Congress passed the ATS and TVPA, both of which reflect an affirmative policy
that fundamental human rights abuses occurring abroad should be heard in U.S. courts.
As such, ATS and TVPA claims are textually committed to the judiciary. Klinghoffer,
937 F.2d at 49 (“The department to whom this [tort] issue has been ‘constitutionally
committed’ is none other than our own -- the Judiciary”), cited in Kadic, 70 F.3d at 249;
see also, Presbyterian Church, 244 F. Supp. 2d at 346-48; Wiwa v. Royal Dutch
Petroleum, 226 F.3d 88, 103-04 (2d Cir. 2000).
As this Court made clear in Klieman v. Palestinian Authority, claims under the
Anti-Terrorism Act (ATA) are justiciable because they arise under a legislative scheme
created to provide a tort remedy for victims of certain kinds of terrorism. 2006 U.S. Dist.
LEXIS at **19-24. Claims under the ATS, a legislative tort scheme that remedies
violations of the law of nations, are justiciable for exactly the same reasons. Justice
Edwards, who authored the Tel Oren concurrence which was endorsed by Sosa, 542 U.S.
at 731-32, wrote that: “[T]he aim of section 1350 was to place in federal court actions
potentially implicating foreign affairs...Indeed, the Supreme Court has at least twice cited
section 1350 as a statutory example of congressional intent to make questions likely to
affect foreign relations originally cognizable in federal courts.” Tel-Oren v. Libyan Arab
Republic, 726 F.2d 774, 790, 797 (D.C. Cir. 1984) (Edwards, J., concurring). Where the
liability is created by a federal statute such as the TVPA, courts have an obligation to
hear the dispute even where the claims have “significant political overtones.” Japan
Whaling Ass’n v. American Cetacean Soc., 478 U.S. 221, 230 (1986).
Case 1:05-cv-02167-PLF Document 8 Filed 05/15/2006 Page 50 of 63
-37-
Defendant’s conclusory and unsupported claim that this case involves
“quintessentially political judgments about foreign policy” fails to cite so much as a line
of text demonstrating a clear commitment of the issues involved to the executive. Memo.
at 22.
2. There are judicially discoverable and manageable standards for
resolving the issues in this case.
Kadic made clear that claims under the ATS based on universally recognized
norms of international law – at issue here – provide judicially discoverable and
manageable standards:
[O]ur decision in Filartiga established that universally recognized norms
of international law provide judicially discoverable and manageable
standards for adjudicating suits brought under the Alien Tort Act, which
obviates any need to make initial policy decisions of the kind normally
reserved for nonjudicial discretion. Moreover, the existence of judicially
discoverable and manageable standards further undermines the claim that
such suits relate to matters that are constitutionally committed to another
branch.
70 F.3d at 249. See also, Presbyterian Church, 244 F. Supp. 2d at 347-49
(“Contrary to Talisman’s assertions, the issues in this case are not political. The
Court’s function is to determine whether Sudan and Talisman violated
international law by committing certain acts. The standards of behavior under
international law are judicially-ascertainable”); Republic of Philippines v.
Marcos, 862 F.2d 1355, 1361 (9th Cir. 1988), cert. denied, 490 U.S. 1035 (1989);
In re Agent Orange, 373 F. Supp. 2d at 67. Standards of liability for international
torts turn on “familiar questions of responsibility for personal and property
injuries,” and should not be avoided because the case takes place in an
international context. Klinghoffer, 739 F. Supp. at 860. See also, Klieman, 2006
Case 1:05-cv-02167-PLF Document 8 Filed 05/15/2006 Page 51 of 63
-38-
U.S. Dist. LEXIS 13797 at **22 (similarly finding judicially manageable
standards under the ATA); Biton II, 412 F. Supp. 2d at 6 (finding judicially
manageable standards “from both existing ATA case law and traditional tort case
law”). As such, there are, contrary to Defendant’s claims, judicially manageable
standards by which this dispute can be resolved.
3. Baker Factors Three Through Six.
Defendant argues that these factors are “also compelling.” Memo. at 22.
