IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
FOR THE DISTRICT OF MASSACHUSETTS
TOWN OF BARNSTABLE, MASSACHUSETTS;
MARJON PRINT AND FRAME SHOP LTD.;
HYANNIS MARINA, INC.; THE KELLER
COMPANY, INC.; THE ALLIANCE TO PROTECT
NANTUCKET SOUND; Sandra P. TAYLOR; and
Jamie REGAN,
Plaintiffs,
v.
Ann G. BERWICK, in her official capacity as
Chair of the Massachusetts Department of Public
Utilities; Jolette A. WESTBROOK, in her official
capacity as Commissioner of the Massachusetts
Department of Public Utilities; David W. CASH,
in his official capacity as Commissioner of the
Massachusetts Department of Public Utilities;
Mark SYLVIA, in his official capacity as
Commissioner of the Massachusetts Department
of Energy Resources; CAPE WIND
ASSOCIATES, LLC; and NSTAR ELECTRIC
COMPANY,
Defendants.
Civil Action No. 14-10148-RGS
Leave to File Granted
on April 14, 2014
PLAINTIFFS’ MEMORANDUM OF LAW IN OPPOSITION
TO THE MOTIONS TO DISMISS
Case 1:14-cv-10148-RGS Document 48 Filed 04/14/14 Page 1 of 60
i
TABLE OF CONTENTS
TABLE OF AUTHORITIES ......................................................................................................... iii
INTRODUCTION ...........................................................................................................................1
FACTUAL AND PROCEDURAL BACKGROUND.....................................................................2
I. Electricity Markets and the Division of Federal and State Regulation. ...............................2
II. The Conduct of Massachusetts at Issue Here. .....................................................................3
III. Summary of the Claims. ......................................................................................................6
STANDARD OF REVIEW .............................................................................................................7
ARGUMENT ...................................................................................................................................7
I. The Commonwealth’s Sovereign Immunity Does Not Bar This Suit. ................................8
II. The Court Should Not Abstain Under Burford. .................................................................12
A. Adequate State-Court Review Was Not Available. ...............................................12
B. None of the Grounds for Burford Abstention Are Present Here. ..........................13
III. Issue Preclusion Does Not Apply. .....................................................................................16
IV. The Complaint Presents a Concrete Controversy. .............................................................19
A. The Issues in This Case Are Fit for Judicial Decision. ..........................................19
B. Withholding Court Consideration Will Work a Hardship to the Parties. ..............22
V. Plaintiffs’ Claims Stem from State Action. .......................................................................23
A. DOER’s Coercive Pressure Was State Action. ......................................................24
B. The DPU’s Approval of the Contract Propagated and Ratified DOER’s
Illegal Conduct. ......................................................................................................26
VI. There Are No Grounds to Dismiss the Preemption Claim. ...............................................28
A. Both Section 1983 and the Supremacy Clause Itself Provide a Cause of
Action. ....................................................................................................................28
B. The Allegations in the Complaint Establish a Clear Violation of the
Supremacy Clause. .................................................................................................32
Case 1:14-cv-10148-RGS Document 48 Filed 04/14/14 Page 2 of 60
ii
1. The Federal Power Act Occupies the Field of Wholesale
Electricity Sales and Preempts Any State Action in That Field. ...............32
2. Massachusetts Encroached on the Field Occupied by the Federal
Power Act by Forcing NSTAR to Enter Into a Wholesale
Electricity Contract and by Dictating the Contract’s Rates and
Terms. ........................................................................................................36
C. Defendants’ Asserted Grounds for Dismissing the Preemption Claim Are
Meritless. ................................................................................................................39
1. The State’s Pike County Authority Does Not Permit It to Force a
Utility to Enter Into a Wholesale Contract and Dictate Its Terms. ............39
2. FERC Has Never Addressed Any Argument Remotely Resembling
Plaintiffs’ Preemption Claim. ....................................................................41
3. FERC’s Eventual Review of the Reasonableness of the NSTAR–
Cape Wind Contract Rate Does Not Deprive This Court of
Jurisdiction to Determine Whether Massachusetts Violated the
FPA. ...........................................................................................................41
VII. There Are No Grounds to Dismiss the Dormant Commerce Clause Claim. .....................42
A. Plaintiffs Have Standing to Bring a Dormant Commerce Clause Claim. ..............43
B. Massachusetts Violated the Commerce Clause by Forcing NSTAR to
Enter Into a Contract with a Politically Favored In-State Generator. ....................46
CONCLUSION ..............................................................................................................................50
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iii
TABLE OF AUTHORITIES
CASES
520 South Michigan Avenue Associates, Ltd. v. Shannon, 549 F.3d 1119 (7th Cir. 2008) ..... 37-38
Alba v. Raytheon Co., 809 N.E.2d 836 (Mass. 2004) ........................................................16, 17, 18
Alliance of Automobile Manufacturers v. Gwadosky, 430 F.3d 30 (1st Cir. 2005) .......................44
Allstate Insurance Co. v. Sabbagh, 603 F.2d 228 (1st Cir. 1979) .................................................15
American Trucking Associations v. City of Los Angeles, 133 S. Ct. 2096 (2013) ...................29, 31
Appalachian Power Co. v. Public Service Commission of West Virginia, 812 F.2d 898
(4th Cir. 1987) ..........................................................................................................................39
Arizona v. United States, 132 S. Ct. 2492 (2012) ..........................................................................35
Arkansas Electric Cooperative Corp. v. Arkansas Public Service Commission, 461 U.S.
375 (1983) ................................................................................................................................35
Bacchus Imports, Ltd. v. Dias, 468 U.S. 263 (1984) .....................................................................47
Ben Oehrleins & Sons & Daughter, Inc. v. Hennepin County, 115 F.3d 1372 (8th Cir.
1997) ..................................................................................................................................45, 46
Boston Edison Co. v. City of Boston, 459 N.E.2d 1231 (Mass. 1984) ............................................9
Bourque v. Cape Southport Associates, LLC, 800 N.E.2d 1077 (Mass. App. Ct. 2004) .........16, 17
Brown v. Hotel & Restaurant & Bartenders Employees International Union Local 54,
468 U.S. 491 (1984) .................................................................................................................32
Buckman Co. v. Plaintiffs’ Legal Committee, 531 U.S. 341 (2001) ..............................................34
Burford v. Sun Oil Co., 319 U.S. 315 (1943)...........................................................................12, 14
C&A Carbone, Inc. v. Town of Clarkstown, 511 U.S. 383 (1994) ................................................46
Cablevision System Corp. v. Department of Telecommunications & Energy, 702 N.E.2d
799 (Mass. 1998) .....................................................................................................................12
California ex rel. Lockyer v. Dynegy, Inc., 375 F.3d 831 (9th Cir. 2004) .....................................38
Californians for Renewable Energy, Inc. (CARE) v. National Grid, 137 FERC ¶ 61,113
(2011) .......................................................................................................................................41
Central Vermont Public Service Corp., 84 FERC ¶ 61,194 (1998) ...............................................40
Case 1:14-cv-10148-RGS Document 48 Filed 04/14/14 Page 4 of 60
iv
Chemical Waste Management, Inc. v. Hunt, 504 U.S. 334 (1992) ................................................47
Chico Service Station, Inc. v. Sol Puerto Rico Ltd., 633 F.3d 20 (1st Cir. 2011) ..........................15
In re Commonwealth Gas Co., 1999 WL 395641 (Mass. DPU 1999) ...........................................9
Crosby v. National Foreign Trade Council, 530 U.S. 363 (2000) ................................................32
DaimlerChrysler Corp. v. Cuno, 547 U.S. 332 (2006) ..................................................................45
Dartmouth-Hitchcock Clinic v. Toumpas, No. 11-cv-358-SM, 2012 WL 4482857 (D.N.H.
Sept. 27, 2012) .........................................................................................................................30
Douglas v. Independent Living Center of Southern California, Inc., 132 S. Ct. 1204
(2012) .................................................................................................................................30, 31
Family Winemakers of California v. Jenkins, 592 F.3d 1 (1st Cir. 2010) .........................47, 48, 49
Fidelity Federal Savings & Loan Ass’n v. de la Cuesta, 458 U.S. 141 (1982) .............................32
FPC v. Florida Power & Light Co., 404 U.S. 453 (1972)...............................................................3
FPC v. Southern California Edison Co., 376 U.S. 205 (1964)....................................33, 36, 37, 40
Fragoso v. Lopez, 991 F.2d 878 (1st Cir. 1993) ............................................................................15
Gastronomical Workers Union Local 610 v. Dorado Beach Hotel Corp., 617 F.3d 54 (1st
Cir. 2010) .................................................................................................................................20
General Motors Corp. v. Tracy, 519 U.S. 278 (1997) .............................................................44, 45
Georgia v. McCollum, 505 U.S. 42 (1992) ....................................................................................24
Granholm v. Heald, 544 U.S. 460 (2005) ........................................................................................1
Guillemard-Ginorio v. Contreras-Gomez, 585 F.3d 508 (1st Cir. 2009) ......................................15
Hostar Marine Transport Systems, Inc. v. United States, 592 F.3d 202 (1st Cir.
2010) ..................................................................................................................7, 19, 24, 36, 39
Houlton Citizens’ Coalition v. Town of Houlton, 175 F.3d 178 (1st Cir. 1999) ...........................46
Jarosz v. Palmer, 766 N.E.2d 482 (Mass. 2002) ...........................................................................19
Kentucky West Virginia Gas Co. v. Pennsylvania Public Utility Commission, 837 F.2d
600 (3d Cir. 1988) ....................................................................................................................39
KG Urban Enterprises, LLC v. Patrick, 693 F.3d 1 (1st Cir. 2012) ..............................................21
Case 1:14-cv-10148-RGS Document 48 Filed 04/14/14 Page 5 of 60
v
KG Urban Enterprises, LLC v. Patrick, 839 F. Supp. 2d 388 (D. Mass. 2012), aff’d in
relevant part, vacated in part, 693 F.3d 1 (1st Cir. 2012) ................................................. 31-32
Local Union No. 12004, United Steelworkers of America v. Massachusetts, 377 F.3d 64
(1st Cir. 2004) ..........................................................................................................................29
Massachusetts Retirement System v. CVS Caremark Corp., 716 F.3d 229 (1st Cir. 2013) ............7
Mississippi Power & Light Co. v. Mississippi ex rel. Moore, 487 U.S. 354 (1988) ......................33
Morgan Stanley Capital Group, Inc. v. Public Utility District Number 1 of Snohomish
County, 554 U.S. 527 (2008) .....................................................................................................4
Nantahala Power & Light Co. v. Thornburg, 476 U.S. 953 (1986) ......................34, 36, 37, 38, 40
National Association of Government Employees v. Mulligan, 849 F. Supp. 2d 167 (D.
Mass. 2012) ..............................................................................................................................13
National Meat Ass’n v. Harris, 132 S. Ct. 965 (2012) ..................................................................29
National Railroad Passenger Corp. v. McDonald, No. 12 CV 2731, -- F. Supp. 2d --,
2013 WL 5434618 (S.D.N.Y. Sept. 26, 2013) .........................................................................10
New England Legal Foundation v. Massachusetts Port Authority, 883 F.2d 157 (1st Cir.
1989) ........................................................................................................................................38
New England Power Co. v. New Hampshire, 455 U.S. 331 (1982) ............................33, 36, 37, 40
New Hampshire Motor Transport Ass’n v. Rowe, 448 F.3d 66 (1st Cir. 2006), aff’d, 552
U.S. 364 (2008) ........................................................................................................................38
New Orleans Public Service, Inc. v. Council of City of New Orleans, 491 U.S. 350
(1989) ...............................................................................................................12, 13, 14, 15, 29
New York v. FERC, 535 U.S. 1 (2002) ..........................................................................................34
Northern Natural Gas Co. v. State Corp. Commission, 372 U.S. 84 (1963) .................................38
NSTAR Electric & Gas Corp. v. FERC, 481 F.3d 794 (D.C. Cir. 2007) .........................................3
Nulankeyutmonen Nkihtaqmikon v. Impson, 503 F.3d 18 (1st Cir. 2007) .....................................21
Pennsylvania Water & Power Co. v. FPC, 193 F.2d 230 (D.C. Cir. 1951), aff’d, 343 U.S.
414 (1952) ................................................................................................................................34
Pharmaceutical Research & Manufacturers of America v. Concannon, 249 F.3d 66 (1st
Cir. 2001), aff’d, 538 U.S. 644 (2003) .....................................................................................29
Case 1:14-cv-10148-RGS Document 48 Filed 04/14/14 Page 6 of 60
vi
Pike County Light & Power Co. v. Pennsylvania Public Utility Commission, 465 A.2d
735 (Pa. Commw. Ct. 1983) ....................................................................................................39
PPL Energyplus, LLC v. Hanna, No. 11-745, -- F. Supp. 2d --, 2013 WL 5603896 (D.N.J.
Oct. 11, 2013) ..................................................................................................34, 35, 36, 37, 40
PPL Energyplus, LLC v. Nazarian, No. MJG-12-1286, -- F. Supp. 2d --, 2013 WL
5432346 (D. Md. Sept. 30, 2013) ..............................................................34, 35, 36, 37, 40, 41
Public Service Co. of New Hampshire v. Patch, 221 F.3d 198 (1st Cir. 2000) .............................15
Public Utilities Commission of Rhode Island v. Attleboro Steam & Electric Co., 273 U.S.
83 (1927) ..................................................................................................................................34
Puerto Rico Telephone Co. v. Municipality of Guayanilla, 450 F.3d 9 (1st Cir. 2006) ................30
Quackenbush v. Allstate Insurance Co., 517 U.S. 706 (1996) ................................................12, 13
Rice v. Santa Fe Elevator Corp., 331 U.S. 218 (1947)..................................................................32
Richards v. Jefferson County, 517 U.S. 793 (1996) ......................................................................16
Riva v. Massachusetts, 61 F.3d 1003 (1st Cir. 1995) ..............................................................21, 23
Robinson v. Department of Public Utilities, 624 N.E.2d 951 (Mass. 1993) ..................................12
Rowe v. New Hampshire Motor Transportation Ass’n, 552 U.S. 364 (2008) ...............................29
Sevigny v. Employers Insurance of Wausau, 411 F.3d 24 (1st Cir. 2005).....................................15
Shaw v. Delta Air Lines, Inc., 463 U.S. 85 (1983) ...................................................................28, 29
Silkwood v. Kerr-McGee Corp., 464 U.S. 238 (1984) ...................................................................35
Sindicato Puertorriqueno de Trabajadores v. Fortuno, 699 F.3d 1 (1st Cir. 2012) ...............19, 22
Staub v. Proctor Hospital, 131 S. Ct. 1186 (2011) ........................................................................27
Stern v. United States District Court for District of Massachusetts, 214 F.3d 4 (1st Cir.
