In Bing, the New York Court of Appeals held that a criminal defendant, who had been represented by counsel on prior pending unrelated charges, was not deprived of the right to counsel under the State Constitution where, in the absence of counsel, the defendant waived his or her Miranda rights and made statements in response to police questioning on matters unrelated to the prior pending charge.
Finding constitutional prohibition against use of statements taken without notice to defense counsel, buttressing suppression and reversal with discussion of DR 7-104 violation
In Rogers, the New York Court of Appeals held that where an arrestee is represented by counsel on an unrelated charge, and counsel orders the police to cease their questioning, the arrestee may not be questioned further unless counsel is present. 48 N.Y.2d at 169.
Explaining that the right to counsel in New York is more robust under the State Constitution than the rights guaranteed by the Sixth Amendment to the United States Constitution
Imposing on police the burden of determining whether representation by counsel continued where a suspect was interviewed a second time after three years had elapsed and noting that "[t]he State right to counsel is a cherished principle, rooted in this State's prerevolutionary constitutional law and developed independent of its Federal counterpart"
Holding that police officer who questioned defendant in custody about an unrelated matter was required to make a reasonable inquiry concerning the defendant's representational status before commencing interrogation, where the circumstances, such as fact that bail had been set, indicated that there was a probable likelihood that an attorney had entered the custodial matter, and the accused was actually represented on the custodial charge
In People v Bongarzone (69 NY2d 892 [1987]), the Court held that two sets of charges like this, each relevant on a trial of the other, once consolidated by the People in an indictment, may not be severed on motion of the defendant.
In People v. Arthur, 22 N.Y.2d 325, 292 N.Y.S.2d 663, 239 N.E.2d 537 (1968), the New York Court of Appeals indicated that it would limit the De Renzzio rule to situations where "trial counsel not only failed to object to the introduction of * * * [the] statements but * * * strategically used them in defense of his client."
In Cohen, the defendant was represented by counsel on a burglary/weapons theft charge and the police knew that he was represented by counsel on this matter.