Barrilleaux v. Mendocino County et al

MOTION for Summary Judgment - "Defendant County of Mendocino's Notice of Motion and Motion for Summary Judgment; Memorandum of Points and Authorities"

N.D. Cal.February 24, 2017

Defendant County of Mendocino’s Notice and Motion for Summary Judgment, et al. 1 U.S.D.C. No. 1:14-cv-01373-TEH 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 11 12 13 14 15 16 17 18 19 20 21 22 23 24 25 26 27 28 Katharine L. Elliott, County Counsel, SBN 135253 Brina A. Blanton, Deputy County Counsel, SBN 260829 OFFICE OF THE COUNTY COUNSEL County of Mendocino 501 Low Gap Road, Room 1030 Ukiah, CA 95482 Telephone: (707) 234-6885 Facsimile: (707) 463-4592 Email: blantonb@co.mendocino.ca.us Anne L. Keck, SBN 136315 KECK LAW OFFICES 418 B Street, Suite 206 Santa Rosa, California 95401 Telephone: (707) 595-4185 Facsimile: (707) 657-7715 Email: akeck@public-law.org Attorneys for Defendant the County of Mendocino UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT NORTHERN DISTRICT OF CALIFORNIA JESSICA BARRILLEAUX, Plaintiff, v. MENDOCINO COUNTY, et al., Defendants. Case No. 1:14-cv-01373-TEH DEFENDANT COUNTY OF MENDOCINO’S NOTICE OF MOTION AND MOTION FOR SUMMARY JUDGMENT; MEMORANDUM OF POINTS AND AUTHORITIES Date: April 17, 2017 Time: 10:00 a.m. Courtroom: 2, 17th Floor NOTICE OF MOTION AND MOTION FOR SUMMARY JUDGMENT TO PLAINTIFF JESSICA BARRILLEAUX AND HER COUNSEL OF RECORD: PLEASE TAKE NOTICE that on April 17, 2017, at 10:00 a.m., or as soon thereafter as the matter may be heard in Courtroom 2 of the above-entitled Court, located at 450 Golden Gate Avenue in San Francisco, California, Defendant the County of Mendocino (the “County”) will respectfully move this Court to award it summary judgment on all claims brought against it in the First Amended Complaint filed on January 15, 2016 (Dkt. No. 69, the “FAC”). Case 3:14-cv-01373-TEH Document 147 Filed 02/24/17 Page 1 of 32 Defendant County of Mendocino’s Notice and Motion for Summary Judgment, et al. 2 U.S.D.C. No. 1:14-cv-01373-TEH 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 11 12 13 14 15 16 17 18 19 20 21 22 23 24 25 26 27 28 This Motion for Summary Judgment is brought pursuant to Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 56 and applicable law, based on the following: 1. The County seeks summary judgment on all injunctive relief claims alleged against it pursuant to Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 56, because there is no genuine dispute as to any material fact and the County is entitled to judgment on such claims as a matter of law because Plaintiff lacks standing to pursue them. 2. The County seeks summary judgment on Plaintiff’s federal law claims alleged in the FAC’s First Cause of Action (brought under the Title II of the Americans with Disability Act of 1990) and the Second Cause of Action (brought under § 504 of the Rehabilitation Act of 1973) pursuant to Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 56, because there is no genuine dispute as to any material fact and the County is entitled to judgment on such claims as a matter of law. 3. The County seeks summary judgment on Plaintiff’s state law claims pursuant to Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 56, on the ground that there is no genuine dispute as to any material fact and the County is entitled to judgment on such claims as a matter of law, as follows: a. The County is entitled to summary judgment on Plaintiff’s Third Cause of Action in the FAC, which alleges a claim under the California Disabled Persons Act (including but not limited to California Civil Code §§ 54, 54.1, 55, and California Government Code § 4450, et seq.); b. The County is entitled to summary judgment on Plaintiff’s Fourth Cause of Action in the FAC, which alleges a claim under California Government Code § 11135; c. The County is entitled to summary judgment on Plaintiff’s Fifth Cause of Action in the FAC, which alleges a claim for dangerous condition of public property (including but not limited to California Government Code §§ 815.2(a), 815.4, 815.6, 820(a) and 835); and d. The County is entitled to summary judgment on Plaintiff’s Sixth Cause of Action in the FAC, which alleges a claim for negligence (including but not limited to California Government Code §§ 815.2(a), 815.4, 815.6, 820(a) and 835). This Motion is based on this Notice and Motion, the accompanying Memorandum of Points and Authorities in support thereof, the accompanying exhibits and declarations of Christopher Shaver, Heather Correll, and Anne Keck, the proposed order, the papers and pleadings on file herein, and on such oral arguments and evidence as may be adduced prior to or at the hearing of this matter. Keck Law Offices Dated: February 24, 2017 By: /s/ Anne L. Keck Anne L. Keck Attorneys for Defendant the County of Mendocino Case 3:14-cv-01373-TEH Document 147 Filed 02/24/17 Page 2 of 32 Defendant County of Mendocino’s Notice and Motion for Summary Judgment, et al. i U.S.D.C. No. 1:14-cv-01373-TEH 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 11 12 13 14 15 16 17 18 19 20 21 22 23 24 25 26 27 28 TABLE OF CONTENTS I. INTRODUCTION…………………………………………………………….………………1 II. GENERAL BACKGROUND………………………………………………………………...2 III. SUMMARY JUDGMENT STANDARDS…………………….……………………………..4 IV. THE TRIAL COURT FACILITIES ACT OF 2002 DIVESTED THE COUNTY OF CONTROL AND RESPONSIBILITY FOR PROVIDING COURT FACILITIES…………………………………………………………5 A. Historical Background...................................................................................................5 B. The Responsibility for the Ukiah Courthouse Transferred from the County to the Judicial Council in 2008...........................................................7 C. History of the Ukiah Courthouse and Pathways to its 4th Floor Courtrooms..........................................................................................................9 V. MOTION FOR SUMMARY JUDGMENT ON BARRILLEAUX’S CLAIMS FOR INJUNCTIVE RELIEF AGAINST THE COUNTY..............................................................10 VI. MOTION FOR SUMMARY JUDGMENT ON BARRILLEAUX’S FEDERAL LAW ADA AND RA CLAIMS AGAINST THE COUNTY..............................13 A. Barrilleaux’s Federal Claims Against the County Fail Because She was Not Denied the Benefits of the County’s Services, Programs, or Activities................................................................................................14 B. Barrilleaux’s Federal Claims Fail Because She Cannot Demonstrate the County Discriminated Against Her Solely By Reason of Her Disability....................16 C. Barrilleaux is Not Entitled to Damages Under Her Federal Law Claims Because She is Unable to Show the County was Deliberately Indifferent to Her Disability..........................................................................................................17 D. Barrilleaux Cannot Satisfy Causation Necessary to Recover Damages for Her Alleged Injury Under Her Federal Law Claims..........................................................18 E. Barrilleaux Cannot Prove the County Received Federal Funding for Superior Court Proceedings Necessary for Her § 504 RA Claim...............................18 VII. MOTION FOR SUMMARY JUDGMENT ON BARRILLEAUX’S STATE LAW CLAIMS...........................................................................................................19 A. Third Cause of Action: The California Disabled Persons Act....................................19 B. Fourth Cause of Action: California Government Code § 11135.................................21 C. Fifth Cause of Action: Dangerous Condition of Public Property................................22 D. Sixth Cause of Action: Negligence..............................................................................25 VIII. CONCLUSION.......................................................................................................................25 Case 3:14-cv-01373-TEH Document 147 Filed 02/24/17 Page 3 of 32 Defendant County of Mendocino’s Notice and Motion for Summary Judgment, et al. ii U.S.D.C. No. 1:14-cv-01373-TEH 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 11 12 13 14 15 16 17 18 19 20 21 22 23 24 25 26 27 28 TABLE OF AUTHORITIES Cases Beauchamp v. Los Gatos Golf Course 273 Cal.App.2d 20 (1969) .............................................................................................................. 24 Bird v. Lewis & Clark Coll. 303 F.3d 1015 (9th Cir. 2002) ........................................................................................................ 13 Biscotti v. Yuba City Unified Sch. Dist. 158 Cal.App.4th 554 (2007) ........................................................................................................... 22 Bowman v. Best W. Station House Inn No. 2:04-CV-0755GEBPAN, 2005 WL 3453712 (E.D. Cal. Dec. 16, 2005) ................................ 12 Brenner v. City of El Cajon 113 Cal.App.4th 434 (2003) ............................................................................................... 22, 23, 25 Castle v. Eurofresh, Inc. 731 F.3d 901 (9th Cir. 2013) .................................................................................................... 13, 19 Celotex Corp. v. Catrett 477 U.S. 317 (1986)...................................................................................................................... 4, 5 Cohen v. City of Culver City 754 F.3d 690 (9th Cir. 2014) .............................................................................................. 13, 14, 15 County of Sonoma v. Workers’ Comp. Appeals Bd. 222 Cal.App.3d 1133 (1990) ............................................................................................................ 6 D’Lil v. Riverboat Delta King, Inc. 59 F.Supp.3d 1001 (E.D. Cal. 2014) .............................................................................................. 20 Davis v. City of Pasadena 42 Cal.App.4th 701 (1996) ....................................................................................................... 24, 25 Donald v. Sacramento Valley Bank 209 Cal.App.3d 1183 (1989) .......................................................................................................... 20 Duvall v. Cty. of Kitsap 260 F.3d 1124 (9th Cir. 2001) ............................................................................................ 14, 17, 18 Employers Ins. of Wausau v. Granite State Ins. Co. 330 F.3d 1214 (9th Cir. 2003) .......................................................................................................... 6 Fielder v. City of Glendale 71 Cal.App.3d 719 (1977) .............................................................................................................. 24 Franceschi v. Schwartz 57 F.3d 828 (9th Cir. 1995) ............................................................................................................ 15 Gasaway v. Northwestern Mut. Life Ins. Co. 26 F.3d 957 (9th Cir. 1994) ............................................................................................................. 5 Case 3:14-cv-01373-TEH Document 147 Filed 02/24/17 Page 4 of 32 Defendant County of Mendocino’s Notice and Motion for Summary Judgment, et al. iii U.S.D.C. No. 1:14-cv-01373-TEH 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 11 12 13 14 15 16 17 18 19 20 21 22 23 24 25 26 27 28 Gibson v. Mendocino County 16 Cal.2d 80 (1940) ........................................................................................................................ 23 Greater L.A. Council on Deafness, Inc., v. Zolin 812 F.2d 1103 (9th Cir. 1987) ........................................................................................................ 19 Hart v. Alameda County 76 Cal.App.4th 766 (1999) ................................................................................................... 6, 14, 19 In re Capacitors Antitrust Litig. 