No. 142. Argued September 17, 2009. Decided October 22, 2009. APPEAL, by permission of a Justice of the Appellate Division of the Supreme Court in the Third Judicial Department, from an order of that Court, entered August 21, 2008. The Appellate Division affirmed a judgment of the Schenectady County Court (Polly A. Hoye, J.), which had convicted defendant, upon a jury verdict, of grand larceny in the first degree and criminal possession of stolen property in the first degree. People v Arafet, 54
No. 65 04-26-2012 In the Matter of Albany Law School et al., Respondents-Appellants, v. New York State Office of Mental Retardation and Developmental Disabilities et al., Appellants-Respondents. Victor Paladino, for appellants-respondents. Jennifer J. Monthie, for respondents-appellants. NYSARC, Inc.; National Disability Rights Network et al., amici curiae. GRAFFEO Victor Paladino, for appellants-respondents. Jennifer J. Monthie, for respondents-appellants. NYSARC, Inc.; National Disability Rights
(a) (1) The importation into the United States, any territory of the United States, the District of Columbia, the Commonwealth of Puerto Rico, or any possession of the United States, or any shipment between the continental United States, the District of Columbia, Hawaii, the Commonwealth of Puerto Rico, or any possession of the United States, of the mongoose of the species Herpestes auropunctatus; of the species of so-called "flying foxes" or fruit bats of the genus Pteropus; of the zebra mussel
1. When the commission of an offense defined in this chapter, or some element of an offense, requires a particular culpable mental state, such mental state is ordinarily designated in the statute defining the offense by use of the terms "intentionally," "knowingly," "recklessly" or "criminal negligence," or by use of terms, such as "with intent to defraud" and "knowing it to be false," describing a specific kind of intent or knowledge. When one and only one of such terms appears in a statute defining
1. A person is guilty of aggravated cruelty to animals when, with no justifiable purpose, he or she intentionally kills or intentionally causes serious physical injury to a companion animal with aggravated cruelty. For purposes of this section, "aggravated cruelty" shall mean conduct which: (i) is intended to cause extreme physical pain; or (ii) is done or carried out in an especially depraved or sadistic manner. 2. Nothing contained in this section shall be construed to prohibit or interfere in
1. A person who wilfully violates or refuses or omits to comply with any lawful order or regulation prescribed by any local board of health or local health officer, is guilty of a misdemeanor; except, however, that where such order or regulation applies to a tenant with respect to his own dwelling unit or to an owner occupied one or two family dwelling, such person is guilty of an offense for the first violation punishable by a fine not to exceed fifty dollars and for a second or subsequent violation
1. For purposes of this section: (a) "Physical condition" shall include any special medical needs of a dog due to disease, illness, injury, age or breed about which the owner or person with custody or control of the dog should reasonably be aware. (b) "Inclement weather" shall mean weather conditions that are likely to adversely affect the health or safety of the dog, including but not limited to rain, sleet, ice, snow, wind, or extreme heat and cold. (c) "Dogs that are left outdoors" shall mean
The doing of anything prohibited by this chapter shall be evidence of the violation of the provisions of this chapter relating to the thing so prohibited, and the omission to do anything directed to be done shall be evidence of a violation of the provisions of the chapter relative to the thing so directed to be done. The intent of any person doing or omitting to do any such act is immaterial in any prosecution for a violation of the provisions of this chapter. Any person who suffers, permits or allows
1. A person shall not confine a companion animal in a motor vehicle in extreme heat or cold without proper ventilation or other protection from such extreme temperatures where such confinement places the companion animal in imminent danger of death or serious physical injury due to exposure to such extreme heat or cold. 2. Where the operator of such a vehicle cannot be promptly located, a police officer, peace officer, peace officer acting as an agent of a duly incorporated humane society, emergency