2000) ........................................................................................................................................20
Strahan v. Coxe, 127 F.3d 155 (1st Cir. 1997) ................................................................................8
Taylor v. Sturgell, 553 U.S. 880 (2008) .........................................................................................16
Trailer Marine Transport Corp. v. Rivera-Vazquez, 931 F.2d 961 (1st Cir. 1991) ......................15
Transmission Access Study Policy Group v. FERC, 225 F.3d 667 (D.C. Cir. 2000) ....................34
Case 1:14-cv-10148-RGS Document 48 Filed 04/14/14 Page 7 of 60
vii
Tyler v. Massachusetts, No. Civ. A. 13-11988, -- F. Supp. 2d --, 2013 WL 5948092 (D.
Mass. Nov. 7, 2013) ...........................................................................................................10, 11
United Haulers Ass’n v. Oneida-Herkimer Solid Waste Management Authority, 550 U.S.
330 (2007) ................................................................................................................................46
United States v. Bank of New England, N.A., 821 F.2d 844 (1st Cir. 1987)..................................27
Vaqueria Tres Monjitas, Inc. v. Irizarry, 587 F.3d 464 (1st Cir. 2009) ........................................13
Verizon Maryland, Inc. v. Public Service Commission of Maryland, 535 U.S. 635
(2002) ...............................................................................................................................8, 9, 10
Verizon New England, Inc. v. International Brotherhood of Electric Workers, Local No.
2322, 651 F.3d 176 (1st Cir. 2011) ....................................................................................20, 22
West Lynn Creamery, Inc. v. Healy, 512 U.S. 186 (1994) .........................................................1, 46
Weaver’s Cove Energy, LLC v. Rhode Island Coastal Resources Management Council,
589 F.3d 458 (1st Cir. 2009) ....................................................................................................43
Whalen v. Massachusetts Trial Court, 397 F.3d 19 (1st Cir. 2005) ..............................................10
Wos v. E.M.A. ex rel. Johnson, 133 S. Ct. 1391 (2013) ...........................................................29, 31
Wyoming v. Oklahoma, 502 U.S. 437 (1992) ................................................................................46
Ex parte Young, 209 U.S. 123 (1908) ..............................................................................................8
CONSTITUTIONAL PROVISIONS AND STATUTES
U.S. Const. art. VI, cl. 2 .............................................................................................................1, 32
16 U.S.C. § 824(a) .........................................................................................................................33
16 U.S.C. § 824(b)(1) ................................................................................................................3, 33
16 U.S.C. § 824(c) ...........................................................................................................................3
16 U.S.C. § 824d(a) .................................................................................................................33, 36
16 U.S.C. § 824e ............................................................................................................................33
1997 Mass. Acts Ch. 164 § 1 ...........................................................................................................2
Case 1:14-cv-10148-RGS Document 48 Filed 04/14/14 Page 8 of 60
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OTHER AUTHORITIES
Description of the Restructured Electric Industry, http://www.mass.gov/eea/energy-
utilities-clean-tech/electric-power/electric-market-info/electric-industry-
restructuring/description-of-the-restructured-electric-industry.html .........................................2
The Federalist No. 44 (James Madison) (Clinton Rossiter ed., 1961) ..............................................
ISO-New England, “How Electricity Flows,” http://iso-ne.com/nwsiss/grid_mkts/elec_
works/index.html .......................................................................................................................3
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INTRODUCTION
Although many of the Plaintiffs oppose Cape Wind on policy grounds, this case is not
about whether Cape Wind is a good idea. Nor is it a case about the virtues of renewable energy.
This case is about whether Massachusetts can promote the Cape Wind project by regulating in a
field occupied by federal law and by insulating Cape Wind from interstate competition, to the
financial detriment of Plaintiffs and all of the citizens of Cape Cod. Under well-established
principles of constitutional law, it cannot.
In the years immediately following independence, our nation was plagued by economic
“Balkanization,” as the states under the Articles of Confederation passed numerous measures to
protect in-state industries from interstate competition. Granholm v. Heald, 544 U.S. 460, 472
(2005) (quotation marks omitted). The Constitution contains two provisions intended to prevent
such Balkanization. First, the Supremacy Clause makes federal law “the supreme law of the
land,” U.S. Const. art. VI, cl. 2, permitting Congress to establish a uniform national policy and to
preempt states’ parochial legislation. See, e.g., The Federalist No. 44, at 287 (James Madison)
(Clinton Rossiter ed., 1961). Second, the “‘negative’ [or ‘dormant’] aspect of the Commerce
Clause prohibits economic protectionism – that is, regulatory measures designed to benefit in-
state economic interests by burdening out-of-state competitors.” W. Lynn Creamery, Inc. v.
Healy, 512 U.S. 186, 192 (1994) (quotation marks omitted). In its zeal to promote the politically
favored Cape Wind project, Massachusetts violated both of those constitutional provisions by
forcing NSTAR, an electric utility in Massachusetts, to enter into an above-market wholesale
electricity contract with Cape Wind, a Massachusetts-based generator, at a price dictated by the
state.
Defendants have mainly raised procedural objections to this suit, including sovereign
immunity, abstention, preclusion, and standing. But Defendants misconstrue the operative case
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2
law and ignore critical allegations in the complaint. As to the argument that the Commonwealth
did not, in fact, force NSTAR into the Cape Wind contract (a claim which, notably, NSTAR does
not itself make), Defendants rely on factual assertions inappropriate for a motion to dismiss. The
complaint alleges in detail the means by which the Commonwealth forced NSTAR into the Cape
Wind contract. Defendants may contest those allegations at a later stage of the case, but on these
motions to dismiss, they must be accepted as true.
FACTUAL AND PROCEDURAL BACKGROUND
I. Electricity Markets and the Division of Federal and State Regulation.
Utilities like Defendant NSTAR acquire electricity from independent power generation
companies that own and operate power plants. Utilities then resell that electricity to their end-
use, or “retail,” customers.1 Utilities also “deliver” or “distribute” electricity to retail customers
using the utility’s wires and cables. Every end-user of electricity within a utility’s service area
relies on the utility to distribute electricity, and pays a distribution charge to the utility for that
service; but end-users are free, under Massachusetts law, to choose whether to purchase the
electricity itself from the utility or from an alternative retail electric supplier.2
Utilities (and other retail electric suppliers) acquire the electricity that they resell to their
retail customers through federally regulated wholesale markets or through federally regulated
wholesale contracts. As discussed fully below, the Federal Power Act (“FPA”) created the
1 While historically utilities in Massachusetts like NSTAR owned power plants themselves and
generated the electricity that they then sold to their customers, in 1997 Massachusetts decided to
restructure its electricity industry in order to make electricity generation a competitive industry.
See 1997 Mass. Acts Ch. 164 § 1.
2 Utilities also continue to supply electricity to “default” customers who have not chosen an
alternative retail electric supplier. See “Description of the Restructured Electric Industry,”
http://www.mass.gov/eea/energy-utilities-clean-tech/electric-power/electric-market-info/electric-
industry-restructuring/description-of-the-restructured-electric-industry.html
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3
Federal Energy Regulatory Commission (“FERC”)3 and gave it exclusive authority to regulate
these wholesale electricity transactions. See 16 U.S.C. § 824(b)(1) (giving FERC jurisdiction
over “the sale of electric energy at wholesale in interstate commerce”).4 Although the FPA
reserved for states the authority to regulate retail electricity transactions, the FPA “occupied the
field” of wholesale electricity transactions and thus preempted any state regulation in that field.
See infra pp. 32-36 (citing sources). In New England, FERC has exercised its authority over
wholesale sales to establish an interstate market for wholesale electricity, which is administered
by an organization called “ISO-New England.”5 Although the market is complicated, it
essentially operates on market-based principles, so that price is set at the intersection of demand
and supply. See, e.g., NSTAR Elec. & Gas Corp. v. FERC, 481 F.3d 794, 796 (D.C. Cir. 2007).
That design encourages companies to operate and develop reliable, efficient generators and
discourages companies from maintaining or developing inefficient, expensive generators.
II. The Conduct of Massachusetts at Issue Here.
Massachusetts Governor Deval Patrick has long favored one particular generation
company in Massachusetts: Cape Wind, a massive wind turbine project that its developers plan
to build in Nantucket Sound between Cape Cod, Martha’s Vineyard, and Nantucket. Promoting
Cape Wind was a centerpiece of Governor Patrick’s election campaign. Compl. ¶ 38.
3 FERC was originally called the Federal Power Commission but was later renamed.
4 Electricity in interstate commerce includes any energy “transmitted from a State and consumed
at any point outside thereof.” 16 U.S.C. § 824(c). That definition encompasses purely “in-
state” electricity that is commingled with electricity transmitted out of state. See FPC v. Florida
Power & Light Co., 404 U.S. 453, 463 (1972). Thus, a wholesale sale of electricity is subject to
federal jurisdiction so long as the electricity is transmitted on lines that are interconnected with
an interstate grid – and that includes all the electricity at issue in this case.
5 See ISO-New England, “How Electricity Flows,” http://iso-ne.com/nwsiss/grid_mkts/
elec_works/index.html.
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But Cape Wind has a problem: Locating wind turbines in Nantucket Sound is costly, and
thus Cape Wind’s electricity is far more expensive than other generators’ electricity, even
comparing Cape Wind to other renewable generators. Id. ¶ 9. Cape Wind cannot survive on the
competitive prices in the wholesale market administered by ISO-New England. Instead, Cape
Wind must seek out above-market bilateral wholesale contracts to sell its power. Id. ¶¶ 10-11.
FERC permits such bilateral contracts, but only if the transaction is voluntary and freely
negotiated. See Morgan Stanley Capital Grp., Inc. v. Pub. Util. Dist. No. 1 of Snohomish Cnty.,
554 U.S. 527, 537 (2008) (explaining that FERC permits “sellers of wholesale electricity to file
‘market-based’ tariffs” that allow “the seller [to] enter into freely negotiated contracts with
purchasers”).
Cape Wind secured one such above-market contract with the Massachusetts utility
National Grid to purchase half of Cape Wind’s output. Compl. ¶¶ 46-52. NSTAR, however,
refused to purchase Cape Wind’s expensive electricity. When NSTAR put out a request for
proposals for electricity from renewable sources (under the Massachusetts Green Communities
Act, utilities are required to purchase a certain amount of electricity from such “green” sources,
see id. ¶¶ 42-45), it chose to purchase renewable electricity from three far less expensive, land-
based wind generators. Id. ¶¶ 53-58. At that point, Cape Wind could not find a buyer for the
other half of its high-priced electricity, and the viability of Cape Wind – and the energy policy of
the Patrick Administration – was in question.
Things changed, however, when NSTAR sought permission to merge with two other
utilities. Under Massachusetts law, the Commonwealth’s Department of Public Utilities
(“DPU”) must approve all mergers of utilities, id. ¶ 59, and that approval process gave the
Case 1:14-cv-10148-RGS Document 48 Filed 04/14/14 Page 13 of 60
5
Patrick Administration the leverage it needed to force NSTAR to accept an above-market
contract with Cape Wind.
Shortly after NSTAR filed its merger approval request with the DPU, the
Commonwealth’s Department of Energy Resources (“DOER”) – a state agency under the direct
control of the Patrick Administration – moved to stay the merger proceeding on the ground that
NSTAR was not sufficiently devoted to the Patrick Administration’s renewable energy policy.
DOER’s blessing was critical to gaining the DPU’s approval of a merger, and DOER’s stay
request stopped the merger cold. Id. ¶¶ 68-72. DOER submitted a filing to the DPU contending
that, as a condition of the merger, the DPU should require NSTAR to purchase wind energy. Id.
¶ 70. The message from the Patrick Administration was clear: either NSTAR entered into a
favorable, above-market contract with Cape Wind, or DOER would delay the merger long
enough to kill it. Id. It was a classic case of regulatory hold-up.
At first, NSTAR resisted the Patrick Administration’s regulatory pressure, id. ¶ 73, but
when it became clear that the merger was in jeopardy, NSTAR met in secret with Patrick
Administration officials and acceded to their demands, id. ¶¶ 75-81. The result was a signed
“Settlement Agreement”6 in which DOER agreed to drop its stay and support the merger, and
NSTAR agreed that it would enter into a wholesale electricity contract with Cape Wind. Id.
¶ 76. The Settlement Agreement provided that the NSTAR–Cape Wind contract must have the
same above-market price and favorable terms as the National Grid–Cape Wind contract. Id. It
also provided that the NSTAR–Cape Wind contract would be effective only if it were approved
by the DPU – a condition the DPU expressly ratified. Id. ¶ 82.
6 The Settlement Agreement is Exhibit 5 of the State Defendants’ Memorandum, ECF No. 38-5.
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6
Shortly thereafter, NSTAR and Cape Wind signed the wholesale contract7 contemplated
by the Settlement Agreement – with a price identical to that contemplated by the Settlement
Agreement – and the NSTAR merger was approved. Id. ¶¶ 82-86. The DPU then issued Order
12-308 approving the NSTAR-Cape Wind contract. Order 12-30 also allowed NSTAR to charge
every customer to whom it distributes electricity (including Plaintiffs) for the entire cost of the
above-market contract – regardless of whether those customers purchase electricity from
NSTAR or from another retail supplier. Id. ¶¶ 90-92, 96; Order 12-30, at 185-87. In other
words, the scheme was designed to provide Cape Wind with a wholesale price support, while
passing the cost on to people, like Plaintiffs, who live or operate businesses in NSTAR’s service
territory.
III. Summary of the Claims.
By forcing NSTAR to enter into a wholesale electricity contract with Cape Wind, and by
setting the price and terms of that contract, the Commonwealth violated the Supremacy Clause
and the dormant Commerce Clause.
Supremacy Clause. In passing the Federal Power Act, Congress “occupied the field” of
wholesale electricity sales and preempted any state action in that field. It would unquestionably
encroach on that exclusively federal field if Massachusetts were to pass a statute requiring
NSTAR to enter into a wholesale contract and setting that contract’s rate and terms. And it is no
different where, as here, state regulators used their regulatory leverage over a merger request to
achieve the same result. Either way, Massachusetts acted in the field occupied by the Federal
7 The NSTAR–Cape Wind contract – called a “Power Purchase Agreement” – is Exhibit 9 of the
State Defendants’ Memorandum, ECF No. 38-9.
8 DPU Order 12-30 is Exhibit 10 of the State Defendants’ Memorandum, ECF No. 38-10.
Case 1:14-cv-10148-RGS Document 48 Filed 04/14/14 Page 15 of 60
7
Power Act by forcing NSTAR to enter the Cape Wind contract, and by dictating the particular
price and terms of that contract.
Dormant Commerce Clause. The Commerce Clause prohibits states from using their
regulatory power to guarantee a market for in-state producers at the expense of out-of-state
competitors. By forcing NSTAR into an above-market contract with Cape Wind, the
Commonwealth discriminated against Cape Wind’s out-of-state competitors which could have
provided renewable energy at a lower price. Massachusetts thereby engaged in exactly the sort
of economic protectionism that the dormant Commerce Clause prohibits.