154 F.Supp.3d 918 (N.D. Cal. 2015) .............................................................................................. 10 Jankey v. Song Koo Lee 55 Cal.4th 1038 (2012) ................................................................................................................... 19 Jones v. Cty. of Los Angeles 99 Cal.App.4th 1039 (2002) ..................................................................................................... 15, 17 Kirola v. City & Cty. of San Francisco 74 F.Supp.3d 1187 (N.D. Cal. 2014) .............................................................................................. 13 Lee v. Am. Nat. Ins. Co. 260 F.3d 997 (9th Cir. 2001) .......................................................................................................... 10 Los Angeles v. Lyons 461 U.S. 95 (1983).......................................................................................................................... 10 Melendres v. Arpaio 695 F.3d 990 (9th Cir. 2012) .......................................................................................................... 11 National Union Fire Ins. Co. v. Argonaut Ins. Co. 701 F.2d 95 (9th Cir. 1983) .............................................................................................................. 5 Shotz v. Cates 256 F.3d 1077 (11th Cir. 2001) ...................................................................................................... 12 Sprint Commc’ns Co., L.P. v. APCC Servs., Inc. 554 U.S. 269 (2008)........................................................................................................................ 11 Steel Co. v. Citizens for a Better Env't 523 U.S. 83 (1998).......................................................................................................................... 11 Superior Court v. Cty. of Sacramento No. C053142, 2008 WL 588923 (Cal. Ct. App. Mar. 5, 2008) ........................................................ 6 Urhausen v. Longs Drug Stores Cal. Inc. 155 Cal.App.4th 254 (2007) ..................................................................................................... 20, 21 Villanazul v. City of Los Angeles 37 Cal.2d 718 (1951) ........................................................................................................................ 5 Weinreich v. L.A. Cnty. Metro. Transp. Auth. 114 F.3d 976 (9th Cir.1997) ..................................................................................................... 14, 16 Case 3:14-cv-01373-TEH Document 147 Filed 02/24/17 Page 5 of 32 Defendant County of Mendocino’s Notice and Motion for Summary Judgment, et al. iv U.S.D.C. No. 1:14-cv-01373-TEH 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 11 12 13 14 15 16 17 18 19 20 21 22 23 24 25 26 27 28 Wilshire Fin. Tower v. City of Los Angeles 217 Cal.App.3d 119 (1990) ............................................................................................................ 20 Y.G. v. Riverside Unified Sch. Dist. 774 F.Supp.2d 1055 (C.D.Cal.2011) .............................................................................................. 22 Zelig v. County of Los Angeles 27 Cal.4th 1112 (2002) ............................................................................................................. 22, 23 Statutes 42 U.S.C. § 12132 .............................................................................................................................. 13 42 U.S.C. § 12182(a) .......................................................................................................................... 15 Cal. Civ. Code § 54(a) ........................................................................................................................ 19 Cal. Civ. Code § 54(c) ........................................................................................................................ 19 Cal. Civ. Code § 54.1(a)(1) ................................................................................................................ 19 Cal. Civ. Code § 54.3 ......................................................................................................................... 19 Cal. Const. Art. XI .............................................................................................................................. 16 Cal. Gov. Code § 11135(a) ................................................................................................................. 22 Cal. Gov. Code § 4456 ....................................................................................................................... 20 Cal. Gov. Code § 70301 ....................................................................................................................... 1 Cal. Gov. Code § 70301(d) ................................................................................................................... 7 Cal. Gov. Code § 70301(h) ................................................................................................................... 7 Cal. Gov. Code § 70312 ....................................................................................................................... 6 Cal. Gov. Code § 70321(a) ................................................................................................................... 7 Cal. Gov. Code § 70323(b) ................................................................................................................... 7 Cal. Gov. Code § 70326(b) ................................................................................................................... 8 Cal. Gov. Code § 70391 ..................................................................................................................... 12 Cal. Gov. Code § 70391(b) ................................................................................................................... 7 Cal. Gov. Code § 70391(e) ................................................................................................................... 7 Cal. Gov. Code § 70391(g) ................................................................................................................... 7 Cal. Gov. Code § 77200 ....................................................................................................................... 6 Case 3:14-cv-01373-TEH Document 147 Filed 02/24/17 Page 6 of 32 Defendant County of Mendocino’s Notice and Motion for Summary Judgment, et al. v U.S.D.C. No. 1:14-cv-01373-TEH 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 11 12 13 14 15 16 17 18 19 20 21 22 23 24 25 26 27 28 Cal. Gov. Code § 815 ......................................................................................................................... 25 Cal. Gov. Code § 830(a) ..................................................................................................................... 22 Cal. Gov. Code § 830.2 ...................................................................................................................... 23 Cal. Gov. Code § 835 ......................................................................................................................... 22 Cal. Gov. Code §§ 70312 ................................................................................................................... 12 Cal. Gov. Code §70343 ........................................................................................................................ 7 Fed. R. Civ. Proc. 56 ............................................................................................................................ 4 Fed. R. Civ. Proc. 56(e). ....................................................................................................................... 5 Case 3:14-cv-01373-TEH Document 147 Filed 02/24/17 Page 7 of 32 Defendant County of Mendocino’s Notice and Motion for Summary Judgment, et al. 1 U.S.D.C. No. 1:14-cv-01373-TEH 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 11 12 13 14 15 16 17 18 19 20 21 22 23 24 25 26 27 28 MEMORANDUM OF POINTS AND AUTHORITIES I. INTRODUCTION Plaintiff Jessica Barrilleaux’s (“Barrilleaux’s”) claims in this case revolve around her alleged inability to access Superior Court proceedings at the Ukiah Courthouse in April 2013, in connection with a hearing on her traffic ticket, based on lack of direct elevator access to the courtroom. Barrilleaux claims that, when using the stairs to depart her hearing held in Courtroom G on the 4th Floor of the Courthouse, her knee gave out and she fell partway down the stairs leading to the 1st Floor. Barrilleaux does not claim there was any defect in the stairs nor that the fall injured her; rather, she claims the mere action in descending the stairs caused her kneecap to displace, as it was held together with pins from a previous surgery. Barrilleaux admits that while an elevator was available for use for part of her descent, she did not use it. More importantly, Barrilleaux did not attempt to access any services provided by the County (as opposed to the Superior Court), nor was the County responsible for providing her with access to Superior Court proceedings at that time. In fact, while the County remains the owner of the Courthouse building, the California Legislature has divested it of all control over the Superior Court’s facilities at the Courthouse (including every area Barrilleaux alleges she accessed or attempted to access) through its passage of the Trial Court Facilities Act of 2002. See Cal. Gov. Code § 70301, et seq., (the “Court Facilities Act”). Pursuant to that Act, in December 2008, the County and the Judicial Council entered into two agreements which effectively transferred all operational control over the Superior Court’s facilities at the Courthouse from the County to the Judicial Council.1 Hence, the Superior Court’s facilities and all common areas of the Courthouse – including the courtrooms on the 4th Floor and the stairway on which Barrilleaux alleges she fell – are controlled by the Judicial Council, not the County. Barrilleaux’s First Amended Complaint (the “FAC”) thus improperly seeks relief against the County by conflating the County with the Judicial Council and Superior Court for the County of Mendocino (collectively, the “Judicial Defendants”). Her claims against the County are without merit because it simply was not responsible for providing access to Superior Court proceedings. 