27 Cited authorities

In re Winship
397 U.S. 358 (1970) Cited 11,640 times 24 Legal Analyses
Holding that the government must prove every element of a crime beyond a reasonable doubt
State v. Danielson
2007 N.Y. Slip Op. 9814 (N.Y. 2007) Cited 9,450 times 1 Legal Analyses
Holding a "legally sufficient verdict can be against the weight of the evidence"
Francis v. Franklin
471 U.S. 307 (1985) Cited 2,056 times 8 Legal Analyses
Holding a mandatory presumption, either conclusive or rebuttable, as to an element violates a defendant's due process rights because it conflicts with the prosecution's burden to prove beyond a reasonable doubt every fact necessary to constitute the crime charged
People v. Bleakley
69 N.Y.2d 490 (N.Y. 1987) Cited 11,294 times 3 Legal Analyses
Holding that the Appellate Division committed reversible error when it "avoid[ed] its exclusive statutory authority to review the weight of the evidence in criminal cases"
People v. Contes
60 N.Y.2d 620 (N.Y. 1983) Cited 11,958 times 2 Legal Analyses
Stating the standard for review of the legal sufficiency of evidence in a criminal case is whether "after viewing the evidence in the light most favorable to the prosecution, any rational trier of fact could have found the essential elements of the crime beyond a reasonable doubt"
Morissette v. United States
342 U.S. 246 (1952) Cited 2,271 times 15 Legal Analyses
Holding that it is a defense to a charge of "knowingly converting" federal property that one did not know that what one was doing was a conversion
People v. Alejandro
70 N.Y.2d 133 (N.Y. 1987) Cited 1,214 times
Reviewing the legislature's intent to create a "demanding standard" for the sufficiency of informations
People v. Hines
97 N.Y.2d 56 (N.Y. 2001) Cited 710 times 4 Legal Analyses
Holding that in a post-verdict CPL § 330.30 motion, "an insufficiency argument may not be addressed unless it has been properly reserved for review during the trial"
People v. Dreyden
2010 N.Y. Slip Op. 5243 (N.Y. 2010) Cited 404 times 1 Legal Analyses
Stating that the gravity knife law "distinguishes gravity knives from certain folding knives that cannot readily be opened by gravity or centrifugal force"
People v. Jones
2007 N.Y. Slip Op. 9070 (N.Y. 2007) Cited 227 times
Dismissing an information alleging disorderly conduct because there was no indication that the defendant "when he stood in the middle of the sidewalk . . . had the intent to or recklessly created a risk of causing 'public inconvenience, annoyance or alarm'"

The People, Respondent,v.Steven Berrezueta, Appellant.

27 Cited authorities

Holding that the government must prove every element of a crime beyond a reasonable doubt

Holding a "legally sufficient verdict can be against the weight of the evidence"

Holding a mandatory presumption, either conclusive or rebuttable, as to an element violates a defendant's due process rights because it conflicts with the prosecution's burden to prove beyond a reasonable doubt every fact necessary to constitute the crime charged

Holding that the Appellate Division committed reversible error when it "avoid[ed] its exclusive statutory authority to review the weight of the evidence in criminal cases"

Stating the standard for review of the legal sufficiency of evidence in a criminal case is whether "after viewing the evidence in the light most favorable to the prosecution, any rational trier of fact could have found the essential elements of the crime beyond a reasonable doubt"

Holding that it is a defense to a charge of "knowingly converting" federal property that one did not know that what one was doing was a conversion

Reviewing the legislature's intent to create a "demanding standard" for the sufficiency of informations

Holding that in a post-verdict CPL § 330.30 motion, "an insufficiency argument may not be addressed unless it has been properly reserved for review during the trial"

Stating that the gravity knife law "distinguishes gravity knives from certain folding knives that cannot readily be opened by gravity or centrifugal force"

Dismissing an information alleging disorderly conduct because there was no indication that the defendant "when he stood in the middle of the sidewalk . . . had the intent to or recklessly created a risk of causing 'public inconvenience, annoyance or alarm'"