13 Cited authorities

Dowling v. United States
493 U.S. 342 (1990) Cited 2,117 times 5 Legal Analyses
Holding that admission of evidence must be fundamentally unfair to constitute a due process violation
Yeager v. United States
557 U.S. 110 (2009) Cited 406 times 6 Legal Analyses
Holding that a jury's failure to reach a verdict on some counts is a "nonevent" that cannot, by negative implication, inform the double jeopardy inquiry
United States v. Felix
503 U.S. 378 (1992) Cited 443 times 1 Legal Analyses
Holding that the Government was not foreclosed from prosecuting substantive drug offenses although it had presented evidence of the drug transactions as evidence of another crime
Standefer v. United States
447 U.S. 10 (1980) Cited 560 times 1 Legal Analyses
Holding that an aider and abettor can be convicted of a charge even if the principal is acquitted
People v. Rayam
94 N.Y.2d 557 (N.Y. 2000) Cited 329 times
Argued February 15, 2000 Decided April 11, 2000. Jeffrey I. Richman, and M. Sue Wycoff for appellant. Robert M. Morgenthau, District Attorney of New York County, New York City (Hilary Hassler and Mark Dwyer of counsel), for respondent. LEVINE, J. Based on events that allegedly occurred at the complaining witness's apartment over a 13-hour period from the evening of February 27 to the morning of February 28, 1995, defendant was indicted on single counts of burglary in the first degree and kidnaping
People v. Horne
97 N.Y.2d 404 (N.Y. 2002) Cited 226 times
Holding Apprendi does not apply to restitution because "a sentencing court is not increasing the maximum sentence available when it makes factual determinations affecting restitution but is merely issuing a sentence within the authorized statutory range"
Reed v. State of New York
78 N.Y.2d 1 (N.Y. 1991) Cited 85 times
Finding a reversal of the underlying criminal conviction is not equivalent to a finding of innocence in a subsequent civil proceeding for wrongful imprisonment involving a lower standard than proof beyond a reasonable doubt
People v. Goodman
69 N.Y.2d 32 (N.Y. 1986) Cited 81 times
In People v Goodman (69 N.Y.2d 32, 38), the Court of Appeals noted: "Before collateral estoppel may be applied in a subsequent criminal case, there must be an identity of parties * * * and issues * * * and a prior proceeding resulting in a final and valid judgment * * * in which the party opposing the estoppel had a `full and fair opportunity' to litigate [citations omitted]".
People v. Acevedo
69 N.Y.2d 478 (N.Y. 1987) Cited 72 times
Defining an ultimate fact as a fact "essential to conviction in the second trial"
Wingate v. Wainwright
464 F.2d 209 (5th Cir. 1972) Cited 110 times
Holding that the prejudicial nature of evidence of a habeas petitioner's prior alleged robberies for which he was tried and acquitted was "quickened by" the prosecution's improper argument, "I am asking you not to allow this man to go back on the street and to redo those things that he has done"

The People of the State of New York, Appellant,v.Donald O'Toole, Respondent.

13 Cited authorities

Holding that admission of evidence must be fundamentally unfair to constitute a due process violation

Holding that a jury's failure to reach a verdict on some counts is a "nonevent" that cannot, by negative implication, inform the double jeopardy inquiry

Holding that the Government was not foreclosed from prosecuting substantive drug offenses although it had presented evidence of the drug transactions as evidence of another crime

Holding that an aider and abettor can be convicted of a charge even if the principal is acquitted

Holding Apprendi does not apply to restitution because "a sentencing court is not increasing the maximum sentence available when it makes factual determinations affecting restitution but is merely issuing a sentence within the authorized statutory range"

Finding a reversal of the underlying criminal conviction is not equivalent to a finding of innocence in a subsequent civil proceeding for wrongful imprisonment involving a lower standard than proof beyond a reasonable doubt

Defining an ultimate fact as a fact "essential to conviction in the second trial"

Holding that the prejudicial nature of evidence of a habeas petitioner's prior alleged robberies for which he was tried and acquitted was "quickened by" the prosecution's improper argument, "I am asking you not to allow this man to go back on the street and to redo those things that he has done"