STANDARD OF REVIEW
On a motion to dismiss, the Court must “accept[] as true all well-pleaded facts in the
complaint and draw[] all reasonable inferences in the plaintiffs’ favor.” Hostar Marine Transp.
Sys., Inc. v. United States, 592 F.3d 202, 207 (1st Cir. 2010). To survive a motion to dismiss, a
complaint must contain sufficient factual matter, accepted as true, to state a claim to relief that is
plausible on its face.” Mass. Retirement Sys. v. CVS Caremark Corp., 716 F.3d 229, 237 (1st
Cir. 2013) (quotation marks omitted).
ARGUMENT
Defendants make seven arguments in seeking dismissal: (1) the suit is barred by
sovereign immunity, see State Mem. 13-16; (2) this Court should abstain from exercising
jurisdiction, see State Mem. 16-19; (3) certain plaintiffs are precluded, see State Mem. 19-21;
(4) Plaintiffs lack standing and their claims are not ripe, see NSTAR Mem. 5-11; (5) Plaintiffs
fail to trace their injury to any state action, see State Mem. 26; Cape Wind Mem. 18-20;
(6) Plaintiffs fail to state a claim for preemption, see State Mem. 21-26; Cape Wind Mem. 9-16;
and (7) Plaintiffs lack standing and fail to state a claim for a violation of the dormant Commerce
Clause, see State Mem. 27-30; Cape Wind Mem. 16-18. Each of these arguments is meritless.
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I. The Commonwealth’s Sovereign Immunity Does Not Bar This Suit.
Defendants first contend that Plaintiffs’ suit is barred by sovereign immunity because
Plaintiffs allegedly seek “completely retrospective” relief. State Mem. 13-16. That is incorrect.
The NSTAR–Cape Wind contract approved by Order 12-30 will last for fifteen years and
authorizes NSTAR, on a prospective basis, to purchase Cape Wind’s electricity periodically
throughout the life of the contract. Critically, moreover, Plaintiffs are the ones who will pay the
above-market rates each time NSTAR makes a purchase. To remedy that injury, Plaintiffs seek a
purely prospective injunction against enforcement of DPU Order 12-30.9
Plaintiffs’ claims fall squarely within those authorized by Ex parte Young, 209 U.S. 123
(1908). “In determining whether the doctrine of Ex Parte Young avoids an Eleventh Amendment
bar to suit, a court need only conduct a straightforward inquiry into whether [the] complaint
alleges an ongoing violation of federal law and seeks relief properly characterized as
prospective.” Verizon Md. Inc. v. Pub. Serv. Comm’n of Md., 535 U.S. 635, 646 (2002). Here,
Plaintiffs satisfy both elements of that test.
First, Plaintiffs have alleged an “ongoing violation of federal law.” Id. DPU Order 12-30
is akin to a statutory license giving NSTAR ongoing authority to procure electricity at the rates
and terms that the Commonwealth illegally dictated in the NSTAR–Cape Wind contract.
Moreover, not only does DPU Order 12-30 authorize NSTAR to procure electricity at illegally-
set rates, but it also authorizes NSTAR to pass on its costs to customers – including Plaintiffs.
See Order 12-30, at 186, 189 (directing NSTAR to file a new tariff conforming to the rates and
9 Plaintiffs also request “any other necessary injunctive relief to remedy the violation” of federal
law. Compl., Prayer for Relief (d). That is in accord with the First Circuit’s holding that, so
long as a complaint properly requests “prospective equitable relief against state officials,”
sovereign immunity does not bar the claim, and the Eleventh Amendment “does not place limits
on the scope of the equitable relief that may be granted once appropriate jurisdiction is found.”
Strahan v. Coxe, 127 F.3d 155, 158, 166-67 (1st Cir. 1997).
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9
conditions approved in the Order). DPU’s continuing authorization for NSTAR to procure
electricity at illegally-set rates – and pass on those rates to NSTAR’s customers – constitutes an
ongoing violation of federal law.
Indeed, if the Commonwealth had enacted a statute that prospectively required NSTAR
to buy power from Cape Wind at a particular price and pass on those costs to consumers, there
would be no doubt that such a statute constituted an “ongoing violation of federal law.”
Massachusetts law, however, treats a rate approved by DPU as the functional equivalent of
statute. See Boston Edison Co. v. City of Boston, 459 N.E.2d 1231, 1233, 1235 (Mass. 1984)
(holding that “[t]he process of utility rate making by a public regulatory body is the exercise of a
legislative function” and that rates have “the rigidity of a quasi statutory enactment”); In re
Commonwealth Gas Co., 1999 WL 395641, at *6 n.2 (Mass. DPU 1999) (“[T]he basis of the
rates and service relationship between a company and its customer is tariffed and therefore
legislative.”). Thus, the Commonwealth’s illegal conduct cannot be cloaked by sovereign
immunity merely because the Commonwealth acted through a DPU order rather than a statute.
Second, Plaintiffs request “relief properly characterized as prospective,” Verizon, 535
U.S. at 646, because they seek to enjoin the ongoing, prospective application of DPU Order 12-
30 for the next fifteen years. Compl., Prayer for Relief (d). Enjoining Order 12-30 would
provide prospective relief by nullifying NSTAR’s license and relieving Plaintiffs of the injury of
paying the inflated electricity rates caused by the Commonwealth’s unconstitutional conduct.
State Defendants contend that they have sovereign immunity because they will engage in
no “future conduct . . . with respect to the contract.” State Mem. 15. But that is both legally
irrelevant and factually incorrect. It is legally irrelevant because, to obtain relief under Ex Parte
Young, Plaintiffs need not show whether the state officials will engage in “future conduct . . .
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with respect to the contract,” State Mem. 15; rather, Plaintiffs need only show “an ongoing
violation of federal law” and seek “relief properly characterized as prospective.” Verizon, 535
U.S. at 646. As explained above, Plaintiffs have met both burdens. Moreover, it is factually
incorrect because State Defendants clearly will engage in “future conduct . . . with respect to the
contract.” State Mem. 15. DPU Order 12-30 states that the DPU will exercise its ongoing
regulatory authority to monitor compliance with its terms. See, e.g., Order 12-30, at 189 (stating
that the DPU “will review NSTAR Electric’s recovery of above-market costs in its annual
reconciliation filings” to “ensure that the Company recovers such costs appropriately”). If the
Court enjoins DPU Order 12-30, then the injunction would prospectively strip the DPU of its
authority to enforce the illegal terms of that order.
Plaintiffs’ claim for declaratory relief likewise is not barred by sovereign immunity.
Verizon held that sovereign immunity posed no barrier to Verizon’s requested declaratory relief
because, although the declaration would affect “the past financial liability of private parties,” it
would not impose financial liability on the state. 535 U.S. at 646. Here, too, the requested
declaratory relief – which would declare the DPU’s approval of the NSTAR–Cape Wind contract
to be unconstitutional, see Compl. Prayer for Relief (b), (c) – may affect Cape Wind’s financial
liability, but it imposes no financial liability on the Commonwealth or any State Defendant. Id.10
State Defendants rely heavily on Tyler v. Massachusetts, No. 13-11988-RGS, 2013 WL
5948092 (D. Mass. Nov. 7, 2013) (cited in State Mem. 13, 16), but that case is far afield. In
10 That distinguishes this case from Whalen v. Massachusetts Trial Court, 397 F.3d 19 (1st Cir.
2005) (cited in State Mem. 14). In that case, a requested injunction would have forced the state
to pay a pension to a state employee; thus it clearly sought money from the state treasury. Here,
the requested declaratory relief would impose no financial liability on the Commonwealth.
Likewise, in National Railroad Passenger Corp. v. McDonald, No. 12 CV 2731, __ F. Supp. 2d
__, 2013 WL 5434618 (S.D.N.Y. Sept. 26, 2013) (cited by State Defendants Mem. 15) – a suit
challenging the state’s past exercise of eminent domain – the requested relief was entirely
retrospective. Id. at *11, 13.
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Tyler, the plaintiff had been raped and gave birth to a child, and a state judge ordered the rapist
to acknowledge paternity of the child as a condition of probation. He did so and then sought
visitation rights from the state probate court. The plaintiff brought suit claiming that the state
court’s imposition of the paternity condition violated her substantive due process rights. Id. at
*1. This Court concluded that it lacked jurisdiction because, among other things, “[t]he relief
sought . . . [was] not prospective.” Id. at *2.
Critically, however, the relief sought in Tyler was “not prospective” only because the
state court had not yet reached a decision on the rapist’s visitation rights. See id. at *2 n.3. The
federal court had no jurisdiction to enjoin the probation condition itself, because “[t]he sentence
complained of ha[d] been imposed and [wa]s now an historical fact.” Id. at *2. But the court
implied that once visitation rights were awarded, a “controversy [would] exist” and the plaintiff
could bring suit in federal court to enjoin the ongoing application of the award of visitation
rights. Id. at *2 n.3.
DPU Order 12-30 is easily distinguishable from the probation condition in Tyler. DPU
Order 12-30 constitutes an ongoing legal entitlement for NSTAR to pay certain rates to Cape
Wind and pass them down to consumers, whereas the probation condition did not constitute an
ongoing legal entitlement in any way. Moreover, DPU Order 12-30 contemplates an ongoing
enforcement role for DPU, whereas the rapist’s acknowledgment of paternity did not require any
ongoing enforcement. Indeed, if there is any analogy to be drawn to Tyler, Plaintiffs are in the
position that the Tyler plaintiff would have been in had the state court already awarded visitation
rights. Like an award of visitation rights, DPU Order 12-30 has prospective application and
imposes ongoing injury on Plaintiffs in the form of elevated electricity rates over fifteen years.
Plaintiffs are not challenging a “historical fact.” Tyler, 2013 WL 5948092 at *2. Rather, they
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are challenging, and seeking relief from, the future application of Order 12-30, and its effects on
the Plaintiffs.
II. The Court Should Not Abstain Under Burford.
State Defendants next contend that this Court should abstain under Burford v. Sun Oil
Co., 319 U.S. 315 (1943), because Plaintiffs allegedly could have raised their claims on direct
review of DPU Order 12-30. State Mem. 16-19. That contention fails.
A. Adequate State-Court Review Was Not Available.
Burford abstention applies only “[w]here timely and adequate state-court review is
available,” New Orleans Public Service, Inc. v. Council of City of New Orleans (“NOPSI”), 491
U.S. 350, 361 (1989), because “[u]ltimately, what is at stake” in Burford abstention is “a federal
court’s decision . . . that a dispute would best be adjudicated in a state forum,” Quackenbush v.
Allstate Insurance Co., 517 U.S. 706, 728 (1996). Here, “timely and adequate state-court
review,” NOPSI, 491 U.S. at 361, was not available to Plaintiffs Hyannis Marina, Marjon Print
& Frame Co., the Keller Company, the Town of Barnstable, Sandra Taylor, and Jamie Regan.
They were not parties before the DPU and thus were not entitled to seek review of the DPU’s
order in state court. See Robinson v. Dep’t of Pub. Utils., 624 N.E.2d 951, 953 & n.3 (Mass.
1993) (even a limited intervenor in proceedings before the agency is not an “aggrieved party in
interest” and has no right to appeal a DPU order under Mass. G.L. c. 25 § 5); Cablevision Sys.
Corp. v. Dep’t of Telecomms. & Energy, 702 N.E.2d 799, 800 (Mass. 1998) (same).11 Even if
those Plaintiffs had attempted to appear before the DPU, moreover, the DPU would have denied
11 State Defendants note that in a different DPU proceeding, No. 12-19, Plaintiff the Alliance to
Protect Nantucket Sound (“Alliance”) stated that it was representing the Town of Barnstable’s
interests. State Mem. 10 n.11. That is irrelevant because the Alliance did not claim to represent
the Town of Barnstable’s interests in the DPU proceeding at issue here, DPU 12-30. See State
Defendants’ Mem. at 11 n.14; see also infra p. 17 n.15.
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intervenor status – and cut off their ability to appeal – because the DPU had already held that the
interests of ratepayers were adequately represented by the Attorney General in the proceeding.
See DPU Hearing Officer Ruling on Petitions to Intervene, DPU 12-30, at 5, 12 (June 5, 2012)
(denying intervention petition of Plaintiff Sandra Taylor).12
Burford, therefore, is inapplicable. The state-court review process could not provide an
“adequate” remedy when it was unavailable to all but one of the Plaintiffs. See Nat’l Ass’n of
Gov’t Empls. v. Mulligan, 849 F. Supp. 2d 167 175 (D. Mass. 2012) (rejecting Burford
abstention when state-court remedy was available to only 11 of 100 members represented by the
plaintiff).
B. None of the Grounds for Burford Abstention Are Present Here.
Even putting aside the unavailability of state-court review, Burford abstention is
inappropriate. Federal courts have a “virtually unflagging” obligation to adjudicate claims
within their jurisdiction, NOPSI, 491 U.S. at 359 (quotation marks omitted), and “Burford
represents an extraordinary and narrow exception to [that] duty,” Quackenbush, 517 U.S. at 728
(internal quotation marks omitted). In particular, “[a] federal court need not abstain from hearing
a case involving state regulatory administration ‘merely because resolution of a federal question
may result in the overturning of a state policy.’” Vaqueria Tres Monjitas, Inc. v. Irizarry, 587
F.3d 464, 473 (1st Cir. 2009) (quoting Zablocki v. Redhail, 434 U.S. 374, 379 n.5 (1978)). Thus,
Defendants face a high bar in urging Burford abstention, and they have not even approached it.
12 The Ruling on Ms. Taylor’s Petition to Intervene is available at http://www.env.state.ma.us/
dpu/docs/electric/12-30/6512dpurul.pdf. State Defendants note that the Alliance’s petition to
intervene in DPU No. 12-30 identified Ms. Taylor “as a petitioner and Alliance supporter on
whose behalf the Alliance sought to intervene.” State Mem. 11 n.14. But, as noted above, Ms.
Taylor was denied status as an intervenor. Ruling on Petitions to Intervene 12.
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In Burford, the plaintiff claimed that the Texas Railroad Commission violated the federal
Due Process Clause by ignoring state law precedents. See Burford, 319 U.S. at 331 & n.28. The
“constitutional challenge was of minimal federal importance” because it “involv[ed] solely the
question whether the commission had properly applied Texas’ complex oil and gas conservation
regulations.” NOPSI, 491 U.S. at 360. The Court abstained because the case turned primarily on
“the intricacy and importance of the [state] regulatory scheme,” NOPSI, 491 U.S. at 360, and a
federal court decision risked a “dangerous” conflict in the interpretation of state law, Burford,
319 U.S. at 334.
By contrast, in NOPSI, abstention was denied where, as here, the plaintiffs claimed that a
state ratemaking body had encroached on the field occupied by the Federal Power Act. NOPSI,
491 U.S. at 353-58. The Court reasoned:
NOPSI’s primary claim is that the [state ratemaking body] is prohibited by federal
law from refusing to provide reimbursement for FERC-allocated wholesale costs.
