16 Cited authorities

Merrill v. Navegar, Inc.
26 Cal.4th 465 (Cal. 2001) Cited 1,256 times 2 Legal Analyses
Restating the same criteria for exceptions from the rule set forth in section 1714
Bausch v. Stryker Corp.
630 F.3d 546 (7th Cir. 2010) Cited 652 times 7 Legal Analyses
Holding that tort law claims based on manufacturing defects were not impliedly preempted
In re Medtronic, Inc., Sprint Fidelis Leads
623 F.3d 1200 (8th Cir. 2010) Cited 320 times 5 Legal Analyses
Holding in medical-device context that potential additional warnings were "precisely the type of state requirement that is 'different from or in addition to' the federal requirement and therefore preempted" (quoting 21 U.S.C. § 360k)
Greenman v. Yuba Power Products, Inc.
59 Cal.2d 57 (Cal. 1963) Cited 872 times 4 Legal Analyses
Holding a manufacturer's liability should be imposed irrespective of fault
Wolicki-Gables v. Arrow International, Inc.
634 F.3d 1296 (11th Cir. 2011) Cited 160 times 3 Legal Analyses
Holding that medical device's pre-market approval “imposes specific requirements on it that are sufficient to preempt a state law claim”
Gomez v. St. Jude Medical Daig Division Inc.
442 F.3d 919 (5th Cir. 2006) Cited 148 times 2 Legal Analyses
Holding that design defect, failure-to-warn, and breach of express warranty claims under LPLA were preempted by § 360k
Chavez v. Glock, Inc.
207 Cal.App.4th 1283 (Cal. Ct. App. 2012) Cited 111 times
Finding same conclusion applied to negligent design and strict liability design defect claims
Shuster v. BAC Home Loans Servicing, LP
211 Cal.App.4th 505 (Cal. Ct. App. 2012) Cited 102 times 1 Legal Analyses
Rejecting claim that defendants had no right to foreclose because they were not the "holder in due course" of the promissory note
Align Technology, Inc. v. Tran
179 Cal.App.4th 949 (Cal. Ct. App. 2009) Cited 80 times
Holding "legislative purpose of former section 439, the predecessor of section 426.30 . . . was to provide for the settlement, in a single action, of all conflicting claims between the parties arising out of the same transaction" and to "avoid a multiplicity of actions"
Jiminez v. Sears, Roebuck Co.
4 Cal.3d 379 (Cal. 1971) Cited 178 times
Stating that "No valid reason appears to require a plaintiff to elect whether to proceed on the theory of strict liability or on the theory of negligence."

Order After Hearing POS

16 Cited authorities

Restating the same criteria for exceptions from the rule set forth in section 1714

Holding that tort law claims based on manufacturing defects were not impliedly preempted

Holding in medical-device context that potential additional warnings were "precisely the type of state requirement that is 'different from or in addition to' the federal requirement and therefore preempted" (quoting 21 U.S.C. § 360k)

Holding a manufacturer's liability should be imposed irrespective of fault

Holding that medical device's pre-market approval “imposes specific requirements on it that are sufficient to preempt a state law claim”

Holding that design defect, failure-to-warn, and breach of express warranty claims under LPLA were preempted by § 360k

Finding same conclusion applied to negligent design and strict liability design defect claims

Rejecting claim that defendants had no right to foreclose because they were not the "holder in due course" of the promissory note

Holding "legislative purpose of former section 439, the predecessor of section 426.30 . . . was to provide for the settlement, in a single action, of all conflicting claims between the parties arising out of the same transaction" and to "avoid a multiplicity of actions"

Stating that "No valid reason appears to require a plaintiff to elect whether to proceed on the theory of strict liability or on the theory of negligence."