1 See Declaration of Christopher Shaver in Support of Defendant County of Mendocino’s Motion for Summary Judgment (“Shaver Dec.”), Exhibits D and E. Case 3:14-cv-01373-TEH Document 147 Filed 02/24/17 Page 8 of 32 Defendant County of Mendocino’s Notice and Motion for Summary Judgment, et al. 2 U.S.D.C. No. 1:14-cv-01373-TEH 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 11 12 13 14 15 16 17 18 19 20 21 22 23 24 25 26 27 28 II. GENERAL BACKGROUND The incidents giving rise to this case began on September 2, 2012, when a California Highway Patrol (“CHP”) Officer conducted a traffic stop of Barrilleaux while she was driving to Ukiah to see a friend.2 The CHP Officer cited her for driving without a license and for speeding (75 miles in a 55 mile-per-hour zone), and Barrilleaux signed a promise to appear on the ticket in the Mendocino County Superior Court on October 22, 2012. (TR at 32, Exh. 1.) Barrilleaux failed to attend the hearing, however, because she “completely forgot about it.” (TR at 34.) Several months later, in either February or April 2013, Barrilleaux went to the DMV to determine how to renew her driver’s license, and was told she first had to clear her outstanding traffic tickets. (TR at 35.) Accordingly, on April 16, 2013, she drove without a license to the Superior Court in Ukiah for the purpose of getting a hearing date to clear up her traffic ticket. (TR at 36-7, 50-1.) However, earlier in March 2013, Barrilleaux had fallen on the sidewalk in front of her business and had broken her left kneecap in three places. (TR at 39-40, 43.) Her kneecap was repaired through surgery using two pins to hold the bone together. (TR at 43.) When she went to the Courthouse on April 16, 2013, Barrilleaux had to use crutches to get around. (TR at 46-7.) When she arrived at the Courthouse that day, Barrilleaux entered the building through the side entrance designated for disabled access. (TR at 54, Exh. 4.) She then asked one of the security guards where the Court Clerk’s room was located, and he said it was on the floor directly above them. (TR at 55, 294.) When she asked how to get there, the security guards told Barrilleaux that she had a choice: she could either walk to the other side of the building to take the elevator up one floor, or she could go up the nearby set of stairs. (TR at 55, 294-5.) Barrilleaux then “chose to go up the stairs” to the Clerk’s office, and she walked up the one flight using her crutches. (TR at 55-6.) Upon talking with the Court Clerk and filling out a form, Barrilleaux was given a new date and time to appear on her traffic ticket in Courtroom G. (TR 59-60, Exh. 5.) She did not request the Court Clerk for any sort of accommodation, nor did she tell the Clerk she had any sort of mobility 2 See the Deposition Transcript of Barrilleaux (“TR”) attached as Exhibits A (Volume I) and B (Volume II) to the accompanying Declaration of Anne Keck (“Keck Dec.”), at p. 30. Case 3:14-cv-01373-TEH Document 147 Filed 02/24/17 Page 9 of 32 Defendant County of Mendocino’s Notice and Motion for Summary Judgment, et al. 3 U.S.D.C. No. 1:14-cv-01373-TEH 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 11 12 13 14 15 16 17 18 19 20 21 22 23 24 25 26 27 28 limitations. (TR at 68-9.) Barrilleaux then exited the Courthouse the same way she went in, including descending the stairs from the 1st Floor on her crutches. (TR at 70.) On April 23, 2013, Barrilleaux again illegally drove to the Courthouse, this time to attend her Traffic Court hearing. (TR at 74.) Prior to that time, around April 21, 2013, Barrilleaux’s doctor told her that her knee bone had completely healed and that she did not need to use crutches to walk anymore. (TR at 47-9.) Instead, Barrilleaux occasionally wore an external knee brace. (TR at 78.) After parking her car, Barrilleaux again entered the Courthouse using the side entrance designated for disabled access. (TR at 75, Exh. 4.) Upon clearing security, she asked one of the security guards for the locations of Courtroom G and a bathroom. (TR at 78-9.) The security guard told her the disability bathroom was on the 5th Floor and Courtroom G was on the 4th Floor. (TR at 79.) He also told her that the elevator went only to floors 3 and 5, and that she would have to go down the stairs from the 5th Floor to reach Courtroom G on the 4th Floor. (Id.) Barrilleaux did not tell the security guard that traversing stairs posed any sort of a problem for her. (TR at 79-80.) Barrilleaux then took the elevator up to the 5th Floor to use the restroom, which she used without any problem. (TR at 81.) Thereafter, she walked down the stairs to the 4th Floor and Courtroom G, without incident. (Id.) After her Traffic Court hearing, Barrilleaux was told by court staff that she was to go down to the Clerk’s room on the 1st Floor to pay her traffic fine. (TR at 82- 5.) Barrilleaux then walked out of Courtroom G and took the stairs all the way down to the 1st Floor. (TR 85-7.) When asked why she did not use the elevator on the 3rd Floor to get to the 1st Floor, her response was, “[o]nly because it was all confusing to me.” (TR at 87.) Unfortunately, halfway down the last set of stairs leading directly to the 1st Floor, Barrilleaux’s knee “gave out” and she fell. (TR at 88, 301.) Barrilleaux claims that “the repetitive motion of descending the staircase” caused a piece of her kneecap attached to her quadriceps tendon to break off and it “shot up my leg like a window shade.” (TR at 264-5, 299.) This made her knee “collapse” as it just kept bending, and it caused her to tumble forward onto the 1st Floor of the Courthouse. (TR at 133.)3 While Barrilleaux said that there was a handrail on the stairway, she does 3 Barrilleaux’s doctor explained to her that her kneecap had pulled apart from the pins that were holding it together from her previous surgery. (TR at 122-3.) Case 3:14-cv-01373-TEH Document 147 Filed 02/24/17 Page 10 of 32 Defendant County of Mendocino’s Notice and Motion for Summary Judgment, et al. 4 U.S.D.C. No. 1:14-cv-01373-TEH 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 11 12 13 14 15 16 17 18 19 20 21 22 23 24 25 26 27 28 not remember whether or not she was holding it at the time she fell. (TR 85, 260-2.) However, Barrilleaux is certain that her injury was not caused by her knee contacting the stairs or ground, but rather by the action of simply bending her leg to go down the stairs. (TR at 300.) Barrilleaux confirmed at her deposition that, prior to the incident on April 23rd, her doctor had told her that everything had healed, that he did not give her directions to avoid going down stairs, and that he did not tell her that her mobility was limited by her knee. (TR at 302-303.) In fact, at that time, Barrilleaux’s doctor had given her only two directives: (1) sometimes wear a brace, and (2) go to physical therapy. (TR at 305.) Barrilleaux herself believed that as of the date of the incident, her knee had healed enough to allow her to safely ascend and descend stairs. (TR at 304.) Barrilleaux claims she never had any contact with any County employees, she never contacted the County with respect to disabled access to any County services, and she never tried to access any County services. (TR at 314-316, 318.) Nevertheless, she named the County as a defendant in six different causes of action seeking injunctive relief and damages, including: (1) Title II of the Americans with Disability Act of 1990 (the “ADA”); (2) § 504 of the Rehabilitation Act of 1973 (the “RA”); (3) California Civil Code §§ 54, 54.1, 55, and California Government Code § 4450, et seq.; (4) California Government Code § 11135; (5) dangerous condition of public property; and (6) negligence. This Court previously denied Barrilleaux’s motion for preliminary injunction, in which she sought an order requiring the installation of chair lifts leading to the 4th Floor of the Courthouse, among other relief. (Dkt. No. 122, attached to the Keck Dec. as Exhibit G, hereinafter the “PI Order”.) The County now seeks entry of summary judgment in its favor on all claims alleged against it, as discussed below. III. SUMMARY JUDGMENT STANDARDS A primary purpose of the summary judgment procedure is to identify and dispose of factually unsupported claims prior to trial. Celotex Corp. v. Catrett, 477 U.S. 317, 323-324 (1986). Summary judgment is proper when, viewing the evidence in the light most favorable to the non-moving party, the court determines that “there is no genuine dispute as to any material fact and the moving party is entitled to judgment as a matter of law.” Fed. R. Civ. Proc. 56. Case 3:14-cv-01373-TEH Document 147 Filed 02/24/17 Page 11 of 32 Defendant County of Mendocino’s Notice and Motion for Summary Judgment, et al. 5 U.S.D.C. No. 1:14-cv-01373-TEH 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 11 12 13 14 15 16 17 18 19 20 21 22 23 24 25 26 27 28 The party moving for summary judgment bears the initial responsibility of informing the district court of the basis for the motion, and identifying those portions of the pleadings, discovery responses, and any affidavits which it believes demonstrate the absence of a genuine issue of material fact. Celotex, 477 U.S. at 323. On an issue for which the opposing party will have the burden of proof at trial, the moving party need only point out “that there is an absence of evidence to support the nonmoving party’s case.” Id. Once the moving party has met its initial burden, the opposing party must go beyond the pleadings and, by his/her own affidavits or discovery responses, “set forth specific facts showing that there is a genuine issue for trial.” Fed. R. Civ. Proc. 56(e). Mere allegations or denials of fact cannot defeat a motion for summary judgment. Id.; see also Gasaway v. Northwestern Mut. Life Ins. Co., 26 F.3d 957, 960 (9th Cir. 1994). Nor is it sufficient for the opposing party simply to raise issues as to the credibility of the moving party’s evidence. See National Union Fire Ins. Co. v. Argonaut Ins. Co., 701 F.2d 95, 97 (9th Cir. 1983). If the nonmoving party fails to show that there is a genuine issue of disputed material fact for trial, “the moving party is entitled to judgment as a matter of law.” Celotex, 477 U.S. at 323. IV. THE TRIAL COURT FACILITIES ACT OF 2002 DIVESTED THE COUNTY OF CONTROL AND RESPONSIBILITY FOR PROVIDING COURT FACILITIES A. Historical Background The operations and control over California trial courts, and the facilities in which they conduct proceedings, have undergone significant changes in recent years. These changes have directly affected the County’s control over, and responsibility for, the Superior Court’s facilities in the Ukiah Courthouse at all times relevant in this action. A brief legal historical review is accordingly appropriate to understand the relevant legal issues. Prior to 1951, counties exerted significant control over municipal courts sufficient to make such courts considered agencies of the counties rather than the state. See Villanazul v. City of Los Angeles, 37 Cal.2d 718, 722-23 (1951). However, after 1951, California made numerous changes in its constitution and statutory scheme to transfer authority and control over trial courts from the counties to the State. See County of Sonoma v. Workers’ Comp. Appeals Bd., 222 Cal.App.3d 1133, Case 3:14-cv-01373-TEH Document 147 Filed 02/24/17 Page 12 of 32 Defendant County of Mendocino’s Notice and Motion for Summary Judgment, et al. 6 U.S.D.C. No. 1:14-cv-01373-TEH 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 11 12 13 14 15 16 17 18 19 20 21 22 23 24 25 26 27 28 1141-42 (1990). These changes demonstrated that the “State itself, and not the counties, … controls and directs the municipal courts.” Id. Indeed, after 1951, it was well settled that the counties did not operate or control trial courts within their borders. See Hart v. Alameda County, 76 Cal.App.4th 766, 782 (1999) (“[A] superior court is not a subagency of county. Rather, it is a separate branch of government.”). Historically, counties were obligated to provide “suitable rooms” for holding court and for judges and court attendants, as well as funding certain court operations. See Superior Court v. Cty. of Sacramento, No. C053142, 2008 WL 588923, at *2-5 (Cal. Ct. App. Mar. 5, 2008), citing former Cal. Gov. Code § 68073, Stats.1953, ch. 911, § 1, p. 2266.4 However, the fundamental relationship between State trial courts and the counties changed again with the Lockyer-Isenberg Trial Court Funding Act of 1997 (the “1997 Court Funding Act”). Pursuant to that Act, the State assumed sole responsibility for the funding of court operations and the counties’ responsibilities for court facilities became more limited. Id., citing Stats.1997, ch. 850, §§ 3(b), 27, 43; see Cal. Gov. Code § 77200. Thereafter, the Legislature enacted the Trial Court Facilities Act of 2002 “to transfer the responsibility for trial court facilities funding and operation” from the counties to the state. Id. (citation omitted); Cal. Gov. Code § 70301, et seq. Under the Court Facilities Act, the counties’ responsibility for providing court facilities ends upon transfer of the facilities to the Judicial Council pursuant to California Government Code § 70312 (“§ 70312”). Specifically, § 70312 provides in relevant part: If responsibility for court facilities is transferred from the county to the Judicial Council pursuant to this chapter, the county is relieved of any responsibility under Section 70311 for providing those facilities. The county is also relieved of any responsibility for deferred or ongoing maintenance for the facility transferred, except for the county facilities payment required by Section 70353. Except as otherwise provided by this chapter, or by the agreement between the Judicial Council and the county under this chapter, the Judicial Council shall have ongoing responsibility for providing trial court facilities. If responsibility for all court facilities within a county has been transferred pursuant to this chapter, that county shall have no responsibility for providing court facilities…. Cal. Gov. Code § 70312. 