Unlike a claim that a state agency has misapplied its lawful authority or has failed
to take into consideration or properly weigh relevant state-law factors, federal
adjudication of this sort of pre-emption claim would not disrupt the State’s
attempt to ensure uniformity in the treatment of an essentially local problem.
Id. at 361-62 (internal quotation marks omitted).
This case is like NOPSI, not Burford. Like NOPSI, this case “does not involve a state-
law claim, nor even an assertion that the federal claims are in any way entangled in a skein of
state-law that must be untangled before the federal case can proceed.” NOPSI, at 491 U.S. at
361 (quotation marks omitted). Nor do Plaintiffs contend that “a state agency has misapplied its
lawful authority or has failed to take into consideration or properly weigh relevant state law
claims.” Id. at 362. Instead, Plaintiffs allege two purely federal claims. Plaintiffs’ preemption
claim is virtually the same as the claim raised in NOPSI, and Plaintiffs’ dormant Commerce
Clause claim is the type of claim routinely litigated in federal courts and is entirely unrelated to
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the state’s administrative scheme. See, e.g., Trailer Marine Transport Corp. v. Rivera-Vazquez,
931 F.2d 961, 964 (1st Cir. 1991). Under NOPSI, therefore, Burford abstention is inappropriate.
State Defendants attempt to distinguish NOPSI on the ground that it involved a
preemption challenge that interfered with an existing FERC order, whereas FERC has
purportedly “recognized that there is nothing problematic” about the DPU’s actions here. State
Mem. 17 n.15. But that is an argument on the merits of preemption (which we address infra pp.
41-42), not a ground for abstention. The First Circuit, moreover, has refused to limit NOPSI to
its facts, explaining that NOPSI “cabins the operation of the Burford doctrine” so that courts
should abstain “only in the narrowly circumscribed situations where deference to a state’s
administrative processes for the determination of complex, policy-laden, state-law issues would
serve a significant local interest and would render federal court review inappropriate.” Fragoso
v. Lopez, 991 F.2d 878, 882 (1st Cir. 1993) (emphasis added); see also Guillemard-Ginorio v.
Contreras-Gomez, 585 F.3d 508, 524 (1st Cir. 2009) (declining to apply Burford abstention
when plaintiff’s claim did not require court to resolve any questions of state law); Pub. Serv. Co.
of N.H. v. Patch, 221 F.3d 198, 203 (1st Cir. 2000) (same); Chico Serv. Station, Inc. v. Sol
Puerto Rico Ltd., 633 F.3d 20, 31-34 (1st Cir. 2011) (same); Sevigny v. Employers Ins. of
Wausau, 411 F.3d 24, 29 (1st Cir. 2005) (rejecting Burford even though predominant issues
involved state law).13 Defendants’ attempt to distinguish NOPSI fails. Because Plaintiffs’
13 Defendants cite only one First Circuit case that granted Burford abstention: Allstate Ins. Co. v.
Sabbagh, 603 F.2d 228 (1st Cir. 1979). Even assuming Allstate remains good law after NOPSI,
it merely illustrates why Burford should not apply here. The sole federal issue in Allstate was a
due process claim that insurance rates set by a state agency were confiscatory; a parallel state-
law claim was raised as well. Id. at 229-30, 233. Like the due process claim in Burford, the case
had “minimal federal importance” and primarily turned on state-law issues. NOPSI, 491 U.S. at
360. Here, Plaintiffs’ preemption and dormant Commerce Clause claims implicate profound
federal interests and involve virtually no state-law issues.
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claims implicate strong federal interests and raise minimal questions of state policy, Burford
abstention should be denied.
III. Issue Preclusion Does Not Apply.
State Defendants next contend that issue preclusion bars the claims of three of the seven
Plaintiffs: the Town of Barnstable, Sandra Taylor, and the Alliance. State Mem. 19-21. Even if
that were correct, it would not bar the claims of the remaining Plaintiffs.14 But issue preclusion
does not bar any Plaintiff.
As the U.S. Supreme Court has emphasized: “[A] person who was not a party to a suit
generally has not had a ‘full and fair opportunity to litigate’ the claims and issues settled in that
suit. The application of claim and issue preclusion to nonparties thus runs up against the
‘deeprooted historic tradition that everyone should have his own day in court.’” Taylor v.
Sturgell, 553 U.S. 880, 893-94 (2008) (quoting Richards v. Jefferson Cnty., 517 U.S. 793, 798
(1996)). That principle, moreover, is rooted in constitutional due process. Richards, 517 U.S. at
797 & n.4. The Supreme Court has squarely rejected any notion that a party can be precluded
merely “based on identity of interests and some kind of relationship between parties and
nonparties.” Taylor, 553 U.S. at 901.
Under Massachusetts law, which governs Defendants’ preclusion claims, Defendants
must show that “the party against whom [issue preclusion] is asserted [was] a party (or in privity
with a party) to the prior adjudication.” Alba v. Raytheon Co., 809 N.E.2d 516, 521 (Mass.
2004). The fact that two parties “share[] an interest in proving or disproving some of the same
facts does not establish that privity existed.” Bourque v. Cape Southport Assocs., LLC, 800
N.E.2d 1077, 1081-82 (Mass. Ct. App. 2004). Rather, the privity element requires Defendants to
14 Defendants suggest that they may argue preclusion with respect to the remaining Plaintiffs at a
later stage. State Mem. 19 n.17. We will respond to that argument when it is made.
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show that one party “exercised substantial control” over the other. Id. (internal quotation marks
omitted).
Town of Barnstable. In arguing that the Town of Barnstable is precluded, Defendants rely
solely on the fact that the Alliance mentioned the Town as a party seeking to intervene in a
different proceeding, DPU 12-19. State Mem. 10 n.11. The Town of Barnstable did not
participate in DPU 12-30, nor do Defendants claim that the Town was in privity with the
Alliance or any other participant in DPU 12-30. The Alliance’s reference to the Town in a
different DPU proceeding15 cannot give rise to preclusion based on a factual finding made by the
DPU in Order 12-30. Nor do Defendants point to any facts demonstrating that the Town of
Barnstable exercised control over the Alliance, or vice-versa, in that proceeding.
Ms. Taylor. Ms. Taylor sought to intervene in DPU 12-30, but that motion was denied.
She therefore did not participate in DPU 12-30. Nor did the Alliance (or any other party) appeal
Order 12-30 on Ms. Taylor’s behalf, and Defendants make no attempt to show the “substantial
control” required for privity. Bourque, 800 N.E.2d at 1081. Ms. Taylor therefore cannot by
precluded by DPU Order 12-30.
The Alliance. The Alliance did participate in DPU 12-30, but preclusion is nevertheless
inapplicable. Preclusion applies only where “the issue decided in the prior adjudication [was]
identical with the one presented in the action in question” and “the issue decided in the prior
adjudication [was] essential to the judgment.” Alba, 809 N.E.2d at 521. Neither condition is met
here.
15 Defendants’ reliance on this filing made in a different proceeding not only is irrelevant, but
also draws an adverse inference that is inappropriate for a motion to dismiss. Factual
development would show that, notwithstanding the Alliance’s reference to the Town of
Barnstable, the Alliance was not acting for the Town in that other DPU proceeding. Even if the
Court were inclined to view the filing as relevant – which it is not – the Town must be afforded
the opportunity to make a factual record regarding its non-involvement in that DPU proceeding.
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First, the issues decided in DPU 12-30 are not identical to the ones presented here. In
Order 12-30, the DPU found (unsurprisingly) that “NSTAR Electric was not required to enter
into the [contract with Cape Wind].” DPU Order 12-30, at 34. Plaintiffs’ preemption claim,
however, does not depend on whether NSTAR’s entry into the Cape Wind contract was
voluntary. Plaintiffs additionally allege that – regardless of NSTAR’s reasons for entering the
contract – the state regulators dictated the price of the NSTAR–Cape Wind contract, as opposed
to allowing that price to emerge freely from negotiations between the parties. Compl. ¶¶ 77, 82-
83, 106-07. Thus, even if NSTAR voluntarily entered into the Cape Wind contract, as the DPU
purportedly found,16 the state intruded into the exclusive federal field when it dictated the price
of that contract. Id. ¶¶ 106-108.17 The DPU made no factual finding about that basis for
Plaintiffs’ preemption claim. Nor did the DPU address Plaintiffs’ dormant Commerce Clause
claim. Thus, the issues in DPU 12-30 are not “identical” to those here for preclusion purposes.
Alba, 809 N.E.2d at 521.
Second, the DPU’s finding that NSTAR’s was not required to enter the Cape Wind
contract was not “essential to the judgment” in DPU 12-30. Id. Immediately after making that
finding, the DPU reasoned that “nothing in [state law] suggests that the [DPU] should inquire
into a company’s motives . . . in entering into a contract, which would be difficult if not
16 The remaining Plaintiffs, who were not parties to DPU 12-30, are in no way bound by the
DPU’s factual findings and remain free to argue that NSTAR’s entry into the contract was not
voluntary.
17 For example, when a company hires an employee and is forced to pay the minimum wage, the
company is not required to enter into the labor contract, but the state nonetheless dictates the rate
at which the employee will be compensated for his labor. Likewise here, even if the
Commonwealth did not force NSTAR to enter into the Cape Wind contract, it nevertheless
established the rate to be paid by NSTAR. And when a state sets a wholesale electricity rate for
a favored in-state generator, it encroaches on the field occupied by the FPA; when that rate is
also above-market, it discriminates against interstate commerce in violation of the dormant
Commerce Clause.
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impossible to do in any event.” Id. Thus, the DPU held that whether NSTAR entered into the
Cape Wind contract voluntarily was irrelevant to the DPU’s decision in Order 12-30. As a
result, the DPU’s voluntariness finding was dicta (or, at most, an alternative ground for decision)
and thus cannot result in issue preclusion. See Jarosz v. Palmer, 766 N.E.2d 482, 489 (Mass.
2002) (“For a ruling to have preclusive effect, it must have a bearing on the outcome of the
case.”); id. (quoting Restatement (Second) of Judgments § 27 comment h (1982)) (“If issues are
determined but the judgment is not dependent upon the determinations, relitigation of those
issues in a subsequent action between the parties is not precluded.”).
IV. The Complaint Presents a Concrete Controversy.
Notably, NSTAR does not take issue with the merits of Plaintiffs’ claims, nor does it
deny Plaintiffs’ assertion that state regulators forced NSTAR into the Cape Wind contract and
dictated the contract’s rate and terms. Instead, NSTAR’s sole contention – framed in terms of
standing and ripeness – is that there is not yet any concrete controversy between the parties. The
determination of whether a controversy is sufficiently concrete for adjudication “depends on two
factors: ‘the fitness of the issues for judicial decision and the hardship to the parties of
withholding court consideration.’” Sindicato Puertorriqueno de Travabadores v. Fortuno, 699
F.3d 1, 8 (1st Cir. 2012) (quoting Abbott Labs. v. Gardner, 387 U.S. 136, 149 (1967)).
Plaintiffs’ allegations must be accepted as true, and all inferences drawn in their favor. Hostar,
592 F.3d at 207. Here, both components of the test for a concrete controversy are satisfied.
A. The Issues in This Case Are Fit for Judicial Decision.
The “basic rationale” of the inquiry into whether issues are fit for decision is “to prevent
the courts, through avoidance of premature adjudication, from entangling themselves in abstract
disagreements.” Id. There is nothing abstract about the disagreement here. Plaintiffs contend
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that DOER illegally coerced NSTAR into contracting with Cape Wind, and that DPU’s
concomitant approval of the NSTAR-Cape Wind contract in Order 12-30 violates federal law.
No future events could possibly affect whether Order 12-30 is legal; all of the factual events that
are necessary to determine the legality of Order 12-30 have already occurred. Thus, “[t]his is not
a situation where a declaration is sought on the legal consequences of a hypothetical act that may
or may not occur in the future.” Verizon New England, Inc. v. Int’l Bhd. of Elec. Workers, Local
No. 2322, 651 F.3d 176, 189 (1st Cir. 2011). Under these circumstances, the First Circuit has
consistently found cases to be fit for judicial decision. See, e.g., id. at 188; Gastronomical
Workers Union Local 610 v. Dorado Beach Hotel Corp., 617 F.3d 54, 61 (1st Cir. 2010) (“This
case is ripe for adjudication. All of the events giving the existence of [liability] are matters of
historical fact.”); Stern v. U.S. Dist. Court for Dist. of Mass., 214 F.3d 4, 10 (1st Cir. 2000)
(finding case ripe when “[t]he issue presented can be finally resolved by declaratory judgment,
its contours are sharply defined, and additional facts will not affect its resolution”).
NSTAR argues that Plaintiffs’ claims are speculative because Cape Wind must still
obtain other regulatory approvals and might never be built. NSTAR Mem. 8 n.4, 9. Notably,
neither Cape Wind nor State Defendants appear to share NSTAR’s doubt that Cape Wind will be
built. In any event, Plaintiffs are challenging the actions that state regulators took in forcing
NSTAR into the Cape Wind contract and permitting NSTAR to pass on the costs of that contract
to Plaintiffs. Each of those actions – including the DPU’s passage of Order 12-30 – has already
occurred. As for the fact that Cape Wind must obtain other regulatory approvals, the First
Circuit has held that a controversy is sufficiently concrete for decision in virtually identical
circumstances:
Plaintiffs’ alleged injury is the BIA’s failure to follow federal law before
approving the lease. The dispute before us is not over the hypothetical
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21
construction and operation of an LNG terminal, but the allegedly improper
approval of the lease that is the prerequisite to the terminal. While the
construction of the terminal is hypothetical and uncertain at this juncture, the
approval of the lease is complete. The BIA has made its decision.
Nulankeyutmonen Nkihtaqmikon v. Impson, 503 F.3d 18, 33 (1st Cir. 2007); accord KG Urban
Enters., LLC v. Patrick, 693 F.3d 1, 16 (1st Cir. 2012) (“The fact that the case could be rendered
moot – for example, if the state Commission determines that land will not be taken into trust –
does not render the case unripe.”); Riva v. Massachusetts, 61 F.3d 1003, 1011 (1st Cir. 1995) (“A
litigant seeking shelter behind a ripeness defense must demonstrate more than a theoretical
possibility that harm may be averted.”). The same is true here: The contract has been signed and
approved by the DPU, and even if the construction of Cape Wind is somewhat “uncertain at this
juncture,” that does not render this action unripe. Nulankeyutmonen, 503 F.3d at 33.
