Rosario Perez Alvarez v. Medicredit, Inc.

MOTION for Summary Judgment

W.D. Tex.January 10, 2018

1 UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT WESTERN DISTRICT OF TEXAS § ROSARIO PEREZ ALVAREZ, § § Plaintiff, § Case No. 5:17-cv-00195-DAE § v. § § MEDICREDIT, INC., § § Defendant. § § PLAINTIFF’S MOTION FOR PARTIAL SUMMARY JUDGMENT Plaintiff, Rosario Perez Alvarez, through undersigned counsel, submits the following motion for partial summary judgment. Alvarez seeks summary judgment in whole or in part as to all three counts of the First Amended Complaint (Docket Entry No. 23), as follows: 1. Count I of the First Amended Complaint (Fair Debt Collection Practices Act Section 806, 15 U.S.C. §§ 1692d and 1692d(5)): Partial summary judgment, as to calls made after May 31, 2016. 2. Count II of the First Amended Complaint (Telephone Consumer Protection Act, 47 U.S.C. § 227): Partial summary judgment, as to each call made after May 31, 2016. 3. Count III of the First Amended Complaint (Fair Debt Collection Practices Act Section 805, 15 U.S.C. §§ 1692(a)(2) and 1692(c): Total summary judgment. In support of this motion, Alvarez submits the following: Case 5:17-cv-00195-DAE Document 32 Filed 01/10/18 Page 1 of 15 2 I. Introduction and background In May 2016, Rosario Perez Alvarez had had enough with her phone constantly ringing. For months, she had been receiving calls to her cellular telephone from Medicredit asking her to pay up for some medical procedures. See SUMF at Paragraph 4. No matter what she did, this company kept calling her. See id. So in May 2016, she reached out for legal help, and on May 25, the undersigned counsel sent a letter of representation to Medicredit informing it that the firm represented Alvarez. See SUMF at Paragraph 5. Medicredit received this letter on May 31, 2016. See SUMF at Paragraph 8. The letter of representation told Medicredit that Alvarez revoked any preexisting consent to call her cellular telephone. See SUMF at Paragraph 6. It also gave Medicredit clear instructions on how to contact Alvarez about a debt: namely, not to, about any debt, except through counsel: THIS LETTER ALSO SERVES AS NOTICE TO IMMEDIATELY CEASE AND DESIST CONTACTING OUR CLIENT with respect to the collection or attempted collection of any debt, pursuant to the federal Fair Debt Collection Practices Act, 15 U.S.C. §§ 1692c(a)(2) and 1692c(c), et seq. There to be absolutely no calls, letters, or other communications whatsoever by any debt collector. Do not contact our client at home, at work, by cellular phone, by mail or otherwise. See SUMF at Paragraph 7. (emphasis in original). After sending this letter, undersigned counsel began preparing Alvarez’s case for possible litigation. However, despite this warning, Medicredit continued to place calls to Alvarez’s cellular telephone. See SUMF at Paragraph 9. From June through September 2016, Medicredit placed 33 calls to Alvarez’s cellular telephone. See id. Each of these calls was placed with the Noble predictive dialer. See SUMF at Paragraph 12. Case 5:17-cv-00195-DAE Document 32 Filed 01/10/18 Page 2 of 15 3 These calls are indisputable violations of both the Fair Debt Collection Practices Act, 15 U.S.C. §§ 1692a-1692o, and the Telephone Consumer Protection Act, 47 U.S.C. § 227. Each call violated Alvarez’s clear request that all communications between the parties occur through counsel, a request Medicredit indisputably received. Each call after May 31, 2016 is therefore a violation of the TCPA. Moreover, because the letter put Medicredit on notice that Alvarez was represented, the continued pattern of calling is both a per-se violation of the FDCPA and an inarguable demonstration of Medicredit’s intent to harass, abuse, and oppress Alvarez into paying the alleged debt. The Court must therefore grant Alvarez’s motion for partial summary judgment. II. Statement of Undisputed Material Facts 1. On April 5, 2015, Plaintiff Rosario Perez Alvarez provided her cellular telephone number ending in 1142 to Santa Rosa Alon Emergency Center as part of seeking treatment. See Exhibit A. 2. On January 11, 2016, Alvarez provided her cellular telephone number ending in 1142 to Methodist Hospital as part of seeking treatment. See Exhibit B. 3. In February 2016, Santa Rosa Alon placed Alvarez’s account with Medicredit for collections. See Exhibit C at 2. Medicredit began calling her at her number ending in 1142 later that month. See id. Medicredit was aware that this number was a cellular telephone. See id. at 1. 