4 Though unpublished, this case opinion is properly considered herein. See Employers Ins. of Wausau v. Granite State Ins. Co., 330 F.3d 1214, 1220 n.8 (9th Cir. 2003) (“[W]e may consider unpublished state decisions, even though such opinions have no precedential value [citation omitted].”). Case 3:14-cv-01373-TEH Document 147 Filed 02/24/17 Page 13 of 32 Defendant County of Mendocino’s Notice and Motion for Summary Judgment, et al. 7 U.S.D.C. No. 1:14-cv-01373-TEH 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 11 12 13 14 15 16 17 18 19 20 21 22 23 24 25 26 27 28 The Court Facilities Act broadly defines the terms used in § 70312 to make it patently clear that its intent was to require all responsibilities for portions of buildings utilized by the Superior Courts to be transferred from the counties to the Judicial Council. For example, the Act contains a definitions section which broadly defines the term “responsibility for facilities” to mean “the obligation of providing, operating, maintaining, altering, and renovating a building that contains the facilities.” Cal. Gov. Code § 70301(h). Further, the term “court facilities” is defined in the Act to include, inter alia, rooms for holding superior court, judges’ chambers, rooms for court attendants, “[c]ommon and connecting space to permit proper and convenient use of the rooms,” and “[a]ny other area within a building required or used for court functions.” Cal. Gov. Code § 70301(d). To effectuate the transfer of court facilities from the counties to the State, the Court Facilities Act required the Judicial Council to “enter into agreements regarding the transfer of responsibility for court facilities from that county to the Judicial Council.” Cal. Gov. Code § 70321(a). Further, if a county also utilized space in a given courthouse for its own purposes, the Court Facilities Act allowed counties to retain title to such buildings, and required the Judicial Council to negotiate and enter agreements with the counties for the joint occupancy of such buildings. Cal. Gov. Code §§ 70323(b), 70343. Upon transfer of a court facility from a county to the Judicial Council, the Judicial Council acquired extensive powers and authority to control, operate, and maintain that facility, including, inter alia, the authority to: (1) exercise the full range of policymaking authority over trial court facilities, including planning, construction, acquisition, and operation [Cal. Gov. Code § 70391(b)]; (2) establish policies, procedures, and guidelines for ensuring that the courts have adequate and sufficient facilities, including, but not limited to, facilities planning, acquisition, construction, design, operation, and maintenance [Cal. Gov. Code § 70391(e)]; and (3) manage court facilities in consultation with the trial courts [Cal. Gov. Code § 70391(g)]. B. The Responsibility for the Ukiah Courthouse Transferred from the County to the Judicial Council in 2008 Pursuant to the Court Facilities Act, the Judicial Defendants and the County entered a Case 3:14-cv-01373-TEH Document 147 Filed 02/24/17 Page 14 of 32 Defendant County of Mendocino’s Notice and Motion for Summary Judgment, et al. 8 U.S.D.C. No. 1:14-cv-01373-TEH 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 11 12 13 14 15 16 17 18 19 20 21 22 23 24 25 26 27 28 Transfer Agreement regarding the Ukiah Courthouse.5 That Agreement provides that “the Transfer of Responsibility” of the Courthouse from the County to the Judicial Council would occur on the closing date of December 23, 2008. (Shaver Dec., Exh. D, § 4.1.) By entering into the Transfer Agreement, the Judicial Council necessarily agreed that there was no defect in the building (as defined by the Court Facilities Act) which could have significantly affected health or safety, or was “significant to the functionality of the facility.” See Cal. Gov. Code § 70326(b). The term “Transfer of Responsibility” is broadly defined in the Transfer Agreement as follows: “Transfer of Responsibility” or “Transfer” means the County’s full and final grant, transfer, absolute assignment, and conveyance to the applicable State Parties [i.e., the Judicial Council and the Superior Court], and the State Parties’ full and final acceptance and assumption of, entitlement to and responsibility for, all of the County’s rights, duties, and liabilities arising from or related to the Court Facility under this Agreement and the [Court Facilities] Act, except for those duties and liabilities expressly retained by the County under this Agreement and the [Court Facilities] Act, and Disputes related to facts or circumstances occurring prior to the Closing Date. (Shaver Dec., Exh. D, at § 2 (emphasis in original).) The Transfer Agreement further provides that, “upon completion of the Transfer, the Parties will have the general rights, duties, and liabilities set forth in the [Court Facilities] Act in respect of the Real Property [meaning the Land, the Building, the Court Facility and Offsite Parking Area],” except as expressly delegated by the Parties in that or another agreement, such as the joint occupancy agreement. (Shaver Dec., Exh. D, § 4.2.) As required by the Court Facilities Act and as referenced in the Transfer Agreement, the Judicial Council and the County also entered into a Joint Occupancy Agreement (the “JOA”) for the purpose of delineating responsibilities between the parties regarding the operation of the Courthouse in the wake of the transfer.6 Pursuant to the JOA, each of the parties have the exclusive right to occupy and use their own areas in the Courthouse (i.e., the County has the exclusive right to occupy 5 See “Transfer Agreement Between the Judicial Council of California, Administrative Office of the Courts, and the County of Mendocino for the Transfer of Responsibility for Court Facility,” for the Ukiah Courthouse, relevant portions of which are attached to the Declaration of Christopher Shaver as Exhibit D (hereinafter, the “Transfer Agreement”). 6 See “Joint Occupancy Agreement Between the Judicial Council of California, Administrative Office of the Courts, and the County of Mendocino,” attached to the Shaver Declaration as Exhibit E (hereinafter, the “JOA”). Case 3:14-cv-01373-TEH Document 147 Filed 02/24/17 Page 15 of 32 Defendant County of Mendocino’s Notice and Motion for Summary Judgment, et al. 9 U.S.D.C. No. 1:14-cv-01373-TEH 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 11 12 13 14 15 16 17 18 19 20 21 22 23 24 25 26 27 28 the DA’s Office, and the Superior Court has the exclusive right to occupy all rooms used by the Court), and both of them have the right to occupy and use the “Common Area,” defined in the JOA to include the hallways, stairways, elevators, and restrooms that are not located within either parties’ exclusive-use area. (Shaver Dec., Exh. E, §§ 2 and 3.1.) While the JOA states the Judicial Council is responsible the Court’s exclusive-use areas, it also requires the Judicial Council to be responsible for the “Operation” of the “Common Area” of the Courthouse.7 The JOA defines the term “Operation” as “the administration, management, maintenance, and repair of designated areas of the Real Property,” including custodial provided in the Common Area. (Id., § 2.) Further, the JOA authorizes the Judicial Council to make reasonable additions and alterations to the Common Area of the Courthouse, with costs to be shared by the County. (Shaver Dec., Exh. E, § 3.2.2.) Hence, beginning in December 2008, the Judicial Council has been and remains responsible for maintaining and operating the portions of the Courthouse used by the Superior Court as well as the “Common Area.” To that end, it has assigned Facility Management Administrator Brent Darymple the responsibility of planning/coordinating the maintenance, repair, and renovation of those areas in the Courthouse. (Keck Dec., Exh. F, ¶ 1.) However, the Superior Court itself remains responsible for ensuring its services (including but not limited to Court proceedings) are accessible to the public and for providing reasonable accommodations (including but not limited to programmatic access) to the public. (Keck Dec., Exhs. D and E.) C. History of the Ukiah Courthouse and Pathways to its 4th Floor Courtrooms The Ukiah Courthouse is the main courthouse in Mendocino County. The original courthouse standing on the site was built in 1859, which was replaced by another courthouse in 1872. (See Shaver Dec., ¶ 3.) Later, in 1927, a Court Annex was added toward the back of the main courthouse (facing School Street). (Id.) In 1950, the 1872 courthouse was demolished and a “new” courthouse was built which incorporated the 1927 Annex. (Id.) When constructing the 1950 Courthouse, in an apparent effort to meld the old with the new, the floors in the 1927 Annex were offset with the floors in the new portion of the 1950 structure. 7 The JOA expressly states, “[t]he Responsible Party is responsible for the Operation of the Common Area…” (Shaver Dec., Exh. E, § 3.2.2.) The JOA defines the term “Responsible Party” as the Judicial Council. (Shaver Dec., Exh. E, § 2.) Case 3:14-cv-01373-TEH Document 147 Filed 02/24/17 Page 16 of 32 Defendant County of Mendocino’s Notice and Motion for Summary Judgment, et al. 10 U.S.D.C. No. 1:14-cv-01373-TEH 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 11 12 13 14 15 16 17 18 19 20 21 22 23 24 25 26 27 28 This resulted in an odd juxtaposition of floors in the building, as the floors in the “new” portion of the building are offset in a zig-zag pattern by about one-half of a floor from the floors in the “old” portion of the building. (Shaver Dec., ¶ 9.) Hence, while the layout of the Courthouse allows for the sole elevator in the building to stop at all floors in the “new” portion of the building (Floors 0, 1, 3, and 5), it precludes the elevator from reaching or stopping at any of the floors in the “old” portion of the building (the Basement, Ground Floor, and Floors 2 and 4), as that portion is not adjacent to the elevator shaft. (Shaver Dec., ¶ 9-10.) Hence, persons must traverse stairs to reach the courtrooms on the 4th Floor, but the courtrooms on the 1st, 3rd, and 5th Floors are directly accessible by the elevator. (Shaver Dec., ¶¶ 10, 11, 14.) Barrilleaux’s lawsuit raises her accessibility complaints with respect to accessing Courtroom G located on the 4th Floor of the Courthouse. Since at least as early as 1956, the Court has been the sole occupant of the 4th Floor of the Courthouse, and to the present day it has contained two courtrooms (currently designated as Courtrooms F and G) as well as other rooms exclusively used by the Court. (Shaver Dec., ¶¶ 16-18.) Moreover, the pathways to the 4th Floor have remained the same since construction of the 1950 portion of the Courthouse. (Shaver Dec., ¶ 18.) The County provides no services, programs, or activities on the 4th Floor of the Courthouse. (Shaver Dec., ¶ 17.) V. MOTION FOR SUMMARY JUDGMENT ON BARRILLEAUX’S CLAIMS FOR INJUNCTIVE RELIEF AGAINST THE COUNTY To invoke the subject matter jurisdiction of the federal courts pursuant to the U.S. Constitution Article III’s case-or-controversy requirement, a plaintiff must provide sufficient facts to demonstrate her standing to seek the requested relief