Trump Threatens Retaliatory Measures vs. Latin American Countries Refusing Repatriation Flights

President Donald Trump on Jan. 20, 2025, issued various immigration-related Executive Orders (EOs) and presidential actions that could have an immediate and lasting impact on Latin American countries. President Trump's immigration-related EOs included, among others:

1. Protecting the United States from Foreign Terrorists and Other National Security and Public Safety Threats
2. Designating Cartels and Other Organizations as Foreign Terrorist Organizations and Specially Designated Global Terrorists
3. Clarifying the Military's Role in Protecting the Territorial Integrity of the United States
4. Protecting the American People Against Invasion
5. Securing Our Borders
6. Declaring a National Emergency at the Southern Border of the United States

Notably, these EOs represent not only a concrete shift in U.S. immigration policy, but they also likely foreshadow a shift in national security priorities. These could lead to new international trade restrictions and embargoes and economic sanctions on Latin American countries and governments perceived to be uncooperative.

The International Emergency Economic Powers Act of 1977 (IEEPA) grants the U.S. president extensive powers to impose economic sanctions and other measures to deal with "any unusual and extraordinary threat…to the national security, foreign policy, or economy of the United States, if the President declares a national emergency with respect to such threat."¹ The IEEPA historically has been used extensively to sanction individuals and entities, or entire countries, that inherently pose a national security threat to the U.S., such as foreign terrorist organizations, belligerent foreign governments and foreign nationals. The imposition of sanctions under the IEEPA has often been labeled a financial death sentence. Broadly speaking, such sanctions have the effect of prohibiting U.S. persons from transacting with persons, entities or regions designated or targeted by sanctions, and any property of such target that comes within the possession of a U.S. person must be frozen. The economic powers granted to the U.S. president under the IEEPA are broad, ranging from issuing economic sanctions, denying of entry into the U.S. and imposing national security tariffs on various imported goods in addition to standard tariffs and duties. The president's use of such powers could go unchecked, except in rare instances of a successful federal court challenge.

Over the years, the IEEPA has been used routinely by U.S. presidents as a broader tool to effectuate such administration's foreign policy agenda. During President Trump's first term, it was used (or threatened to be used) as a sword to effectuate the administration's policies on foreign trade and immigration. For example, in 2019, President Trump announced his intention to use the IEEPA to impose tariffs on goods imported from Mexico.² Prior to their effective date, the tariffs were suspended because Mexico "agreed to take strong measures to…stem the tide of migration."³

Recent Incident with Colombia

More recently, on Jan. 26, 2025, the second Trump Administration threatened to impose across-the-board tariffs, visa restrictions, financial sanctions and potentially other retaliatory measures after Colombia turned away two U.S. military aircraft with migrants being deported, framing the refusal to accept the deported Colombian nationals as a significant threat to U.S. national security. Newly appointed U.S. Department of State Secretary Marco Rubio stated that the U.S. "will no longer be lied to nor taken advantage of. It is the responsibility of each nation to take back their citizens who are illegally present in the United States in a serious and expeditious manner."⁴ Secretary Rubio also added that Colombian President Gustavo Petro had previously authorized these flights, but the authorizations were canceled while the planes were airborne.⁵ President Petro condemned the action by the Trump Administration, posting on the social platform X that "the U.S. cannot treat Colombian migrants as criminals" (translated from Spanish). In response to these threats, President Petro ordered the Colombian Foreign Trade Minister, via the social platform X, to raise import tariffs on goods imported from the U.S. by 25 percent.

As soon as in the evening of Jan. 26, 2025, the White House announced that the U.S. and Colombian governments had reached an agreement. "The Government of Colombia has agreed to all of President Trump's terms, including the unrestricted acceptance of all illegal aliens from Colombia returned from the United States, including on U.S. military aircraft, without limitation or delay."⁶ The IEEPA tariffs and sanctions are to be "held in reserve, and not signed," unless the government of Colombia fails to honor the agreement.⁷ Notably, the emergency visa sanctions implemented by the State Department and enhanced inspections from U.S. Customs and Border Protection remained in effect until the first group of Colombian migrants arrived in Colombia.⁸ From a practical perspective, we are receiving reports that consulates are closed and there is no immigration-related activity at the U.S. Embassy in Bogota, indicating the visa sanctions imposed by President Trump were in effect immediately.⁹ Two Colombian Air Force planes carrying migrants from the U.S. arrived in Bogota, on Jan. 28, 2025,¹⁰ but it remains to be seen when and to what extent the enhanced inspections and emergency visa sanctions will be lifted, including the suspension of activity at the U.S. Embassy in Bogota.

