40 Cited authorities

Perry v. New Hampshire
565 U.S. 228 (2012) Cited 1,360 times 2 Legal Analyses
Holding that courts need not inquire into the reliability of an eyewitness identification when it is not procured "under unnecessarily suggestive circumstances"
Neil v. Biggers
409 U.S. 188 (1972) Cited 7,388 times 8 Legal Analyses
Holding identification occurring seven months after crime was reliable
Manson v. Brathwaite
432 U.S. 98 (1977) Cited 5,591 times 7 Legal Analyses
Holding that, if police procedures are unduly suggestive, identification will be excluded if its reliability does not outweigh corrupting influence of suggestive procedure
United States v. Wade
388 U.S. 218 (1967) Cited 8,072 times 17 Legal Analyses
Holding that the Sixth Amendment provides the right to counsel at a postindictment lineup even though the Fifth Amendment is not implicated
Stovall v. Denno
388 U.S. 293 (1967) Cited 5,309 times 4 Legal Analyses
Holding that a suggestive show-up was "imperative" where it was not clear how long the person making the identification would live; she was not able to visit the jail; taking the defendant to the hospital room was the only feasible procedure; and a line-up at the police station was not possible
State v. Henderson
208 N.J. 208 (N.J. 2011) Cited 704 times 1 Legal Analyses
Holding a jury instruction on cross-racial identification should be given whenever cross-racial identification is in issue at trial
Watkins v. Sowders
449 U.S. 341 (1981) Cited 364 times
Holding that the due process clause of the Fourteenth Amendment does not require a per se rule that a hearing outside the presence of the jury be conducted whenever a defendant challenges the admissibility of a witness's identification
Commonwealth v. Crayton
470 Mass. 228 (Mass. 2014) Cited 329 times
Holding that defendant has burden to establish that there is no good reason for admission of in-court identification and noting that “there may be good reason ... [when] the eyewitness was familiar with the defendant before the commission of the crime ... [or when] the witness is an arresting officer who was also an eyewitness to the commission of the crime, and the identification merely confirms that the defendant is the person who was arrested for the charged crime”
People v. Rodriguez
79 N.Y.2d 445 (N.Y. 1992) Cited 643 times 1 Legal Analyses
Holding that where "a citizen identification [is] `merely confirmatory' . . . that the People [bear the burden of showing] that the protagonists are known to one another, or [if] there is no mutual relationship, that the witness knows defendant so well as to be impervious to police suggestion."
Dunnigan v. Keane
137 F.3d 117 (2d Cir. 1998) Cited 527 times
Holding that evidence must be "sufficiently material to provide the basis for conviction" to violate the Due Process Clause

The People, Respondent,v.Kaity Marshall, Appellant.

40 Cited authorities

Holding that courts need not inquire into the reliability of an eyewitness identification when it is not procured "under unnecessarily suggestive circumstances"

Holding identification occurring seven months after crime was reliable

Holding that, if police procedures are unduly suggestive, identification will be excluded if its reliability does not outweigh corrupting influence of suggestive procedure

Holding that the Sixth Amendment provides the right to counsel at a postindictment lineup even though the Fifth Amendment is not implicated

Holding that a suggestive show-up was "imperative" where it was not clear how long the person making the identification would live; she was not able to visit the jail; taking the defendant to the hospital room was the only feasible procedure; and a line-up at the police station was not possible

Holding a jury instruction on cross-racial identification should be given whenever cross-racial identification is in issue at trial

Holding that the due process clause of the Fourteenth Amendment does not require a per se rule that a hearing outside the presence of the jury be conducted whenever a defendant challenges the admissibility of a witness's identification

Holding that where "a citizen identification [is] `merely confirmatory' . . . that the People [bear the burden of showing] that the protagonists are known to one another, or [if] there is no mutual relationship, that the witness knows defendant so well as to be impervious to police suggestion."

Holding that evidence must be "sufficiently material to provide the basis for conviction" to violate the Due Process Clause