28 Cited authorities

  1. People v. Casey

    95 N.Y.2d 354 (N.Y. 2000)   Cited 1,259 times
    In Case, we stated the rule broadly: "A valid and sufficient accusatory instrument is a nonwaivable jurisdictional prerequisite to a criminal prosecution" (id. at 99; citation omitted).
  2. People v. Kalin

    2009 N.Y. Slip Op. 2446 (N.Y. 2009)   Cited 617 times
    In Kalin, the Court of Appeals concluded that, because the officer's account of his experience, the packaging of the drugs, and the drug paraphernalia recovered from the car "supplied the basis" for his belief that the substances in question were illegal drugs, the information was facially sufficient notwithstanding the absence of a lab report or a description of the appearance of the drugs themselves (id. at 231-232, 878 N.Y.S.2d 653, 906 N.E.2d 381).
  3. People v. Dumay

    2014 N.Y. Slip Op. 4038 (N.Y. 2014)   Cited 329 times
    Finding factual allegations in information sufficient to support obstructing governmental administration charge, where information alleged that defendant slammed the trunk of police car and stood behind car preventing it from moving
  4. People v. Dreyden

    2010 N.Y. Slip Op. 5243 (N.Y. 2010)   Cited 348 times   1 Legal Analyses
    Stating that the gravity knife law "distinguishes gravity knives from certain folding knives that cannot readily be opened by gravity or centrifugal force"
  5. People v. Konieczny

    2 N.Y.3d 569 (N.Y. 2004)   Cited 400 times

    87. Submitted May 6, 2004. Decided June 10, 2004. APPEAL, by permission of the Chief Judge of the Court of Appeals, from an order of the Niagara County Court (Sara S. Sperrazza, J.), entered March 13, 2003. The County Court affirmed a judgment of the City Court of North Tonawanda, Niagara County (William R. Lewis, J.), which had convicted defendant, upon his plea of guilty, of attempted criminal contempt in the second degree. Michael J. Violante, Public Defender, Lockport ( Joseph G. Frazier of counsel)

  6. People v. Hansen

    95 N.Y.2d 227 (N.Y. 2000)   Cited 365 times   2 Legal Analyses
    Holding that, by pleading guilty, the defendant had forfeited his right to challenge the prosecutor's submission of hearsay evidence to the grand jury
  7. People v. Jackson

    2012 N.Y. Slip Op. 2252 (N.Y. 2012)   Cited 217 times
    Interpreting a substantially similar definition of "public place" and concluding that a person is in a public place when located on a highway even if he or she is inside a personal automobile
  8. People v. Kasse

    2014 N.Y. Slip Op. 2103 (N.Y. 2014)   Cited 69 times

    2014-03-27 The PEOPLE, etc., Respondent, v. Harouna KASSE, Appellant. Steven Banks, The Legal Aid Society, New York City (Michael J. McLaughlin of counsel), for appellant. Cyrus R. Vance, Jr., District Attorney, New York City (Sheryl Feldman of counsel), for respondent. Steven Banks, The Legal Aid Society, New York City (Michael J. McLaughlin of counsel), for appellant. Cyrus R. Vance, Jr., District Attorney, New York City (Sheryl Feldman of counsel), for respondent. MEMORANDUM: The order of the

  9. People v. Santana

    2006 N.Y. Slip Op. 5155 (N.Y. 2006)   Cited 60 times
    In Santana, we applied the general rule that qualifying language found outside the text of a relevant Penal Law provision is in the nature of a "proviso" (see 7 NY3d at 237), but our ultimate conclusion was premised on the belief that the Legislature could not reasonably have intended the People to negate the existence of each of the myriad labor disputes delineated in Judiciary Law § 753-a in a prosecution for criminal contempt based on the defendant's violation of an order of protection prohibiting him from residing in an apartment (see id.).
  10. People v. Prescott

    66 N.Y.2d 216 (N.Y. 1985)   Cited 103 times
    In People v Prescott (66 N.Y.2d 216, 221), the court held, "[t]he test for determining whether two offenses are the same within the meaning of the double jeopardy clause is whether two distinct statutory provisions each requires proof of a fact that the other does not".
  11. Section 39-17-1301 - Part definitions

    Tenn. Code § 39-17-1301   Cited 20 times
    In T.C.A. § 39-17-1301, the definition statute for statutes dealing with weapons and explosives, "Explosive Weapon" has a substantially similar definition to that for destructive device in the now repealed T.C.A. § 39-3-711.
  12. Section 28-1201 - Terms, defined

    Neb. Rev. Stat. § 28-1201   Cited 18 times

    For purposes of sections 28-1201 to 28-1212.04, unless the context otherwise requires: (1) Firearm means any weapon which is designed to or may readily be converted to expel any projectile by the action of an explosive or frame or receiver of any such weapon; (2) Fugitive from justice means any person who has fled or is fleeing from any peace officer to avoid prosecution or incarceration for a felony; (3) Handgun means any firearm with a barrel less than sixteen inches in length or any firearm designed

  13. Section 61-7-2 - Definitions

    W. Va. Code § 61-7-2   Cited 13 times

    As used in this article, unless the context otherwise requires: (1) "Blackjack" means a short bludgeon consisting, at the striking end, of an encased piece of lead or some other heavy substance and, at the handle end, a strap or springy shaft which increases the force of impact when a person or object is struck. The term "blackjack" includes, but is not limited to, a billy, billy club, sand club, sandbag, or slapjack. (2) "Gravity knife" means any knife that has a blade released from the handle by

  14. Section 571.010 - Definitions

    Mo. Rev. Stat. § 571.010   Cited 3 times

    As used in this chapter, the following terms shall mean: (1)"Antique, curio or relic firearm", any firearm so defined by the National Gun Control Act, 18 U.S.C. Title 26, Section 5845, and the United States Treasury/Bureau of Alcohol Tobacco and Firearms, 27 CFR Section 178.11: (a)"Antique firearm" is any firearm not designed or redesigned for using rim fire or conventional center fire ignition with fixed ammunition and manufactured in or before 1898, said ammunition not being manufactured any longer;

  15. Section 16920

    Cal. Pen. Code § 16920   Cited 1 times

    As used in this part, "metal knuckles" means any device or instrument made wholly or partially of metal that is worn for purposes of offense or defense in or on the hand and that either protects the wearer's hand while striking a blow or increases the force of impact from the blow or injury to the individual receiving the blow. The metal contained in the device may help support the hand or fist, provide a shield to protect it, or consist of projections or studs which would contact the individual