NSTAR also points out that the exact rate that NSTAR must pay Cape Wind may be
adjusted in the future based on certain contingencies, such as Cape Wind’s qualifications for tax
credits. NSTAR Mem. 8. As a result, NSTAR contends that “it is quite simply impossible to tell
whether the plaintiffs’ NSTAR bills in 2016 and beyond are ‘above-market’ until that time.” Id.
at 9. But these contentions are irrelevant to standing and ripeness, because Plaintiffs’ injury is
not based on the difference between NSTAR’s rates in 2016 and market rates in 2016. Rather, it
is based on the difference between the deal NSTAR did strike in 2012 and the deal NSTAR
could have struck in 2012, either with Cape Wind or with one of Cape Wind’s competitors, had
it not been forced into the particular terms of the NSTAR–Cape Wind contract by state
regulators. Indeed, NSTAR’s own estimate was that the Cape Wind contract would cost
Plaintiffs and other ratepayers nearly a billion dollars over the fifteen-year term of the contract in
comparison with what NSTAR could have obtained by entering into a different long-term
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22
contract. Compl. ¶ 93; see also Order 12-30, at 183 (noting the “above-market” costs of the
contract).
Moreover, because of the state coercion, NSTAR was unable to negotiate the price of the
Cape Wind contract – even though power prices had fallen since National Grid had agreed to that
price. Compl. ¶¶ 83, 93-94. Notably, NSTAR does not argue that it would have agreed to
identical rates without DOER’s coercion, and contemporaneous statements of NSTAR
executives confirmed that NSTAR viewed Cape Wind’s power as over-priced. Compl. ¶¶ 56,
88. The DPU, moreover, expressly acknowledged in Order 12-30 that Cape Wind was charging
above-market prices. Compl. ¶¶ 91, 93-96; Order 12-30, at 183. Indeed, a recent competitive
bidding process for renewable electricity resulted in prices only about 40% the amount charged
by Cape Wind and compelled by the state. Compl. ¶ 95.
B. Withholding Court Consideration Will Work a Hardship to the Parties.
This case also presents a concrete controversy because delaying judicial review will
cause prejudice to the parties. Sindicato, 699 F.3d at 8. When applying the hardship factor,
“[r]ather than asking, negatively, whether denying relief would impose hardship, courts will do
well to ask, in a more positive vein, whether granting relief would serve a useful purpose, or, put
another way, whether the sought-after declaration would be of practical assistance in setting the
underlying controversy to rest.” Verizon New England, Inc., 651 F.3d at 188 (quotation marks
omitted).
Here, adjudicating this case immediately would serve the useful purpose of allowing the
parties to know whether Cape Wind can charge its above-market rates before Cape Wind is
constructed. Indeed, Cape Wind, far from arguing that the case is unripe and should be filed
later, instead seeks expedited review. If Cape Wind is constructed, and this Court then enters an
order enjoining the Cape Wind-NSTAR contract, such an order would impose considerable
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23
hardship: Cape Wind would face the significant day-to-day costs associated with maintaining a
wind generator, but would be unable to sell any power to NSTAR unless NSTAR voluntarily
signed a new contract. And even if NSTAR did sign a new contract, it might be at a price too
low for Cape Wind to make a profit – particularly because the Green Communities Act now
requires competitive bidding. 2012 Mass. Acts ch. 209 § 35, 36. It would be far more
convenient for this Court to resolve this dispute before Cape Wind is built. Riva, 61 F.3d at 1010
(delaying adjudication would cause hardship when “a party must decide currently whether to
expend substantial resources that would be largely or entirely wasted if the issue were later
resolved in an unfavorable way”).
In its brief discussion of the hardship prong, NSTAR contends that Plaintiffs’ injuries are
“contingent” and that the Court should wait and see whether “the market ultimately determines
that the rate paid by NSTAR to Cape Wind beginning in 2016 is above-market.” NSTAR Mem.
10-11. This contention is identical to NSTAR’s contention regarding the “fitness” prong, and as
explained above, it fundamentally misunderstands Plaintiffs’ claims. Plaintiffs allege an
immediate injury, which should be immediately resolved by this Court. See supra pp. 19-22.
V. Plaintiffs’ Claims Stem from State Action.
Both State Defendants and Cape Wind contend that Plaintiffs have failed to allege any
state action. They argue that although DOER was tasked with implementing the Governor’s
clean energy initiatives, it was nonetheless acting as something other than a state actor when it
threatened to hold up NSTAR’s merger unless NSTAR agreed to purchase power from Cape
Wind at the price and on the terms set forth in the Settlement Agreement. State Mem. 26; Cape
Wind Mem. 20. They further argue that, even if DOER’s actions were improper, that should not
matter, because the contract could not go into effect until it was approved by the DPU, a separate
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state agency. Cape Wind Mem. 18. In their view, DPU’s approval acts as a kind of intervening
cause that launders any illegality by DOER. Id.
These arguments should be rejected. The Court must, at the motion-to-dismiss stage,
accept as true the well-pleaded factual allegations in the Complaint and draw all inferences in
Plaintiffs’ favor. See Hostar, 592 F.3d at 207. Here, the factual allegations, taken as true,
support the inference that DOER leveraged its role as the Commonwealth’s agency in charge of
energy and environmental policy to force NSTAR into the contract with Cape Wind, at a price
and on terms dictated by DOER. See Compl. ¶¶ 64-89, 92, 106-08. And the allegations further
support the inference that the DPU’s approval of that contract – which the DPU understood was
a condition precedent to the contract’s effectiveness – ratified and propagated DOER’s illegal
conduct. Id. ¶¶ 84-92, 94-97. The Defendants may seek to contest these points as a matter of
fact later in the proceedings, but for purposes of evaluating the motion to dismiss, the Court must
accept these allegations as true and draw all inferences in Plaintiffs’ favor.
A. DOER’s Coercive Pressure Was State Action.
State Defendants and Cape Wind contend that Plaintiffs may not challenge DOER’s
exercise of coercion over NSTAR because DOER did not engage in state action. According to
Cape Wind, DOER was acting “solely in its role as party-advocate in a contested adjudicatory
proceeding,” rather than as a state actor. Cape Wind Mem. 20; see also State Mem. 26.
This contention fails. DOER is an arm of the Commonwealth of Massachusetts; DOER
officials are invoking the Commonwealth’s sovereign immunity and are being represented by the
Commonwealth’s attorneys in this very lawsuit. The mere fact that DOER was a party to the
DPU proceedings does not preclude it from being a state actor; if it did, then a prosecutor would
be considered a non-state actor merely because the prosecutor is a litigant in court, which is
clearly wrong. See Georgia v. McCollum, 505 U.S. 42, 50 (1992) (noting that a prosecutor is “a
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quintessential state actor”). Indeed, in Order 12-30, the DPU specifically relied on DOER’s
sovereign status as its basis for approving DOER’s involvement in developing the NSTAR–Cape
Wind Memorandum of Understanding (“MOU”)18 that became the basis for the power contract
approved by the DPU. The DPU explained:
DOER is an executive agency with substantial responsibility for establishing and
implementing the Commonwealth’s energy policies pursuant to G.L. c. 25A, § 6,
and with various statutory obligations with respect to implementation of the
Green Communities Act. . . . With respect to Section 83 specifically, DOER is
charged with consulting with the Commonwealth’s electric distribution
companies regarding their choice of contracting and solicitation methods for long-
term contracts. In light of DOER’s role in developing energy policy in the
Commonwealth and its specific responsibilities with respect to Section 83
contracts, the Department finds that DOER’s involvement as a party to the
settlement agreement in D.P.U. 10-170 and the development of the NSTAR
Electric-Cape Wind MOU was appropriate and in no way invalidates the PPA.
Order 12-30, at 37-38. Although Plaintiffs disagree that DOER’s involvement was
“appropriate,” this passage should leave no doubt that DOER was exercising sovereign authority
in compelling NSTAR to contract with Cape Wind.19
18 The Memorandum of Understanding is Exhibit 7 of State Defendants’ Memorandum, ECF No.
38-7.
19 State Defendants and Cape Wind quote an out-of-context statement from the Alliance
suggesting that the DOER was not acting in its sovereign capacity. State Mem. 26; Cape Wind
Mem. 20. But Defendants do not argue estoppel, and they could not. The Alliance filed those
comments in a different DPU proceeding than the proceeding that led to Order 12-30, and in the
entirely different context of arguing that the Settlement Agreement violated the Sherman Act.
Comments of the Alliance to Protect Nantucket Sound and Its Individual Supporters, DPU 12-
19, at 9-10, Ex. 4 to State Mem. Moreover, in those very same comments, the Alliance argued
that “DOER’s insistence on a Cape Wind Mandate in its Settlement Agreement with NSTAR
Electric created an unconstitutional regime that violates the Commerce Clause.” Id. at 6. Thus,
the Alliance has always taken the position that DOER engages in state action, because only state
actors can “creat[e] an unconstitutional regime that violates the Commerce Clause.” Id.
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B. The DPU’s Approval of the Contract Propagated and Ratified DOER’s
Illegal Conduct.
State Defendants and Cape Wind also contend that DOER’s exercise of coercion did not
cause any harm because the DPU was the state agency that ultimately approved the merger. See
State Mem. 26 (“DOER had no legal authority to reject or approve the merger . . . . [O]nly DPU
had such authority.”); Cape Wind Mem. 18-19 (arguing that DOER could not have caused harm
because the DPU, not DOER, approval the contract). But Plaintiffs are not contending that
DOER is causing a continuing violation of federal law. Plaintiffs contend that the DPU, through
Order 12-30, is engaging in a continuing violation of federal law, because that Order ratifies a
power contract, on a prospective basis, that was illegally coerced by DOER.
State Defendants and Cape Wind, however, appear to argue that DOER could not
possibly have coerced NSTAR into contracting with Cape Wind, because DOER did not have
any leverage. Their theory appears to be that because DPU (and not DOER) was the entity
ultimately responsible for approving the merger, DPU (and not DOER) was the only agency with
the power to impose conditions on that approval. See State Mem. 26; Cape Wind Mem. 18-19.
But as Plaintiffs alleged in the Complaint, DOER conditioned its support of the merger on
NSTAR’s agreement to contract with Cape Wind. Compl. ¶¶ 75, 78, 106-107. Thus, DOER
agreed to take the position that “the merger . . . is consistent with the public interest” only
because NSTAR agreed to buy power from Cape Wind. Id. ¶ 78. It stands to reason that
DOER’s support of the merger was a powerful bargaining chip that allowed DOER to exercise
significant leverage over NSTAR. DOER is the agency in charge of implementing the
Commonwealth’s energy policy and has a legal right to participate in DPU proceedings. Indeed,
DOER was even able to persuade DPU to change the standard of review applicable to mergers.
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Id. ¶ 66. At a minimum, the determination of whether DOER had leverage to exercise coercive
power over NSTAR is a factual question inappropriate for resolution in a Motion to Dismiss.
The argument of State Defendants and Cape Wind appears to reduce to the following
reasoning: Because DOER coerced NSTAR to sign the contract (but did not ultimately approve
it), and because DPU approved the contract (but did not coerce NSTAR into signing it), no one
from the state could have violated federal law. Thus, under their view, if a state apportions
responsibility for violating federal law to multiple state actors, all of the state actors can shield
themselves from federal jurisdiction. But this argument cannot possibly be correct. It is well-
accepted that an organizational defendant cannot evade legal liability simply by apportioning
responsibility among multiple decision-makers and then claiming that no one decision-maker is
responsible for every act that led to liability. See, e.g., Staub v. Proctor Hosp., 131 S. Ct. 1186,
1191-93 (2011) (organizational defendant cannot evade liability by apportioning responsibility
among multiple agents); United States v. Bank of New England, N.A., 821 F.2d 844, 856 (1st Cir.
1987) (knowledge of multiple corporate agents must be aggregated to establish corporation’s
responsibility). Indeed, the argument of State Defendants and Cape Wind would lead to the
absurd outcome that a prosecutor’s action could never violate federal law, because the prosecutor
is a litigator and not the agent that is ultimately responsibility for imposing a criminal sentence.
That is clearly wrong. If a prosecutor coerces a defendant into agreeing to a plea bargain or
imposes an illegal condition on his recommendation of a lower sentence, then the conviction is
illegal even if the plea or recommendation is ultimately accepted by a judge: the criminal
defendant can challenge the conviction or sentence on the ground that it propagated the effect of
the prosecutor’s illegal actions.
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Moreover, the DPU’s approval of the contract was hardly independent of DOER’s
involvement in dictating the terms of the contract. The DPU issued an Order approving the
MOU, see DPU Order 12-19, Ex. 8 to State Mem. (approving MOU), and the Settlement
Agreement expressly made the DPU’s approval of the anticipated Cape Wind contract a
condition of the contract’s effectiveness, see Settlement Agreement ¶ 2.2.4, Ex. 5 to State Mem.;
see also MOU ¶ 3, Ex. 7 to State Mem. (stating that the parties agree that the power contract
would be submitted to the DPU for approval). Accordingly, Plaintiffs can challenge DPU Order
12-30 on the ground that it propagates the effects of DOER’s illegal coercion of the PPA.20
VI. There Are No Grounds to Dismiss the Preemption Claim.
A. Both Section 1983 and the Supremacy Clause Itself Provide a Cause of
Action.
Under well-established Supreme Court and First Circuit precedent, Plaintiffs may bring
their preemption claim under 42 U.S.C. § 1983 and directly under the Supremacy Clause. Cape
Wind’s contention that Plaintiffs lack a cause of action, Cape Wind Mem. 9-13, fundamentally
misunderstands Plaintiffs’ claims and the governing legal framework.
It is well-established that a plaintiff may bring suit against state officials contending that
state action is preempted by a federal statute. For instance, in Shaw v. Delta Air Lines, Inc., 463
U.S. 85 (1983), the plaintiff, Delta, brought a preemption claim against state officials. Id. at 92.
The Supreme Court held that it had jurisdiction to hear the claim: “A plaintiff who seeks
injunctive relief from state regulation, on the ground that such regulation is pre-empted by a
20 State Defendants’ remaining arguments regarding DOER’s liability lack merit. State
Defendants contend that Plaintiffs “have already litigated” the issues presented in this lawsuit,
State Mem. 26, but that is simply a rehash of the issue preclusion argument that Plaintiffs have
addressed above. Supra pp. 16-19. State Defendants also argue that “FERC retains the authority
to consider and approve or reject Cape Wind’s wholesale electricity rates,” id., but as Plaintiffs
argued below, FERC’s authority is a non-sequitur in this case. Infra pp. 41-42.
