Holding that, under the abuse-of-discretion standard, "we must affirm unless . . . the district court has made a clear error of judgment, or has applied the wrong legal standard"
Holding that because the expert failed to reliably rule in his theory of causation, the court did not need to "venture into the quagmire of attempting to define the parameters of a reliable process of 'ruling out' other possible causes" of the disease in question
In Seamon, the Eleventh Circuit reversed the district court's exclusion of a plaintiff's expert as unreliable, finding that it was “evident from the record that [the expert] did in fact provide a reasonable explanation as to why he has concluded that any alternative cause suggested by the defense was not the sole cause of the plaintiff's injury.” 813 F.3d at 989.
Holding that it was manifestly erroneous for the district court to exclude an expert on the basis that her opinion was “an ipse dixit assessment,” when the record was to the contrary