July 9, 1999 Appeal from Order of Supreme Court, Monroe County, (Siracuse, J.). OPINION OF THE COURT PINE, J. P. The issue presented in these appeals is when a foreclosure sale is consummated within the meaning of RPAPL 1371. Chase Manhattan Bank commenced foreclosure actions against two pieces of property, one in Rochester and the other in Buffalo, owned by Carl A. Gifaldi and Eva Gifaldi (defendants). Plaintiff, Lennar Northeast Partners Limited Partnership (Lennar), subsequently acquired the loans

No. 04-18420 B. September 22, 2006. Nicholas, Perot, Smith, Bernhart Zosh P.C., Edward J. Dinki, Esq., of counsel, Akron, NY, for Debtor. Thomas J. Gaffney, Esq., Buffalo, NY, Trustee. DECISION ORDER CARL L. BUCKI, Bankruptcy Judge. The present dispute involves the meaning of delivery for purposes of effecting a transfer by deed of an interest in real property under New York law. Until January of 2002, Charlotte Cardinale held title, in fee simple absolute, to her homestead at 59 Norman Drive in

April 14, 1992 Appeal from the Supreme Court, New York County (William P. McCooe, J.). It is uncontroverted that the defendant partnership unconditionally delivered the deeds at issue to counsel for Crossland on February 7, 1991. These deeds, which were duly acknowledged, were accepted and retained without objection by counsel on said date. Accordingly, under these circumstances, title to the property vested on that date thus commencing the 90-day time period set forth in RPAPL 1371 (2) (see, Sanders

November 6, 1995 Appeal from the Supreme Court, Queens County (LeVine, J.). Ordered that the order is affirmed insofar as appealed from, with costs. RPAPL 1371 (2) requires that a motion to enter a deficiency judgment be made within 90 days after the date the sale is consummated by the delivery of the proper deed of conveyance to the purchaser (Vittoria v Mazel, Bracha, Hatzlocha, 217 A.D.2d 657; Roosevelt Sav. Bank v Tsotsos, 215 A.D.2d 547; North Fork Bank Trust Co. v Boe, 198 A.D.2d 336). We agree

December 5, 1973 Hancock, Estabrook, Ryan, Shove Hust ( Melvin E. Holm of counsel), for plaintiff. Charles R. Rinaldo for Leonard C. Rinaldo, Sr., defendant. JAMES H. BOOMER, J. In this mortgage foreclosure action the mortgagee bank seeks a judgment of foreclosure and sale, not only of the real property, an apartment house, but also of the personal property used in connection with the apartment house. The mortgage covers the personal property as well as the real property and the only question involved

DECEMBER TERM, 1865. 1. The statute of Texas, relating to the organization, c., of its District Courts, which enacts that when a party shall file an affidavit of the loss of an instrument recorded under the statute, or of his inability to procure the original, a certified copy of the record shall be admitted in like manner as the original — does not dispense with the proof which is exacted when the original instrument is filed, in case an affidavit (which the statute also allows) alleging a belief

Argued December 5, 1889 Decided December 20, 1889 James S. Bennett for appellant. Alex. Blumenstiel for respondents. DANFORTH, J. The controversy is between the voluntary assignee of an insolvent debtor for the benefit of his creditors on one side, and his judgment and execution creditors on the other. The jury found in favor of the assignee, but judgment on the verdict was suspended until exceptions taken at the trial could be passed upon by the General Term. That court sustained the exceptions

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