Beatrice Bell v. Ditech Financial, Llc et al

NOTICE OF MOTION AND MOTION to Dismiss Case

C.D. Cal.June 12, 2017

L oc k e L or d L L P 4 4 M o n tg om er y S tr ee t, S u it e 41 0 0 S a n F ra n ci sc o , C A 94 10 4 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 11 12 13 14 15 16 17 18 19 20 21 22 23 24 25 26 27 28 1 MOTION TO DISMISS Bell v. Ditech Financial,, LLC, et al., Case No. 2:16-cv-07245-R-(AJWx) Regina J. McClendon (SBN 184669) rmcclendon@lockelord.com LOCKE LORD LLP 44 Montgomery Street, Suite 4100 San Francisco, California 94104 Telephone: (415) 318-8810 Facsimile: (415) 676-5816 Simon M. Feng (SBN 295360) simon.feng@lockelord.com LOCKE LORD LLP 300 South Grand Avenue, Suite 2600 Los Angeles, California 90071 Telephone: (213) 485-1500 Facsimile: (213) 485-1200 Attorneys for Defendant Ditech Financial LLC UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT CENTRAL DISTRICT OF CALIFORNIA BEATRICE BELL, an individual, Plaintiff, vs. DITECH FINANCIAL, LLC, a limited liability corporation; EXPERIAN INFORMATION SOLUTIONS, INC, a corporation; EQUIFAX INFORMATION SERVICES LLC, a limited liability company; TRANS UNION LLC, a limited liability company, Defendants. ) ) ) ) ) ) ) ) ) ) ) ) ) ) ) ) ) ) ) ) ) ) CASE NO.: 2:16-cv-07245-R-(AJWx) DITECH FINANCIAL LLC’S NOTICE OF MOTION AND MOTION TO DISMISS THE COMPLAINT; MEMORANDUM OF POINTS AND AUTHORITIES IN SUPPORT THEREOF Date: July 17, 2017 Time: 10:00 a.m. Place: Courtroom 880 Complaint Filed: September 27, 2016 Discovery Cut-off: June 26, 2017 Final Pretrial Conference: July 17, 2017 Trial Date: August 15, 2017 Case 2:16-cv-07245-R-AJW Document 32 Filed 06/12/17 Page 1 of 12 Page ID #:111 L oc k e L or d L L P 4 4 M o n tg om er y S tr ee t, S u it e 41 0 0 S a n F ra n ci sc o , C A 94 10 4 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 11 12 13 14 15 16 17 18 19 20 21 22 23 24 25 26 27 28 2 MOTION TO DISMISS Bell v. Ditech Financial,, LLC, et al., Case No. 2:16-cv-07245-R-(AJWx) TO ALL PARTIES AND THEIR COUNSEL OF RECORD: PLEASE TAKE NOTICE THAT on July 17, 2017 at 10:00 a.m., or as soon thereafter as the matter may be heard in the above-entitled Court, defendant Ditech Financial LLC (“Defendant” or “Ditech”) will present for hearing before the Honorable Manuel L. Real, United States District Judge, in Courtroom 880, 8th Floor of the United States District Court located at Roybal Federal Building and U.S. Courthouse, 255 East Temple Street, Los Angeles, California 90012, its Motion to Dismiss the Complaint filed by plaintiff Beatrice Bell (“Plaintiff”). Ditech seeks dismissal pursuant to Federal Rules of Civil Procedure 12(b)(6) on the grounds that Plaintiff fails to state a claim upon which relief can be granted. This Motion is based on this Notice of Motion and Motion, the incorporated Memorandum of Points and Authorities, the pleadings, papers and records on file in this action, and such oral argument as may be presented at the time of hearing. This Motion seeks dismissal of all of Plaintiff’s claims in the Complaint against Ditech. Dated: June 12, 2017 Respectfully submitted, LOCKE LORD LLP By: /s/ Simon M. Feng Regina J. McClendon Simon M. Feng Attorneys for Defendant Ditech Financial LLC Case 2:16-cv-07245-R-AJW Document 32 Filed 06/12/17 Page 2 of 12 Page ID #:112 L oc k e L or d L L P 4 4 M o n tg om er y S tr ee t, S u it e 41 0 0 S a n F ra n ci sc o , C A 94 10 4 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 11 12 13 14 15 16 17 18 19 20 21 22 23 24 25 26 27 28 3 MOTION TO DISMISS Bell v. Ditech Financial,, LLC, et al., Case No. 2:16-cv-07245-R-(AJWx) MEMORANDUM OF POINTS AND AUTHORITIES I. INTRODUCTION Defendant Ditech Financial LLC (“Defendant” or “Ditech”) moves to dismiss plaintiff Beatrice Bell’s Complaint relating to the real property located at 2818 Briar Knoll Drive, Henderson, Nevada 89074 (the “Property”) on the grounds that Plaintiff fails to state a claim upon which relief