§Why CasetextPricing

The People, Respondent,v.Pettis Hardy, Appellant.

Brief

24 Cited authorities

  1. Allen v. United States

    164 U.S. 492 (1896)   Cited 2,811 times   3 Legal Analyses
    Holding that a trial court may encourage a deadlocked jury to continue deliberating provided it does so noncoercively

  2. People v. Barnes

    50 N.Y.2d 375 (N.Y. 1980)   Cited 443 times   2 Legal Analyses
    Holding that the relevant "moral certainty" standard "does not apply to a situation where, as here, both direct and circumstantial evidence are employed to demonstrate a defendant's culpability"

  3. People v. Ford

    66 N.Y.2d 428 (N.Y. 1985)   Cited 352 times
    Retaining the charge because it emphasizes the need for careful reasoning and "forecloses danger . . . that the trier of facts may leap logical gaps in the proof offered and draw unwarranted conclusion based on probabilities of low degree"

  4. People v. Daddona

    81 N.Y.2d 990 (N.Y. 1993)   Cited 156 times

    Argued February 18, 1993 Decided May 6, 1993 Appeal from the Appellate Division of the Supreme Court in the Second Judicial Department, Fisher, J. Mahler Harris, P.C., Kew Gardens (Stephen R. Mahler of counsel), for appellant. Richard A. Brown, District Attorney of Queens County, Kew Gardens (Kenneth B. Russo and Barbara D. Underwood of counsel), for respondent. MEMORANDUM. The order of the Appellate Division should be affirmed. Upon a jury verdict, defendant was convicted of several counts of possession

  5. People v. Sanchez

    61 N.Y.2d 1022 (N.Y. 1984)   Cited 182 times
    In People v Sanchez (61 N.Y.2d 1022, 1024), we held that it was not necessary that a circumstantial evidence charge use the words "moral certainty" but emphasized that "the jury should be instructed in substance that it must appear that the inference of guilt is the only one that can fairly and reasonably be drawn from the facts, and that the evidence excludes beyond a reasonable doubt every reasonable hypothesis of innocence."

  6. Matter of Plummer v. Rothwax

    63 N.Y.2d 243 (N.Y. 1984)   Cited 118 times
    In Matter of Plummer v. Rothwax (63 NY2d 243), the judge declared a mistrial after jurors had declared further deliberations would be fruitless, and this Court found that "it was reasonable for the trial court to avoid any coaxing, inducing or pressuring the jury to return for further deliberations.

  7. People v. Pagan

    45 N.Y.2d 725 (N.Y. 1978)   Cited 114 times
    In People v. Pagan (45 N.Y.2d 725, 726-727), the Court of Appeals cautioned against "[s]upplemental charges which prod jurors through prejudicial innuendoes or coerce them with untoward pressure to reach an agreement".

  8. People v. Aponte

    2 N.Y.3d 304 (N.Y. 2004)   Cited 39 times
    Reminding trial court "that criminal jury instructions generally are not fertile ground for innovation during trial"

  9. People v. Shawn Hunter

    17 N.Y.3d 725 (N.Y. 2011)   Cited 29 times

    Argued April 28, 2011. Decided June 2, 2011. APPEAL, by permission of an Associate Judge of the Court of Appeals, from an order of the Appellate Division of the Supreme Court in the Fourth Judicial Department, entered February 11, 2010. The Appellate Division affirmed a judgment of the Supreme Court, Monroe County (Francis A. Affronti, J.), which had convicted defendant, upon his plea of guilty, of criminal sale of a controlled substance in the third degree, and criminal possession of a controlled

  10. People v. Santiago

    2013 N.Y. Slip Op. 7829 (N.Y. 2013)   Cited 18 times

    2013-11-26 The PEOPLE of the State of New York, Respondent, v. Hector SANTIAGO, Appellant. Steven Banks, The Legal Aid Society, New York City (Svetlana M. Kornfeind of counsel), for appellant. Cyrus R. Vance, Jr., District Attorney, New York City (Beth Fisch Cohen and Patrick J. Hynes of counsel), for respondent. Steven Banks, The Legal Aid Society, New York City (Svetlana M. Kornfeind of counsel), for appellant. Cyrus R. Vance, Jr., District Attorney, New York City (Beth Fisch Cohen and Patrick

  11. Section 155.30 - Grand Larceny in the fourth degree

    N.Y. Penal Law § 155.30   Cited 921 times

    A person is guilty of grand larceny in the fourth degree when he steals property and when: 1. The value of the property exceeds one thousand dollars; or 2. The property consists of a public record, writing or instrument kept, filed or deposited according to law with or in the keeping of any public office or public servant; or 3. The property consists of secret scientific material; or 4. The property consists of a credit card or debit card; or 5. The property, regardless of its nature and value, is

  12. Section 155.25 - Petit larceny

    N.Y. Penal Law § 155.25   Cited 739 times   1 Legal Analyses
    Defining "petit larceny"