16 Cited authorities

  1. Gernatt Asphalt v. Sardinia

    87 N.Y.2d 668 (N.Y. 1996)   Cited 266 times   4 Legal Analyses
    In Gernatt —decided after the legislature had codified Frew Run's holding in an amendment to the MLRL's supersession clause—the Town of Sardinia amended its zoning ordinance to eliminate all mining as a permitted use throughout the town.
  2. DJL Restaurant Corp. v. City of New York

    96 N.Y.2d 91 (N.Y. 2001)   Cited 94 times
    Finding separate levels of oversight can coexist when the impact is tangential
  3. Huntley Huntley v. Council of Oakmont

    600 Pa. 207 (Pa. 2009)   Cited 54 times   4 Legal Analyses
    Recognizing that while natural gas may be classified as a mineral under the Municipalities Planning Code, "Pennsylvania common law has applied a rebuttable presumption in the context of a private deed conveyance that the term 'mineral' does not include oil or gas."
  4. Rodgers v. Village of Tarrytown

    302 N.Y. 115 (N.Y. 1951)   Cited 265 times   2 Legal Analyses
    In Rodgers v. Village of Tarrytown (302 N.Y. 115, 124), a charge of illegal 'spot zoning' for the benefit of one owner and the detriment of other owners was dismissed as without substance. It was said that the relevant inquiry is 'whether it was accomplished for the benefit of individual owners rather than pursuant to a comprehensive plan for the general welfare of the community'.
  5. Board of County Commissioners v. Bowen/Edwards Associates, Inc.

    830 P.2d 1045 (Colo. 1992)   Cited 74 times   2 Legal Analyses
    Rejecting implied preemption where the state's interest "is not so patently dominant over a county's interest in land-use control, nor are the respective interests of both the state and the county so irreconcilably in conflict, as to eliminate by necessary implication any prospect for a harmonious application of both regulatory schemes"
  6. Golden v. Planning Bd. of Ramapo

    30 N.Y.2d 359 (N.Y. 1972)   Cited 121 times
    In Matter of Golden v. Planning Bd. (30 N.Y.2d 359, 370-371) the court declared that the delegation of police power, even if couched in the broadest terms, could not be read as conferring the entire police power of the State.
  7. Berenson v. Town of New Castle

    38 N.Y.2d 102 (N.Y. 1975)   Cited 100 times
    In Berenson, the plaintiffs filed a declaratory judgment action attacking the "validity of the [z]oning [o]rdinance of the Town of New Castle in its entirety on the ground that the ordinance exclude[d] multifamily housing from the list of permitted uses."
  8. United States v. Town of Dryden (In re Norse Energy Corp.)

    108 A.D.3d 25 (N.Y. App. Div. 2013)   Cited 20 times   3 Legal Analyses
    Holding that New York state law did not preempt municipal ordinance banning hydrocarbon extraction activities
  9. Robinson Twp. v. Commonwealth

    52 A.3d 463 (Pa. Cmmw. Ct. 2012)   Cited 20 times   5 Legal Analyses
    In Robinson Township, 52 A.3d at 476, this Court considered whether one member of a borough council and one member of a board of supervisors had standing to challenge the constitutionality of a statute that restricted their official actions.
  10. Kurzius v. Upper Brookville

    51 N.Y.2d 338 (N.Y. 1980)   Cited 61 times

    Argued October 6, 1980 Decided November 20, 1980 Appeal from the Appellate Division of the Supreme Court in the Second Judicial Department, DOUGLAS F. YOUNG, J. Joseph L. Tobin, Jr., for appellant. John M. Armentano, George J. Farrell, Jr., and Robert V. Guido for respondents. Gus Bauman for National Association of Home Builders and others, amici curiae. William H. Mathers for Village of Cove Neck, amicus curiae. Edward N. Costikyan and Steven S. Honigman for North Shore Area Mayors Joint Municipal

  11. Section 51 - Liberal construction

    N.Y. Mun. Home Rule Law § 51   Cited 16 times

    This chapter shall be liberally construed. The powers herein granted shall be in addition to all other powers granted to local governments by other provisions of law. A permissive procedure authorized by this chapter shall not be deemed to be exclusive or to prohibit the use of any other procedure authorized by any state statute, charter or local law lawfully adopted, but shall be deemed an alternative thereto. N.Y. Mun. Home Rule Law § 51