can be granted. See Fed. R. Civ. P. 12(b)(6). The crux of the Complaint is that Ditech is attempting to collect money from Plaintiff on a second mortgage that was allegedly paid off and is improperly reporting delinquent payments to credit reporting agencies (“CRAs”). As a result, Plaintiff asserts claims for violation of the Fair Debt Collection Practices Act (“FDCPA”) and the Federal Credit Reporting Act (“FCRA”). However, Plaintiff’s allegations do not support claims for violation of either statute. As explained more fully herein, Plaintiff fails to state a claim upon which relief can be granted. Accordingly, Ditech respectfully requests that the Court grants its motion to dismiss in its entirety. II. STATEMENT OF FACTS On or about November 17, 2006, Plaintiff obtained a second mortgage loan in the original principal balance of $68,000 (the “Subject Loan”) from Greenlight Financial Services. The Subject Loan was secured by a Deed of Trust (“DOT”) recorded against the Property in the Clark County Recorder’s Office on December 21, 2006 as Document Number 20061221-0001650. Plaintiff alleges that she short sold the Property on or about November 29, 2011, and use the funds to pay off the Subject Loan. Compl. ¶¶ 23 (d)-(e).1 Plaintiff further claims that since the short sale, Ditech continues to contact her about a delinquency on the Subject Loan, and continues to report the delinquency of the Subject Loan to the credit bureaus. Id. ¶¶ 23 (f)-(g). 1 A short sale is a transaction in which a borrower sells a property for less than the amount owing on the loan and the lender agrees to accept less than the full amount due on the loan in satisfaction of the loan. Case 2:16-cv-07245-R-AJW Document 32 Filed 06/12/17 Page 3 of 12 Page ID #:113 L oc k e L or d L L P 4 4 M o n tg om er y S tr ee t, S u it e 41 0 0 S a n F ra n ci sc o , C A 94 10 4 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 11 12 13 14 15 16 17 18 19 20 21 22 23 24 25 26 27 28 4 MOTION TO DISMISS Bell v. Ditech Financial,, LLC, et al., Case No. 2:16-cv-07245-R-(AJWx) III. LEGAL ARGUMENT A. Applicable Legal Standard. “To survive a motion to dismiss, a complaint must contain sufficient factual matter, accepted as true, to ‘state a claim to relief that is plausible on its face.’” Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 556 U.S. 662, 678 (2009) (citing Bell Atlantic Corp. v. Twombly, 550 U.S. 544, 570 (2007)). Thus, in resolving a Rule 12(b)(6) motion to dismiss, a court engages in a two-prong inquiry. First, a court accepts all well-pled allegations as true, but “[t]hreadbare recitals of the elements of a cause of action, supported by mere conclusory statements, do not suffice.” Id. (citation omitted). A court is “not bound to accept as true a legal conclusion couched as a factual allegation.” Id. (citation omitted). Nor need a court “accept as true allegations that contradict matters properly subject to judicial notice or by exhibit.” Sprewell v. Golden State Warriors, 266 F.3d 979, 988 (9th Cir. 2001). Second, the court determines whether the well-pled factual allegations are sufficient to “raise a right to relief above the speculative level.” Twombly, 550 U.S. at 555 (citation omitted). “[O]nly a complaint that states a plausible claim for relief survives a motion to dismiss.” Iqbal, 556 U.S. at 679. “[W]here the well-pleaded facts do not permit the court to infer more than the mere possibility of misconduct, the complaint has alleged-but it has not ‘show[n]’-‘that the pleader is entitled to relief.’” Id. (citing Fed. R. Civ. P. 8(a)(2)). B. Plaintiff Fails To Plead A Claim For Violation Of The Fair Credit Reporting Act. As an initial matter, Plaintiff alleges that Ditech violated 15 U.S.C. § 1692g under her claim for violation of the FCRA. However, section 1692(g) is not a statutory provision under the FCRA, but rather, a section under the FDCPA. Accordingly, Ditech will address Plaintiff’s section 1692(g) claim in the FDCPA section below. 