4. From February through May 2016, Medicredit placed numerous telephone calls to Alvarez’s cellular telephone number ending in 1142. See Exhibit D at 1-3. 5. Alvarez sought legal help in stopping Medicredit’s calls, and on May 25, 2016, the undersigned counsel sent Medicredit a letter of representation. See Exhibit E. 6. The letter of representation told Medicredit that Alvarez revoked any preexisting consent to call her cellular telephone. See id. Case 5:17-cv-00195-DAE Document 32 Filed 01/10/18 Page 3 of 15 4 7. The letter of representation contained explicit language that Medicredit was not to contact Alvarez on any debt for any reason: THIS LETTER ALSO SERVES AS NOTICE TO IMMEDIATELY CEASE AND DESIST CONTACTING OUR CLIENT with respect to the collection or attempted collection of any debt, pursuant to the federal Fair Debt Collection Practices Act, 15 U.S.C. §§ 1692c(a)(2) and 1692c(c), et seq. There to be absolutely no calls, letters, or other communications whatsoever by any debt collector. Do not contact our client at home, at work, by cellular phone, by mail or otherwise. See id. (emphasis in original). 8. Medicredit received this letter on May 31, 2016. See Exhibit F and Exhibit G at 20:22 to 21:4; also compare Docket Entry No. 28, Amended Complaint at Paragraph 26, and Docket Entry No. 30, Answer to Amended Complaint, at Paragraph 26. 9. Despite this warning, Medicredit placed a further 33 calls to Alvarez after the letter was received. See Exhibit D at 4-5. 10. When Medicredit receives correspondence from or about a consumer, it is supposed to be scanned and forwarded to the appropriate location in the organization, which would lead to the application of a notation to the account to cease communications. See Exhibit G at 19:7 to 26:16. 11. The letter received on May 31, 2016 was never scanned or forwarded to the appropriate location. See id. at 26:9 to 26:17 12. Every call Medicredit made to Alvarez’s number was made with the Noble dialer in its predictive or IVR mode. See id. 57:9 to 57:13 The IVR mode is a form of the predictive mode. See id. at 14:22 to 15:10. Neither mode requires human intervention to dial. See id. at 11:21 to 13: 21. Case 5:17-cv-00195-DAE Document 32 Filed 01/10/18 Page 4 of 15 5 13. In July 2016, Methodist Hospital placed Alvarez’s account with Medicredit for collections. See Exhibit H at 1. Medicredit began calling her on that account later that month. See id. III. Standard of review Summary judgment is proper where “the movant shows that there is no genuine dispute as to any material fact and the movant is entitled to judgment as a matter of law.” Fed. R. Civ. P. 56(a). In deciding whether a dispute of material fact exists or is genuine, the court must believe the evidence of the party not seeking summary judgment and draw all inferences from the evidence in the non-moving party’s favor. Anderson v. Liberty Lobby, Inc., 477 U.S. 242, 255 (1986)). Therefore, a party seeking summary judgment must show by reference to the pleadings, admissions, answers to interrogatories, depositions, and affidavits that there are no material facts truly in dispute in the case. See Celotex Corp. v. Catrett, 477 U.S. 317, 323 (1986). Only after the moving party satisfies this initial burden must the non-moving party present specific evidence that there remains a genuine issue for trial. See Anderson, 477 U.S. at 256. At summary judgment, the opposing the motion for summary judgment is entitled to have their allegations taken as true, to