against the defendant. Los Angeles v. Lyons, 461 U.S. 95, 101-102 (1983). “[T]he Article III standing requirement is a constitutional limitation that applies to all claims litigated in a federal court whether based on federal or state law.” In re Capacitors Antitrust Litig., 154 F.Supp.3d 918, 925 (N.D. Cal. 2015); see also Lee v. Am. Nat. Ins. Co., 260 F.3d 997, 1001–02 (9th Cir. 2001). “[I]n order to have Article III standing, a plaintiff must adequately establish: (1) an injury in fact (i.e., a concrete and particularized invasion of a legally protected interest); (2) causation (i.e., a ‘fairly ... trace[able]’connection between the alleged injury in fact and the alleged conduct of the Case 3:14-cv-01373-TEH Document 147 Filed 02/24/17 Page 17 of 32 Defendant County of Mendocino’s Notice and Motion for Summary Judgment, et al. 11 U.S.D.C. No. 1:14-cv-01373-TEH 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 11 12 13 14 15 16 17 18 19 20 21 22 23 24 25 26 27 28 defendant); and (3) redressability (i.e., it is ‘likely’ and not ‘merely speculative’ that the plaintiff’s injury will be remedied by the relief plaintiff seeks in bringing suit). Sprint Commc’ns Co., L.P. v. APCC Servs., Inc., 554 U.S. 269, 273–74 (2008) (citing Lujan v. Defenders of Wildlife, 504 U.S. 555, 560–61 (1992)) (emphasis added, internal quotations omitted). “This triad of injury in fact, causation, and redressability constitutes the core of Article III's case-or-controversy requirement, and the party invoking federal jurisdiction bears the burden of establishing its existence.” Steel Co. v. Citizens for a Better Env’t, 523 U.S. 83, 103–104 (1998). Moreover, where a plaintiff seeks prospect injunctive relief, to satisfy standing requirements she must also demonstrate that she is realistically threatened by a repetition of the injury from the defendant against which such relief is sought. Melendres v. Arpaio, 695 F.3d 990, 997 (9th Cir. 2012). For purposes of this Motion only, the County does not contest the first prong of the standing inquiry, as Barrilleaux claims that she suffered an injury to her knee while descending the stairs from Courtroom G on the 4th Floor to the Clerk’s Office on the 1st Floor. However, as to the County, Barrilleaux cannot demonstrate causation (i.e., that the County is responsible for her injury) or redressability (i.e., that an order against the County will solve any future problems of accessing the Superior Court), nor can she demonstrate that she is realistically threatened with future injury that could be traceable to the County. To demonstrate causation sufficient to satisfy the second element of Article III’s standing requirement, Barrilleaux must prove that the injury to her knee was caused by an action (or inaction) of the County at the time of the incident in April 2013. Yet, as demonstrated by the Court Facilities Act, the Transfer Agreement, and the JOA, at the time of the alleged incident in April 2013, the County was not responsible for operating or maintaining the courtrooms in the Courthouse, nor was it responsible for ensuring the public had access to Superior Court proceedings on the 4th Floor or otherwise. (Shaver Dec., ¶¶ 19-21; Keck Dec., Exhs. D, E and F.) For these reasons, the County could not have “caused” Barrilleaux’s fall as she was attempting to leave Courtroom G. Moreover, Barrilleaux has admitted that it was her own choice to eschew using the elevator in favor of the stairs on both of her visits to the Courthouse – demonstrating a lack of causation for her claims against any defendant in this case. (TR at 55-6, 87; see also causation discussion in Section VI.C, below.) Case 3:14-cv-01373-TEH Document 147 Filed 02/24/17 Page 18 of 32 Defendant County of Mendocino’s Notice and Motion for Summary Judgment, et al. 12 U.S.D.C. No. 1:14-cv-01373-TEH 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 11 12 13 14 15 16 17 18 19 20 21 22 23 24 25 26 27 28 Barrilleaux also cannot demonstrate the redressability factor necessary to satisfy her standing to seek injunctive relief against the County, because the County is simply not responsible for providing the relief she seeks. Specifically, Barrilleaux’s FAC generally seeks an injunction requiring the County to modify the Courthouse “so that plaintiff and similarly situated persons with disabilities may obtain the benefits of, and access to, defendants’ ‘programs, services and activities’ in a ‘full and equal’ manner,” including to “adopt notification and signage policies warning persons of the inaccessibility of the 4th floor courtrooms and facilities, and of the availability of alternative procedures and accommodations and how to obtain them.” (FAC, at pp. 22-23.) However, the Superior Court is the entity responsible for providing such access to its own proceedings, and since 2008 the Judicial Council has been responsible for ensuring the courtrooms and “Common Area” of the Courthouse are accessible. See Cal. Gov. Code §§ 70312, 70391; see also Shaver Dec., Exh. D at §§ 4.1-2, Exh. E at § 3.2.2. Indeed, Judicial Defendants confirm that they – and not the County – are responsible for providing such access to Superior Court proceedings. (Keck Dec. Exhs. D, E and F.) Moreover, Barrilleaux cannot prove that she is realistically threatened with future injury that could be traceable to the County, because the County is simply not responsible for providing her access to Superior Court proceedings. See Shotz v. Cates, 256 F.3d 1077, 1081 (11th Cir. 2001) (“In ADA cases, courts have held that a plaintiff lacks standing to seek injunctive relief unless he alleges facts giving rise to an inference that he will suffer future discrimination by the defendant [emphasis added].”). Further, the County does not believe Barrilleaux’s claim that she could be harmed in the future by her inability to access Courtroom G is “real and immediate” as opposed to “conjectural, hypothetical, or contingent.8 Thus, Barrilleaux has alleged no future injury that could be traceable to the County because it is not responsible for providing her with future access to Superior Court proceedings in the Courthouse. 8 See Shotz, 256 F.3d at 1081 (citation omitted); see also Bowman v. Best W. Station House Inn, No. 2:04-CV-0755GEBPAN, 2005 WL 3453712, at *1 (E.D. Cal. Dec. 16, 2005) (“Even when a plaintiff declares in a vague manner an intent “to return to the places [she] had visited before ... ‘[s]uch some day’ intentions – without any description of concrete plans, or indeed even any specification of when the some day will be – do not support a finding of the ‘actual or imminent’ injury that our cases require.” [quoting Lujan, 504 U.S. at 564] … “Absent such an allegation, the likelihood of future discrimination remains conjectural, hypothetical, or contingent, and not real and immediate.” [citing Shotz, 256 F.3d at 1082].). Case 3:14-cv-01373-TEH Document 147 Filed 02/24/17 Page 19 of 32 Defendant County of Mendocino’s Notice and Motion for Summary Judgment, et al. 13 U.S.D.C. No. 1:14-cv-01373-TEH 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 11 12 13 14 15 16 17 18 19 20 21 22 23 24 25 26 27 28 Accordingly, Barrilleaux is unable to prove she has standing to seek her requested injunctive relief against the County, warranting summary judgment in favor of the County on such claims. VI. MOTION FOR SUMMARY JUDGMENT ON BARRILLEAUX’S FEDERAL LAW ADA AND RA CLAIMS AGAINST THE COUNTY Barrilleaux alleges federal law claims against the County under both Title II of the ADA as well as the RA. (See FAC, First and Second Causes of Action.) Title II of the ADA, which applies to state and local governments, provides that “no qualified individual with a disability shall, by reason of such disability, be excluded from participation in or be denied the benefits of the services, programs, or activities of a public entity, or be subjected to discrimination by any such entity.” 42 U.S.C. § 12132. “Title II emphasizes ‘program access,’ meaning that a public entity’s programs and services, viewed in their entirety, must be equally accessible to disabled persons.” Cohen v. City of Culver City, 754 F.3d 690, 694-95 (9th Cir. 2014). Section 504 of the RA “is materially identical to and the model for the ADA, except that it is limited to programs that receive federal financial assistance....” Castle v. Eurofresh, Inc., 731 F.3d 901, 908 (9th Cir. 2013) (citation omitted).9 Hence, utilizing the standards of the ADA to analyze both of Barrilleaux’s federal law claims is appropriate. Under Title II of the ADA, a “public entity must make reasonable modifications to avoid discrimination against persons with disabilities, unless it can demonstrate that doing so would fundamentally alter the nature of the service, program, or activity it provides.” Id., at 695. However, “[b]ecause the proper unit of analysis under Title II of the ADA is programs and services – not the individual sites at which they are offered – it is possible for a program, when viewed in its entirety, to be in compliance with the ADA, even if some aspects of facilities where the programs are offered are inaccessible.” Kirola v. City & Cty. of San Francisco, 74 F.Supp.3d 1187, 1236 (N.D. Cal. 2014) (emphasis in original, citations omitted); see also Bird v. Lewis & Clark Coll., 303 F.3d 1015, 1022 (9th Cir. 2002) (“Accessibility is not location-dependent; rather, as we have explained, the essential inquiry is whether the program overall is accessible through reasonable accommodations.”). To prove a public program or service violates Title II of the ADA, a plaintiff must show that: 9 While the County disputes that it received any federal funding related to its programs in the Courthouse, such a fact is to be disregarded for purposes of this summary judgment motion per the relief sought in the County’s Administrative Motion (filed concurrently herewith). Case 3:14-cv-01373-TEH Document 147 Filed 02/24/17 Page 20 of 32 Defendant County of Mendocino’s Notice and Motion for Summary Judgment, et al. 14 U.S.D.C. No. 1:14-cv-01373-TEH 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 11 12 13 14 15 16 17 18 19 20 21 22 23 24 25 26 27 28 (1) she is a qualified individual with a disability; (2) she was either excluded from participation in or denied the benefits of a public entity’s services, programs, or activities, or was otherwise discriminated against by the public entity; and (3) such exclusion, denial, or discrimination was by reason of her disability (hereinafter referred to as the “ADA Requirements”). Weinreich v. L.A. Cnty. Metro. Transp. Auth., 114 F.3d 976, 978 (9th Cir.1997) (citing to 42 U.S.C. § 12132). In addition, to recover damages under the ADA, a plaintiff must prove “intentional discrimination on the part of the defendant” which requires a showing of “deliberate indifference.” Duvall v. Cty. of Kitsap, 260 F.3d 1124, 1138 (9th Cir. 2001). Deliberate indifference requires (1) “knowledge that a harm to a federally protected right is substantially likely” and (2) “a failure to act upon that likelihood.” Id., at 1139. Accordingly, the deliberate indifference standard requires a plaintiff to prove that the public entity had notice of the plaintiff’s need for an accommodation and deliberately failed to take action to accommodate that need. A showing of negligent conduct is thus insufficient, as the deliberate indifference standard “involves an element of deliberateness.” Id. For purposes of the instant Motion only, the County does not dispute the first ADA Requirement – that Barrilleaux was a qualified individual with a disability at the time of the incident. However, Barrilleaux cannot satisfy either the second or third ADA Requirements, nor can she satisfy the deliberate indifference standard or establish causation for her alleged damages. Further, Barrilleaux’s RA claim must fail as the County receives no federal funding for the Superior Court proceedings she accessed in the