Argued September 8, 1997 Decided October 16, 1997 Appeal from the the Supreme Court (Karla Moskowitz, J.). Marcia P. Hirsch, Bronx, Rudolph Rosa Di Sant and Sheldon Melnitsky for appellant. John J. Cox, New York City, for respondent. Carb, Luria, Cook Kufeld, L. L. P., New York City (James E. Schwartz of counsel) LEVINE, J. Petitioner Germaine Gaines commenced this CPLR article 78 proceeding to challenge respondent New York State Division of Housing and Community Renewal's (DHCR) determination that

290 A.D.2d 326 736 N.Y.S.2d 359 Estelle Aaron, Appellant, v. Great Bay Contracting, Inc., Respondent. Supreme Court of New York, First Department January 17, 2002. OPINION Order, Supreme Court, New York County (Louise Gruner Gans, J.), entered on or about March 19, 2001, which denied petitioner's application to discharge or reduce respondent's mechanic's lien, unanimously affirmed, without costs. Pertinent provisions of the parties' contract governing respondent's renovation of petitioner's apartment

No. 2009-11740. January 18, 2011. In an action to foreclose on a mechanic's lien, the plaintiff appeals from so much of an order of the Supreme Court, Kings County (Ruchelsman, J.), dated October 27, 2009, as granted that branch of the pre-answer motion of the defendant Serge Dorime which was to vacate the plaintiffs mechanic's lien to the extent of reducing the lien from the sum of $257,950 to the sum of $65,950, and setting the matter down for a hearing concerning the validity of the remainder

2003-09636 January 31, 2005. In a proceeding pursuant to Lien Law § 19 (6) to summarily discharge a mechanic's lien, the petitioner appeals from an order of the Supreme Court, Kings County (Knipel, J.), dated September 17, 2003, which granted the respondents' cross motion to dismiss the petition. Before: Schmidt, J.P., Santucci, Luciano and Rivera, JJ., concur. Ordered that the order is affirmed, with costs. A court has no inherent power to vacate or discharge a notice of lien except as authorized

March 31, 1997 Appeal from the Supreme Court, Nassau County, Edward W. McCarty, III, J. Murray Hollander, New York City (Donald Davis of counsel), for appellant. Thomas L. Costa, L.L.P., Melville, for respondent. ALTMAN, J. At issue on this appeal is the interpretation of a 1982 amendment to Lien Law § 2 (4) which expanded the definition of "improvement" to include the performance of certain specified real estate brokerage services, thereby enabling real estate brokers to file mechanic's liens. In

November 16, 1992 Appeal from the Supreme Court, Westchester County (Gurahian, J.). Ordered that the order is affirmed, with costs. The petitioner, a real estate developer, contracted with the appellant for the design and installation of heating, ventilation and air conditioning systems for a condominium complex known as "Westage Towers East". During the course of the work, the petitioner filed a declaration of condominium (see, Real Property Law art 9-B), identifying the property by individual tax

Argued April 6, 1954 Decided May 20, 1954 Appeal from the Supreme Court, Appellate Division, Second Department, C.A. JOHNSON, J. William Brafman and Joseph Goldman for appellants. Richard Steel and Martin A. Jacobs for respondent. Per Curiam. Respondent's mechanic's lien for making "drawings of preliminary plans" and allied architectural services which never became embodied in an erected structure, should not summarily be dismissed on motion under subdivision (6) of section 19 of the Lien Law, upon

Argued February 26, 1923 Decided March 13, 1923 Townsend Scudder and George Morton Levy for appellant. Manton Marks for respondent. CRANE, J. This is an action brought to foreclose a mechanic's lien wherein the Fidelity and Deposit Company of Maryland has been made a party by reason of its having given an undertaking to discharge the lien. Upon a motion made by the company for judgment on the pleadings, the mechanic's lien as filed has been held to be bad. The complaint alleges that one James M.

(a) Appointment of temporary receiver; joinder of moving party. Upon motion of a person having an apparent interest in property which is the subject of an action in the supreme or a county court, a temporary receiver of the property may be appointed, before or after service of summons and at any time prior to judgment, or during the pendency of an appeal, where there is danger that the property will be removed from the state, or lost, materially injured or destroyed. A motion made by a person not

A lien other than a lien for labor performed or materials furnished for a public improvement specified in this article, may be discharged as follows: (1) By the certificate of the lienor, duly acknowledged or proved and filed in the office where the notice of lien is filed, stating that the lien is satisfied or released as to the whole or a portion of the real property affected thereby and may be discharged in whole or in part, specifying the part. Upon filing such certificate, the county clerk in

The notice of lien shall state: 1. The name and residence of the lienor; and if the lienor is a partnership or a corporation, the business address of such firm, or corporation, the names of partners and principal place of business, and if a foreign corporation, its principal place of business within the state. 1-a. The name and address of the lienor's attorney, if any. 2. The name of the owner of the real property against whose interest therein a lien is claimed, and the interest of the owner as

At any time during the pendency of said action pursuant to section two hundred one, the court may upon application therefor appoint a receiver to conserve said property and to receive the rents, income and profits therefrom during the pendency of the action. The rents, income and profits so received, after the payment of the expenses of such receivership, shall be paid over to such party or parties as shall be determined in the final judgment to be entitled to possession of said property and in the