Threatening Communications

Elonis v. United States, 135 S. Ct. 2001 (2015)

In order to be guilty of making an unlawful interstate threat, it is not enough that the defendant’s rants (on Facebook) would be perceived by others as threatening. The government must prove that the defendant intended the statements as threats. There must be subjective intent to threaten the listener, which is not satisfied simply with proof that a reasonable listener would feel threatened.

United States v. Heineman, 767 F.3d 970 (10th Cir. 2014)

Anticipating the decision in Elonis, the Tenth Circuit held that unless there is proof that the defendant subjectively intended to instill fear in the recipient, a conviction for violating § 875(c) may not be sustained. See also United States v. Wheeler, 776 F.3d 736 (10th Cir. 2015) (same).

United States v. Stock, 728 F.3d 287 (3rd Cir. 2013)

The defendant was charged with violating 18 U.S.C. §875. The Third Circuit held that “the word ‘threat’ in § 875(c) encompasses only communications expressing an intent to inflict injury in the present or future.” Thus, a general threat that a person deserves to be killed is not sufficient to prove a threat under §875. In this case, the defendant wrote a post on Craigslist stating that he had been searching for some particular police officer so that he could beat him up, but couldn’t find him. He did not say that the search would continue, or that he had any intent to harm him in the future. However, he did state that he wished that the officer would die. The Third Circuit held that this “wish” was sufficient to satisfy the “future intent” element of the offense. The Third Circuit held that the district court had the authority to determine whether the indictment was sufficient to allege an offense, because the precise “threat” made by the defendant was set forth in the indictment.

United States v. White, 670 F.3d 498 (4th Cir. 2012)

It is a federal crime to transmit interstate “any threat to injure the person of another.” 18 U.S.C. § 875. Several counts of conviction were affirmed in this case, but one count was found to have insufficient evidentiary support, because the “threats” did not show an immediate intent to inflict harm on the recipient.

United States v. Havelock, 619 F.3d 1091 (9th Cir. 2010)

The statute that makes it a federal crime to mail a threatening communication to another person – 18 U.S.C. § 876(c) – requires that the mailing be to a person, not to an institution, or a company. This case was re-heard with the same holding, 664 F.3d 1284 (9th Cir. 2012).