Courthouse. Each of these issues is discussed below. A. Barrilleaux’s Federal Claims Against the County Fail Because She was Not Denied the Benefits of the County’s Services, Programs, or Activities To prove the second ADA Requirement, Barrilleaux must demonstrate that the County (as opposed to any other defendant) discriminated against her by denying her access to the County’s services, programs, or activities held on the 4th Floor of the Ukiah Courthouse. See Cohen, 754 F.3d at 695. Barrilleaux, however, cannot make such a showing because her claims are based solely on her alleged denial of access to Superior Court proceedings – which are provided by the Judicial Branch of the State, not the County. See Hart, 76 Cal.App.4th at 782 (The superior court is a separate branch of government, not a sub-agency the county.); see also Franceschi v. Schwartz, 57 Case 3:14-cv-01373-TEH Document 147 Filed 02/24/17 Page 21 of 32 Defendant County of Mendocino’s Notice and Motion for Summary Judgment, et al. 15 U.S.D.C. No. 1:14-cv-01373-TEH 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 11 12 13 14 15 16 17 18 19 20 21 22 23 24 25 26 27 28 F.3d 828, 831 (9th Cir. 1995) (The court is an “arm of the state,” not the county, for Eleventh Amendment purposes.); see also Jones v. Cty. of Los Angeles, 99 Cal.App.4th 1039, 1045 (2002) (Employment-related lawsuit by Superior Court employee could not proceed against the County because it is a “separate entity” from the Court.). In fact, Barrilleaux admitted in her deposition that she did not attempt to access any service of the County.10 Nor did Barrilleaux speak with any County employee about any of her issues accessing the Courthouse. (TR at 318; Declaration of Heather Correll (“Correll Dec.”), ¶ 10.) Nor did Barrilleaux ever request an accommodation from the County, with respect to accessing the Courthouse or otherwise. (TR at 315.) Instead, Barrilleaux’s claims against the County appear to be based solely on the fact that the County is the current owner of the building. However, Title II of the ADA does not focus on access to facilities, but rather on access to services, programs, or activities of a public entity. (See PI Order, attached to Keck Dec. as Exh. G, citing 28 C.F.R. § 35.150(a).) Indeed, while Title III of the ADA (applicable to private entities which provide public accommodations and services) expressly applies to any person who “owns … a place of public accommodation,”11 Title II of the ADA does not contain such language. A Title II claim, therefore, cannot be based simply on the fact that a public entity owns a building. See Cohen, 754 F.3d at 700, and fn 4 (Title II’s emphasis on “program access” is different from Title III, “which governs places of public accommodation [and] imposes more stringent requirements aimed at ensuring that every facility is equally accessible to disabled persons.”). Accordingly, under Title II of the ADA, the County’s simple ownership of the Courthouse building does not require it to make all portions of that building accessible to mobility impaired members of the public. Nor is the County required to provide the public with access to the Superior Court’s services, programs, or activities, because the California Legislature divested the County of any such 10 Barrilleaux testified at her deposition as follows: Q So my question to you was, have you ever tried to access any of the services of the County of Mendocino aside from trying to access the court? A Oh, the County of Mendocino, no. (Keck Dec., Exh. B, TR at 316.) 11 See 42 U.S.C. § 12182(a). Case 3:14-cv-01373-TEH Document 147 Filed 02/24/17 Page 22 of 32 Defendant County of Mendocino’s Notice and Motion for Summary Judgment, et al. 16 U.S.D.C. No. 1:14-cv-01373-TEH 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 11 12 13 14 15 16 17 18 19 20 21 22 23 24 25 26 27 28 responsibility via the 1997 Court Funding Act and the 2002 Court Facilities Act. (See Section III.B, above.) Indeed, the County has no ability to set policies for the Superior Court or Judicial Council regarding access to court proceedings, as the County is a separate subdivision within the State and has no legal power to control the State or its agencies. See e.g., Cal. Const. Art. XI, § 1 (Counties are “legal subdivisions of the State” with their own enumerated powers provided for by the Legislature). Rather, the Judicial Defendants are solely responsible for providing access to Superior Court proceedings, and do so through their policies and procedures. (See Keck Dec., Exhs. D and E.) The undisputed facts thus demonstrate that Barrilleaux was not denied access to a service, program, or activity of the County, and because the County does not control the Superior Court or its proceedings which Barrilleaux attempted to access, she cannot satisfy the second prong of the ADA Requirements. The County is accordingly entitled to summary judgment on Barrilleaux’s ADA and RA claims as a matter of law. B. Barrilleaux’s Federal Claims Fail Because She Cannot Demonstrate the County Discriminated Against Her Solely By Reason of Her Disability The third ADA Requirement requires Barrilleaux to prove the County denied her access to the Superior Court proceedings held in Courtrooom G on the 4th Floor of the Courthouse “solely by reason of disability.” See Weinreich., 114 F.3d at 978-9 (citation omitted). Yet, none of her allegations can be read to support this ADA Requirement, and no supporting evidence exists. Specifically, in response to the Judicial Defendants’ motion to dismiss, this Court held in its July 25, 2014 Order that Barrilleaux had alleged that a Superior Court Clerk was “aware” of her disability when Barrilleaux had appeared in the Clerk’s Office on crutches, but the Clerk nevertheless calendared her Traffic Court hearing to occur on the 4th Floor, all the while knowing that it had no direct elevator service. (Dkt. No. 25, at p. 10.) However, Barrilleaux never had any contact with the County or its employees with respect to the setting of her Traffic Court hearing. (TR at 314-316, 318.) Indeed, the undisputed evidence demonstrates that the County had no notice whatsoever that Barrilleaux either intended to attend a Superior Court proceeding or required an accommodation for accessing it. (Correll Dec., ¶ 10.) Moreover, because the County was not responsible for scheduling or providing Barrilleaux Case 3:14-cv-01373-TEH Document 147 Filed 02/24/17 Page 23 of 32 Defendant County of Mendocino’s Notice and Motion for Summary Judgment, et al. 17 U.S.D.C. No. 1:14-cv-01373-TEH 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 11 12 13 14 15 16 17 18 19 20 21 22 23 24 25 26 27 28 with a hearing in Superior Court, it could not have discriminated against her because of her disability. In fact, the Superior Court has verified that its employees are responsible for providing disabled access to its proceedings to comply with the ADA, and do so on a routine basis. (Keck Dec., Exhs. D and E.) Barrilleaux’s argument that the County’s title to the building is sufficient to hold it liable under Title II of the ADA is accordingly incorrect, and there is simply no evidence showing that Barrilleaux attempted to access a County program or that the County discriminated against Barrilleaux by reason of her disability or otherwise. C. Barrilleaux is Not Entitled to Damages Under Her Federal Law Claims Because She is Unable to Show the County was Deliberately Indifferent to Her Disability The deliberate indifference requirement for an ADA damages claim involves a two-step analysis. First, “[w]hen the plaintiff has alerted the public entity to his need for accommodation (or where the need for accommodation is obvious, or required by statute or regulation), the public entity is on notice that an accommodation is required, and the plaintiff has satisfied the first element of the deliberate indifference test.” Duvall, 260 F.3d at 1139. Second, “a public entity is required to undertake a fact-specific investigation to determine what constitutes a reasonable accommodation,” and “a public entity does not act by proffering just any accommodation: it must consider the particular individual’s need when conducting its investigation into what accommodations are reasonable.” Id. To meet this second element, “a failure to act must be a result of conduct that is more than negligence, and involves an element of deliberateness.” Id. In its July 25, 2014 Order, this Court denied the Judicial Defendants’ motion to dismiss in part because Barrilleaux’s allegations satisfied the “deliberate indifference” standard to seek damages, as she alleged that a Court Clerk was aware of her walking impairment (because she was on crutches at the time) and was deliberately indifferent to her need for an accommodation because the Clerk set her Traffic Court hearing to occur on a floor without direct elevator access. (Dkt. No. 25, at pp. 12-13.) However, Superior Court Clerks are not County employees,12 and Barrilleaux admits that she never had any contact with County employees, she never contacted the County with 12 See Superior Court’s Responses to Plaintiff’s Request for Admissions Nos. 25 and 26, attached to the Keck Declaration as Exhibit C, at p. 3; see also Jones, 99 Cal.App.4th at 1045. Case 3:14-cv-01373-TEH Document 147 Filed 02/24/17 Page 24 of 32 Defendant County of Mendocino’s Notice and Motion for Summary Judgment, et al. 18 U.S.D.C. No. 1:14-cv-01373-TEH 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 11 12 13 14 15 16 17 18 19 20 21 22 23 24 25 26 27 28 respect to disabled access to any County services, and she never tried to access any services of the County. (TR at 314-316, 318; see also Correll Dec., ¶ 10.) Barrilleaux’s own admissions thus preclude her from obtaining damages from the County on her ADA and RA claims, because the undisputed facts demonstrate that (a) the County had no notice of her specific need for an accommodation to access any County service, and (b) it did not deliberately fail to take action to accommodate her need to access a County service. See Duvall, 260 F.3d at 1138. D. Barrilleaux Cannot Satisfy Causation Necessary to Recover Damages for Her Alleged Injury Under Her Federal Law Claims Barrilleaux also cannot demonstrate that the County or the structure of the Courthouse caused her injury, because she admitted in her deposition that she chose to use the stairs in lieu of the elevator even though it was available to her. In fact, on her first April 16th visit to the Courthouse, a security guard told her she had a choice to take the elevator up to the 1st Floor or use the stairs, and she chose to use the stairs even though she was on crutches at the time. (TR at 55-6, 297.) On her second April 23rd visit to the Courthouse (during which she fell), she chose to descend the stairs from the 4th Floor to the 1st Floor to access the Clerk’s Office even though she knew the elevator next to the stairway would have taken her from the 3rd Floor to the 1st Floor. (TR at 55, 79, 81; see also Correll Dec. at figure 2.) Barrilleaux testified that the injury to her knee was not caused by any defect in the stairs, but rather by the repetitive motion of going down several flights of stairs – at the end of which her knee simply “gave out.” (TR at 88, 301.) Hence, she could easily have avoided the repetitive motion injury by descending only one set of stairs from the 4th Floor to the 3rd Floor, and then taking the elevator to the 1st Floor to access the Clerk’s Office. (Correll Dec., ¶ 7.) Barrilleaux’s choice to use the stairs to descend the entire three levels thus precludes her from demonstrating causation to recover damages for her injury against the County. E. Barrilleaux Cannot Prove the County Received Federal Funding for Superior Court Proceedings Necessary for Her § 504 RA Claim Section 504 of the RA “is materially identical to and the model for the ADA, except that it is limited