receive the benefit of the doubt when their assertions conflict with those of the movant and to have inferences from the underlying facts drawn in their favor. See Big Apple BMW, Inc. v. BMW of North America, Inc., 974 F. 2d 1358, 1362-63 (3d Cir. 1992), cert. denied, 507 U.S. 912 (1993). IV. Argument A. There is no genuine issue of material fact that Medicredit contacted Alvarez after it knew she was represented by counsel and wished Medicredit to stop calling The FDCPA exists “to eliminate abusive debt collection practices, to ensure that debt collectors who abstain from such practices are not competitively disadvantaged, and to promote Case 5:17-cv-00195-DAE Document 32 Filed 01/10/18 Page 5 of 15 6 consistent state action to protect consumers.” See Jerman v. Carlisle, McNelli, Rini, Kramer & Ulrich LPA, 559 U.S. 753, 577 (2010). Because Congress perceived the problem of abusive debt collection practices to be widespread, it deliberately made the FDCPA “an extraordinarily broad statute.” See Frey v. Gangwish, 970 F.2d 1516, 1521 (6th Cir. 1992). Therefore, the FDCPA “must be enforced as written, even when eminently sensible exceptions are proposed in the face of an innocent and/or de minimis violation.” See Williams v. Javitch, Block & Rathbone, LLP, 480 F.Supp. 2d 1016, 1021 (S.D. Ohio 2007), citing Frey, 970 F.2d at 1521. Moreover, as a remedial statute, the FDCPA must be construed liberally in favor of the consumer. See Sprinkle v. SB&C Ltd., 472 F.Supp. 2d 1235 (W.D. Wash. 2006); see also Clark v. Capital Credit & Collection Services, Inc., 460 F. 3d 1162 (9th Cir. 2006) (the remedial nature of the FDCPA requires that courts interpret it liberally); and Johnson v. Riddle, 305 F. 3d 1107 (10th Cir. 2002) (“Because the FDCPA … is a remedial statute, it should be construed liberally in favor of the consumer”). The FDCPA imposes a simple duty on debt collectors who receive notice that a consumer it has been contacting about a debt has retained counsel: stop contacting that consumer about that debt until further notice. See 15 U.S.C. § 1692c(a)(2). So long as the debt collector knows or can readily ascertain the attorney’s name and address, the only reason a debt collector should contact a represented consumer is if the attorney has permitted it to do so. See id. Similarly, a debt collector who receives written notice that a consumer no longer wishes to be contacted may only make direct contact with the consumer to advise the consumer that it is no longer pursuing the consumer or that it may or will pursue remedies to collect the debt. See 15 U.S.C. § 1692c(c). The parties do not genuinely dispute that when Medicredit called Alvarez on her cellular telephone, it was acting as a debt collector and Alvarez was a consumer. Medicredit’s calls to Alvarez were about debts owed to medical providers for medical services Alvarez received; these Case 5:17-cv-00195-DAE Document 32 Filed 01/10/18 Page 6 of 15 7 accounts were placed with Medicredit for collection. See SUMF at Paragraphs 3 and 13. There is also no dispute that on May 31, 2016, Medicredit received the letter of representation the undersigned counsel sent six days earlier. See SUMF at Paragraph 8. Plaintiff’s counsel has never sent anything to Medicredit granting it consent to contact Alvarez directly. Medicredit’s violation of the FDCPA is therefore indisputable. Medicredit may claim that the calls made after it received the letter did not relate to the accounts it was trying to collect before it received this letter. It is true that when a debt collector knows a consumer is represented about one debt, but has no knowledge that the consumer is represented regarding other debts, the collector may continue to contact the consumer about those other debts. See 15 U.S.C. § 1692c(a)(2); see also Graziano v. Harrison, 950 F.2d 107, 113 (3d Cir. 1991). However, that defense does not apply to Medicredit. The letter of representation does not limit the scope of representation to any account. See Exhibit