Colombia is not the only Latin American country that has expressed discontent as the Trump Administration continues its crackdown on immigration and the resulting mass deportations. Last week, Mexico also refused a request to let certain U.S. military planes land with migrants.¹¹ The Trump Administration did not impose similar emergency sanctions against Mexico, but President Trump previously threatened to use tariffs and other measures to compel Mexico into taking further action to curb illegal immigration and drug trafficking into the U.S.¹² Brazil's government also condemned the treatment of Brazilian migrants after they were handcuffed on deportation flights to Brazil.¹³

As was the case with the government of Colombia, Latin American countries may retaliate against the U.S. and impose their own tariffs and other countermeasures in response to the Trump Administration's threats and actions. This raises potential corollary challenges, including with respect to U.S. and foreign anti-boycotting rules and laws. Generally speaking, the U.S. anti-boycott regulations encourage and, in specified cases, require U.S. persons to refuse to comply with unsanctioned foreign boycotts. The U.S. anti-boycotting rules effectively prevent U.S. persons from advancing foreign policies of other nations that run counter to U.S. policy.¹⁴ In certain cases, U.S. persons are also required to report boycott-related activities and requests they receive to take certain action to comply with, further or support an unsanctioned foreign boycott.¹⁵ As countermeasures from Latin American countries intensify in response to the Trump Administration's threats and actions, there is also the potential for compliance challenges in the U.S. and international export administration and anti-boycotting space.

Looking Ahead

It is evident that the Trump Administration is prepared to leverage the full executive arsenal to implement its foreign policy agenda, including implementing international trade restrictions, embargoes and economic sanctions on countries and governments perceived to be uncooperative. It is anticipated that geopolitical and U.S. international relationships in Latin America (and elsewhere) will evolve at a more rapid pace than under the Biden Administration as the new administration continues their efforts to conduct deportations, foreign trade negotiations and other foreign policy priorities.¹⁶ Adding to the uncertainty, it is expected that the Trump Administration will challenge the legal limits of the executive branch's authority, including foreign policy priorities that arguably can be perceived as a "threat…to the national security, foreign policy, or economy of the United States."

U.S. persons and foreign persons, including financial institutions and other persons who conduct cross-border business with a nexus to Latin America, should closely monitor ongoing advances. Holland & Knight's Financial Services Team and International Trade Group have vast experience with U.S. export control, anti-boycotting and sanctions laws, including the sanctions administered by the U.S. Department of the Treasury's Office of Foreign Assets Control.

For more information, please contact the authors.

Notes

¹ 50 U.S.C. § 1701(a).

² See Congressional Research Service Insight, The International Emergency Economic Powers Act (IEEPA) and Tariffs: Historical Background and Key Issues, CRS report no. IN11129 (Washington, DC: Congressional Research Service, 2019).

³Id.

⁴ See Press Statement from Secretary of State, Marco Rubio, Ending Illegal Immigration in the United States (Jan. 26, 2025).

⁵Id.

⁶ See White House Statement from the Press Secretary (Jan. 26, 2025).

⁷Id.

⁸Id.

⁹ See U.S. Department of State Office of the Spokesperson, Secretary Rubio Authorizes Visa Restrictions on Colombian Government Officials and their Immediate Family Members (Jan. 26, 2025) (noting that "Secretary Rubio immediately ordered a suspension of visa issuance at the U.S. Embassy Bogota consular section.").

¹⁰ See Reuters, "Colombian planes carrying US deportees arrive in Bogota after Trump-Petro row" (Jan. 28, 2025).

¹¹ See Reuters, Phil Steward and Diego Ore, "Mexico refuses US military flight deporting migrants, sources say" (Jan. 25, 2025).

¹² See @realDonaldTrump post, Truth Social (Nov. 25, 2024).

¹³ See Reuters, Luciana Novaes Magalhaes, "Brazil condemns handcuffing of deportees on flight from US" (Jan. 25, 2024).

¹⁴ See, generally, 15 C.F.R. Chapter VII Subchapter C.

¹⁵ 15 C.F.R. § 760.5.

¹⁶ As previously reported, President Trump also rescinded certain actions implemented by the Biden Administration to ease sanctions on Cuba and the Cuban people (see Holland & Knight's previous alert, "Trump Administration Rescinds Certain Actions by the Previous Administration to Ease Cuba Sanctions," Jan. 23, 2025).

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Information contained in this alert is for the general education and knowledge of our readers. It is not designed to be, and should not be used as, the sole source of information when analyzing and resolving a legal problem, and it should not be substituted for legal advice, which relies on a specific factual analysis. Moreover, the laws of each jurisdiction are different and are constantly changing. This information is not intended to create, and receipt of it does not constitute, an attorney-client relationship. If you have specific questions regarding a particular fact situation, we urge you to consult the authors of this publication, your Holland & Knight representative or other competent legal counsel.

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