to programs that receive federal financial assistance....” Castle v. Eurofresh, Inc., 731 F.3d Case 3:14-cv-01373-TEH Document 147 Filed 02/24/17 Page 25 of 32 Defendant County of Mendocino’s Notice and Motion for Summary Judgment, et al. 19 U.S.D.C. No. 1:14-cv-01373-TEH 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 11 12 13 14 15 16 17 18 19 20 21 22 23 24 25 26 27 28 901, 908 (9th Cir. 2013) (citation omitted). Hence, the RA “does not prohibit discrimination against the handicapped as such; it simply bars the use of federal funds to support programs or activities that so discriminate…” Greater L.A. Council on Deafness, Inc., v. Zolin, 812 F.2d 1103, 1111 (9th Cir. 1987). Because the County is not responsible for providing the public with Superior Court hearings [see e.g., Hart, 76 Cal.App.4th at 782], and thus could receive no federal funding for such a “program,” Barrilleaux’s RA claim likewise fails. VII. MOTION FOR SUMMARY JUDGMENT ON BARRILLEAUX’S STATE LAW CLAIMS Barrilleaux’s state law claims against the County are drafted so broadly and are based on such a plethora of statutes and legal theories that it is difficult to determine precisely which claims are based on which alleged facts. The County accordingly is left in the position of having to guess the actual bases for Barrilleaux’s state law claims in this Motion.13 Based on its interpretation of Barrilleaux’s state law claims against it in the FAC and related facts, the County submits that it is entitled to summary judgment on all such claims, as discussed below. A. Third Cause of Action: The California Disabled Persons Act Barrilleaux’s Third Cause of Action is based on California’s Disabled Persons Act (the “CDPA”), set out in California Civil Code §§ 54, 54.1, and 55. The CDPA “generally guarantees people with disabilities equal rights of access ‘to public places, buildings, facilities and services, as well as common carriers, housing and places of public accommodation.’” Jankey v. Song Koo Lee, 55 Cal.4th 1038, 1044–45 (2012); see also Cal. Civ. Code §§ 54(a), 54.1(a)(1). The CDPA creates a right of action against anyone who “denies or interferes with admittance to or enjoyment of the public facilities” or “otherwise interferes with the rights of an individual with a disability. Cal. Civ. Code § 54.3. There are two separate grounds for establishing a violation of the CDPA: (1) a violation of the ADA [Cal. Civ. Code § 54(c)]; and (2) proof that a structural impediment violates a structural 13 For example, the FAC’s state law claims incorporate several allegations regarding handicapped parking as well as curb ramps and sidewalks. (FAC at ¶ 19.) However, Barrilleaux does not appear to be pursuing that claim in this case, because the City of Ukiah has sole and exclusive ownership and control over the streets and sidewalks of Ukiah, and thus any claim against the County based on their alleged defects is improper. (Shaver Dec., ¶ 24.) Case 3:14-cv-01373-TEH Document 147 Filed 02/24/17 Page 26 of 32 Defendant County of Mendocino’s Notice and Motion for Summary Judgment, et al. 20 U.S.D.C. No. 1:14-cv-01373-TEH 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 11 12 13 14 15 16 17 18 19 20 21 22 23 24 25 26 27 28 access standard of a particular California building code. See D’Lil v. Riverboat Delta King, Inc., 59 F.Supp.3d 1001, 1007 (E.D. Cal. 2014) (California’s structural building code standards, “not the [C]DPA’s general guarantee of full and equal access, determine a defendant’s liability under the CPDA [internal quotation marks and citations omitted].”). Barrilleaux, however, cannot succeed under either of these two CDPA provisions. Specifically, Barrilleaux’s CDPA claim based on a violation of the ADA fails for the same reasons her ADA claim fails (see Section VI, above). In addition, her CDPA claim based on a violation of the California building code (Government Code §§ 4450, et seq.) also fails, for two separate reasons. First, while California law enacted in 1968 requires all government-funded buildings and related facilities be accessible to the handicapped, it makes an exception for buildings constructed prior to that date. See Wilshire Fin. Tower v. City of Los Angeles, 217 Cal.App.3d 119, 121 (1990) (containing history of statutory scheme). Specifically, California Government Code § 4456 provides in relevant part, [A]ny building or facility which would have been subject to this chapter but for the fact it was constructed prior to November 13, 1968, shall comply with the provisions of this chapter when alterations, structural repairs or additions are made to such building or facility. This requirement shall only apply to the area of specific alteration, structural repair or addition and shall not be construed to mean that the entire structure or facility is subject to this chapter.” Cal. Gov. Code § 4456; see also Donald v. Sacramento Valley Bank, 209 Cal.App.3d 1183, 1192 (1989) (Under § 4456, “physical changes in existing buildings were not required by this statutory scheme; only new construction and alterations, structural repairs or additions to existing buildings made after the effective date of the legislation, fell within the scope of the legislation.”). Because the 4th Floor of the Courthouse and its access pathways have not been structurally altered since at least as early as 1956 (see Shaver Dec., ¶ 16, 18), Barrilleaux’s CDPA claim must fail. Second, to prove a CDPA claim for statutory damages based on a violation of building code access regulations, Barrilleaux must satisfy “what is, in effect, a standing requirement.” Urhausen v. Longs Drug Stores Cal. Inc., 155 Cal.App.4th 254, 262 (2007) (citation omitted).) That is, to be entitled to damages under the CDPA, Barrilleaux must prove that “she was denied equal access on a particular occasion.” Id. Case 3:14-cv-01373-TEH Document 147 Filed 02/24/17 Page 27 of 32 Defendant County of Mendocino’s Notice and Motion for Summary Judgment, et al. 21 U.S.D.C. No. 1:14-cv-01373-TEH 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 11 12 13 14 15 16 17 18 19 20 21 22 23 24 25 26 27 28 The facts of Urhausen are illustrative of Barrilleaux’s lack of standing in the instant case. In Urhausen, the disabled plaintiff drove to Longs Drugs, but instead of parking in a disabled parking space (she had a permit to do so), she instead chose to park in a regular, non-disabled parking space. While walking with the aid of crutches to the store, plaintiff fell and injured herself. Through discovery, it was revealed that a disabled parking place with an adjacent access ramp was available at the time, and had she parked in that disabled parking space, she would have had a dedicated access ramp to enter the store. Plaintiff's decision not to park in the disabled parking space resulted in her failure to “demonstrate that she was denied equal access to the store without demonstrating that this route, too, was inadequate.” Id., at p. 263. Likewise, in the instant case, Barrilleaux’s own decisions to disregard the elevator in the Courthouse and take the stairs demonstrates that she was not denied “equal access” to the Courthouse. As described above (see Section VI.D), while security guards informed Barrilleaux of the elevator access that was available on both her visits, she nevertheless chose to use the stairs both times. Indeed, on Barrilleaux’s April 26th visit, while she used the elevator to get up to the 5th Floor, when leaving Courtroom G on the 4th Floor she went down the stairs all the way to the 1st Floor, rather than taking the elevator from the 3rd Floor. (TR 85-7.) She chose this path of travel because her doctor did not tell her to avoid stairs, she believed that her knee was fully healed, and she did not think that traversing stairs would cause her any problems. (TR 302-5.) It was on the very last few steps before the 1st Floor that her knee gave out [TR 88, 301] – which would not have occurred had she taken the elevator from the 3rd Floor to the 1st Floor. Hence, it was Barrilleaux’s own choices in eschewing the elevator in favor of the stairs which caused her injury and prevent her from arguing she was denied “equal access” to the Courthouse. The County is accordingly entitled to summary judgment on Barrilleaux’s CDPA claim. B. Fourth Cause of Action: California Government Code § 11135 Barrilleaux’s Fourth Cause of Action is based on California Government Code § 11135, which prohibits denying persons with a disability “full and equal access to the benefits of, or be unlawfully subjected to discrimination under, any program or activity that is conducted, operated, or administered by the state or by any state agency, is funded directly by the state, or receives any Case 3:14-cv-01373-TEH Document 147 Filed 02/24/17 Page 28 of 32 Defendant County of Mendocino’s Notice and Motion for Summary Judgment, et al. 22 U.S.D.C. No. 1:14-cv-01373-TEH 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 11 12 13 14 15 16 17 18 19 20 21 22 23 24 25 26 27 28 financial assistance from the state.” Cal. Gov. Code § 11135(a). Section 11135 “is identical to the Rehabilitation Act except that the entity must receive State financial assistance rather than Federal financial assistance.” Y.G. v. Riverside Unified Sch. Dist., 774 F.Supp.2d 1055, 1065 (C.D. Cal. 2011). Because Superior Court proceedings are not operated by the County, and thus it receives no state funding to provide such proceedings, Barrilleaux’s claim under § 11135 must fail. C. Fifth Cause of Action: Dangerous Condition of Public Property In her Fifth Cause of Action, Barrilleaux alleges a claim against the County for dangerous condition of public property and seeks damages under California Government Code §§ 815.2(a), 815.4, 815.6, 820(a) and 835. However, under California law, the sole basis for imposing liability on public entities for dangerous conditions of public property is California Government Code § 835 (“§ 835”). See Zelig v. County of Los Angeles, 27 Cal.4th 1112, 1131-1132 (2002); see also Brenner v. City of El Cajon, 113 Cal.App.4th 434, 438-439 (2003).14 Thus, at the outset, the County is entitled to summary judgment on all bases for Barrilleaux’s Fifth Cause of Action aside from § 835. With respect to § 835, the statute expressly provides: Except as provided by statute, a public entity is liable for injury caused by a dangerous condition of its property if the plaintiff establishes that the property was in a dangerous condition at the time of the injury, that the injury was proximately caused by the dangerous condition, that the dangerous condition created a reasonably foreseeable risk of the kind of injury which was incurred, and that either: (a) A negligent or wrongful act or omission of an employee of the public entity within the scope of his employment created the dangerous condition; or (b) The public entity had actual or constructive notice of the dangerous condition under Section 835.2 a sufficient time prior to the injury to have taken measures to protect against the dangerous condition. Cal. Gov. Code § 835. California law defines “dangerous condition” as “a condition of property that creates a substantial (as distinguished from a minor, trivial or insignificant) risk of injury when such property or adjacent property is used with due care in a manner in which it is reasonably foreseeable that it will be used.” Cal. Gov. Code § 830(a). On the other hand, § 830.2 also explains that “[a] condition 14 In California, public entity liability for personal injury is governed by statute. Biscotti v. Yuba City Unified Sch. Dist., 158 Cal.App.4th 554, 558 (2007). Case 3:14-cv-01373-TEH Document 147 Filed 02/24/17 Page 29 of 32 Defendant County of Mendocino’s Notice and Motion for Summary Judgment, et al. 23 U.S.D.C. No. 1:14-cv-01373-TEH 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 11 12 13 14 15 16 17 18 19 20 21 22 23 24 25 26 27 28 is not a dangerous condition