Hanson et al v. Colgate-Palmolive Company et al

MOTION for Summary Judgment

S.D. Ga.September 15, 2017

1 IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT FOR THE SOUTHERN DISTRICT OF GEORGIA BRUNSWICK DIVISION SHARON M. HANSON AND DOUGLAS B. HANSON. PLAINTIFF, VS. COLGATE-PALMOLIVE COMPANY; CYPRUS AMAX MINERALS COMPANY; And JOHN DOES NO. 1-15. DEFENDANTS. ) ) ) ) ) ) ) ) ) ) ) ) ) Civil Action No. 2:16-cv-00034-LGW-RSB DEFENDANT CYPRUS AMAX MINERALS COMPANY’S MOTION FOR SUMMARY JUDGMENT AND MEMORANDUM OF LAW IN SUPPORT Plaintiffs Sharon M. Hanson and Douglas B. Hanson (collectively “Plaintiffs”) claim that Mrs. Hanson developed pleural mesothelioma and ovarian cancer as a result of exposure to cosmetic talc that was allegedly contaminated with asbestos. The cosmetic talc product was manufactured by co-defendant Colgate Palmolive and sold under the Cashmere Bouquet brand name. Plaintiffs claim that Defendant Cyprus Amax Minerals Company (“CAMC”) is a successor to the company that supplied talc to Colgate for use in Cashmere Bouquet. CAMC is entitled to summary judgment for two reasons. First, CAMC never sold talc at any point in time and is not the successor to the company that allegedly sold the talc at issue in this case. Plaintiffs simply sued the wrong company. And second, Plaintiffs cannot prove that the actual talc to which Mrs. Hanson was exposed ever contained asbestos, much less that it was contaminated with any stated frequency or in any particular amount. Consequently, even assuming Plaintiffs’ alleged evidence of contamination were true, Plaintiffs cannot prove anything other than a de minimis and remote possibility that Mrs. Hanson was ever exposed to asbestos from talc sold Case 2:16-cv-00034-LGW-RSB Document 53 Filed 09/15/17 Page 1 of 15 2 by CAMC (or its alleged predecessor), and a mere possibility of asbestos exposure is not sufficient to overcome summary judgment. MEMORANDUM OF LAW IN SUPPORT I. MATERIAL FACTS A. Plaintiffs’ Claims. Plaintiffs allege that Mrs. Hanson was exposed to talc through her use of Cashmere Bouquet between 1961 and 1973, which allegedly led to her development of mesothelioma and ovarian cancer.1 Mrs. Hanson further testified that she used Cashmere Bouquet almost daily from 1962-1970.2 She claims she first understood that Cashmere Bouquet contained asbestos because her attorney told her this.3 Mrs. Hanson states that other than her lawyer no one has told her the Cashmere Bouquet she used may have been contaminated with asbestos.4 None of her doctors told her that her illness was caused by talcum powder usage.5 And none of her doctors told her that her illness was caused by Cashmere Bouquet.6 Further, Plaintiffs do not have any of the actual containers of Cashmere Bouquet from which they allege exposure.7 Mrs. Hanson was diagnosed with mesothelioma in 2009.8 B. CAMC Never Sold Talc. 1 Plaintiffs’ Complaint at ¶¶ 1-2, 15, Ex. 1; see also April 27, 2016 Deposition of Sharon Hanson (Vol. I) (“Hanson Dep. Vol. I”) at 104:14-20; 105:14-20, Ex. 2. 2 Hanson Dep. Vol. I at 106:4-9. 3 Id. at 151:25-152:18. 4 Id. at 54:5 – 55:7. 5 Id. at 55:8-21. 6 Id. 55:22 – 56:2. 7 See Plaintiffs’ Response to Request No. 47 in Colgate Palmolive’s First Request for Production of Documents to Plaintiffs, Ex. 3. 