15 U.S.C. § 1681s-2, contained within the FCRA, sets forth “[r]esponsibilities Case 2:16-cv-07245-R-AJW Document 32 Filed 06/12/17 Page 4 of 12 Page ID #:114 L oc k e L or d L L P 4 4 M o n tg om er y S tr ee t, S u it e 41 0 0 S a n F ra n ci sc o , C A 94 10 4 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 11 12 13 14 15 16 17 18 19 20 21 22 23 24 25 26 27 28 5 MOTION TO DISMISS Bell v. Ditech Financial,, LLC, et al., Case No. 2:16-cv-07245-R-(AJWx) of furnishers of information to consumer reporting agencies.” 15 U.S.C. § 1681s-2. Subsection (b) relates to the “[d]uties of furnishers of information upon notice of dispute.” See 15 U.S.C. § 1681s-2(b). For liability under subsection (b) to attach, a furnisher of credit information must first have received notice from a CRA that there is a dispute with regard to information provided by the furnisher to the CRA. See Vietor v. Commonwealth Land Title, No. C-07-06453, 2010 WL 545856, at *4 (N.D. Cal. Feb. 11, 2010) (dismissing FCRA claim because plaintiff failed to plead she notified the CRA of a disputed account, that the CRA notified defendant, or that defendant failed to investigate). Here, Plaintiff claims that Ditech violated section 1681s-2 because it failed to provide notice of Plaintiff’s dispute to the CRAs, failed to complete an investigation of Plaintiff’s written dispute and provide results of an investigation within 30 days, and because Ditech failed to notify Plaintiff of any determination that Plaintiff’s dispute was frivolous within 5 days. Compl. ¶¶ 29, 31-32. But section 1681s-2 does not require a furnisher of information, like Ditech, to give notice of the disputed matter to the CRAs. Rather, the statute requires the CRA to inform Ditech after Plaintiff has given notice of a dispute to the CRAs. Gens v. Wachovia Mortgage Corp., No. 10-cv-01073-LHK, 2011 WL 9121, at *8 (N.D. Cal. Jan. 3, 2011) (“[O]nly a CRA’s notification to a furnisher of information of a dispute triggers duties under subsection (b).”). There is simply no requirement for Ditech to notify the CRAs of the alleged dispute. And while Plaintiff alleges that she sent a notice of dispute to the CRAs, Plaintiff fails to allege when and how the CRAs informed Ditech about the dispute, and how Ditech failed to take remedial action after being notified. The failure to plead those facts warrants dismissal. See Abouelhassan v. Chase Bank, No. C 07- 03951 JF (PVT), 2007 WL 3010421, *4 (N.D. Cal. Oct. 12, 2007) (“[T]he rule in this jurisdiction is that the individual consumer cannot state a FCRA claim against a furnisher of his credit information unless he passes through the “filtering mechanism….”); see also Von Brincken v. Mortgageclose.Com, Inc., No. 2:10-cv- Case 2:16-cv-07245-R-AJW Document 32 Filed 06/12/17 Page 5 of 12 Page ID #:115 L oc k e L or d L L P 4 4 M o n tg om er y S tr ee t, S u it e 41 0 0 S a n F ra n ci sc o , C A 94 10 4 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 11 12 13 14 15 16 17 18 19 20 21 22 23 24 25 26 27 28 6 MOTION TO DISMISS Bell v. Ditech Financial,, LLC, et al., Case No. 2:16-cv-07245-R-(AJWx) 2153-JAM-KJN, 2011 WL 2621010, at *5 (E.D. Cal. June 30, 2011) (“to succeed on such a claim, a plaintiff must allege that she had a dispute with a credit reporting agency regarding the accuracy of an account, that the credit reporting agency notified the furnisher of the information, and that the furnisher failed to take the remedial measures outlined in the statute.”). Plaintiff’s allegation that Ditech failed to complete an investigation of the “written dispute and provide the results of an investigation” within 30 days or for Ditech to notify that “Plaintiff’s dispute is frivolous” within 5 days is confusing because she does not allege within 30 days or within 5 days of a triggering event. In other words, Plaintiff does not specify whether Ditech violated those deadlines from the time