Compelling, however, is not sufficient to establish the presence of a Baker factor. It must
be inextricable from the case at bar. Baker, 369 U.S. at 217. Here, it is possible to
decide this case without an initial policy determination of a kind clearly for nonjudicial
discretion. A finding that Defendant, in participating in the decision to bomb the United
Nations compound at Qana, violated the law of nations requires a determination of fact
and law, not of policy. See, e.g., In re Agent Orange, 373 F. Supp. 2d at 71 (even a
determination of the President’s conduct during war “is one of substantive international
law, not policy”); Presbyterian Church, 244 F. Supp. 2d at 346.
Further, it is possible for the Court to independently resolve this case without
coming into conflict with the other branches of government. Factors four, five, and six
are only relevant if contradiction of a prior political branch decision would “seriously
interfere with important governmental interests.” Kadic, 70 F.3d at 249; see Presbyterian
Church, 244 F. Supp. 2d at 346-349. Adjudication of this matter would not exhibit a lack
of respect for the political branches, as no prior political decisions are even implicated by
this case. See, e.g., Klinghoffer, 937 F.2d at 50; In re: Agent Orange, 373 F. Supp. 2d at
72 (declining to apply the fifth Baker factor where “the Executive and the Legislature
Case 1:05-cv-02167-PLF Document 8 Filed 05/15/2006 Page 52 of 63
23 Compare Defendant’s sources with Barbara G.B. Ferguson, “US committed to peace
process, Clinton assures Arab-Americans,” Saudi Gazette (Aug. 8, 1996) (reporting that
Clinton stated that he was appalled about the bombing at Qana and that the nation’s
silence about it would never happen again). Klimaski Dcl., Exhibit 3.
24 Defendant cites U.S. Dep’t of State Daily Press Briefing (Apr. 19, 1996), at
http://www.hri.org/docs/statedep/ 1996/96-04-19.std.html, for the claim that the U.S.
government did not address the Qana incident as a legal dispute. Memo. at 24.
However, nothing in that press briefing suggests that providing a tort remedy for the
victims of Qana would put the Judiciary in conflict with the Executive, which was at the
time concerned with de-escalating the violence between Israel and Lebanon, not
adjudicating the matter of the attack on Qana. Defendant also argues that a judicial
finding that the Defendant acted deliberately in shelling the UN compound would
conflict with Executive assertions to the contrary. Id. However, the baseless conclusions
of U.S. officials about Defendant’s state of mind during the attack are neither policy
determinations nor meaningful executive pronouncements warranting dismissal.
-39-
have not made significant political decisions in the area being trod on by the instant
parties”); see also, Biton II, 412 F. Supp. 2d at 6 (through enactment of the ATA,
Congress made the initial policy determination that courts can resolve a defendant’s
liability without expressing a lack of respect to the political branches). Moreover, despite
the Ambassador of Israel’s letter to the State Department, the Executive has not
submitted a statement of interest in this case. The sixth factor is not called into play in
the absence of some contrary executive or legislative pronouncement, which does not
exist here. Id. President Clinton’s ambivalent statements about Qana23 and irrelevant
Executive utterances about U.S. diplomatic efforts24 cannot seriously be accepted as
official policy positions, let alone those at risk of conflicting with this Court’s
adjudication of the matter.
If Defendant’s argument were to prevail and every case in which the Executive
expressed some sort of view was rendered a political question, the ATS and TVPA would
be nullities. See Presbyterian Church of Sudan v. Talisman Energy, Inc., 244 F. Supp. 2d
289, 346 (S.D.N.Y. 2003) (“Indeed, as the world’s foremost superpower, the United
Case 1:05-cv-02167-PLF Document 8 Filed 05/15/2006 Page 53 of 63
-40-
States has complex diplomatic relationships with virtually every country. This fact,
without more, does not militate in favor of dismissal.”).
IV. THE ACT OF STATE DOCTRINE DOES NOT BAR PLAINTIFFS’
CLAIMS.
A. Defendant Has Not Met His Burden to Prove an Act of State.
When the Act of State Doctrine (ASD) defense “is raised in connection with a
motion to dismiss under Rule 12(b)(6), the court must be satisfied that there is no set of
facts favorable to the plaintiffs and suggested by the complaint which could fail to
establish the occurrence of an act of state.” Ramirez de Arellano v. Weinberger, 745 F.2d
1500, 1534 (D.C. Cir. 1984) (en banc), vacated on other grounds, 471 U.S. 1113 (1985).