8 April 28, 2016 Deposition of Sharon Hanson (Vol. II) at 73:20-23, Ex. 4. Case 2:16-cv-00034-LGW-RSB Document 53 Filed 09/15/17 Page 2 of 15 3 CAMC has never sold talc.9 The Complaint does not contain any allegations that the talc in Cashmere Bouquet was supplied by CAMC.10 CAMC has no records that it supplied the talc used to make Cashmere Bouquet.11 Mrs. Hanson only used Cashmere Bouquet from 1961 to 1973.12 Before 1979, Colgate purchased its talc from Charlies Mathieu, a company completely unrelated to CAMC.13 C. CAMC’s Corporate History. Plaintiffs’ Complaint states that CAMC is liable individually, doing business as, and as successor to Sierra Talc Company and United Talc Company.14 However, despite Plaintiffs’ allegations, there is no evidence that Sierra Talc or United Talc sold talc to Colgate for Cashmere Bouquet. As stated above, prior to 1979, Colgate purchased talc for Cashmere Bouquet from Charles Mathieu, a completely different company from CAMC.15 Cyprus Mines Corporation acquired the assets of Sierra Talc Company and United Clay Mines in approximately 1964.16 In approximately 1965, Sierra Talc Company and United Clay Mines were combined and renamed United Sierra Division of Cyprus Mines Corporation.17 In 1974, the United Sierra division of Cyprus Mines Corporation was renamed Cyprus Industrial Minerals Company.18 Cyprus Industrial Minerals Company, a division of Cyprus Mines Corporation, mined, sold, and distributed talc to various sophisticated third-party manufacturers at the same time that 9 ¶9 to Affidavit of Patrick Downey in Support of CAMC's Motion for Summary Judgment (“Downey Aff.”), Ex. 5. 10 See generally Plaintiffs’ Complaint. 11 ¶2 to Downey Aff. 12 See Hanson Dep. Vol I at 104:14-20; 105:14-20. 13 See Colgate-Palmolive Company’s Response No. 3 to Plaintiffs’ First Interrogatories (“Colgate Reponse”), Ex. 6. 14 See generally Plaintiff’s Complaint. 15 Colgate Response. 16 ¶3 to Downey Aff. 17 Id. 18 Id. Case 2:16-cv-00034-LGW-RSB Document 53 Filed 09/15/17 Page 3 of 15 4 Charles Mathieu was doing business with Colgate.19 Cyprus Industrial Minerals Company did not sell talc to Colgate prior to 1979.20 In 1992, Cyprus Mines Corporation and Cyprus Minerals Company created Cyprus Talc Corporation and transferred its talc business to that entity.21 On June 5, 1992, RTZ America, Inc. purchased all outstanding stock of Cyprus Talc Corporation from Cyprus Mines Corporation.22 RTZ America, Inc. thereafter changed the name of Cyprus Talc Corporation to Luzenac America, Inc.23 On August 1, 2011, Imerys Minerals UK, Ltd. purchased all outstanding stock of Luzenac America, Inc. from RTZ America, Inc. and changed the name of the company to Imerys Talc America, Inc.24 Pursuant to paragraph 4 of the “Agreement of Transfer and Assumption” dated June 5, 1992, Cyprus Minerals Company transferred to Cyprus Talc Corporation, with certain exceptions not relevant here, “all of the liabilities or obligations, whether known, unknown, contingent or otherwise primarily relating to the Transferred Assets[.]”25 The “Transferred Assets” are defined in paragraph 2 of the “Agreement of Transfer and Assumption” as “all of Cyprus’ [Cyprus Mines Corporation's] right, title and interest in and to the assets, properties, rights and businesses of every type and description used primarily in or relating to Cyprus’ talc business . . . whether real, personal or mixed, tangible or intangible, whether currently in use or idle, fixed or unfixed, accrued, absolute, contingent or otherwise, wherever located[.]”26 In 1993, after Cyprus Minerals Company sold Cyprus Talc Corporation to RTZ, America Inc., CAMC was created by the merger of Cyprus Minerals Company and AMAX.27 CAMC never 19 See generally Downey Aff. 20 ¶2 to Downey Aff. 21 Id. at ¶3. 22 Id. 23 Id. at ¶4. 24 Id. 25 Id. at ¶6. 