it allegedly received notice of the dispute, or from the time the CRAs received notice of the dispute. It is important to note that Plaintiff does not state exactly when she notified Ditech of the credit dispute, but only alleges that she “contacted Ditech on numerous occasions to resolve the discrepancies on her credit.” Compl. ¶ 23(h). Ditech has no duty to investigate any disputes or provide any notices to Plaintiff unless Plaintiff gave notice of the dispute to the CRAs and the CRAs notified Ditech. See Sanai v. Saltz, 170 Cal.App.4th 746, 765 (2009) (“Absent notice from Experian, [defendant] had no enforceable duty to reinvestigate the information about [plaintiff] it had previously provided.”). Therefore, Plaintiff’s claim under section 1681s-2 fails. C. Plaintiff Fails To Plead A Claim For Violation Of The Fair Debt Collection Practices Act. Plaintiff alleges that Ditech violated the Fair Debt Collection Practices Act (“FDCPA”), more specifically, 15 U.S.C. §§ 1692b(2), 1692d, 1692d(5), and 1692f because Ditech called Plaintiff to collect on a non-existing debt. Compl. ¶¶ 23(f), 49, 53(a)-(d). She also asserts a violation under 15 U.S.C.§ 1692g2 because she did not 2 Plaintiff asserts incorrectly a violation of 15 U.S.C. § 1692g (Compl. ¶ 30) under her cause of action for violation of the FCRA because section 1692g is a provision under the FDCPA. Case 2:16-cv-07245-R-AJW Document 32 Filed 06/12/17 Page 6 of 12 Page ID #:116 L oc k e L or d L L P 4 4 M o n tg om er y S tr ee t, S u it e 41 0 0 S a n F ra n ci sc o , C A 94 10 4 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 11 12 13 14 15 16 17 18 19 20 21 22 23 24 25 26 27 28 7 MOTION TO DISMISS Bell v. Ditech Financial,, LLC, et al., Case No. 2:16-cv-07245-R-(AJWx) receive “written documentation of the amount of the debt, the name of the original creditor nor other information” after Plaintiff’s initial communication. Compl. ¶ 30. The FDCPA claim fails for multiple reasons. 1. FDCPA claim fails because Ditech is not a debt collector. Plaintiff’s claims for violation of 15 U.S.C. §§ 1692b(2), 1692d, 1692d(5), 1692f and 1692g fail because Ditech is not a debt collector within the meaning of the FDCPA. Hepler v. Washington Mut. Bank, F.A., No. cv-07-4804 CAS, 2009 WL 1045470, at *4-5 (C.D. Cal. Apr. 17, 2009) (“[T]he law is well-settled… that creditors, mortgagors, and mortgage servicing companies are not debt collectors and are statutorily exempt from liability under the FDCPA.”); see also Walker v. Equity 1 Lenders Group, No. 09-cv-325 WQH (AJB), 2009 WL 1364430, at *7 (S.D. Cal. May 14, 2009) (a mortgage servicing company foreclosing on a property is not acting as a debt collector within the meaning of the FDCPA). Plaintiff acknowledges the recent Ninth Circuit decision in Dowers v. Nationstar, 852 F.3d 964 (9th Cir. 2017), which held that a section 1692f(6) claim is actionable against a “security interest enforcer.” Id. at 970. But Plaintiff does not make a section 1692f(6) claim. Rather, she alleges that “Defendant violated 15 U.S.C. § 1692f of the FDCPA by using unfair or unconscionable means in connection with the collection of an alleged debt.” Compl. ¶ 53(d). This subtly is important because only a section 1692f(6) claim is actionable against security interest enforcers. Dowers, 852 F.3d at 970 (“[F]or the purpose of section 1692f(6), a debt collector also includes a security interest enforcer.”) (internal citation omitted). Dowers does not expand the definition of “debt collectors” to include “security interest enforcer” to any other provision in the FDCPA except for section 1692f(6). Id. (“[F]or purposes of the FDCPA outside of [s]ection 1692f(6), a security interest enforcer is not a debt collector…”) (emphasis in original). Because Plaintiff fails to allege that Ditech is not a debt collector within the meaning of the FDCPA, this claim must fail. Case 2:16-cv-07245-R-AJW Document 32 Filed 06/12/17 Page 7 