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federal statute which, by virtue of the Supremacy Clause of the Constitution, must prevail, thus
presents a federal question which the federal courts have jurisdiction under 28 U.S.C. § 1331 to
resolve.” Id. at 96 n.14. The Court then partially ruled for Delta on the merits, holding that a
portion of New York’s statute was preempted. Id. at 108-09. Since Shaw, the Supreme Court
has routinely ruled in favor of plaintiffs’ preemption challenges to state action, without even
hinting that plaintiffs might lack a cause of action. See, e.g., Am. Trucking Ass’ns., Inc. v. City of
L.A., 133 S. Ct. 2096 (2013); Wos v. E.M.A. ex rel. Johnson, 133 S. Ct. 1391 (2013); Nat’l Meat
Ass’n v. Harris, 132 S. Ct. 965 (2012); Rowe v. N.H. Motor Transp. Ass’n, 552 U.S. 364 (2008).
Indeed, in NOPSI, the Supreme Court held that a federal court should not abstain from hearing a
preemption lawsuit under the Federal Power Act – the same statute that Plaintiffs invoke here.
491 U.S. at 359.
Likewise, the First Circuit has held that “in suits against state officials for declaratory and
injunctive relief, a plaintiff may invoke the jurisdiction of the federal courts by asserting a claim
of preemption, even absent an explicit statutory cause of action.” Local Union No. 12004,
United Steelworkers of America v. Massachusetts, 377 F.3d 64, 75 (1st Cir. 2004). Quoting a
leading treatise, the First Circuit stated that “[w]hile there may be some lack of harmony in the
case law, the rule that there is an implied right of action to enjoin state or local regulation that is
preempted by a federal statutory or constitutional provision – and that such an action falls within
the federal question jurisdiction – is well-established.” Id. at 75 n.8 (quoting Fallon, Meltzer &
Shapiro, Hart & Wechsler’s The Federal Courts & The Federal System 903 (5th ed. 2003)); see
also Pharm. Research & Mfrs. of Am. v. Concannon, 249 F.3d 66, 73 (1st Cir. 2001) (“‘[A] state
or territorial law can be unenforceable as preempted by federal law even when the federal law
secures no individual substantive rights for the party arguing preemption.’” (quoting St. Thomas–
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St. John Hotel & Tourism Ass’n v. Virgin Islands, 218 F.3d 232, 241 (3d Cir. 2000))), aff’d, 538
U.S. 644 (2003); P.R. Tel. Co. v. Municipality of Guayanilla, 450 F.3d 9, 15 (1st Cir. 2006) (“A
party may bring a claim under the Supremacy Clause that a local enactment is preempted even if
the federal law at issue does not create a private right of action.” (quoting Qwest Corp. v. City of
Santa Fe, 380 F.3d 1258, 1266 (10th Cir.2004))). This authority is dispositive and establishes
that Plaintiffs’ preemption claim may proceed.21
Cape Wind’s contrary arguments lack merit. First, Cape Wind cites a dissenting opinion
arguing in favor of limiting the scope of preemption claims. Cape Wind Mem. 14-15 (citing
Douglas v. Indep. Living Ctr. of S. Cal., 132 S. Ct. 1204, 1213 (2012) (Roberts, C.J.,
dissenting)). But neither the Supreme Court nor the First Circuit has ever adopted the dissenters’
view of the law in Douglas. As a court within this Circuit recently explained:
In this circuit, applicable precedent generally supports plaintiffs’ claim of right to
a cause of action challenging the validity of state laws under the Supremacy
Clause on grounds that they conflict with federal law and undermine important
federal interests. So, while the differing views expressed in Douglas concededly
add up to serious doubt about the future viability of private suits like this one, the
law remains unchanged by Douglas. This court is obliged to rule in a manner
consistent with applicable circuit and Supreme Court precedent and cannot ignore
that precedent in anticipation of future change.
Dartmouth-Hitchcock Clinic v. Toumpas, No. 11-cv-358-SM, 2012 WL 4482857, at *3 (D.N.H.
Sept. 27, 2012) (internal quotation marks omitted). Under current Supreme Court and First
Circuit case law, Plaintiffs may bring their preemption cause of action.
Moreover, even if the dissenters’ view in Douglas had prevailed, this case would be
readily distinguishable. In Douglas, the plaintiffs were, in effect, suing for money damages.
21 Cape Wind contends that “Plaintiffs bring both their actions pursuant to 42 U.S.C. § 1983.”
Cape Wind Mem. 13. That is incorrect. Plaintiffs’ claim is alternatively brought directly under
the Supremacy Clause and under 42 U.S.C. § 1983. See Compl. p. 31 (claim is brought for
“violation of Supremacy Clause and 42 U.S.C. § 1983” (emphasis added; capitalization altered)).
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Although they were nominally seeking an injunction, the plaintiffs’ allegation was that certain
rate reductions were preempted by the Medicaid Act, and they sought an injunction that would
halt those rate reductions and ensure greater compensation. Douglas v. Indep. Living Ctr. Of S.
Cal., 132 S. Ct. 1204, 1209-10 (2012). Here, Plaintiffs are not seeking money damages, either
explicitly or implicitly; they are seeking to enjoin an illegal order, a type of injunction routinely
sought in federal court. See, e.g., Wos, 133 S. Ct. at 1395-96 (post-Douglas case ruling in favor
of plaintiffs’ suit alleging that state statute was preempted by Medicaid Act).
Finally, Cape Wind offers the irrelevant argument that there is no federal cause of action
for a just and reasonable rate. Cape Wind Mem. 15-16. But Plaintiffs are not suing for a
“general right to a reasonable rate.” Id. at 15. Plaintiffs do not ask this Court to make any
determination about what a reasonable rate might be. Rather, Plaintiffs seek only to enjoin state
officials from enforcing DPU Order 12-30, which ratified and approved the state’s illegal
wholesale rate-setting, and which entitles NSTAR to charge Plaintiffs and other ratepayers for
those illegal wholesale rates. As discussed further below, see infra pp. 41-42, the state may not
intrude into the field of wholesale rate-setting, regardless of whether the rate that it sets is
deemed by FERC to be just and reasonable.22
22 In a lengthy footnote, Cape Wind offers two other arguments against Plaintiffs’ preemption
claim. Cape Wind Mem. 13 n.15. Both are unsuccessful. First, Cape Wind argues that
Plaintiffs may not challenge a “contract between the state and a private company.” But Plaintiffs
do not challenge a contract; Plaintiffs challenge a DPU Order, which is undoubtedly state action.
Cape Wind also appears to suggest that a plaintiff may not bring a preemption claim unless it
challenges “state statute[s] or regulations,” id., but this contention is obviously incorrect. See,
e.g., Am. Trucking Ass’ns., Inc., 133 S. Ct. at 2099 (entertaining preemption challenge to
“concession agreement” between city and trucking companies). Second, Cape Wind contends
that a preemption claim may be raised only as a defense in a state enforcement proceeding, or
preemptively against a threat of an enforcement proceeding. This is an exact replica of the
argument made in the Chief Justice’s dissent in Douglas. 132 S. Ct. at 1213 (Roberts, C.J.,
dissenting). But as noted above, the Chief Justice’s dissent did not command a majority of the
Court, and does not reflect current case law. See, e.g., KG Urban Enterprises, LLC v. Patrick,
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B. The Allegations in the Complaint Establish a Clear Violation of the
Supremacy Clause.
1. The Federal Power Act Occupies the Field of Wholesale Electricity
Sales and Preempts Any State Action in That Field.
It is a “fundamental principle of the Constitution . . . that Congress has the power to
preempt state law.” Crosby v. Nat’l Foreign Trade Council, 530 U.S. 363, 372 (2000). That
power arises by “direct operation of the Supremacy Clause.” Brown v. Hotel & Rest. &
Bartenders Emps. Int’l Union Local 54, 468 U.S. 491, 501 (1984); see U.S. Const., art. VI, cl. 2
(the laws of the United States “shall be the supreme Law of the Land . . . any Thing in the
Constitution or Laws of any State to the Contrary notwithstanding”).
“When Congress intends federal law to ‘occupy the field,’” federal law preempts state
law “[e]ven without an express provision for preemption.” Crosby, 530 U.S. at 372; Fidelity
Fed. Sav. & Loan Ass’n v. de la Cuesta, 458 U.S. 141, 153 (1982). A congressional intent to
occupy a field can be inferred when “[t]he scheme of federal regulation may be so pervasive as
to make reasonable the inference that Congress left no room for the States to supplement it,” or
when “the Act of Congress may touch a field in which the federal interest is so dominant that the
federal system will be assumed to preclude enforcement of state laws on the same subject.” Rice
v. Santa Fe Elevator Corp., 331 U.S. 218, 230 (1947).
In the Federal Power Act, Congress occupied the field of wholesale electricity sales,
including the price at which electricity is sold at wholesale, and the terms and conditions under
839 F. Supp. 2d 388, 400 (D. Mass. 2012) (addressing merits of plaintiff’s claim that state’s
decision to license casinos was preempted, despite absence of any state enforcement action
against plaintiff), aff’d in relevant part, vacated in part, 693 F.3d 27-28 (1st Cir. 2012).
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33
which such electricity is sold. Thus, the FPA specifically provides that FERC will regulate
wholesale sales of electricity:
The provisions of this subchapter [which establish FERC’s jurisdiction] shall
apply to the transmission of electric energy in interstate commerce and to the sale
of electric energy at wholesale in interstate commerce . . . .
16 U.S.C. § 824(b)(1) (emphasis added). The FPA defines a “sale of electric energy at
wholesale” as a “sale . . . for resale.” Id. § 824(d). Thus, FERC has exclusive jurisdiction to
regulate any sale of electricity other than the final “retail” sale made to the factories, homes, and
businesses that consume electricity.
Under the FPA, FERC’s authority to regulate wholesale sales of electric energy includes
the power to establish “just and reasonable” wholesale rates. Id. § 824e. The statute defines the
scope of that authority to include:
All rates and charges made, demanded, or received by [an electric generator] for
or in connection with the transmission or sale of electric energy subject to the
jurisdiction of the Commission, and all rules and regulations affecting or
pertaining to such rates or charges . . . .
16 U.S.C. § 824d(a).
Courts have repeatedly held that the FPA gives FERC exclusive authority to regulate
wholesale electricity sales and to establish the prices and terms at which such sales take place.
As Justice Scalia has explained: “It is common ground that if FERC has jurisdiction over a
subject, the States cannot have jurisdiction over the same subject.” Miss. Power & Light Co. v.
Miss. ex rel. Moore, 487 U.S. 354, 377 (1988) (Scalia, J., concurring in the judgment).
Accordingly, the Supreme Court has held that the FPA left “no power in the states to regulate . . .
sales for resale in interstate commerce.” FPC v. S. Cal. Edison Co., 376 U.S. 205, 215 (1964)
(quotation marks omitted); New England Power Co. v. New Hampshire, 455 U.S. 331, 340
(1982) (FPA “delegated to [FERC] exclusive authority to regulate the transmission and sale at
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34
wholesale of electric energy in interstate commerce, without regard to the source of
production”); Nantahala Power & Light Co. v. Thornburg, 476 U.S. 953,956 (1986) (“FERC . . .
has exclusive jurisdiction over interstate wholesale power rates”); Penn. Water & Power Co. v.
FPC, 193 F.2d 230, 239 (D.C. Cir. 1951) (through the FPA, Congress has “occupied the field
with regard to interstate wholesale rates of electric companies.”), aff’d, 343 U.S. 414 (1952);
Transmission Access Study Policy Grp. v. FERC, 225 F.3d 667, 723 (D.C. Cir. 2000) (noting
“FERC's exclusive jurisdiction over all aspects of wholesale sales”).23
Applying those precedents, two recent cases have struck down attempts by states to set
wholesale electricity rates. In PPL Energyplus, LLC v. Nazarian, No. MJG-12-1286, __ F. Supp.
2d __, 2013 WL 5432346 (D. Md. Sept. 30, 2013), and PPL Energyplus, LLC v. Hanna, No. 11-
745, __ F. Supp. 2d __, 2013 WL 5603896 (D.N.J. Oct. 11, 2013), courts invalidated attempts by
New Jersey and Maryland, respectively, to establish wholesale electricity rates paid by state
utilities to generators. Both cases confirmed that when states encroach upon FERC’s exclusive
authority to regulate wholesale sales, the state action is preempted by the FPA and must be
enjoined. See Nazarian, 2013 WL 5432346, at *31 (striking down a state commission order as
preempted by the FPA because it “establishes the price ultimately received by [a particular
generator] for its actual physical [electric] energy and capacity sales”); Hanna, 2013 WL
23 The presumption against preemption on which State Defendants rely has no application here,
because the field of wholesale electricity sales is not one that the states ever occupied. See
Buckman Co. v. Plaintiffs’ Legal Comm., 531 U.S. 341, 347–48 (2001) (presumption against
preemption is warranted only for “a field which the States have traditionally occupied” (citation
omitted)). In 1927, the Supreme Court held that state regulation in the field of interstate
wholesale electricity sales violated the dormant Commerce Clause. Pub. Utils. Comm’n of R.I. v.
Attleboro Steam & Electric Co., 273 U.S. 83, 89-90 (1927). That ruling created a regulatory
“gap,” and Congress enacted the Federal Power Act to fill that gap. See New York v. FERC, 535
U.S. 1, 21 (2002).
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5603896, at *34-35 (striking down state law that guaranteed a wholesale price to a generator
because it “intrudes upon the authority of [FERC] and violates federal law”).24
State Defendants contend that the FPA is intended to accommodate, rather than preempt,
state policy. To be sure, the FPA left certain regulatory authority to the states, but that authority
did not include any power to regulate wholesale sales. See Nazarian, 2013 WL 5432346, at *29-
30 (although “the FPA explicitly preserve[d] state jurisdiction over certain areas of the electric
energy regulation field . . . [,] [t]he preservation of state authority in a carved-out area within a
broader federal regulatory field does not eliminate the exclusive federal jurisdiction over the
balance of the field,” and “through the FPA Congress vested FERC with authority over
wholesale electric energy prices”); Hanna, 2013 WL 5603896, at *35 (“Although the State of
New Jersey and the Board retained the responsibility for the siting and construction of power
plants, they are required to exercise this responsibility without interfering with [FERC’s]
exclusive authority to regulate wholesale sales of electricity in interstate commerce.”). Thus, the
field of wholesale electricity rates is exclusively federal, and “any state law falling within [an
exclusively federal] field is preempted.” Silkwood v. Kerr-McGee Corp., 464 U.S. 238, 248
(1984) (emphasis added). That is so even if the state law is “parallel” or “complementary” to
federal regulation, Arizona v. United States, 132 S. Ct. 2492, 2501-02 (2012), and even if the
federal government has decided not to regulate at all. See Ark. Elec. Coop. Corp. v. Ark. Pub.