within the meaning of this chapter if the trial or appellate court, viewing the evidence most favorably to the plaintiff, determines as a matter of law that the risk created by the condition was of such a minor, trivial or insignificant nature in view of the surrounding circumstances that no reasonable person would conclude that the condition created a substantial risk of injury when such property or adjacent property was used with due care in a manner in which it was reasonably foreseeable that it would be used.” Cal. Gov. Code § 830.2. Therefore, to prevail on a claim for dangerous condition of public property under § 835, Barrilleaux must prove: “(1) a dangerous condition existed on the public property at the time of the injury; (2) the condition proximately caused the injury; (3) the condition created a reasonably foreseeable risk of the kind of injury sustained; and (4) the public entity had actual or constructive notice of the dangerous condition of the property in sufficient time to have taken measures to protect against it. Brenner, 113 Cal.App.4th at 439. Barrilleaux cannot satisfy any of these four conditions underlying her § 835 claim in this case, as follows. First, to demonstrate that a “dangerous condition” existed on the public property, Barrilleaux must prove that there was a physical defect in the property itself. See Zelig, 27 Cal.4th at 1135 (“We emphasize, however, that liability is imposed only when there is some defect in the property itself and a causal connection is established between the defect and the injury.”); see also Gibson v. Mendocino County, 16 Cal.2d 80 (1940) (In 1940, the South entrance to the courthouse in Ukiah was “a defective and dangerous condition” because the metal plate on the floor with corrugations had worn smooth, it had a downward slope, and the action of the self-closing door “exerted a sudden and powerful thrust outward,” all of which contributed to plaintiff’s fall.). However, Barrilleaux’s own admissions demonstrate that she did not fall due to any defect in the stairs, but rather because her knee simply “gave out” based on the repetitive motion of descending. (TR at 88, 300.) In other words, there was nothing about the stairs themselves which caused her to fall, nor did the stairs injure her. Hence, for Barrrilleaux to succeed on her § 835 claim, she would have to prove that all stairs are inherently defective and dangerous – an untenable position. Thus, while the existence of a dangerous condition is ordinarily a question of fact, it is for the court to determine in the first instance whether “as a matter of law” a dangerous condition exists which could implicate public Case 3:14-cv-01373-TEH Document 147 Filed 02/24/17 Page 30 of 32 Defendant County of Mendocino’s Notice and Motion for Summary Judgment, et al. 24 U.S.D.C. No. 1:14-cv-01373-TEH 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 11 12 13 14 15 16 17 18 19 20 21 22 23 24 25 26 27 28 entity liability under § 835. Fielder v. City of Glendale, 71 Cal.App.3d 719, 734 (1977). Summary judgment in the County’s favor on this claim is accordingly proper because reasonable minds cannot conclude that the stairway in the Ukiah Courthouse is a “dangerous condition” of public property sufficient to implicate the County’s liability under § 835. Second, Barrilleaux claims the lack of direct elevator access to the 4th Floor of the Courthouse forced her to use the stairs, which then caused her to injure herself and fall. However, Barrilleaux made the choice to descend the stairs all the way from the 4th Floor to the 1st Floor with full knowledge that she could have taken the elevator from the 3rd Floor to the 1st Floor. (TR at 55, 79; Correll Dec., ¶ 7, figure 2.) Accordingly, Barrilleaux cannot satisfy the requirement of causation necessary to prove her claim. Third, the fact that the Courthouse contains stairs does not create “a reasonably foreseeable risk” of the kind of injury Barrilleaux sustained, because there was nothing about the stairs themselves that caused her injury. Instead, Barrilleaux claims that her kneecap “shot up” her leg simply by her repetitive motion in bending her knee. (TR at 264-5, 299-300.) Hence, neither the stairs themselves nor their configuration created a reasonably foreseeable risk of injury. See Davis v. City of Pasadena, 42 Cal.App.4th 701, 704 (1996) (Stairs which were constructed to allow persons to descend diagonally, which plaintiff alleged caused her to fall, posed only a minor, trivial, or insignificant risk contemplated by sections 830 and 830.2, and thus the stairs were not a dangerous condition.). Fourth, because there was nothing about the Courthouse stairs that created a reasonably foreseeable risk of injury, the County had no prior notice that it should have done anything to remedy any defect in them. In fact, the County had received no prior claims or complaints regarding the stairway, and had no notice of any prior injury incurring on it. (Correll Dec., ¶ 9.) In such a circumstance, the County cannot be held liable for failing to remedy a dangerous defect that did not exist. See Beauchamp v. Los Gatos Golf Course, 273 Cal.App.2d 20, 30–31 (1969) (Lack of physical defect in cement walk and lack of prior complaints of slips and falls, inter alia, supported nonsuit in dangerous condition slip-and-fall case.) More importantly, while Barrilleaux claims that she was required to use the Courthouse stairs because the Superior Court Clerk scheduled her Case 3:14-cv-01373-TEH Document 147 Filed 02/24/17 Page 31 of 32 Defendant County of Mendocino’s Notice and Motion for Summary Judgment, et al. 25 U.S.D.C. No. 1:14-cv-01373-TEH 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 11 12 13 14 15 16 17 18 19 20 21 22 23 24 25 26 27 28 hearing to occur in Courtroom G, there was no reason at that time for the County to believe the Judicial Defendants would refuse or otherwise fail to accommodate her alleged disability by moving her hearing to a more accessible courtroom. (See Keck Dec., Exhs. D, E, and Exh. G (PI Order).) Accordingly, Barrilleaux’s claim for dangerous condition of public property is without merit, warranting summary judgment in favor of the County. D. Sixth Cause of Action: Negligence Barrilleaux’s Sixth Cause of Action for negligence is identical to her Fifth Cause of Action for dangerous condition of public property. (Compare FAC ¶ 52 with ¶ 56.) Indeed, the code sections which form the basis of both of these claims are the same. (Compare FAC ¶ 53 with ¶ 57.) Yet, the FAC contains no allegations which could implicate the County’s negligence. Barrilleaux’s negligence claim is accordingly unsupportable because: (a) § 835 is the sole statutory basis for a claim imposing liability on a public entity based on the condition of public property [Brenner, 113 Cal.App.4th at 438]; (b) the County cannot be held liable for common law negligence, as all California public entities are entitled to sovereign immunity unless liability is permitted by statute [Cal. Gov. Code § 815; Davis, 42 Cal.App.4th at 703], and (c) there is no indicia of negligence by any County employee. For these reasons, the County is entitled to summary judgment on Barrilleaux’s negligence claim. VIII. CONCLUSION Based on the foregoing, the County of Mendocino respectfully requests this Court to grant it summary judgment pursuant to FRCP Rule 56 on all claims alleged against it herein, and for such other and further relief as the Court deems just and proper. Respectfully Submitted, Keck Law Offices Dated: February 24, 2017 By: /s/ Anne L. Keck Anne L. Keck Attorneys for Defendant the County of Mendocino Case 3:14-cv-01373-TEH Document 147 Filed 02/24/17 Page 32 of 32 [Proposed] Order Granting Defendant County of Mendocino’s Motion for Summary Judgment 1 U.S.D.C. No. 1:14-cv-01373-TEH 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 11 12 13 14 15 16 17 18 19 20 21 22 23 24 25 26 27 28 Katharine L. Elliott, County Counsel, SBN 135253 Brina A. Blanton, Deputy County Counsel, SBN 260829 OFFICE OF THE COUNTY COUNSEL County of Mendocino 501 Low Gap Road, Room 1030 Ukiah, CA 95482 Telephone: (707) 234-6885 Facsimile: (707) 463-4592 Email: blantonb@co.mendocino.ca.us Anne L. Keck, SBN 136315 KECK LAW OFFICES 418 B Street, Suite 206 Santa Rosa, California 95401 Telephone: (707) 595-4185 Facsimile: (707) 657-7715 Email: akeck@public-law.org Attorneys for Defendant the County of Mendocino UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT NORTHERN DISTRICT OF CALIFORNIA JESSICA BARRILLEAUX, Plaintiff, v. MENDOCINO COUNTY, et al., Defendants. Case No. 3:14-cv-01373-TEH [PROPOSED] ORDER GRANTING DEFENDANT COUNTY OF MENDOCINO’S MOTION FOR SUMMARY JUDGMENT Date: April 17, 2017 Time: 10:00 a.m. Courtroom: 2, 17th Floor Defendant the County of Mendocino’s (“County’s”) Motion for Summary Judgment came on for hearing in the above-referenced Court on April 17, 2017. Plaintiff Jessica Barrilleaux (“Barrilleaux”) and the County appeared at the hearing through their respective counsel of record. Upon review of the moving and opposition papers, the other papers in the Court’s file, consideration of the oral arguments of counsel, and good cause appearing, IT IS HEREBY ORDERED that the County’s Motion for Summary Judgment is GRANTED on all claims alleged against it in the First Amended Complaint (“FAC”) filed herein, based on the authorities, evidence, and analysis contained in the County’s Motion, as follows: Case 3:14-cv-01373-TEH Document 147-1 Filed 02/24/17 Page 1 of 2 [Proposed] Order Granting Defendant County of Mendocino’s Motion for Summary Judgment 2 U.S.D.C. No. 1:14-cv-01373-TEH 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 11 12 13 14 15 16 17 18 19 20 21 22 23 24 25 26 27 28 1. The County is granted summary judgment on all injunctive relief claims alleged against it pursuant to Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 56, because there is no genuine dispute as to any material fact and County is entitled to judgment on such claims as a matter of law because Barrilleaux lacks standing to pursue them. 2. The County is granted summary judgment on Barrilleaux’s federal law claims alleged in the FAC’s First Cause of Action (brought under the Title II of the Americans with Disability Act of 1990) and the Second Cause of Action (brought under § 504 of the Rehabilitation Act of 1973) pursuant to Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 56, because there is no genuine dispute as to any material fact and County is entitled to judgment on such claims as a matter of law. 3. The County is granted summary judgment on Barrileauux’s state law claims pursuant to Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 56, on the ground that there is no genuine dispute as to any material fact and County is entitled to judgment on such claims as a matter of law, as follows: a. The County is granted summary judgment on Barrileauux’s Third Cause of Action alleged in the FAC based on the California Disabled Persons Act (including but not limited to California Civil Code §§ 54, 54.1, 55, and California Government Code § 4450, et seq.); b. The County is granted summary judgment on Plaintiff’s Fourth Cause of Action alleged in the FAC based on California Government Code § 11135; c. The County is granted summary judgment on Barrileauux’s Fifth Cause of Action alleged in the FAC based on a dangerous condition of public property (including but not limited to California Government Code §§ 815.2(a), 815.4, 815.6, 820(a) and 835); and d. The County is granted summary judgment on Barrileauux’s Sixth Cause of Action alleged in the FAC based on negligence (including but not limited to California Government Code §§ 815.2(a), 815.4, 815.6, 820(a) and 835). IT IS SO ORDERED. Date: _____________ ____________________________________ HONORABLE THELTON E. HENDERSON United States District Court Judge Case 3:14-cv-01373-TEH Document 147-1 Filed 02/24/17 Page 2 of 2