of 12 Page ID #:117 L oc k e L or d L L P 4 4 M o n tg om er y S tr ee t, S u it e 41 0 0 S a n F ra n ci sc o , C A 94 10 4 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 11 12 13 14 15 16 17 18 19 20 21 22 23 24 25 26 27 28 8 MOTION TO DISMISS Bell v. Ditech Financial,, LLC, et al., Case No. 2:16-cv-07245-R-(AJWx) 2. FDCPA claim fails because it is insufficiently pleaded. Each of Plaintiff’s claim for violation of a FDCPA provision fails. Plaintiff alleges that Ditech “violated 15 U.S.C. § 1692b(2) by communicating with any person other than the consumer and stating that such consumer owes any debt…” Compl. ¶ 53(a). But this claim fails because Plaintiff does not allege that the communication was made to acquire her location information. 15 U.S.C. § 1692b(2); see also Coats v. Mandarich Law Group, LLP, No. 2:13-cv-246-EFB PS, 2014 WL 545432, at *4 (E.D. Cal. Feb. 12, 2014) (failed to state a section 1692b(2) claim; “[C]omplaint does not contain any allegations regarding communication made to others in an attempt to acquire plaintiff’s location information.”). Plaintiff claims that Ditech “violated 15 U.S.C. § 1692d by engaging in conduct the natural consequence of which is to harass, oppress, or abuse any person in connection with the collection of an alleged debt.” Compl. ¶ 53(b). While Plaintiff alleges that Ditech called her, she fails to specify exactly what conduct was harassing, oppressive, or abusive. 15 U.S.C. § 1692d; see also Coats, 2014 WL 545432, at *4 (failed to state a section 1692d claim; “[C]omplaint does not identify what conduct plaintiff believes defendants engaged in that was harassing in nature.”). Accordingly, the Court should dismiss this claim. Likewise, Plaintiff’s claim that Ditech violated 15 U.S.C. § 1692d(5) fails. Plaintiff alleges that Ditech “violated [section] 1692d(5) by causing a telephone to ring or engaging any person in telephone conversation repeatedly or continuously with intent to annoy, abuse, or harass any person at the called number.” Compl. ¶ 53(c). She claims that Ditech called her to collect on a non-existing debt. Id. ¶ 23(f) (Ditech has “continued to call”); ¶ 49 (Ditech “repeatedly and continuously called”). But mere allegations of phone calls do not automatically trigger a claim under section 1692d(5). See Arteaga v. Asset Acceptance, LLC, 733 F. Supp. 2d 1218, 1229 (E.D. Cal. Aug. 23, 2011) (no section 1692d(5) claim; plaintiff fails to “cite to a single case in which ‘daily’ or ‘nearly daily’ phone calls” give rise to a section 1692d(5) claim). Case 2:16-cv-07245-R-AJW Document 32 Filed 06/12/17 Page 8 of 12 Page ID #:118 L oc k e L or d L L P 4 4 M o n tg om er y S tr ee t, S u it e 41 0 0 S a n F ra n ci sc o , C A 94 10 4 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 11 12 13 14 15 16 17 18 19 20 21 22 23 24 25 26 27 28 9 MOTION TO DISMISS Bell v. Ditech Financial,, LLC, et al., Case No. 2:16-cv-07245-R-(AJWx) Plaintiff’s failure to plead with particularity the pattern and frequency of the alleged calls is fatal to this claim. See Crockett v. Rash Curtis & Associates, 929 F. Supp. 2d 1030, 1032 (N.D. Cal. Mar. 14, 2013) (“No bright-line rule guides courts in determining which conduct fails to establish harassment as a matter of law, but courts have found call volumes similar to the 22 at issue here to state a claim for relief under [section 1692d(5)].”); see also Arteaga, 733 F. Supp. 2d 1218 at 1228 (citing Kuhn v. Account Control Tech., Inc., 865 F.Supp. 1443, 1453 (Dist. Nev.1994)) (six telephone calls in 24 minutes constituted harassment in violation of section 1692d(5)); id. (citing United States v. Central Adjustment Bureau, Inc., 667 F.Supp. 370, 376 (N.D. Tex. 1986)), aff'd, 823 F.2d 880 (5th Cir. 1987) (finding harassment where debt collector made as many as four or five telephone calls to the same debtor in one day). Because Plaintiff fails to plead the pattern and frequency of the calls to show