Serv. Comm’n, 461 U.S. 375, 383-84 (1983). Here, the FPA grants FERC exclusive authority to
24 Defendants attempt to distinguish these cases, but the cases’ key holding – that states may not
set wholesale electricity rates – is directly relevant here. See Hanna, 2013 WL 5603896, at *34-
35; Nazarian, 2013 WL 5432346, at *30-31. In those cases, Maryland and New Jersey set
wholesale rates by fixing the price of a “contract for differences” that they forced utilities to
enter. Here, Massachusetts set wholesale rates by using its leverage over a merger application to
compel the utility to enter into a power contract at a particular price and on particular terms.
Both means of setting wholesale rates are equally preempted.
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regulate “rates and charges made, demanded, or received … for or in connection with” wholesale
electricity transactions. 16 U.S.C. § 824d(a). States are entirely foreclosed from attempting to do
so themselves.
2. Massachusetts Encroached on the Field Occupied by the Federal
Power Act by Forcing NSTAR to Enter Into a Wholesale Electricity
Contract and by Dictating the Contract’s Rates and Terms.
Under the FPA, any wholesale electricity sale made by Cape Wind falls within FERC’s
exclusive jurisdiction, and any effort by Massachusetts to regulate the rates or terms of a Cape
Wind wholesale electricity sale is preempted. See Nazarian, 2013 WL 5432346, at *29-30;
Hanna, 2013 WL 5603896, at *35; see also S. Cal. Edison Co., 376 U.S. at 215; New England
Power Co., 455 U.S. at 340; Nantahala Power, 476 U.S. at 956; supra pp. 32-36. Here,
Massachusetts encroached on the field occupied by the Federal Power Act when it used its
regulatory authority over NSTAR’s merger request to force NSTAR to enter into a wholesale
contract with Cape Wind and to dictate the rates and terms of that contract.
For example, the allegations in the complaint – which the Court must accept as true for
purposes of a motion to dismiss, see Hostar Marine, 592 F.3d at 207 – show that NSTAR would
not have entered into the NSTAR–Cape Wind contract unless the Patrick Administration had
made it a condition of approving NSTAR’s requested merger. See, e.g., Compl. ¶¶ 56-57, 68, 88
(“Following the DPU’s approval of the merger, NSTAR Chief Executive May – now Chief
Executive of the merged corporation – explained NSTAR’s entry into the power contract by
citing the ‘fear’ that Massachusetts regulators might otherwise block the company’s planned
merger with Northeast Utilities.”). Moreover, the allegations show that NSTAR was not able to
freely negotiate the price of the contract. See Compl. ¶ 77 (the Settlement Agreement stipulated
that “the terms of the [NSTAR–]Cape Wind Contract, including but not limited to the purchase
price for the power . . . , shall be substantially the same as those terms [in the National Grid
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37
contract].”); id. ¶ 83 (“NSTAR did not engage in negotiations with Cape Wind over the price of
the power purchase agreement at any time. Instead, the price was identical to the National Grid
contract, as dictated by the Settlement Agreement between NSTAR and DOER. An NSTAR
executive later testified that “[t]he Settlement Agreement … contemplated that the ‘purchase
price . . . shall be substantially the same as those terms approved by the Department in National
Grid, D.P.U. 10-54 (2010).’”); id. (quoting an NSTAR executive as testifying that “we regarded
the terms on pricing as largely negotiated already” and that “pursuant to the terms of the
agreement with DOER, that we were substantially going to comply with what was in there in
terms of price”); id. ¶ 85 (“The recitals of the power contract specifically state that the basis for
NSTAR’s entry into the contract is the Settlement Agreement between NSTAR and DOER.”).
Thus, the allegations show that NSTAR was compelled into a particular wholesale power
contract, the rates and terms of which Massachusetts expressly dictated. See id. ¶¶ 68-89.
A Massachusetts statute or order directly requiring NSTAR to enter into the NSTAR–
Cape Wind contract and setting that contract’s rates and terms would unquestionably be
preempted under the FPA. See Nazarian, 2013 WL 5432346, at *35 (striking down state
commission order that “establishes the price ultimately received by [a particular generator] for its
[wholesale electricity] sales”); Hanna, 2013 WL 5603896, at *34-35 (striking down state statute
that set a wholesale electricity price); see also S. Cal. Edison Co., 376 U.S. at 215 (the FPA left
“no power in the states to regulate . . . sales for resale in interstate commerce” (quotation marks
omitted)); New England Power Co., 455 U.S. at 340 (same); Nantahala Power, 476 U.S. at 956
(same). The Supremacy Clause does not permit Massachusetts to achieve indirectly, through the
exercise of its regulatory leverage over mergers, what it plainly would be barred from achieving
directly – for “[w]hat a state cannot do directly, it also cannot do indirectly.” 520 S. Mich. Ave.
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Assocs., Ltd. v. Shannon, 549 F.3d 1119, 1129 (7th Cir. 2008). As the Supreme Court has held
with respect to the Natural Gas Act, which is parallel in this relevant respect to the Federal
Power Act, “[t]he federal regulatory scheme leaves no room either for direct state regulation of
the prices of interstate wholesales of natural gas or for state regulations which would indirectly
achieve the same result.” N. Natural Gas Co. v. State Corp. Comm’n, 372 U.S. 84, 91 (1963);
California ex rel. Lockyer v. Dynegy, Inc., 375 F.3d 831, 850 & n.17 (9th Cir. 2004) (holding
that California’s enforcement of its state unfair competition law was preempted notwithstanding
California’s contention that its “application of unfair competition laws merely represents an
indirect intrusion into FERC's exclusive authority” (emphasis in original)); Nantahala, 476 U.S.
at 966-67 (holding that the state may not use its authority over retail rate-setting to indirectly
regulate wholesale rates); see also generally N.H. Motor Transp. Ass’n v. Rowe, 448 F.3d 66, 79
(1st Cir. 2006) (finding preemption and rejecting interpretation of statute that would “permit
states to do indirectly what they cannot do directly”), aff’d, 552 U.S. 364 (2008); New England
Legal Found. v. Mass. Port Auth., 883 F.2d 157, 174 (1st Cir. 1989) (finding preemption and
holding that the state “cannot do indirectly what it is forbidden to do directly”).
State Defendants and Cape Wind contend that Massachusetts regulators did not, as a
factual matter, force NSTAR to enter into the Cape Wind contract, and that the terms of the
contract were privately negotiated. See State Mem. 21; Cape Wind Mem. 10 n.13. (Any such
argument is notably absent from NSTAR’s motion to dismiss.) But that argument is based solely
on factual claims at odds with the complaint, including that “NStar and Cape Wind privately
negotiated the contract rate” and that “DOER had no legal authority to reject or approve the
merger.” State Mem. 21, 26. Such factual arguments are inappropriate for a motion to dismiss.
Defendants may attempt to refute those factual assertions by a motion for summary judgment or
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39
at trial. But assuming that the allegations in the complaint are true, as required on a motion to
dismiss, see Hostar Marine, 592 F.3d at 207, Massachusetts regulators forced NSTAR into a
wholesale electricity contract and dictated the terms of that contract. As described above, those
actions encroached on the field occupied by the Federal Power Act and were therefore preempted
by federal law.
C. Defendants’ Asserted Grounds for Dismissing the Preemption Claim Are
Meritless.
Defendants raise several arguments contending that the preemption claim should be
dismissed on the merits. Each argument is baseless.
1. The State’s Pike County Authority Does Not Permit It to Force a
Utility to Enter Into a Wholesale Contract and Dictate Its Terms.
Defendants assert that the DPU’s approval of the NSTAR–Cape Wind contract was
authorized by the state’s “Pike County” authority to review the “prudence” of a utility’s selection
of one among several available wholesale contracts. See State Mem. 24; Cape Wind Mem. 9-11
(describing the DPU Order as a buyer-side regulation). That is a red herring because Plaintiffs’
preemption claim has nothing to do with the state’s Pike County authority.
As noted above, under the FPA, states retain authority to regulate the retail rates that
utilities charge to end-use customers. Under the Pike County doctrine – named after Pike County
Light & Power Co. v. Pennsylvania Public Utility Commission, 465 A.2d 735, 737-38 (Pa.
Commw. Ct. 1983) – a state commission may “consider[] whether the purchasing utility chose
wisely among alternative sources of energy supply in entering into the particular agreement.”
Appalachian Power Co. v. Pub. Service Comm’n of W. Va., 812 F.2d 898, 903 (4th Cir. 1987);
see also Kentucky West Virginia Gas Co. v. Penn. Pub. Utility Comm’n, 837 F.2d 600, 609 (3d
Cir. 1988). If the commission determines that the utility did not choose wisely, it may deny the
utility the ability to recover the costs of a particular agreement in its rates.
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Thus, under Pike County, a state is free to deem “prudent” a utility’s decision to procure
electricity from a relatively expensive source of power (for example, solar power). But Pike
County does not authorize states to force utilities to enter into particular contracts, or establish
the rates and terms under which electricity is procured. See Nazarian, 2013 WL 5432346, at
*31; Hanna, 2013 WL 5603896, at *34-35; see also S. Cal. Edison Co., 376 U.S. at 215; New
England Power Co., 455 U.S. at 340; Nantahala Power, 476 U.S. at 956; cf. Central Vt. Pub.
Serv. Corp., 84 FERC ¶ 61,194, ¶¶ 61,974-95 (1998) (cited in State Mem. 24) (“[A] state
commission is not precluded under the FPA from reviewing the prudence of a wholesale
purchase that was made at [FERC]-approved rates if the purchaser had other legal choices
available.” (emphasis added)).25
Yet that is precisely what Massachusetts did here. Massachusetts did not merely
determine that the NSTAR–Cape Wind contract was a “prudent” choice among available
alternatives. Rather, as described above, Massachusetts used its regulatory authority to force
Cape Wind into a particular contract (the NSTAR–Cape Wind contract) and to dictate its price
and terms. In sum, by forcing NSTAR to enter this particular contract and dictating the price and
terms of that contract, the state encroached on the core of FERC’s exclusive authority to regulate
wholesale sales under the FPA.
25 Cape Wind appears to contend that a state has free rein to regulate a utility’s buyer-side
conduct. Cape Wind Mem. 12. But a state may not use its regulatory authority over utilities to
force those utilities to purchase electricity at a particular rate. See Nazarian, 2013 WL 5432346,
at *33 (“The Court does not perceive, for purposes of field preemption, any meaningful
difference between state actions directed to the demand side and those directed to the supply side
of the wholesale energy market . . . . [The proposition that] state regulation of such matters is
void under the Supremacy Clause . . . holds firm whether the rate or price in question is that
received by a generation facility for wholesale sales or is that paid by [a utility] for wholesale
purchases.”).
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2. FERC Has Never Addressed Any Argument Remotely Resembling
Plaintiffs’ Preemption Claim.
Defendants assert that “FERC itself has said that DPU’s approval of the PPA does not
usurp its authority.” State Mem. 25 (citing Californians for Renewable Energy, Inc. (CARE) v.
Nat’l Grid, 137 FERC ¶ 61,113 (2011), Ex. 2 to State Mem.); Cape Wind Mem. 12. That is a
gross mischaracterization of the FERC order on which Defendants rely. The CARE proceeding
addressed only the National Grid–Cape Wind contract and did not address any preemption
argument remotely resembling the one raised by Plaintiffs here.26 See Californians for
Renewable Energy, Inc. (CARE) v. Nat’l Grid, 137 FERC ¶ 61,113, ¶¶ 61,591-92 (2011). There
was no allegation in the CARE proceeding that the National Grid contract was the result of state
coercion, see id., and indeed, National Grid voluntarily contracted with Cape Wind, see Comp.
¶¶ 46-48. It was only with respect to NSTAR that Massachusetts used its regulatory authority to
force the utility to enter into an above-market wholesale contract with the politically favored
Cape Wind project. Thus, FERC’s CARE order in no way addressed whether Massachusetts’s
coercive efforts to force NSTAR into the Cape Wind contract violated the Federal Power Act.
3. FERC’s Eventual Review of the Reasonableness of the NSTAR–Cape
Wind Contract Rate Does Not Deprive This Court of Jurisdiction to
Determine Whether Massachusetts Violated the FPA.
Defendants further argue that there is no violation of the FPA because FERC, as it does
for all wholesale contracts, will eventually determine whether the NSTAR–Cape Wind contract
26 As FERC observed, the CARE complaint was “incomprehensible,” “consist[ing] of a string of
vague and unsupported allegations that the Massachusetts Commission’s [approval of the
National Grid/Cape Wind contract] violates the FPA, PURPA and previous Commission orders,
allegations of fraudulent behavior and allegations of affiliation with international criminal
organizations.” 137 FERC ¶ 61,113, ¶¶ 61,591-92. Thus, FERC denied the complaint largely on
the ground that it had “fail[ed] to meet the requirements of the Commission’s Rules of Practice
and Procedure to lay out a case before the Commission and with evidentiary support rather than
bare allegations.” Id. ¶ 61,592.
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rate is just and reasonable. See State Mem. 21, 25; Cape Wind Mem. 12-13. Yet again,
however, Defendants misconstrue Plaintiffs’ preemption claim. This action is not a challenge to
the NSTAR–Cape Wind rate itself, but rather to Massachusetts’s actions in forcing NSTAR to
accept that rate. As the federal court in Maryland recently concluded in rejecting a materially
identical argument, where Plaintiffs claim that a state unlawfully dictated the terms of a
wholesale sale, the federal courts – not FERC – have “jurisdiction to answer the question of
whether the . . . state action is unconstitutional.” Nazarian, 2013 WL 5432346, at *41. The fact
that FERC will eventually determine whether the rate dictated by the unlawful state action is just
and reasonable “does not strip this Court of jurisdiction to decide the constitutionality of the
[state’s] regulatory actions and to enjoin enforcement of an unconstitutional state action.” Id.
The very same reasoning applies here. This Court – not FERC – has jurisdiction to
determine whether Massachusetts acted unlawfully when it forced NSTAR to enter into a
wholesale contract with Cape Wind. The fact that FERC will eventually address whether the
NSTAR–Cape Wind contract price is reasonable does not deprive this Court of jurisdiction or
absolve Massachusetts’s encroachment on the field occupied by the FPA. See id.
VII. There Are No Grounds to Dismiss the Dormant Commerce Clause Claim.
Plaintiffs allege that Massachusetts violated the dormant aspect of the Commerce Clause
by forcing NSTAR to give up cheaper out-of-state options and purchase wholesale electricity
from a politically favored in-state seller, Cape Wind. Defendants claim that Plaintiffs lack
standing to raise such a claim and that the claim should be dismissed on the facts. But those
arguments misconstrue case law, ignore critical allegations in the complaint, and rely on factual
assertions inappropriate for a motion to dismiss. The dormant Commerce Clause claim should
not be dismissed.
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A. Plaintiffs Have Standing to Bring a Dormant Commerce Clause Claim.