26 Id. 27 Id. at ¶7. Case 2:16-cv-00034-LGW-RSB Document 53 Filed 09/15/17 Page 4 of 15 5 sold talc and is not related to Charles Mathieu, the company that actual sold the talc at issue.28 In order for CAMC to be held liable for the pre-1979 sales to Colgate for Cashmere Bouquet, Plaintiffs need to prove that CAMC is the successor to Charles Mathieu. As explained in the corporate history above, that is not the case – CAMC is not the successor to Charles Mathieu. To the extent that Plaintiffs contend that some Cyprus entity is the successor to Charles Mathieu, it is certainly not CAMC. D. Talc and Asbestos. Talc is used in a wide variety of commercial applications, ranging from pharmaceuticals and cosmetics to ceramics, paints, paper and asphalt roofing.29 The end-uses for talc are determined by variables such as chemical and mineralogical composition, particle size and shape, specific gravity, hardness, and color.30 Asbestos is a collective term that describes a regulated group of six naturally occurring, highly fibrous silicate minerals that form as fiber bundles which are easily separated into long, thin, flexible fibers when crushed.31 The six minerals that, when crystallized in a rare asbestiform habit, are regulated as asbestos fall into two families of minerals: serpentine and amphibole.32 Talc is not asbestos.33 Non-talc minerals can occur within a talc deposit.34 Those minerals are often referred to as "accessory minerals" and typically include, for example, chlorite and dolomite.35 If asbestos were present in talc, it would be considered an accessory mineral.36 28 Id. at ¶9. 29 See Affidavit of Matthew S. Sanchez (“Sanchez Aff.”) at ¶16, Ex. 7. 30 Id. 31 Id. at ¶19. 32 Id. 33 Id. 34 Id. at ¶79. 35 Id. 36 Id. Case 2:16-cv-00034-LGW-RSB Document 53 Filed 09/15/17 Page 5 of 15 6 The talc source mines used in Cashmere Bouquet (northern Italy, southwest Montana, and North Carolina) produce, and have produced, tens of thousands of tons of mined talc annually.37 These mines were all sourced during Mrs. Hanson’s alleged exposure period.38 As noted above, CAMC never mined talc, and never mined talc at any of mines in northern Italy, southwest Montana, or North Carolina.39 In mines that produce pharmaceutical and cosmetic grade talc, such as those discussed here, the raw talc ore that is selectively mined is almost all pure talc with minor amounts of carbonates and chlorite.40 After hand sorting and other beneficiation techniques, the percentage of pure raw talc increases and only trace amounts, if any, of accessory minerals remain.41 Several things must happen for asbestos contamination to occur in a finished talc product: a. First, asbestos must be present in the area being mined.42 Then, the miners must include non-talc rock with the talc as it is being mined. Talc veins are often up to several meters thick, and not all talc that is mined will contain non-talc rock; most will not.43 b. Second, the non-talc rock that is mined with the talc must contain asbestos. Most talc does not contain minerals that even could be asbestos.44 c. Third, the amphibole/asbestos rock must survive the milling processes that are designed to remove impurities from the talc.45 For example, hand sorting, mechanical screening, froth flotation, and other separation (also known as 37 Id. at ¶82. 38 Id. at ¶8, 13, 55, 66, 82; Hanson Dep. Vol. I at 104:14-20; 105:14-20. 39 ¶9 to Downey Aff. 40 Sanchez Aff. at ¶82. 41 Id. 42 Id. at ¶83. 43 Id. 44 Id. 45 Id. Case 2:16-cv-00034-LGW-RSB Document 53 Filed 09/15/17 Page 6 of 15 7 "beneficiation") techniques are used to remove impurities.46 d. Fourth, among the tons of product that is mined and sold to customers, the particular talc with asbestos contamination must reach the manufacturer (Colgate) of the product at issue (Cashmere Bouquet).47 e. Fifth, among the tons of product sold to the manufacturer (Colgate), the particular talc with trace asbestos contamination must be placed into a container (one among thousands), that container must