annoyance, abuse, or harassment, this claim fails. Plaintiff asserts that Ditech “violated 15 U.S.C. § 1692f of the FDCPA by using unfair and unconscionable means in connection with the collection of an alleged debt.” Compl. ¶ 53(d). A prerequisite to asserting this claim requires Plaintiff to allege a “material false or misleading statement.” Gates v. Asset Acceptance, LLC, 801 F. Supp. 2d 1044, 1047 (S.D. Cal. July 26, 2011). Plaintiff has not identified a single statement, let alone a material false or misleading statement. Id. (“Only a collector's material false or misleading statements are actionable under § 1692f of the FDCPA”). Because Plaintiff fails to identify a specific material false or misleading statement made by Ditech, this claim should be dismissed. 15 U.S.C. § 1692g pertains to debt validation letters between a debtor and debt collector after the initial communication with the debtor in connection with the collection of a debt. See 15 U.S.C. § 1692g. Plaintiff alleges that Ditech violated section 1692g because it did not send “Plaintiff written documentation of the amount of debt, the name of the original creditor nor other information.” But that allegation does not support a section 1692g claim because Plaintiff does not allege she notified Case 2:16-cv-07245-R-AJW Document 32 Filed 06/12/17 Page 9 of 12 Page ID #:119 L oc k e L or d L L P 4 4 M o n tg om er y S tr ee t, S u it e 41 0 0 S a n F ra n ci sc o , C A 94 10 4 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 11 12 13 14 15 16 17 18 19 20 21 22 23 24 25 26 27 28 10 MOTION TO DISMISS Bell v. Ditech Financial,, LLC, et al., Case No. 2:16-cv-07245-R-(AJWx) Ditech of a disputed debt after receiving an initial communication regarding the collection of the debt. Instead, she alleges that she contacted Ditech and CRAs to resolve discrepancies on her credit. Compl. ¶¶ 23(h), 23(i), 27. Plaintiff’s failure to plead that she requested a validation of the debt after she received initial communication regarding the collection of a debt warrants this claim to be dismissed. Mahon v. Credit Bureau of Placer County Inc., 171 F. 3d 1197, 1202 (9th Cir. 1999) (“Under this section, a debt collector must provide verification of the debt to the debtor, upon written request made by the debtor within 30 days after receipt of the initial Notice.”) (internal citation omitted). 3. FDCPA claim fails to satisfy Rule 8 of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure. Lastly, Plaintiff’s second cause of action for violation of the FDCPA fails to satisfy Rule 8 of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure because Plaintiff generically asserts allegations against “Defendant,” but states that the second cause of action is “against BOFA” and names “Defendant Ditech” in several allegations in support of this claim. Compl. pp. 8-9. Because it is unclear as to whether this claim is asserted against Ditech, this claim fails to satisfy Rule 8. See Flores v. EMC Mortgage Company, 997 F.Supp.2d 1088, 1103 (E.D. Cal. Feb. 18, 2014) (“Specific identification of the parties to the activities alleged by the plaintiffs is required in this action to enable the defendant to plead intelligently.”) (internal citations omitted). IV. CONCLUSION For these reasons, Ditech Financial LLC respectfully requests that this Court grant its motion to dismiss in its entirety. Case 2:16-cv-07245-R-AJW Document 32 Filed 06/12/17 Page 10 of 12 Page ID #:120 L oc k e L or d L L P 4 4 M o n tg om er y S tr ee t, S u it e 41 0 0 S a n F ra n ci sc o , C A 94 10 4 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 11 12 13 14 15 16 17 18 19 20 21 22 23 24 25 26 27 28 11 MOTION TO DISMISS Bell v. Ditech Financial,, LLC, et al., Case No. 2:16-cv-07245-R-(AJWx) Dated: June 12, 2017 Respectfully submitted, LOCKE LORD LLP By: /s/ Simon M. Feng Regina J. McClendon Simon M. Feng Attorneys for Defendant Ditech Financial LLC Case 2:16-cv-07245-R-AJW