E. Rather, it states that Medicredit should not contact Alvarez “for any reason” and notices Medicredit to cease and desist contacting Alvarez “with respect to the collection or attempted collection of any debt.” See SUMF at Paragraph 7 (emphasis added). It explicitly instructs Medicredit never to contact Alvarez at all by telephone, by mail, at home, or at work, and specifically advises Medicredit not to attempt to communicate with Alvarez directly. See id. Thus even if the calls after May 31 related to a new account, Medicredit was on notice that counsel represented Alvarez about that account as well and that no communications should be made on that account either. Medicredit also claims that it is entitled to an affirmative defense of bona-fide error. To be entitled to this defense, a debt collector must show by a preponderance of the evidence that (1) the violation alleged was unintentional, (2) the violation alleged arose from bona-fide error, and (3) Case 5:17-cv-00195-DAE Document 32 Filed 01/10/18 Page 7 of 15 8 the bona-fide error occurred despite procedures reasonably adapted to avoid the violation in question. See 15 U.S.C. 1692k(c); see also Beck v. Maximus, Inc, 457 F.3d 291, 297-98 (3d Cir. 2006) (clarifying the discrete elements the collector must prove to be entitled to the defense). Medicredit has not supplied sufficient evidence to support this defense. The only evidence it has supplied about how it handled the letter, or about any of its policies and procedures, is the deposition testimony of its corporate representative Donald Wright. Mr. Wright testified that because it was marked to the attention of the legal department, the Medicredit employee who signed for the letter of representation should have scanned it and forwarded it to Medicredit’s support-services team and counsel. See SUMF at Paragraph 10 and Exhibit G at 23:2 to 24:1. Had the letter been forwarded, Mr. Wright said, the accounts on file would be marked such that the dialer would not make calls to Alvarez. See SUMF at Paragraph 10 and Exhibit G at 24:5 to 26:3. However, the letter was never forwarded, and so that protocol was never used. See SUMF at Paragraph 11 and Exhibit G at 24:2 to 24:4 and 26:4 to 26:17. Nowhere in the record is there any indication of how Medicredit makes sure that employees actually scan and send correspondence marked attention to the legal department to the right places within the organization. Nor is there anything in the record about how Medicredit makes sure that the system will prevent contact with a consumer as to accounts for which the consumer is represented placed with Medicredit after a letter of representation is received. Indeed, notably, Medicredit refused to supply any information about its policies and procedures for revocation of consent or handling of debt collection despite Alvarez specifically asking for such information in discovery. In summary, Medicredit was on notice that counsel represented Alvarez after May 31, 2016. The letter of representation unequivocally told Medicredit Alvarez was represented as to all Case 5:17-cv-00195-DAE Document 32 Filed 01/10/18 Page 8 of 15 9 debts and that it should cease all direct communication with her at once. Medicredit did not do so, and thus Alvarez is entitled to summary judgment on the whole of Count III of the First Amended Complaint. B. There is no genuine issue of material fact that Medicredit called Alvarez’s cellular telephone with an automatic telephone dialing system without her prior express consent each time it called her after May 31, 2016 Medicredit is also liable to Alvarez under the TCPA. To make a prima facie claim under the TCPA, Alvarez needs only show three elements: first, that Medicredit called a cellular telephone; second, that she was the “called party” for the calls Medicredit made to that telephone; and third, that these calls were made with an automatic telephone dialing system (ATDS) or with a pre-recorded or artificially-generated voice. See Mims v. Arrow