be shipped to a store near plaintiff, and plaintiff must purchase that particular container.48 f. Sixth, this process must be repeated over and over for plaintiff to have repeated exposure to body powder contaminated with asbestos.49 From a mineralogical/geological perspective and considering the evidence available regarding the northern Italy, southwest Montana, and North Carolina talc mines, the chances of these steps happening once are extremely small.50 The chances of these steps happening repeatedly such that the same individual receives talc contaminated with asbestos over an extended period of time are so small as to approach the impossible.51 II. ARGUMENT AND CITATION OF AUTHORITY A. STANDARD OF REVIEW Summary judgment is proper if the movant “shows that there is no genuine issue as to any material fact and the movant is entitled to a judgment as a matter of law.” Fed. R. Civ. P. 56(c); see also Celotex Corp. v. Catrett, 477 U.S. 317, 322, 106 S. Ct. 2548, 91 L. Ed. 2d 265 (1986). 46 Id. 47 Id. 48 Id. 49 Id. 50 Id. at ¶84. 51 Id. Case 2:16-cv-00034-LGW-RSB Document 53 Filed 09/15/17 Page 7 of 15 8 Not all factual disputes render summary judgment inappropriate; only a genuine issue of material fact will defeat a properly supported motion for summary judgment. See Anderson v. Liberty Lobby, Inc., 477 U.S. 242, 247-248, 106 S. Ct. 2505, 91 L. Ed. 2d 202 (1986). This means that summary judgment may be granted if there is insufficient evidence for a reasonable jury to return a verdict for the nonmoving party or, in other words, if reasonable minds could not differ as to the verdict. See id. at 249-252. On summary judgment, the moving party “bears the initial responsibility of informing the court of the basis of its motion, and identifying those portions of the pleadings, depositions, answers to interrogatories, and admissions on file, together with the affidavits, if any, which it believes demonstrate the absence of a genuine issue of material fact” and that entitle it to a judgment as a matter of law. Celotex, 477 U.S. at 323 (internal quotation marks omitted). If the moving party discharges this burden, the burden then shifts to the nonmoving party to respond by setting forth specific evidence in the record and articulating the precise manner in which that evidence creates a genuine issue of material fact, or that the moving party is not entitled to a judgment as a matter of law. See Fed. R. Civ. P. 56(e); see also Celotex, 477 U.S. at 324-326. The evidence must consist of more than mere conclusory allegations of legal conclusions. Avirgan v. Hull, 932 F.2d 1572, 1577 (11th Cir. 1991). B. CAMC IS ENTITLED TO SUMMARY JUDGMENT BECAUSE PLAINTIFFS CANNOT HOLD CAMC LIABLE UNDER A SUCCESSOR LIABILITY THEORY. Summary judgment should be granted because Plaintiffs cannot meet their evidentiary burden of demonstrating that CAMC is liable under the theory of successor liability. The Supreme Court of Georgia summarized the law of successor liability in Georgia in Bullington v. Union Tool Corp., 254 Ga. 283, 284, 328 S.E.2d 726 (1985), as follows: Case 2:16-cv-00034-LGW-RSB Document 53 Filed 09/15/17 Page 8 of 15 9 Generally, a purchasing corporation does not assume the liabilities of the seller unless: (1) there is an agreement to assume liabilities; (2) the transaction is, in fact, a merger; (3) the transaction is a fraudulent attempt to avoid liabilities; or (4) the purchaser is a mere continuation of the predecessor corporation. Acme Sec., Inc. v. CLN Props., LLC (In re Acme Sec., Inc.), 484 B.R. 475, 478 (Bankr. N.D. Ga. 2012). None of these conditions apply to the facts of this case. First, Charles Mathieu is the company that sold talc to Colgate prior to 