Defendant must provide evidence of an “act of state” and bear the burden of proving that
the doctrine applies. See Alfred Dunhill of London, Inc. v. Republic of Cuba, 425 U.S.
682, 691, 694-695 (1976). The act of state doctrine only applies if 1) there is an “act of
state” at issue and 2) barring adjudication is found to be appropriate. See, e.g., Banco
Nacional de Cuba v. Sabbatino, 376 U.S. 398 (1964). Defendant has failed to establish
either, so his motion must be denied.
B. Defendant Has Failed to Prove that the Validity of an Official “Act of
State” Within Sovereign Territory Is at Issue.
Defendant argues that the act of state doctrine mandates dismissal without even
identifying the Supreme Court’s articulation of that doctrine: “Every sovereign State is
bound to respect the independence of every other sovereign State, and the courts of one
country will not sit in judgment on the acts of the government of another done within its
own territory.” Underhill v. Hernandez, 168 U.S. 250, 252 (1897) (emphasis added); see
also, Sabbatino, 376 U.S. at 401. By avoiding citation to the test laid out in Underhill
Case 1:05-cv-02167-PLF Document 8 Filed 05/15/2006 Page 54 of 63
-41-
and Sabbatino, Defendant seeks to obscure the indisputable fact that he cannot meet the
basic requirement of the Doctrine, namely the fact that the conduct at issue must occur
within the foreign state’s own territory. Defendant failed to meet his burden because he
failed to prove (or even argue) that the act at issue was in fact an “act of state,” that is, an
act 1) done within Israel’s own sovereign territory that was 2) an official public act. See,
e.g., id. at 401.
1. The act of state doctrine does not apply because the act alleged
occurred outside of Israel’s sovereign territory.
The act of state doctrine does not apply to acts outside of a sovereign’s territory.
See Underhill, 168 U.S. at 252; Sabbatino, 376 U.S. at 401; W. S. Kirkpatrick & Co. v.
Environmental Tectonics Corp., Int'l, 493 U.S. 400, 405 (1990); Republic of Aus. v.
Altmann, 541 U.S. 677, 700 (2004); El-Hadad, v. Embassy of the United Arab Emirates,
69 F. Supp. 2d 69, 81 (D.D.C. 1999) (refusing to apply the ASD to an act occurring in the
U.S. because the ASD “applies only when the actions of the foreign state occur within
that foreign state”); Flatow v. Islamic Republic of Iran, 999 F. Supp. 1, 24 (D.D.C. 1998)
(“Political assassinations ordered by foreign states outside their territory, however, are
not valid acts of state which bar consideration of the case”) (emphasis added). The attack
which Plaintiffs (who are Lebanese citizens residing in Lebanon) complain of occurred in
Lebanon, a sovereign nation, not within Israel’s territory. Complaint at ¶¶ 7-13, 27, 33.
Defendant does not claim otherwise, admitting that the shelling occurred across
Israel’s borders. Memo. at 29. Instead, Defendant argues that he has satisfied the
requirement that the act occurred within Israel because Plaintiffs did not allege that
Defendant acted outside his offices in Jerusalem. Memo. at 28, n. 34. Despite bearing
Case 1:05-cv-02167-PLF Document 8 Filed 05/15/2006 Page 55 of 63
-42-
the burden of proof, Defendant provides no factual or legal support for his argument;
indeed, where an official approved an act is immaterial to where the act was done. See,
e.g., Risk v. Kingdom of Norway, 707 F. Supp. 1159, 1168 (N.D. Cal. 1989), aff’d, 936 F.
2d 393 (9th Cir. 1991) (act of state doctrine does not apply to Norwegian officials’ acts
inside the U.S. even though approved by officials in Norway).
2. The act of state doctrine does not bar Plaintiffs’ claims because
Defendant failed to establish an “official” act of state.
Defendant fails to provide evidence of a “statute, decree, order, or resolution” of
the Israeli Government authorizing the attack on Plaintiffs, which resulted in their
injuries and the deaths of their loved ones. Dunhill, 425 U.S at 695; Liu v. Republic of
China, 892 F.2d 1419, 1432 (9th Cir. 1989) (act of state doctrine burden requires “some
evidence that the government acted in its sovereign capacity…”); Galu v. SwissAir, 873
F.2d 650, 654 (2d Cir. 1989) (defendant bears the burden “to establish foreign law to the
extent necessary to establish its entitlement to the act of state defense.”) Defendant never
argues that the attack was legal under Israeli law and provides no admissible evidence
that his conduct constituted official acts of Israel. A purported letter from the
Ambassador of Israel asserting that the case challenges sovereign actions approved by
Israel does not constitute evidence of such. (See Plaintiffs’ Objection to Defendant’s
Submissions, filed simultaneously herewith.)