Fin. Servs., LLC, 565 U.S, 368, 373-74 (2012) (citing 47 U.S.C. § 227(b)(1)(A)(iii)). Her damages are $500 per telephone call, which the Court may in its discretion enhance to up to $1,500 if it further finds that Medicredit willfully or knowingly violated the statute or the regulations the FCC has made under the statute. See id. A TCPA plaintiff does not need to make any further showings to demonstrate a prima facie claim; other points at issue, including prior express consent, are affirmative defenses that the defendant bears the burden of proving. See, e.g., Levy v. Receivables Performance Mgmt., 972 F.Supp. 2d 409, 422 (E.D.N.Y. 2013) (citing 47 U.S.C. §227(b)(1)(A)(iii)). The parties do not genuinely dispute that Medicredit called Alvarez on her cellular telephone with the number ending in 1142. Medicredit’s own records establish that this number was a cellular number associated with Alvarez on her accounts. See SUMF at Paragraph 3. Moreover, each call placed to that number was placed by a dialer in some kind of predictive mode. See SUMF at Paragraph 12. When dialing in the predictive mode, Medicredit’s Noble dialer automatically places calls to numbers derived from a stored list without a worker’s intervention. Case 5:17-cv-00195-DAE Document 32 Filed 01/10/18 Page 9 of 15 10 See id. This matches the description of a predictive dialer found in Federal Communications Commission guidance; such dialers are ATDSes under the TCPA because they can place calls to a phone without human intervention. See, e.g., Gragg v. Orange Cab Co., 995 F. Supp. 2d 1189, 1193 (W.D. Wash. 2014), (following FCC 2008 and 2012 findings and case law to hold “….definition of an ATDS now includes ‘predictive dialers’ which dial without human intervention from preprogrammed lists rather than generate numbers randomly or sequentially.”); see also Meyer v. Portfolio Recovery Associates, 707 F.3d 1036, 1043 (9th Cir. 2012) (citing In re Rules and Regulations Implementing the Tel. Consumer Protect. Act of 1991, 18 FCC Rcd. 14- 014, 140931-14093 (July 3, 2003) (2003 FCC Order). Alvarez’s prima facie cause of action is therefore established. Medicredit claims that it had prior express consent to call Alvarez using an ATDS. Without addressing revocation before May 31, 2016, this is clearly not true after May 31, 2016. The letter of representation clearly states that Alvarez revokes any preexisting consent to call her cellular telephone. See SUMF at Paragraph 7. It further instructs Medicredit not to call Alvarez for any debt. See id. This clearly constitutes a valid revocation of any prior consent to call. Under the TCPA, a called party may revoke consent to be called at any time for any reason. Gager v. Dell Fin. Servs., LLC, 727 F.3d 265, 271, 274; In re Rules and Regulations Implementing the Telephone Consumer Protection Act of 1991, 30 F.C.C. Rcd. 7961, 7990-91, 7993, 7996 (2015) (2015 FCC Order). This right is rooted in three interrelated sources: the common law of torts, the FCC’s regulations, and the remedial purposes of the TCPA. Gager, 727 F.3d at 270-71. At common law, while a party could consent to an action that would otherwise be a violation of his rights, that consent could be revoked at any time just by giving the counterparty reason to know the party no longer agrees to that action. Id. Courts have found that this accorded with the purpose Case 5:17-cv-00195-DAE Document 32 Filed 01/10/18 Page 10 of 15 11 of the TCPA—protecting consumers from the invasion of privacy and disruption automated calls represent. Id. at 271. Finally, even before its explicit statement of a right to revoke in 2015, the FCC, which is charged with the enforcement and interpretation of the TCPA, had long given implicit recognition to the right to revoke. See, e.g. In re Rules and Regulations Implementing the Telephone Consumer Protection Act of 1991 (SoundBite Communications, Inc.), 27 F.C.C. Rcd. 15391, 15397-98 (Nov. 29, 2012) (discussing requirements for text messages to consumers requesting