To establish standing, Plaintiffs need only show “a concrete and particularized injury in
fact, a causal connection that permits tracing the claimed injury to the defendant’s actions, and a
likelihood that prevailing in the action will afford some redress for the injury.” Weaver’s Cove
Energy, LLC v. R.I. Coastal Res. Mgmt. Council, 589 F.3d 458, 467 (1st Cir. 2009) (quotation
marks omitted). “The plaintiff need not show that ‘the defendant’s actions are the very last step
in the chain of causation’ for the injury. It suffices if the plaintiff can show ‘injury produced by
determinative or coercive effect upon the action of someone else.’” Id. (quoting Bennett v.
Spear, 520 U.S. 154, 169 (1997)).
Plaintiffs’ standing is straightforward. The Complaint alleges that each Plaintiff will
suffer a concrete and particularized injury in fact because, as end-use customers of NSTAR, they
will directly bear the above-market cost of the Cape Wind contract. Compl. ¶¶ 95-97; Order 12-
30, at 183 (approving NSTAR’s recovery of “above-market costs . . . from all distribution
customers”). The Complaint alleges that if NSTAR had been permitted to obtain wholesale
electricity from competing sources, including those out-of-state, it could have purchased at prices
less than one-half of what Cape Wind charges. Compl. ¶ 95.
That injury in fact was caused by Defendants’ action, see id., because, as described
above, they compelled NSTAR to contract with Cape Wind rather than a less expensive
alternative in order to favor an in-state project that would promote job growth within the state.
Id. ¶¶ 38-40. And Plaintiffs’ requested relief will redress their injury, because by invalidating
DPU Order 12-30, NSTAR would no longer be permitted to charge Plaintiffs and other
customers for the above-market costs of Cape Wind’s electricity.
Notwithstanding that clear injury in fact, Defendants argue that Plaintiffs are not the
proper parties to bring a Commerce Clause claim, and that the only parties who may do so are
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“competitors for long-term renewable energy contracts who claim to have lost out on an
opportunity to compete in Massachusetts by virtue of out-of-state discrimination.” State Mem.
27; Cape Wind Mem. 16. The law, however, does not support that contention.
In General Motors Corp. v. Tracy, the Supreme Court clarified that “cognizable injury
from unconstitutional discrimination against interstate commerce does not stop at members of
the class against whom a State ultimately discriminates.” 519 U.S. 278, 286 (1997) (emphasis
added). Here, therefore, Cape Wind’s out-of-state competitors are not the only ones who have
standing, as Defendants claim. Rather, as Tracy explained, “customers of [the class against
whom a State ultimately discriminates] may also be injured,” 519 U.S. at 286 (emphasis added),
and here, Plaintiffs (who are NSTAR customers) are unquestionably injured because it is
undisputed that NSTAR will pass on all the costs of the Cape Wind contract to its customers.
Likewise, in Alliance of Automobile Manufacturers v. Gwadosky, 430 F.3d 30 (1st Cir.
2005), the First Circuit held that an association of automobile manufacturers had standing to
bring a dormant Commerce Clause claim complaining of discrimination against out-of-state
automobile dealers and in favor of in-state dealers. The court reasoned that a manufacturer had
“suffered concrete pecuniary injury” as a result of the challenged state law, and “[t]hat injury is
enough to ground . . . standing to sue even though [the manufacturer] is not a member of the out-
of-state class against whom the [state law] ostensibly discriminates.” Id. at 37. The same logic
applies here: Plaintiffs suffer a concrete pecuniary injury as a result of the state’s discrimination,
and that is enough to ground standing for a Commerce Clause claim.
The authorities Defendants cite are not to the contrary. In DaimlerChrysler Corp. v.
Cuno (cited in State Mem. 27), the plaintiff lacked standing because its “alleged injury [was]
based on the asserted effect of the allegedly illegal activity on public revenues, to which the
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[plaintiff as] taxpayer contributes.” 547 U.S. 332, 344 (2006). But here Plaintiffs are not
alleging any such “taxpayer standing.” Id. at 345. Plaintiffs raise no challenge to any tax or any
expenditure of public revenues. Rather, Plaintiffs’ injury is based on the increased cost they
must pay in purchasing electricity, and their standing derives not from their status as taxpayers
but as their status as “customers” of “the class against whom a State ultimately discriminates.”
Tracy, 519 U.S. at 286.
Nor are Defendants aided by Ben Oehrleins & Sons & Daughter, Inc. v. Hennepin
County, 115 F.3d 1372, 1381 (8th Cir. 1997) (cited in State Mem. 28-29). That out-of-circuit
case concerned a county ordinance that favored in-state waste haulers, and the court determined
that the customers of the haulers had no prudential standing to bring a Commerce Clause claim,
even though they likely paid higher costs as a result of the ordinance. Id. at 1379-81. The First
Circuit, however, has adopted a more expansive view of prudential standing. As discussed
above, in Gwadosky, the First Circuit held that the plaintiffs had standing to challenge a law
under the Commerce Clause even though they were not part of the class that was discriminated
against, because the plaintiffs would “bear the true cost” of the state regulation. 430 F.3d at 38.
The same is true here: Plaintiffs bear the true cost of the contract approved in DPU Order 12-30.
Moreover, even if Ben Oehrleins were the law in this Circuit, it still would not control
this case. In the ordinary case in which a consumer claims standing on the basis that an upstream
party has incurred higher costs that it may have passed on, the injury is indirect and mediated by
myriad market factors that may determine whether, and how much, of the added cost can be
passed downstream to the consumer. In Ben Oehrleins, for example, it was up to the haulers to
determine whether and to what degree to pass on their higher costs to customers, and the
customers, to establish standing, presumably would need to adduce complex economic testimony
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tracing those costs. There may be good prudential reasons not to allow such suits. Here,
however, the injury to Plaintiffs is direct, transparent, and essentially undisputed. Indeed,
NSTAR essentially purchases wholesale electricity on behalf of its customers, because under the
regulatory scheme, NSTAR is permitted to pass every penny of its costs under the contract to its
customers, including Plaintiffs, see Compl. ¶¶ 94-97, DPU Order 12-30, at 182-89. That
distinguishes this case from Ben Oehrleins. See Houlton Citizens’ Coalition v. Town of Houlton,
175 F.3d 178, 182-83 (1st Cir. 1999) (declining to decide whether to follow Ben Oehrleins and
holding that “a classic plaintiff asserting his own economic interests under the Commerce
Clause” had standing to bring suit).27
B. Massachusetts Violated the Commerce Clause by Forcing NSTAR to Enter
Into a Contract with a Politically Favored In-State Generator.
The “dormant” aspect of the Commerce Clause prohibits states from using their
regulatory power to discriminate in favor of in-state producers as compared to producers located
outside of the state. C&A Carbone, Inc. v. Town of Clarkstown, 511 U.S. 383, 389-90 (1994);
W. Lynn Creamery, 512 U.S. at 192; Wyoming v. Oklahoma, 502 U.S. 437, 454-55 (1992).
Forbidden discrimination “simply means differential treatment of in-state and out-of-state
economic interests that benefits the former and burdens the latter.” United Haulers Ass’n v.
Oneida-Herkimer Solid Waste Mgmt. Auth., 550 U.S. 330, 338 (2007) (quotation marks omitted);
W. Lynn Creamery, 512 U.S. at 192 (the “‘negative’ aspect of the Commerce Clause prohibits
27 As an added reason for denying prudential standing, Ben Oehrleins held that “there [was] no
indication that allowing standing to the [customers] is necessary to insure protection of the rights
asserted.” Ben Oehrleins, 115 F.3d at 1381 (internal quotation marks omitted). But that was
only because the waste haulers had themselves brought suit. See id. Here, NSTAR has not
brought suit “to insure protection of the rights asserted,” id. (internal quotation marks omitted),
likely in part because NSTAR may pass on all of the above-market costs of the Cape Wind
contract to customers such as Plaintiffs. Permitting Plaintiffs to proceed with this suit may be
the only way that Massachusetts’s alleged violation of the Commerce Clause can be redressed,
and that is yet another reason to reject Defendants’ reliance on the prudential standing doctrine.
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economic protectionism – that is, regulatory measures designed to benefit in-state economic
interests by burdening out-of-state competitors” (quotation marks omitted)). “A finding that
state legislation constitutes economic protectionism may be made on the basis of either
discriminatory purpose or discriminatory effect.” Chem. Waste Mgmt., Inc. v. Hunt, 504 U.S.
334, 344 n. 6 (1992) (citations and quotation marks omitted); accord Bacchus Imps., Ltd. v. Dias,
468 U.S. 263, 270-273 (1984). Here, Plaintiffs have stated a claim under both theories.
First, Plaintiffs have stated a claim that Massachusetts regulators were motivated by a
purpose to discriminate against interstate commerce. The Green Communities Act – which, as
discussed above, requires Massachusetts utilities such as NSTAR to purchase a certain amount of
wholesale power from renewable sources – originally required utilities to purchase from
renewable generators in Massachusetts. It was only when a lawsuit was filed under the dormant
Commerce Clause that Massachusetts regulators agreed not to enforce that blatantly
discriminatory provision. See Compl. ¶¶ 49-52. Yet as alleged in the complaint, the intent to
favor in-state generators remained, and Massachusetts regulators were acting on that intent when
they forced NSTAR to contract with Cape Wind as a condition of its merger approval. Id. ¶ 116.
The First Circuit has expressly recognized that the existence of a “facially discriminatory and
unconstitutional predecessor” statute strengthens the inference that facially neutral state action
has a discriminatory purpose, Family Winemakers of Cal. v. Jenkins, 592 F.3d 1, 14 (1st Cir.
2010), which is the exact situation here.
Numerous statements by Governor Patrick and members of his administration confirm
that NSTAR was forced into the Cape Wind contract because of a desire by the state to insulate
Cape Wind from interstate competition. See, e.g., Compl. ¶ 39 (Governor touted in-state jobs
created by Cape Wind); id. (Governor: “States with Democratic, Republican and Independent
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Governors are working with the Obama Administration on a collaborative process to responsibly
site future offshore wind projects. But let me be clear: they are all racing for second place,
because Massachusetts will be first.”); id. ¶ 40 (Secretary of Energy and Environmental Affairs:
“[Massachusetts would] stand to gain from having the first offshore wind farm in the U.S. built
here. . . . But only one state can reap the particular economic benefits of being the first mover –
and with Cape Wind going forward, it will be Massachusetts.”). As the First Circuit has
explained, comments by government officials, such as legislators and state commissioners, are
“precisely the kind of evidence the Supreme Court has looked to in previous Commerce Clause
cases challenging a statute as discriminatory in purpose.” Family Winemakers, 592 F.3d at 7 n.4.
Second, Plaintiffs have pleaded a claim that Massachusetts’ actions had the effect of
discriminating against interstate commerce. A law is discriminatory in effect “when, in practice,
it affects similarly situated entities in a market by imposing disproportionate burdens on out-of-
state interests and conferring advantages upon in-state interests.” Family Winemakers, 592 F.3d
at 10. Here, Massachusetts has favored a Massachusetts generator – Cape Wind – over out-of-
state generators, and that state action indubitably has a discriminatory effect. Thus,
Massachusetts must show that its act of favoritism “serves a legitimate local purpose that cannot
be attained through reasonable non-discriminatory alternatives,” id. at 17, a burden that cannot
possibly be sustained at the motion to dismiss stage.
Indeed, State Defendants do not make any serious attempt to argue that the myriad
factual disputes in resolving Dormant Commerce Clause claim can be resolved on the pleadings.
Instead, they make only two arguments, both of which are meritless. First, they contend that
Section 83, as currently written, “is neutral on its face regarding in-state vs. out-of-state
competitors.” State Mem. 29. To the extent State Defendants contend that facially neutral
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regulation is exempt from a dormant Commerce Clause challenge, they are wrong. Family
Winemakers, 592 F.3d at 5 (“facially neutral but discriminatory” state laws may be challenged
under Dormant Commerce Clause). In any event, Plaintiffs do not challenge Section 83; they
challenge DOER’s act of discriminating against interstate commerce. DOER’s insistence that
NSTAR purchase electricity from a Massachusetts-based provider, and eschew out-of-state
providers, is the antithesis of facial neutrality.
Second, State Defendants argue that the DPU has already ruled against Plaintiffs’
challenges. State Mem. 29. As explained above, the DPU’s decisions are without preclusive
force. Supra pp. 16-19. But even if they were, State Defendants’ preclusion argument as to the
dormant Commerce Clause challenge would clearly fail. State Defendants rely on DPU’s
rejection of a Dormant Commerce Clause challenge to the National Grid contract, id. at 29, but
that was a completely separate contract involving an electric company which, unlike NSTAR,
voluntarily contracted with National Grid. Compl. ¶ 49 (“Cape Wind could not persuade
NSTAR to enter into a no-bid power purchase agreement at Cape Wind’s inflated rates, as
National Grid had done.”). As for State Defendants’ citation to DPU Order 12-30, State Mem. at
29-30, that discussion did not even mention a dormant Commerce Clause challenge. In short,
Plaintiffs’ dormant Commerce Clause allegations have never been tested in any forum.
Case 1:14-cv-10148-RGS Document 48 Filed 04/14/14 Page 58 of 60
50
CONCLUSION
For the foregoing reasons, the motions to dismiss should be denied.
April 14, 2014 Respectfully submitted,
/s/ Ira H. Zaleznik
Ira H. Zaleznik (BBO# 538800)
Joshua M. D. Segal (BBO# 678367)
Lawson &Weitzen, LLP
88 Black Falcon Avenue, Suite 345
Boston, MA 02210
Tel. (617) 439-4990
Email: izaleznik@lawson-weitzen.com
jsegal@lawson-weitzen.com
Counsel for Town of Barnstable, Mass.
/s/ Matthew E. Price
Matthew E. Price (BBO# 668990)
Adam G. Unikowsky*
Matthew S. McKenzie*
Jenner & Block LLP
1099 New York Avenue NW Suite 900
Washington, DC 20001
Tel. (202) 639-6000
Email: mprice@jenner.com
aunikowsky@jenner.com
mmckenzie@jenner.com
Robert A. Bianchi (BBO# 042360)
Robert A. Bianchi & Associates
55 Sea St. Extension
P.O. Box 128
Hyannis, MA 02601
Tel. (508) 775-0785
Email: robbianchi@aol.com
Counsel for Hyannis Marina, Inc., Marjon
Print & Frame Shop Ltd.. The Keller
Company, Inc., The Alliance to Protect
Nantucket Sound, Sandra P. Taylor, and
Jamie Regan
*Admitted pro hac vice.
Case 1:14-cv-10148-RGS Document 48 Filed 04/14/14 Page 59 of 60
51
CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE
I certify that this document, filed through the Court’s ECF system, will be sent
electronically to registered participants as identified on the Notice of Electronic Filing (NEF) and
that electronic (PDF) copies will be sent to those indicated as non-registered participants by
email on April 14, 2014.
/s/ Matthew E. Price
Matthew E. Price
Case 1:14-cv-10148-RGS Document 48 Filed 04/14/14 Page 60 of 60