Holding that the preambles at issue — "point of origin," "angle of rotation," and "scale" — did not limit the scope of the digitizer invention but simply described features that necessarily exit in any coordinate system for a digitizer
Holding that a challenger failed to meet its burden of proving a prior art reference anticipated the patent claims when it "failed to provide any testimony or other evidence that would demonstrate to the jury how that reference met the limitations of the claims"
Holding district court did not err by declining to construe the term "melting" as it did "not appear to have required construction, or to depart from its ordinary meaning"
Finding no genuine issue of material fact as to whether prior art was in public use on basis of witness testimony, documentary evidence, patentee's admissions
Holding that the term "pumping means" in a patent directed to fuel pump assembly technology was not a means-plus-function limitation as the limitation recited not only a pumping means, but its structure, location, and operation
Holding that the district court did not abuse its discretion when it excluded expert testimony that was not included in the expert report because "[a]n expert witness may not testify to subject matter beyond the scope of the witness's expert report unless the failure to include that information in the report was substantially justified or harmless."
Holding that although "an accused infringer cannot defeat a claim of literal infringement or establish invalidity merely by pointing to similarities between an accused product and the prior art, . . . [a litigant may argue] that if a claim term must be broadly interpreted to read on an accused device, then this same broad construction will read on the prior art."
Fed. R. Evid. 602 Cited 3,503 times 13 Legal Analyses
Stating that " witness may testify only if evidence is introduced sufficient to support a finding that the witness has personal knowledge of the matter"