confirmation of revocation), and In re Rules and Regulations Implementing the Telephone Consumer Protection Act of 1991, 23 F.C.C. Rcd. 559, 564-65 (January 4, 2008) (generally). The only limitation on the consumer’s right of revocation is that the consumer has to make his revocation in a manner reasonably calculated to ensure that the caller understands is no longer willing to consider being contacted. See Gager, 727 F.3d at 271-72, and 2015 FCC Order, 30 F.C.C. Rcd. at 7996, 7998. A written letter of representation from an attorney explicitly stating that consent to call is revoked and demanding that the caller immediately cease all communications with the consumer should meet this standard. Compare Gager, 727 F.3d at 267 (consumer wrote caller a letter asking calls to stop); see also Schweitzer v. Comenity Bank, 866 F.3d 1273, 1278 (11th Cir. 2017) and Van Patten v. Vertical Fitness Group, LLC, 847 F.3d 1037, 1048 (9th Cir. 2017) (both holding that even somewhat equivocal oral statements may be effective to revoke consent). Medicredit may argue that because it started calling about a new account that was placed with it in July 2016, the letter of representation did not effectively revoke consent to call for calls placed after that date. It may claim that since the new account was only placed with it in July, a Case 5:17-cv-00195-DAE Document 32 Filed 01/10/18 Page 11 of 15 12 letter from May cannot be deemed to have revoked that consent. After all, it may claim, how can Alvarez revoke consent she had not yet granted? However, Alvarez never granted Medicredit consent to call; rather, if she granted consent to call, it was granted to the hospitals at which she was treated. See SUMF at Paragraphs 1-2. In both cases, consent to call was granted before she sent the letter of representation. See id. Medicredit was simply acting on behalf of those hospitals; her revocation came after those consents were granted and should be interpreted as such. Again, the letter of representation unequivocally stated that it applied to all debts. See SUMF at Paragraph 7 Medicredit may also claim it would be technologically or administratively difficult to require callers to keep track of multiple accounts where a consumer has revoked consent. However, this gets the purpose of the TCPA precisely backwards. The TCPA is a remedial statute that should be interpreted broadly to benefit consumers. See Gager 727 F.3d at 271. ATDSes drastically reduce the cost to callers of using the telephone to annoy consumers and intrude on their privacy and seclusion; the TCPA exists to shift some of that cost back to callers. See, e.g., Leyse v. Bank of Am., N.A., 804 F.3d 316, 325-27 (3d Cir. 2015); Susinno v. Work Out World, Inc. 862 F.3d 346, 351-52 (3d Cir. 2017); Satterfield v. Simon & Schuster, Inc., 569 F.3d 946, 954 (9th Cir. 2009); Maryland v. Universal Elections, Inc., 729 F.3d 360, 376-77 (4th Cir. 2013); and Osorio v. State Farm Bank, F.S.B., 746 F.3d 1242, 1258 (11th Cir. 2014). The cost for callers to comply with the TCPA should therefore not be of significant concern to the Court in interpreting the meaning of consent under it: the statute exists to protect consumers against abuses arising from this cost-saving technology. See, e.g., Schweitzer, 866 F.3d at 1277-78 (dismissing callers’ concerns about the cost of complying with partial revocation). Case 5:17-cv-00195-DAE Document 32 Filed 01/10/18 Page 12 of 15 13 Simply put: the letter Medicredit received on May 31, 2016 clearly stated that she revoked consent to call for all debts. Nevertheless, Medicredit make 33 calls to Alvarez’s number after May 31, 2016 with an ATDS—a number Medicredit knew was for Alvarez’s cell phone. Therefore, Alvarez is entitled to partial summary judgment on Count II of the First Amended Complaint as to each of the 33 calls made after May 31, 2016, for the full measure of damages available under the TCPA. C. There is no genuine issue of material fact that Medicredit harassed Alvarez when it called