Finding that where "a plaintiff has met its burden of proving deliberate deception in the context of a two-player market, it is appropriate to utilize a presumption of injury," and distinguishing from non-comparative advertising cases, where "the injury 'accrues equally to all competitors; none is more likely to suffer from the offending broadcasts than any other,'" meaning that a plaintiff must offer "'some indication of actual injury and causation' . . . to ensure that plaintiff's injury is not speculative"
Holding that, where it is unclear whether a motion is made under rule 50(b) or rule 59, and the party seeking relief failed to properly preserve arguments by a mid-trial motion for judgment as a matter of law under rule 50, "[t]hat leaves only the possibility of Rule 50 relief"
Holding that "this Court is bound to disregard any errors, including the admission of expert testimony, that do not affect the substantial rights of the parties"
Holding that “[i]n light § 5001's mandatory nature,” even a failure to request such interest in the complaint or during trial does not constitute a waiver of the right to prejudgment interest under the statute
Holding that where it is impossible to appraise damages with certainty, the Surrogate "had the right to resort to reasonable conjectures and probable estimates and to make the best approximation possible through the exercise of good judgment and common sense in arriving at that amount"
Holding that lost profit estimates for CD-ROM sales were too speculative when the CD-ROM database technology had never been implemented in the trademark field
Holding "absent an agreement establishing a fixed duration, an employment relationship is presumed to be a hiring at will, terminable at any time by either party."