Even if Defendant had presented evidence of an official Israeli act authorizing the
attack on the United Nations compound, the act of state doctrine would still not apply
because war crimes, extrajudicial killings, and CIDTP can never be considered official
acts of state. “[J]us cogens violations are considered violations of peremptory norms,
Case 1:05-cv-02167-PLF Document 8 Filed 05/15/2006 Page 56 of 63
-43-
from which no derogation is permitted. Acts of state to the contrary are invalid.”
Presbyterian Church, 244 F. Supp. 2d at 345. As the Second Circuit has confirmed:
“[W]e doubt that the acts of even a state official, taken in violation of a nation’s
fundamental law and wholly unratified by that nation’s government, could properly be
characterized as an act of state.” Kadic, 70 F.3d at 250; accord, Filartiga v. Pena-Irala,
630 F.2d 876, 889 (2d Cir. 1980). See also, Linder, 963 F.2d at 337 (only “acts of
legitimate warfare” are exempt from liability [under] Underhill); Sarei v. Rio Tinto Plc,
221 F. Supp. 2d 1116, 1189 (C.D. Cal. 2002) (9th Cir., argued June 23, 2005) (war
crimes cannot be deemed official acts of state because they are not legitimate acts of
warfare); Flatow, 999 F. Supp. at 24 (“acts of international terrorism are not valid acts of
state of the type which bar consideration”); Biton II, 412 F. Supp. 2d at 9 (“children are
not the proper targets of war”).
It “would be a rare case in which the act of state doctrine precluded suit under”
the ATS. Kadic, 70 F.3d at 250. The TVPA’s legislative history makes clear that since
“no state officially condones torture or extrajudicial killings,” the act of state doctrine
cannot shield defendants from TVPA liability. S. Rep. No. 102-249, at 6 (1991).
Moreover, acts outside an official’s scope of authority cannot be acts of state because
they cannot “give effect to a State’s public interests.” Sharon, 599 F. Supp. at 544 (citing
RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF FOREIGN RELATIONS LAW § 41 (1962)). Violations of
international human rights, such as war crimes, extrajudicial killings, and CIDTP, cannot
be in the public interest. See Liu Qi, 349 F. Supp. 2d at 1306; Doe v. Unocal, 963 F.
Supp. 880, 893 (C.D. Cal. 1997). “It is only when officials having sovereign authority
act in an official capacity that the Act of State Doctrine applies.” Jimenez v. Aristegueita,
Case 1:05-cv-02167-PLF Document 8 Filed 05/15/2006 Page 57 of 63
-44-
311 F.2d 547, 557 (5th Cir. 1962), cert. denied, 373 U.S. 914 (1963) (citations omitted).
Defendant unpersuasively cites Roe v. Unocal Corp., 70 F. Supp. 2d 1073, 1078-
1080 (C.D. Cal. 1999), which held only that the act of state doctrine barred a soldier from
challenging an order by his superior officer to work without pay – an order that did not
conflict with Burmese law, international law, or U.S. law. The Roe court expressly
refused to reconsider its holding in National Coalition Gov’t of Union of Burma
(NCGUB), 176 F.R.D. 329 (C.D. Cal. 1997), that abuses by the Burmese military were
not acts of state. Roe, 70 F. Supp. 2d at 1076, n. 1 (citing NCGUB, 176 F.R.D. at 349-
57). Like the conduct at issue in NCGUB, the act at issue here was illegal under
international law, domestic law, and as argued herein, U.S. law. See supra at II.B.2,
discussing Israeli law. Defendant’s reliance on Saltany v. Reagan, 702 F. Supp. 319
(D.D.C. 1988), is also misplaced, as the claims against the United Kingdom itself were
dismissed on act of state grounds because the plaintiffs alleged that Prime Minister
Thatcher, acting as the sitting head of government and “speaking from its seat of
government” (not outside the scope of authority), assented to a U.S. request to use air
bases in its territory (Great Britain) to conduct a military mission. Id. at 320-321.