1979. There is no evidence in this case that any Cyprus entity succeeded to the liabilities for Charles Mathieu’s pre- 1979 sale of talc. But even assuming (incorrectly) that a Cyprus entity is the successor to Charles Mathieu, CAMC cannot be held liable because the prior Cyprus entities sold those talc liabilities to RTZ America, Inc., before CAMC’s formation. As discussed above, through a Stock Purchase Agreement, RTZ America, Inc. (a company unrelated to CAMC) acquired the existing talc business owned by Cyprus Mines and expressly assumed the talc-related liabilities that allegedly form the basis for the Plaintiffs’ claims in this action.52 Plaintiffs’ causes of action against CAMC accordingly lack any legal basis, and CAMC is entitled to judgment as a matter of law. The remainder of the potential exceptions to the rule of non-liability do not apply because there is no transaction between Charles Mathieu and CAMC to which they could apply. As noted above, Plaintiffs apparently contend, although not stated in their Complaint, that an unidentified Cyprus entity is somehow a successor to Charles Mathieu, and that CAMC is the successor to that entity. But that theory fails before it ever gets started because, as detailed above, the prior Cyprus entities that were in the talc business sold that business and the associated liabilities (with certain exceptions not relevant here), to RTZ America, Inc. before the defendant in this case, CAMC, ever existed. Plaintiffs simply cannot draw a line between alleged liabilities of Charles Mathieu and CAMC, and CAMC is entitled to summary judgment as a result. 52 See generally Downey Aff. Case 2:16-cv-00034-LGW-RSB Document 53 Filed 09/15/17 Page 9 of 15 10 C. CAMC IS ENTITLED TO SUMMARY JUDGMENT BECAUSE PLAINTIFFS CANNOT PROVE ANYTHING OTHER THAN A VAGUE AND REMOTE POSSIBILITY THAT MRS. HANSON WAS EVER EXPOSED TO TALC ATTIRBUTABLE TO CAMC. Plaintiff’s evidence, even viewed in the light most favorable to her, shows nothing more than a possibility, and a remote one, that she was exposed—in some unknown amount, with an unknown frequency—to any asbestos in talc attributed to CAMC. “A de minimis contribution to an injury is not sufficient to establish legal causation under Georgia law.” Scapa Dryer Fabrics, Inc. v. Knight, 299 Ga. 286, 291, 788 S.E.2d 421, 426 (2016). Federal courts applying Georgia law in asbestos cases have held that “the threshold for every theory is proof that an injured plaintiff was exposed to asbestos-containing products for which the defendant is responsible,” and the plaintiff must present evidence “that a particular defendant’s asbestos-containing product was used at the job site and that the plaintiff was in proximity to that product at the time it was being used.” Hoffman v. AC&S, Inc., 248 Ga. App. 608, 611, 548 S.E.2d 379, 382 (2001); Thurmon v. Georgia Pac., LLC, 650 F. App'x 752, 757 (11th Cir. 2016) (“[A] plaintiff must present evidence that a particular defendant's asbestos-containing product was used in proximity of that plaintiff…a plaintiff must link a particular defendant's product to his injury in order to survive a motion for summary judgment.”) “An inference based on mere possibility, conjecture, or speculation is not a reasonable inference sufficient to establish a genuine issue of fact and preclude summary judgment.” Pirkle v. Quiktrip Corp., 325 Ga. App. 597, 600, 754 S.E.2d 387, 390 (2014). Where a plaintiff's proof of causation is based on “mere possibilities, or the matter remains one of pure speculation or conjecture, or the probabilities are at best evenly balanced, it is the duty of the trial court to grant summary judgment for the defendant.” Barclay v. Stephenson, 337 