Document 32 Filed 06/12/17 Page 11 of 12 Page ID #:121 L oc k e L or d L L P 4 4 M o n tg om er y S tr ee t, S u it e 41 0 0 S a n F ra n ci sc o , C A 94 10 4 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 11 12 13 14 15 16 17 18 19 20 21 22 23 24 25 26 27 28 12 MOTION TO DISMISS Bell v. Ditech Financial,, LLC, et al., Case No. 2:16-cv-07245-R-(AJWx) CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE I, Simon M. Feng, an attorney, do hereby certify that on June 12, 2017, I electronically filed the foregoing DITECH FINANCIAL LLC’S NOTICE OF MOTION AND MOTION TO DISMISS THE COMPLAINT; MEMORANDUM OF POINTS AND AUTHORITIES IN SUPPORT THEREOF with the Clerk of the Court using the electronic case filing system, which will send notification of such filings to the parties registered with the Court’s CM/ECF system. Dated: June 12, 2017 /s/ Simon M. Feng Case 2:16-cv-07245-R-AJW Document 32 Filed 06/12/17 Page 12 of 12 Page ID #:122 L oc k e L or d L L P 4 4 M o n tg om er y S tr ee t, S u it e 41 0 0 S a n F ra n ci sc o , C A 94 10 4 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 11 12 13 14 15 16 17 18 19 20 21 22 23 24 25 26 27 28 [Proposed] Order Bell v. Ditech Financial,, LLC, et al., Case No. 2:16-cv-07245-R-(AJWx) Regina J. McClendon (SBN 184669) rmcclendon@lockelord.com LOCKE LORD LLP 44 Montgomery Street, Suite 4100 San Francisco, California 94104 Telephone: (415) 318-8810 Facsimile: (415) 676-5816 Simon M. Feng (SBN 295360) simon.feng@lockelord.com LOCKE LORD LLP 300 South Grand Avenue, Suite 2600 Los Angeles, California 90071 Telephone: (213) 485-1500 Facsimile: (213) 485-1200 Attorneys for Defendant Ditech Financial LLC UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT CENTRAL DISTRICT OF CALIFORNIA BEATRICE BELL an individual; Plaintiff, vs. DITECH FINANCIAL, LLC, a limited liability corporation; EXPERIAN INFORMATION SOLUTIONS, INC, a corporation; EQUIFAX INFORMATION SERVICES LLC, a limited liability company; TRANS UNION LLC, a limited liability company, Defendants. ) ) ) ) ) ) ) ) ) ) ) ) ) ) ) ) ) ) ) ) ) ) ) CASE NO.: 2:16-cv-07245-R-(AJWx) [PROPOSED] ORDER REGARDING DITECH FINANCIAL LLC’S MOTION TO DISMISS PLAINTIFF’S COMPLAINT Date: July 17, 2017 Time: 10:00 a.m. Place: Courtroom 880 Complaint Filed: September 27, 2016 Discovery Cut-off: June 26, 2017 Final Pretrial Conference: July 17, 2017 Trial Date: August 15, 2017 Case 2:16-cv-07245-R-AJW Document 32-1 Filed 06/12/17 Page 1 of 3 Page ID #:123 L oc k e L or d L L P 4 4 M o n tg om er y S tr ee t, S u it e 41 0 0 S a n F ra n ci sc o , C A 94 10 4 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 11 12 13 14 15 16 17 18 19 20 21 22 23 24 25 26 27 28 [Proposed] Order Bell v. Ditech Financial,, LLC, et al., Case No. 2:16-cv-07245-R-(AJWx) This Court, having considered the papers filed by the parties and their arguments at the hearing, hereby GRANTS/DENIES defendant Ditech Financial LLC’s Motion To Dismiss. IT IS SO ORDERED. Dated: Honorable Manuel L. Real United States District Judge Case 2:16-cv-07245-R-AJW Document 32-1 Filed 06/12/17 Page 2 of 3 Page ID #:124 L oc k e L or d L L P 4 4 M o n tg om er y S tr ee t, S u it e 41 0 0 S a n F ra n ci sc o , C A 94 10 4 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 11 12 13 14 15 16 17 18 19 20 21 22 23 24 25 26 27 28 [Proposed] Order Bell v. Ditech Financial,, LLC, et al., Case No. 2:16-cv-07245-R-(AJWx) CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE I, Simon M. Feng, an attorney, do hereby certify that on June 12, 2017, I electronically filed the foregoing [PROPOSED] ORDER REGARDING DITECH FINANCIAL LLC’S MOTION TO DISMISS PLAINTIFF’S COMPLAINT with the Clerk of the Court using the electronic case filing system, which will send notification of such filings to the parties registered with the Court’s CM/ECF system. Dated: June 12, 2017 /s/ Simon M. Feng Case 2:16-cv-07245-R-AJW Document 32-1 Filed 06/12/17 Page 3 of 3 Page ID #:125