5450 January 8, 2002. Order, Supreme Court, New York County (Helen Freedman, J.), entered December 13, 2000, which granted plaintiff's motion for summary judgment in lieu of complaint and directed judgment in its favor in the amount of $1,449,802.85 plus interest, costs and fees, unanimously reversed, on the law, without costs, the motion denied and the matter remanded for further proceedings. MALCOLM T. BROWN for PLAINTIFF-RESPONDENT. JEFFREY L. SOLOMON for DEFENDANT-APPELLANT. Before: Williams

2015-07-22 Michael T. NUGENT, et al., appellants, v. Joseph C. HUBBARD, et al., defendants, Daniel O'Donnell, et al., respondents (and a third-party action). Peter R. Ginsberg Law, LLC, New York, N.Y. (Christopher R. Deubert of counsel), for appellants. Glass & Glass, Babylon, N.Y. (Gerard J. Glass of counsel), for respondents. PETER B. SKELOS Peter R. Ginsberg Law, LLC, New York, N.Y. (Christopher R. Deubert of counsel), for appellants. Glass & Glass, Babylon, N.Y. (Gerard J. Glass of counsel),

7190. April 13, 2006. Order, Supreme Court, New York County (Richard B. Lowe, III, J.), entered February 22, 2005, which, to the extent appealed from, denied plaintiff's motion for summary judgment on its cause of action to recover a deficiency judgment against defendant Gold Lane Corp., affirmed, without costs. Zeichner Ellman Krause LLP, New York (Bruce S. Goodman of counsel), for appellant. Leo Fox, New York, for respondents. Before: Buckley, P.J., Mazzarelli and Catterson, JJ. Concur. Following

July 18, 1990. Appeal from the Supreme Court, Nassau County, John Di Noto, J. Hayt, Hayt Landau (Aaron R. Cahn of counsel), for appellant. Pinks, Brooks, Stern, Rubin Arbeit (Steven G. Pinks of counsel), for respondents. BALLETTA, J. In the instant case, the individual defendants executed guarantees for the payments of loans made to the corporate defendant, which agreements contained language purportedly waiving all rights that they may have had with respect to the collateral securing the loans.

December 8, 1994 Appeal from the Supreme Court, New York County (Beverly Cohen, J.). Plaintiff guarantors' purported waiver of the defense of commercial reasonableness in their guaranties was ineffective (Marine Midland Bank v CMR Indus., 159 A.D.2d 94, 102-107 [2d Dept]; Marine Midland Bank v Kristin Intl., 141 A.D.2d 259 [4th Dept]; see also, Bank of China v Chan, 937 F.2d 780, 785-786 [2d Cir]; contra, First City Div. of Chase Lincoln First Bank v Vitale, 123 A.D.2d 207 [3d Dept]). Summary judgment

June 27, 1991 Appeal from the Supreme Court, Dutchess County (Jiudice, J.). Harvey, J. On December 30, 1983, defendant Heady Electric Company, Inc., by its president, defendant Brian T. Heady (hereinafter Heady), executed a secured note in favor of plaintiff in the amount of $150,000. Heady and his wife, defendant Coral A. Heady, also executed a guarantee agreement in conjunction with this transaction. The proceeds of this note and the others that followed were rolled over and eventually consolidated

(a) Duty of care when secured party in possession. Except as otherwise provided in subsection (d), a secured party shall use reasonable care in the custody and preservation of collateral in the secured party's possession. In the case of chattel paper or an instrument, reasonable care includes taking necessary steps to preserve rights against prior parties unless otherwise agreed. (b) Expenses, risks, duties, and rights when secured party in possession. Except as otherwise provided in subsection (d)

(a) Except as otherwise provided in subsection (b) or elsewhere in this act, the effect of provisions of this act may be varied by agreement. (b) The obligations of good faith, diligence, reasonableness, and care prescribed by this act may not be disclaimed by agreement. The parties, by agreement, may determine the standards by which the performance of those obligations is to be measured if those standards are not manifestly unreasonable. Whenever this act requires an action to be taken within a

(a) Waiver of disposition notification. A debtor or secondary obligor may waive the right to notification of disposition of collateral under Section 9-611 only by an agreement to that effect entered into and authenticated after default. (b) Waiver of mandatory disposition. A debtor may waive the right to require disposition of collateral under Section 9-620 (e) only by an agreement to that effect entered into and authenticated after default. (c) Waiver of redemption right. Except in a consumer-goods

(a) Content. All briefs shall conform to the requirements of section 500.1 of this Part and contain a table of contents, a table of cases and authorities, questions presented, point headings, and, if necessary, a disclosure statement pursuant to section 500.1(f) of this Part. Such disclosure statement shall be included before the table of contents in the party's principal brief. Appellant's brief shall include a statement showing that the court has jurisdiction to entertain the appeal and to review