Ga. App. 365, 368, 787 S.E.2d 322, 326 (2016). In short, Plaintiffs lack sufficient evidence of exposure and causation to reach a jury. Case 2:16-cv-00034-LGW-RSB Document 53 Filed 09/15/17 Page 10 of 15 11 Four of Plaintiffs’ experts, Drs. Gordon, Webber, Moline and Kradin offered an opinion related to Mrs. Hanson’s exposure to asbestos from Cashmere Bouquet talc. However, none of those opinions are admissible, as set forth in Defendants’ Daubert Motion to Exclude Testimony from Plaintiffs’ Experts Regarding Mrs. Hanson’s Asbestos Exposure. In the interest of efficiency, CAMC will not repeat those arguments here but instead incorporates them by reference and refers the Court to the separate briefing. Because the exposure opinions of Plaintiffs’ experts are inadmissible, Plaintiffs are left without evidence as to both dose and causation, and failure to prove either is fatal to their claims. D. CAMC IS ENTITLED TO SUMMARY JUDGMENT ON PLAINTIFFS’ CLAIM FOR PUNITIVE DAMAGES. The evidence does not support an award of punitive damages as to CAMC and Plaintiffs’ claim for punitive damages as to CAMC fails as a matter of law. Punitive damages may be awarded only in such tort actions in which it is proven by clear and convincing evidence that the defendant's actions showed willful misconduct, malice, fraud, wantonness, oppression, or that entire want of care which would raise the presumption of conscious indifference to consequences. (Emphasis added) O.C.G.A. § 51-12-5.1(b). O.C.G.A. § 51-12-5.1(b), imposes a strict state of mind requirement upon plaintiffs: Punitive damages cannot be imposed . . . without a finding of some form of culpable conduct, and negligence, even gross negligence, is not sufficient to support an award of punitive damages . . . . There must be aggravating circumstances or outrage, such as spite, malice, or a fraudulent or evil motive on the part of the defendant, or such a conscious and deliberate disregard of the interests of others that the conduct may be called wilful or wanton. Comcast Corp. v. Warren, 286 Ga. App. 835, 650 S.E.2d 307, 311 (Ga. Ct. App. 2007). Negligence alone, even gross negligence, will not support an award of punitive damages. Lewis v. Suttles Truck Leasing, Inc., 869 F. Supp. 947, 949 (S.D. Ga. 1994). Case 2:16-cv-00034-LGW-RSB Document 53 Filed 09/15/17 Page 11 of 15 12 Plaintiffs have failed to proffer any evidence - much less evidence arising to the level of clear and convincing evidence53 - showing CAMC exhibited spiteful, malicious, fraudulent, evil, conscious, or deliberate misconduct. To recover punitive damages in accordance with the statute, Plaintiffs, at a minimum would have to prove two things: (1) that CAMC supplied talc contaminated with asbestos to Colgate with willful misconduct, malice, fraud, wantonness, oppression, or that entire want of care, AND (2) that Colgate used that specific talc in Cashmere Bouquet between 1952 and 1975. The record is devoid of evidence for either claim. When a plaintiff “fails to establish a question of fact that a defendant's conduct was either willful or consciously indifferent to the consequences, summary judgment on a claim for punitive damages is appropriate.” Funderbunk v. Fannie Mae, No. 1:13-CV-01362-LMM, 2015 WL 11216734, at *4 (N.D. Ga. Aug. 4, 2015). There is not a single document in evidence that shows CAMC had knowledge that any container of Cashmere Bouquet – much less one used by Mrs. Hanson - contained asbestos. And, the evidence is clear that CAMC did not even provide the talc used in Cashmere Bouquet. As explained above, CAMC never mined, milled, or sold talc. Thus, even if the Plaintiffs were able to prove that Mrs. Hanson used asbestos-containing talc (they cannot), Mrs. Hanson would not have standing to recover as an aggrieved person, as she never consumed talc provided by CAMC. Accordingly, it is impossible for the Plaintiffs to prove that CAMC knew of a risk, acted intentionally despite that risk, and harmed Mrs. Hanson. 