3. The act of state doctrine does not bar plaintiffs’ claims because
they do not require the Court to declare an official act invalid.
Finally, even if Defendant could provide evidence of an act that is a “statute,
decree, order, or resolution,” Plaintiffs’ claims do not implicate the act of state doctrine
as they do not require the Court to declare the act invalid. See, e.g., Sabbatino, 376 U.S.
at 401. In W. S. Kirkpatrick, the Supreme Court rejected the act of state doctrine since
plaintiff “was not trying to undo or disregard the governmental action.” 493 U.S. at 407.
Case 1:05-cv-02167-PLF Document 8 Filed 05/15/2006 Page 58 of 63
-45-
This case does not seek to deny legal effect to any act of a foreign government, nor
render it “null and void.” Id. at 406 (citing Sabbatino). W. S. Kirkpatrick cited with
approval the court’s finding in Sharon that the “issue in this litigation is not whether [the
alleged] acts are valid, but whether they occurred.” 599 F. Supp. at 546. Sharon rejected
the act of state doctrine because the issue was not whether acts condoning the massacre
of unarmed noncombatant civilians were valid: “no one is suggesting that these
acts…have validity in the sense that they cannot be attacked. All agree…such actions, if
they occurred, would be illegal and abhorrent.” Id.
C. Even if an Act of State Were at Issue, the Sabbatino Factors Would
Counsel Against Application of the Doctrine.
Ignoring the first issue of whether the conduct was “an act of state,” Defendant
relies on the factors set forth in Sabbatino that a court must consider to determine
whether adjudication of an act of state should be permitted. Such factors, however,
cannot transform an unofficial act or an act outside a sovereign’s territory into an “act of
state.” See W. S. Kirkpatrick, 493 U.S. at 405 (inquiries unnecessary where “the factual
predicate for application of the act of state doctrine does not exist). If an act of state were
at issue here, the Sabbatino factors would support adjudication.
The first Sabbatino factor, the degree of international consensus concerning
applicable legal principles, counsels against application of the act of state doctrine in this
case. Sabbatino, 376 U.S. at 427-28. Plaintiffs’ ATS claims, which must be based on
specific, universal, and obligatory norms, by definition, reflect a high degree of
international consensus. See Sosa, 542 U.S. at 748; see also, Kadic, 70 F.3d at 250
(unambiguous agreement regarding war crimes and summary execution principles); Doe
Case 1:05-cv-02167-PLF Document 8 Filed 05/15/2006 Page 59 of 63
-46-
v. Unocal, 963 F. Supp. at 894-95 (jus cogens violations); Qi, 349 F. Supp. at 1296
(CIDTP); Liu, 892 F.2d at 1433 (murder). The act of state doctrine should not be applied
here given the universality of the applicable CIL norms.
The second Sabbatino factor relates to the “implications of an issue…for our
foreign relations” and also weighs against application of the act of state doctrine. 376
U.S. at 428. Defendant does not explain how adjudicating this case would detrimentally
affect U.S. foreign relations, much less produce evidence thereof. To the extent that he
makes such arguments regarding the political question doctrine, Plaintiffs refute them
above. Not surprisingly, Defendant fails to consider the principle of sovereignty and any
implications on U.S. foreign relations with regard to Lebanon, the sovereign nation
whose citizens suffered this grotesque attack in their own country. The mere fact that
Defendant was formerly an official of the Israeli Government, an ally of the U.S., does
not weigh against adjudicating this action. Even if this case were to have implications on
foreign relations, the act of state doctrine should not be used to deny application of
established principles of human rights.
A consideration of such questions as the massacre of unarmed civilians no
doubt touches “on national nerves,” Sabbatino, 376 U.S. at 428, and raises
the possibility of embarrassment to the United States and Israel. This case,
of course, does not entail judicial scrutiny of the legitimacy of such acts.
But even if it did, a court should not refuse to apply established principles
of human rights because of a doctrine designed to keep courts out of the
business of enforcing property rights in litigation affecting property within
a foreign sovereign state. To the contrary, Sabbatino suggests -- and the
most current authority proposes -- that the act of state doctrine need not be
applied to bar review of the violation of well recognized human rights.
