People v. Kalin

In Kalin, 12 N.Y.3d 225, 878 N.Y.S.2d 653, 906 N.E.2d 381, the Court of Appeals examined an information which had charged the defendant with, among other things, criminal possession of a controlled substance in the seventh degree for the possession of nine plastic bags of heroin.

People v. Henderson

In People v. Henderson (92 NY2d 677, 680), the Court of Appeals indicated that a jury could "certainly" infer that a victim felt substantial pain where an information recited that "defendant, together with another and in an attempt to steal the victim's property, attempted to pull the victim from his motor scooter and kicked him in the legs, causing him to suffer contusions and swelling" (id.).

People v. Jones

Dismissing an information alleging disorderly conduct because there was no indication that the defendant "when he stood in the middle of the sidewalk . . . had the intent to or recklessly created a risk of causing 'public inconvenience, annoyance or alarm'"

People v. McRay

Recognizing that a glassine envelope is a "'telltale sign of heroin'" and that passing one in a "furtive or evasive" manner provides probable cause to arrest (quoting People v. Alexander, 333 N.E.2d 157, 158 (N.Y. 1975))

Conrad v. Judson

People v. Keizer

In Keizer, we held that, where there was a jurisdictionally sufficient accusatory instrument, a claim of error based on a guilty plea in violation of CPL 220.10 to a crime that is of a lesser grade, but not a lesser included offense (CPL 1.20[37]) of a crime charged in the accusatory instrument was forfeited by the guilty plea (see 100 N.Y.2d at 119, 760 N.Y.S.2d 720, 790 N.E.2d 1149).

People v. Maldonado

In People v Maldonado (86 N.Y.2d 631), this Court upheld a probable cause determination based on an undercover officer's radio call reporting a "positive buy" on the ground that since the arresting officer "interpreted `positive buy' to mean that narcotics had been sold," the "arresting officer could reasonably believe * * * that defendant had sold narcotics to the undercover" (id., at 636).

People v. Deegan

In People v Deegan (69 N.Y.2d 976, 978-979, supra) and People v Jennings (69 N.Y.2d 103, 114-115, supra), we stated that the "moral certainty" standard is only for the trier of fact and that the proper measure of legal sufficiency is whether the facts and the inferences that flow therefrom support a finding for the People on every element of the charged crime.

People v. Reisman

In People v Reisman (29 N.Y.2d 278, 285), the Court of Appeals noted that "[k]nowledge, of course, may be shown circumstantially by conduct or directly by admission" and, generally, "possession suffices to permit the inference that the possessor knows what he possesses, especially, but not exclusively, if it is in his hands, on his person, in his vehicle, or on his premises" (see also, People v Tirado, 47 A.D.2d 193, affd 38 N.Y.2d 955).

People v. Suber

In People v. Suber, 19 NY3d 247, 252, 946 N.Y.S.2d 552 (2012), the Court of Appeals held that “CPL Sec. 100.40(1) does not mandate corroboration of an admission in an information.