Travel Act

Favorable and Noteworthy Decisions in the Supreme Court and Federal Appellate Courts

United States v. Zolicoffer, 869 F.2d 771 (3rd Cir. 1989)

The defendant was convicted of a Travel Act offense based on his acts of trafficking in cocaine. However, there was no evidence that the defendant acted or attempted to act after his interstate travel. The mere act of deplaning and entering a terminal cannot be separated from the actual act of travel and thus an essential element of the offense was missing. The defendant must at least do something to further the illegal activity, though the post-travel activity need not be itself illegal.

United States v. Montford, 27 F.3d 137 (5th Cir. 1994)

The defendants sought to avoid the reach of Mississippi gambling statutes by gambling on a boat which traveled outside the three-mile limit. They were prosecuted under the Travel Act for traveling in foreign commerce to accomplish the gambling. They were also prosecuted under 18 U.S.C. §1084. The cruise ship, however, did not travel in foreign commerce because it never traveled to another country, or into another country’s waters.

United States v. Roberson, 6 F.3d 1088 (5th Cir. 1993)

In order to constitute a violation of the Travel Act, the defendant’s conduct must be part of a criminal enterprise, not just an isolated act of criminality, or even one of many sporadic acts. The government failed in this case to prove the existence of an enterprise.

United States v. Holcomb, 797 F.2d 1320 (5th Cir. 1986)

The defendant was the accountant for a business which operated a prostitution ring. There was no evidence that the accountant was aware that the prostitutes traveled across state lines. Consequently, the accountant’s conviction as an aider and abettor of a travel act violation could not be upheld.

United States v. Barry, 888 F.2d 1092 (6th Cir. 1989)

The Sixth Circuit holds that the use of the mails in a purely intrastate mailing is not sufficient to constitute a Travel Act violation. 18 U.S.C. §1952(a) punishes the use of any facility in interstate commerce, including the mail, with intent to commit or facilitate unlawful activity. This does not include the use of the mails which do not cross state boundaries.

United States v. Pollock, 926 F.2d 1044 (11th Cir. 1991)

The evidence failed to support the defendant’s Travel Act conviction. The defendant was stopped and searched on I-75 and was found in possession of two kilograms of cocaine. In order to be guilty of violating 18 U.S.C. §1952, the defendant must travel interstate to promote, carry on, or facilitate, any unlawful activity. “Unlawful activity” is defined as “any business enterprise involving narcotics.” The government in this case failed to prove that the travel from Florida to Georgia establishes the kind of continuous course of conduct required to establish a “business enterprise” as contrasted with casual and sporadic drug involvement. Merely being familiar with the mechanics of the drug trade and the fact that the defendant had a prior drug conviction, is a far cry from establishing that he was engaged in a continuous course of drug business activity.

United States v. Bates, 840 F.2d 858 (11th Cir. 1988)

One single act involving the transportation of narcotics across state lines cannot constitute a “business enterprise” as described in the Travel Act, 18 U.S.C. §1952(a)(3). There must be continuous conduct rather than sporadic casual involvement in illegal activity.

United States v. Jones, 909 F.2d 533 (D.C.Cir. 1990)

Four women were prosecuted under the Travel Act for their participation in a prostitution ring. In order to prosecute someone for using a facility in interstate commerce for the purpose of violating a state law, the prosecution must show the activity was, in fact, unlawful under a specific state law. Furthermore, the government must prove that the defendant had the intent, with respect to each element of the relevant state offense. In instructing the jury in this case, the district court read the prostitution-related statutes of the relevant states, but did not adequately charge the jury, as a state court would, on the elements of those offenses. Because of this failure, all Travel Act convictions in this case were reversed.