30 Cited authorities

  1. People v. Catu

    4 N.Y.3d 242 (N.Y. 2005)   Cited 507 times   7 Legal Analyses
    Vacating guilty plea when defendant not told of PRS because PRS is a "definite, immediate and largely automatic" direct consequence of sentence
  2. People v. Sparber

    2008 N.Y. Slip Op. 3946 (N.Y. 2008)   Cited 355 times   5 Legal Analyses
    Holding that, by imposing PRS terms, DOCS usurped the judicial function as defined by New York law; only the sentencing court has the authority to impose the PRS component of the sentence and must do so at the time of sentencing
  3. People v. Williams

    14 N.Y.3d 198 (N.Y. 2010)   Cited 257 times
    Holding that “after release from prison, a legitimate expectation in the finality of a sentence arises and the Double Jeopardy Clause prevents reformation to attach a PRS component to the original completed sentence”
  4. Garner v. Correctional Servs

    2008 N.Y. Slip Op. 3947 (N.Y. 2008)   Cited 248 times
    Holding that post-release supervision imposed by anyone other than a judge violates New York state law
  5. People v. Morales

    80 N.Y.2d 450 (N.Y. 1992)   Cited 134 times
    In Morales, the issue before the Court was whether it was reversible error to exclude the defendant when the court preliminarily examined a child witness to determine whether she understood the nature of an oath.
  6. People v. Boyd

    2009 N.Y. Slip Op. 3627 (N.Y. 2009)   Cited 63 times
    In Boyd, the Court extended this exception to cases where a court informs the defendant at his plea that his sentence includes a period of supervised release, without specifying the exact duration.
  7. People v. Acevedo

    2011 N.Y. Slip Op. 5582 (N.Y. 2011)   Cited 36 times
    In People v. Acevedo, 17 N.Y.3d 297, 929 N.Y.S.2d 55, 952 N.E.2d 1047 (2011), the Court of Appeals held that defendants will not be permitted, “by means of [seeking] vacatur and resentence” on prior convictions in which the court failed to impose required postrelease supervision, “to render their prior convictions useless as predicates to enhance punishment for the crimes they subsequently committed” (id. at 303, 929 N.Y.S.2d 55, 952 N.E.2d 1047).
  8. United States v. Salim

    690 F.3d 115 (2d Cir. 2012)   Cited 32 times
    Holding that it was error to find that the defendant's decision not to attend resentencing was voluntary without assessing the credibility and reasonableness of his explanation that that decision was based on his fear of abuse; but affirming because the issue was unpreserved and did not warrant reversal under plain-error analysis because the defendant did “not prove that his presence would have affected the outcome of his resentencing”
  9. U.S. v. Arrous

    320 F.3d 355 (2d Cir. 2003)   Cited 39 times
    Holding that the defendant should have been present for his resentencing following remand from a successful appeal, but that his exclusion from the proceeding was harmless error because his new sentence was less onerous than his previous one, and his presence would not have affected the outcome of his resentencing
  10. People v. Pignataro

    2013 N.Y. Slip Op. 8286 (N.Y. 2013)   Cited 24 times
    In Pignataro, the defendant challenged his resentencing under N.Y. Penal Law § 70.85, claiming the statute is unconstitutional because it deprives him of his right to vacate his guilty plea.
  11. Section 440.10 - Motion to vacate judgment

    N.Y. Crim. Proc. Law § 440.10   Cited 9,045 times   6 Legal Analyses
    Stating that the court “must deny” a § 440.10 motion when sufficient facts appear on the record to permit appellate review of the claim and the defendant unjustifiably failed to raise that issue on direct appeal
  12. Section 125.25 - [Effective Until 9/1/2024] Murder in the second degree

    N.Y. Penal Law § 125.25   Cited 4,321 times   12 Legal Analyses
    Requiring "intent to cause the death of another person"
  13. Section 125.20 - Manslaughter in the first degree

    N.Y. Penal Law § 125.20   Cited 1,141 times
    Defining Manslaughter in the First Degree
  14. Section 380.50 - [Effective 9/1/2024] Statements at time of sentence

    N.Y. Crim. Proc. Law § 380.50   Cited 290 times
    Sentencing court must afford the parties "an opportunity to make a statement with respect to any matter relevant to the question of sentence"
  15. Section 601-D - Post-release supervision; certain cases

    N.Y. Correct. Law § 601-D   Cited 225 times   2 Legal Analyses

    This section shall apply only to incarcerated individuals in the custody of the commissioner, and releasees under the supervision of the department, upon whom a determinate sentence was imposed between September first, nineteen hundred ninety-eight, and the effective date of this section, which was required by law to include a term of post-release supervision: 1. For purposes of this section, such a person shall be deemed a "designated person" if the commitment order that accompanied such person

  16. Section 380.20 - Sentence required

    N.Y. Crim. Proc. Law § 380.20   Cited 183 times

    The court must pronounce sentence in every case where a conviction is entered. If an accusatory instrument contains multiple counts and a conviction is entered on more than one count the court must pronounce sentence on each count. N.Y. Crim. Proc. Law § 380.20

  17. Section 70.85 - Transitional exception to determinate sentencing laws

    N.Y. Penal Law § 70.85   Cited 139 times

    This section shall apply only to cases in which a determinate sentence was imposed between September first, nineteen hundred ninety-eight, and the effective date of this section, and was required by law to include a term of post-release supervision, but the court did not explicitly state such a term when pronouncing sentence. When such a case is again before the court pursuant to section six hundred one-d of the correction law or otherwise, for consideration of whether to resentence, the court may

  18. Section 380.40 - Defendant's presence at sentencing

    N.Y. Crim. Proc. Law § 380.40   Cited 110 times

    1. In general. The defendant must be personally present at the time sentence is pronounced. 2. Exception. Where sentence is to be pronounced for a misdemeanor or for a petty offense, the court may, on motion of the defendant, dispense with the requirement that the defendant be personally present. Any such motion must be accompanied by a waiver, signed and acknowledged by the defendant, reciting the maximum sentence that may be imposed for the offense and stating that the defendant waives the right