her after May 31 Section 1692d of the FDCPA prohibits debt collectors from engaging in any conduct “the natural consequence of which is to harass, oppress or abuse any person in connection with the collection of a debt.” See 15 U.S.C. §1692d. Section 1692d then sets forth various actions a debt collector may take that constitute a violation of this Section. For example, section 1692d(5) of the FDCPA prohibits debt collectors “[c]ausing a telephone to ring or engaging any person in telephone conversation repeatedly or continuously with intent to annoy, abuse, or harass any person at the called number.” See 15 U.S.C. §1692d(5). There is a near-consensus that a debt collector can violate the statute through sheer call volume, as Section 1692d(5) lists as a violation “causing a telephone to ring or engaging any in person in a telephone conversation repeatedly or continuously with intent to annoy, abuse, or harass any person at the called number.” See § 1692d(5); see also Carr v. NCO Financial Systems, Inc., 2011 WL 6371899, at *2 (E.D. Pa. Dec. 20, 2011); Valentine v. Brock & Scott, PLLC, 2010 WL 1727681, at *4 (D.S.C. April 26, 2010) (holding eleven (11) calls in nineteen (19) days constituted harassment); and Brown v. Hosto & Buchan, PLLC, 748 F.Supp.2d 847, 852 (W.D. Tenn. 2010) (holding seventeen (17) calls in one (1) month constituted harassment). Moreover, when a consumer specifically tells a caller to stop calling, an inference arises that subsequent Case 5:17-cv-00195-DAE Document 32 Filed 01/10/18 Page 13 of 15 14 frequent phone calls were made with intent to harass, as the only reason the collector would have to call at that point would be to annoy the debtor into paying. See, e.g., Gilroy v. Ameriquest Morg. Co., 632 F.Supp. 2d. 132, 136-37 (D.N.H. 2009). In this case, the parties do not dispute that Medicredit placed 33 calls to Alvarez, causing her phone to ring, from June through September 2016. See SUNF at Paragraph 9. They further do not dispute that Alvarez told Medicredit to stop calling through counsel’s letter of representation. See SUMF at Paragraphs 6-7. As established, Medicredit has not produced information about its policies or procedures sufficient to show bona-fide error. See 30b6 and answers to interrogatories. Therefore, Alvarez is entitled to summary judgment on Count I of the First Amended Complaint as to calls made after May 31, 2015. V. Conclusion The facts of this case are clear: Alvarez sent a letter of representation. Medicredit kept calling her anyway. Medicredit has no defense or excuse for its behavior. Thus partial summary judgment must be granted to Alvarez as requested in this motion. Respectfully submitted, Dated: January 10, 2018 By: s/ Amy L. Bennecoff Ginsburg Amy L. Bennecoff Ginsburg, Esq. Kimmel & Silverman, P.C. 30 East Butler Pike Ambler, PA 19002 Phone: 215-540-8888 Facsimile: 877-788-2864 Email: aginsburg@creditlaw.com Case 5:17-cv-00195-DAE Document 32 Filed 01/10/18 Page 14 of 15 15 Certificate of Service The undersigned hereby certifies that on January 10, 2018, a copy of the foregoing document was served electronically via the Court’s Electronic Case Filing (ECF) system: Jacob F. Hollars Spencer Fane, LLP 1700 Lincoln Street, Suite 2000 Denver, CO 80247 303-839-3707 Fax: 303-839-3838 Email: jhollars@spencerfane.com Scott J. Dickenson Spencer Fane, LLP 1 North Brentwood Blvd., Suite 1000 St. Louis, MO 63105 314-863-7773 Fax: 314-862-4656 Email: sdickenson@spencerfane.com LEAD ATTORNEY Shafeeqa Watkins Giarratani Ogletree Deakins Nash Smoak & Stewart, PC 301 Congress Avenue, Suite 1150 Austin, TX 78701 512-344-4723 Fax: 512-344-4701 Email: shafeeqa.giarratani@ogletree.com Tara Moriarty Kumpf Ogletree, Deakins, Nash, Smoak & Stewart, P.C 301 Congress Avenue, Suite 1150 Austin, TX 78701 (512) 344-4700 Fax: (512) 344-4701 Email: tara.kumpf@ogletreedeakins.com Attorneys for Defendant s/ Amy L. Bennecoff Ginsburg Amy L. Bennecoff Ginsburg, Esq. Case 5:17-cv-00195-DAE Document 32 Filed 01/10/18 Page 15 of 15