53 Clear and convincing evidence is defined as evidence that will cause the jury to firmly believe each essential element of the claim to a high degree of probability. This is a different and higher burden of proof than a mere preponderance of the evidence. Ga. Suggested Pattern Jury Instructions, Vol. I: Civil Cases (5th ed.), Sec. 02.040 Case 2:16-cv-00034-LGW-RSB Document 53 Filed 09/15/17 Page 12 of 15 13 Even if CAMC is found to be the alleged successor in this case, courts have been reluctant to impose punitive damages against an “innocent successor.” See Armstrong v. Lockheed Martin Beryllium Corp., 990 F.Supp. 1395, 1403 n. 9 (M.D.Fla. 1997) (“Under no circumstances can this court envision the imposition of punitive damages liability against an innocent successor. The conflicting interests of the parties and policies justifying successor liability and punitive damages all militate in favor of the successor company on such a claim.”) Absent evidence creating a genuine issue of fact as to the material state-of-mind element, CAMC is entitled to summary judgment on Plaintiffs’ claim for punitive damages as a matter of law. CONCLUSION WHEREFORE, for the reasons set forth above, Defendant Cyprus Amax Minerals Company respectfully requests that this Court grant summary judgment in its favour on Plaintiffs claims against it and grant such further relief that this Court deems just and proper. Respectfully submitted this 15th day of September, 2017. ALSTON & BIRD LLP /s/ Scott A. Elder, Esq. Scott A. Elder, Esq. Georgia Bar Number 665879 One Atlantic Center 1201 West Peachtree Street Atlanta, GA 30309 (404) 881-7000 scott.elder@alston.com Office: (404) 881-7592 Fax: (404) 253-8580 Case 2:16-cv-00034-LGW-RSB Document 53 Filed 09/15/17 Page 13 of 15 14 FISHERBROYLES, LLP /s/ R. Bates Lovett__________ R. Bates Lovett, Esq. Georgia Bar Number 459568 35 Barnard Street, Suite 300 Savannah, Georgia 31401 Email: bates.lovett@fisherbroyles.com Office: (912) 335-4467 Mobile: (912) 844-1346 Fax: (912) 651-8290 Attorneys for Defendant Cyprus Amax Minerals Company Case 2:16-cv-00034-LGW-RSB Document 53 Filed 09/15/17 Page 14 of 15 15 IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT FOR THE SOUTHERN DISTRICT OF GEORGIA BRUNSWICK DIVISION SHARON M. HANSON AND DOUGLAS B. HANSON. PLAINTIFF, VS. COLGATE-PALMOLIVE COMPANY; CYPRUS AMAX MINERALS COMPANY; And JOHN DOES NO. 1-15. DEFENDANTS. ) ) ) ) ) ) ) ) ) ) ) ) ) Civil Action No. 2:16-cv-00034-LGW-RSB CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE The undersigned hereby certifies that all parties were served with a copy of the foregoing DEFENDANT CYPRUS AMAX MINERALS COMPANY’S MOTION FOR SUMMARY JUDGMENT AND MEMORANDUM OF LAW IN SUPPORT by filing the same with the Clerk of Court using the CM/ECF system which will automatically electronically mail notification of such filing to the following attorneys of record: Rob Buck, Esq. Kevin Paul, Esq. Lane Young, Esq. c/o The Buck Law Firm c/o Simon Greenstone Peter York, Esq. 1050 Crown Pointe Parkway 3232 McKinney Ave. Hawkins Parnell Thackston & Young Suite 940 Suite 610 303 Peachtree Street, NE, Suite 4000 Atlanta, GA 30338 Dallas, TX 75204 Atlanta, GA 30308 Attorneys for Plaintiffs Attorneys for Plaintiffs Attorneys for Colgate-Palmolive Submitted this 15th day of September, 2017. /s/ R. Bates Lovett, Esq.__________ R. Bates Lovett, Esq. 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