49 Cited authorities

  1. Misicki v. Caradonna

    2009 N.Y. Slip Op. 3764 (N.Y. 2009)   Cited 381 times
    Holding that 12 N.Y.C.R.R. § 23-9.2 imposes a nondelegable duty to make "necessary repairs or replacement" upon discovery of any unsafe condition
  2. Riley v. County of Broome

    95 N.Y.2d 455 (N.Y. 2000)   Cited 312 times
    Noting that though legislative history can be relevant when interpreting New York statutes, "the words of the statute are the best evidence of the Legislature's intent," and "[a]s a general rule, unambiguous language of a statute is alone determinative"
  3. Saarinen v. Kerr

    84 N.Y.2d 494 (N.Y. 1994)   Cited 349 times   2 Legal Analyses
    Holding that a standard of "reckless disregard for the safety of others" required evidence that defendant had engaged in conduct "of an unreasonable character in disregard of a known or obvious risk that was so great as to make it highly probable that harm would follow and ha[d] done so with conscious indifference to the outcome"
  4. Patrolmen's Benevolent Ass'n v. City of New York

    41 N.Y.2d 205 (N.Y. 1976)   Cited 370 times

    Argued October 12, 1976 Decided December 22, 1976 Appeal from the Appellate Division of the Supreme Court in the First Judicial Department, GEORGE STARKE, J. W. Bernard Richland, Corporation Counsel (James G. Greilsheimer and L. Kevin Sheridan of counsel), New York City, for appellant. Frederick R. Livingston, Jay W. Waks and William C. Zifchak, New York City, for respondent. Louis J. Lefkowitz, Attorney-General (George D. Zuckerman and Samuel A. Hirshowitz of counsel), New York City, for intervenor

  5. Cabrera v. Rodriguez

    72 A.D.3d 553 (N.Y. App. Div. 2010)   Cited 141 times
    In Cabrera v. Rodriguez, 72 A.D.3d 553 (1st Dept. 2010), the Appellate Division, First Department, affirmed it's holding that the assertion that a rear end collision with a stopped or stopping vehicle, even with allegations of non-functioning lights on the lead vehicle, is prima facie establishment of liability in rear-end collision cases.
  6. Campbell v. City of Elmira

    84 N.Y.2d 505 (N.Y. 1994)   Cited 157 times
    In Campbell v. City of Elmira, 84 N.Y.2d 505, 620 N.Y.S.2d 302, 644 N.E.2d 993 (1994), the court found that there were sharply disputed facts and inferences that justified upholding a jury's finding of recklessness, thus distinguishing Saarinen. Campbell, 620 N YS.2d at 306-07, 644 N.E.2d at 997-98.
  7. Kabir v. County of Monroe

    16 N.Y.3d 217 (N.Y. 2011)   Cited 89 times   1 Legal Analyses
    Finding rear-end collision is prima facie evidence of negligence of the operator of the rear vehicle under state law
  8. Francisco v. Schoepfer

    30 A.D.3d 275 (N.Y. App. Div. 2006)   Cited 88 times

    7432. June 20, 2006. Order, Supreme Court, New York County (Milton A. Tingling, J.), entered June 23, 2005, which, to the extent appealed from, denied defendant Kim Joonsuk's motion for summary judgment dismissing the complaint and all cross claims against him, unanimously reversed, on the law, without costs, and the motion granted. The Clerk is directed to enter judgment in favor of defendant Kim Joonsuk dismissing the complaint and all cross claims against him. Sweetbaum Sweetbaum, Lake Success

  9. Criscione v. City of New York

    97 N.Y.2d 152 (N.Y. 2001)   Cited 99 times
    In Criscione, a police officer was involved in a car accident while responding to a dispatch call to investigate a family dispute.
  10. Bingham v. New York City Transit Auth.

    99 N.Y.2d 355 (N.Y. 2003)   Cited 60 times

    13 Argued January 14, 2003. Decided February 20, 2003. APPEAL, by permission of the Court of Appeals, from an order of the Appellate Division of the Supreme Court in the First Judicial Department, entered October 30, 2001, which affirmed an order of the Supreme Court (Robert Lippmann, J.), entered in New York County, granting a motion by defendants for summary judgment dismissing the complaint. Constantine P. Kokkoris, for appellant. Lawrence Heisler, for respondents. Judges Smith, Ciparick, Wesley

  11. Section 1104 - Authorized emergency vehicles

    N.Y. Veh. & Traf. Law § 1104   Cited 364 times

    (a) The driver of an authorized emergency vehicle, when involved in an emergency operation, may exercise the privileges set forth in this section, but subject to the conditions herein stated. (b) The driver of an authorized emergency vehicle may: 1. Stop, stand or park irrespective of the provisions of this title; 2. Proceed past a steady red signal, a flashing red signal or a stop sign, but only after slowing down as may be necessary for safe operation; 3. Exceed the maximum speed limits so long

  12. Section 1103 - Public officers and employees to obey title; exceptions

    N.Y. Veh. & Traf. Law § 1103   Cited 131 times

    (a) The provisions of this title applicable to the drivers of vehicles upon the highways shall apply to drivers of all vehicles owned or operated by the United States, this state, or any county, city, town, district, or any other political subdivision of the state, except as provided in this section and subject to such specific exceptions as are set forth in this title with reference to authorized emergency vehicles. (b) Unless specifically made applicable, the provisions of this title, except the

  13. Section 114-B - Emergency operation

    N.Y. Veh. & Traf. Law § 114-B   Cited 86 times

    The operation, or parking, of an authorized emergency vehicle, when such vehicle is engaged in transporting a sick or injured person, transporting prisoners, delivering blood or blood products in a situation involving an imminent health risk, pursuing an actual or suspected violator of the law, or responding to, or working or assisting at the scene of an accident, disaster, police call, alarm of fire, actual or potential release of hazardous materials or other emergency. Emergency operation shall