29 Cited authorities

Semtek International Inc. v. Lockheed Martin Corp.
531 U.S. 497 (2001) Cited 1,355 times 3 Legal Analyses
Holding that the "claim-preclusive effect" of a previous decision by a federal court sitting in diversity is governed by "the law that would be applied by state courts in the State in which the federal diversity court sits"
In the Matter of Hunter
4 N.Y.3d 260 (N.Y. 2005) Cited 525 times
Concluding that res judicata barred petitioner's claim against executor of estate where prior Surrogate's Court's decree had released executor from all further liability as to matters embraced in the decree, including petitioner's claim
Cnty. of Orange v. U.S. Dist. Court for the Cent. Dist. of Cal.
784 F.3d 520 (9th Cir. 2015) Cited 91 times 3 Legal Analyses
Holding that "Erie [R. Co. v. Tompkins, 304 U.S. 64 (1938)]'s federalism principle requires federal courts sitting in diversity to import, as the federal rule, state law governing jury trial waivers where . . . state law is even more protective than federal law of the jury trial right"
Harris v. Steinem
571 F.2d 119 (2d Cir. 1978) Cited 179 times
Finding that a counterclaim for defamation based on the filing of the initial complaint is not a compulsory counterclaim despite common issues of law and fact
Modell Co. v. Minister
68 N.Y.2d 456 (N.Y. 1986) Cited 97 times
Holding that "a party is not free to remain silent in an action in which he is the defendant and then bring a second action seeking relief inconsistent with the judgment in the first action by asserting what is simply a new legal theory"
Mali v. Fed. Ins. Co.
720 F.3d 387 (2d Cir. 2013) Cited 41 times 2 Legal Analyses
Finding that a permissive inference instruction is not a sanction but "simply an explanation to the jury of its fact-finding powers."
Clawson v. GMAC Mortg., LLC
CIVIL ACTION NO. 3:12-CV-00212 (S.D. Tex. May. 9, 2013) Cited 34 times
CIVIL ACTION NO. 3:12-CV-00212 05-09-2013 MARY BETH CLAWSON, et al, Plaintiffs, v. GMAC MORTGAGE, LLC F/K/A GMAC MORTGAGE CORPORATION, et al, Defendants. Gregg Costa MEMORANDUM AND ORDER This case arises out of the attempted foreclosure on Plaintiffs Mary Beth Clawson and John Riddle's home in Bacliff, Texas. Plaintiffs request a declaratory judgment stating that Defendants' attempted foreclosure on the property is barred by the applicable statute of limitations, the doctrine of res judicata, and
Cefali v. Buffalo Brass Co., Inc.
748 F. Supp. 1011 (W.D.N.Y. 1990) Cited 46 times
Holding that plaintiffs who settled their E.R.I.S.A. claims were a "prevailing party" under E.R.I.S.A. and entitled to a reasonable fee
People v. Chestnut
2012 N.Y. Slip Op. 4375 (N.Y. 2012) Cited 12 times
2012-06-7 The PEOPLE of the State of New York, Respondent, v. Kevin CHESTNUT, Appellant. Appellate Advocates, New York City (William G. Kastin and Lynn W.L. Fahey of counsel), for appellant. Richard A. Brown, District Attorney, Kew Gardens (Jennifer Hagan and John M. Castellano of counsel), for respondent. JONES Appellate Advocates, New York City (William G. Kastin and Lynn W.L. Fahey of counsel), for appellant. Richard A. Brown, District Attorney, Kew Gardens (Jennifer Hagan and John M. Castellano
67-25 Dartmouth Street Corp. v. Syllman
29 A.D.3d 888 (N.Y. App. Div. 2006) Cited 18 times
2005-05274. May 23, 2006. In an action to recover attorneys' fees allegedly due pursuant to a proprietary lease, the plaintiff appeals, as limited by its brief, from so much of an order of the Supreme Court, Queens County (Weiss, J.), dated May 3, 2005, as denied its motion for summary judgment and granted that branch of the defendant's motion which was for summary judgment dismissing the complaint, and the defendant cross-appeals from the same order. Richard Creditor, LLC, Forest Hills, N.Y., for
Rule 13 - Counterclaim and Crossclaim
Fed. R. Civ. P. 13 Cited 4,916 times 21 Legal Analyses
Determining whether counterclaims are compulsory

Paramount Pictures Corporation, Appellant,v.Allianz Risk Transfer AG, et al., Respondents, et al., Defendant.

29 Cited authorities

Holding that the "claim-preclusive effect" of a previous decision by a federal court sitting in diversity is governed by "the law that would be applied by state courts in the State in which the federal diversity court sits"

Concluding that res judicata barred petitioner's claim against executor of estate where prior Surrogate's Court's decree had released executor from all further liability as to matters embraced in the decree, including petitioner's claim

Holding that "Erie [R. Co. v. Tompkins, 304 U.S. 64 (1938)]'s federalism principle requires federal courts sitting in diversity to import, as the federal rule, state law governing jury trial waivers where . . . state law is even more protective than federal law of the jury trial right"

Finding that a counterclaim for defamation based on the filing of the initial complaint is not a compulsory counterclaim despite common issues of law and fact

Holding that "a party is not free to remain silent in an action in which he is the defendant and then bring a second action seeking relief inconsistent with the judgment in the first action by asserting what is simply a new legal theory"

Finding that a permissive inference instruction is not a sanction but "simply an explanation to the jury of its fact-finding powers."

Holding that plaintiffs who settled their E.R.I.S.A. claims were a "prevailing party" under E.R.I.S.A. and entitled to a reasonable fee

Determining whether counterclaims are compulsory