§Why CasetextPricing

In the Matter of Sylvan Lawrence, Deceased.---------------Richard S. Lawrence, et al., Respondents,v.Graubard Miller, et al., Appellants,----------------Richard S. Lawrence, et al., Intervenors-Respondents.

Brief

6 Cited authorities

  1. Lawrence v. Miller

    2008 N.Y. Slip Op. 9434 (N.Y. 2008)   Cited 403 times
    Affirming denial of motion to dismiss in a legal malpractice case because the parties had not presented evidence to show whether the retainer agreement was unconscionable

  2. Jacobson v. Sassower

    66 N.Y.2d 991 (N.Y. 1985)   Cited 247 times
    Affirming Jacobson v. Sassower, supra

  3. King v. Fox

    2006 N.Y. Slip Op. 4746 (N.Y. 2006)   Cited 135 times
    Finding that even a fee agreement otherwise prohibited as unconscionable may be enforced if the parties entered into it knowingly and intentionally

  4. Campagnola v. Mulholland

    76 N.Y.2d 38 (N.Y. 1990)   Cited 206 times
    Holding that in the context of a contingency fee agreement for one third of the client's recovery, "[w]here [an attorney's] discharge is without cause, the attorney is limited to recovering in quantum meruit the reasonable value of the services rendered"

  5. Samuel v. Druckman Sinel

    2009 N.Y. Slip Op. 2447 (N.Y. 2009)   Cited 36 times

    No. 39. Argued February 17, 2009. Decided March 31, 2009. CROSS APPEALS, by permission of the Appellate Division of the Supreme Court in the First Judicial Department, from an order of that Court, entered April 8, 2008. The Appellate Division (1) modified, on the law, an order of the Supreme Court, New York County (Debra A. James, J.; op 2007 NY Slip Op 30518[U]), which had denied defendants' motion for summary judgment and denied plaintiffs' cross motion for summary judgment, to transfer the action

  6. Gair v. Peck

    6 N.Y.2d 97 (N.Y. 1959)   Cited 148 times
    In Gair v. Peck, 6 N.Y.2d 97, 188 N.Y.S.2d 491, 160 N.E.2d 43 (1959), the New York Court of Appeals considered a court rule adopted by an Appellate Division of the Supreme Court, which provided, with exceptions not material to our discussion, that contingent fees in personal injury or death cases in excess of one-third of the net recovery were unreasonable and unconscionable, unless authorized by a written order of the court.