Sharon, 599 F. Supp. at 552.
Case 1:05-cv-02167-PLF Document 8 Filed 05/15/2006 Page 60 of 63
-47-
D. Defendant Need Not Have Ordered the Attack on the United Nations
Compound to Be Held Liable.
Contrary to Defendant’s command responsibility argument (Memo. at 29-30), the
TVPA Senate Report makes clear that “a higher official need not have personally
performed or ordered the abuses in order to be held liable.” S. Rep. No. 102-249, at 9 (1st
Sess. 1991) (emphasis added). Cases cited by Defendant confirm that a superior is
responsible for failing to prevent or punish a subordinate’s actions of which the superior
knew or should have known. See, e.g., Hilao, 103 F.3d at 777; Ford ex rel. Estate of
Ford v. Garcia, 289 F.3d 1283, 1288 (11th Cir. 2002); accord, In re Yamashita, 327 U.S.
1, 16 (1946). See also, Forti v. Suarez-Mason, 672 F. Supp. at 1537-38 (defendant found
liable for abuses committed by soldiers under his command based on a finding that he
had "authorized, approved and directed and ratified" the actions as part of a "policy,
pattern and practice" which he had endorsed"); Xuncax, 886 F. Supp. at 171-175
(Guatemalan general found liable for ordering, directing program of human rights abuses
and because he "was aware of and supported" the abuses committed by personnel under
his command, and "refused to act to prevent such atrocities"); Paul v. Avril, 901 F.Supp.
330 (S.D. Fla. 1994) (defendant liable for torture committed by soldiers acting under his
instructions, authority, direction and control and within the scope of authority granted by
him). This doctrine is also well established under international law. See, e.g.,
Additional Protocol I to the Geneva Conventions, Arts. 86, 87 (recognizing doctrine of
command responsibility); Prosecutor v. Hadzihasanovic, IT-01-47-AR72 (ICTY) (16
July 2003) at ¶¶ 10-31 (recognizing the doctrine of command responsibility under
customary international law).
Case 1:05-cv-02167-PLF Document 8 Filed 05/15/2006 Page 61 of 63
-48-
Further, claims based on indirect liability are actionable under the ATS and the
TVPA. See Cabello v. Fernandez-Larios, 402 F.3d 1148, 1157-58 (11th Cir. 2005) citing
Hilao v. Estate of Marcos, 103 F.3d 767, 776-77 (9th Cir. 1996). “An examination of
legislative history indicates that the TVPA was intended to reach beyond the person who
actually committed the acts, to those ordering, abetting, or assisting in the violation.”
Cabello at 776 1158, citing S.Rep. No. 102-249, at 8-9 (1991); see also, In re Agent
Orange, 373 F. Supp. 2d at 53-54; Carmichael v. United Tech. Corp., 835 F.2d 109, 113-
14 (5th Cir. 1988).
Finally, Defendant’s argument that Plaintiffs’ future discovery will invade
Israel’s sovereignty is speculative and premature. Memo. at 30. See, Ibrahim, 391 F.
Supp. 2d at 16 (rejecting speculation at the motion to dismiss stage about future clashes
with the United States’ need for secrecy about its interrogation programs in Iraq).
Moreover, in the context of this case, much of the relevant information has already been
revealed in the course of the United Nations’ investigation. For example, while
Defendant posits that there would be intrusive discovery into the command structure, the
UN report indicates that Israel has already provided information on the role of the
Northern Command in the decision to fire on the compound at Qana. Klimaski Dcl.
Exhibit 1 at ¶6(b).
CONCLUSION
For the foregoing reasons, Plaintiffs respectfully request that Defendant’s Motion
to Dismiss be denied, and that if necessary, they be allowed the opportunity to conduct
jurisdictional discovery.
Case 1:05-cv-02167-PLF Document 8 Filed 05/15/2006 Page 62 of 63
-49-
Dated: May 15, 2006 Respectfully submitted,
/s/
James R. Klimaski (243543), Local Counsel
Judith Chomsky, Maria LaHood, Michael
Poulshock,
Jennifer Green, and William Goodman
Attorneys for Plaintiffs
Case 1:05-cv-02167-PLF Document 8 Filed 05/15/2006 Page 63 of 63