The Supreme Court

The Supreme Court of the United States announced decisions in six cases today:

Henderson v. United States, No. 13-1487: Petitioner Tony Henderson was required to turn over firearms he lawfully owned as a condition of his bail after being charged with a felony drug offense. After Henderson pleaded guilty to the felony charge, he was prohibited under 18 U.S.C. §922(g) from possessing any firearms, and Henderson asked the Federal Bureau of Investigation to transfer custody of his firearms to his friend. The agency refused to do so, the District Court denied Henderson’s motion ordering their transfer, and the Eleventh Circuit affirmed. Today, the Court vacated and remanded, holding that §922(g) does not bar such a transfer unless it would allow the felon to later control the guns, so that he could either use them or direct their use.

The Court's decision is available here.

City and County of San Francisco v. Sheehan, No. 13-1412: After Respondent Teresa Sheehan, who suffers from a schizoaffective disorder, began acting erratically and threatened to kill her social worker, the City and County of San Francisco (“San Francisco”) dispatched two officers to escort her from her group home to a facility for temporary evaluation and treatment. When the officers first entered her room, Sheehan grabbed a knife and threatened to kill them. The officers retreated, but then, without considering if they could accommodate her disability, reentered her room. Sheehan confronted them again with a knife, and after pepper spray failed to be effective, the officers shot Sheehan multiple times. Sheehan sued San Francisco for violating Title II of the Americans with Disabilities Act of 1990 (“ADA”), 42 U.S.C. §12132 by arresting her without accommodating her disability, and sued the officers in their individual capacity under 42 U.S.C. §1983 for violating her Fourth Amendment rights. The District Court granted summary judgment to the defendants, but the Ninth Circuit vacated in part, holding that the ADA applied, and that the officers were not entitled to qualified immunity. Today, the Court dismissed as improvidently granted the question of whether §12132 requires law enforcement officers to provide accommodations to an armed, violent, and mentally ill suspect in the course of bringing the suspect into custody, and reversed on the question of qualified immunity, holding that the officers are entitled to qualified immunity because they did not violate any clearly established Fourth Amendment rights.

The Court's decision is available here.

Comptroller of Treasury of Md. V. Wynne, No. 13-485: Maryland, like many other States, taxes the income its residents earn both within and outside the State, as well as the income that nonresidents earn from sources within Maryland. But Maryland is unique in that it does not offer its residents a full credit against the income taxes that they pay to other States, with the result that some of the income earned by Maryland residents outside the State is taxed twice, and taxpayers have an incentive to opt for intrastate rather than interstate economic activity. Here, in a suit involving Maryland residents who also paid income tax to other States, the Court of Appeals of Maryland affirmed the lower court's finding that Maryland’s tax unconstitutionally discriminated against interstate commerce. The Court today affirmed that Maryland’s tax scheme violates the dormant Commerce Clause.

The Court's decision is available here.

Coleman v. Tollefson, No. 13-1333: Although a federal litigant who is too poor to pay court fees may proceed in forma pauperis under 28 U.S.C. §1915, a “three strikes” provision prevents a court from granting such status to a prisoner who “has, on 3 or more prior occasions, while incarcerated . . ., brought an action or appeal in a court of the United States that was dismissed on the grounds that it is frivolous, malicious, or fails to state a claim upon which relief may be granted.” §1915(g). Petitioner Andre Lee Coleman had filed three federal lawsuits that were all dismissed on these grounds. But while the third dismissal was pending on appeal, Coleman filed four new lawsuits and sought in forma pauperis status in each. The District Court refused to allow him to proceed in forma pauperis under the “three strikes” rule, despite the fact that the third dismissal was pending on appeal. The Sixth Circuit affirmed. Today, the Court affirmed, holding that the courts must count a dismissal on the statutorily enumerated grounds as a “strike” even though it remains pending on appeal.

The Court's decision is available here.

Tibble v. Edison, Int’l, No. 13-550: Under the Employee Retirement Income Security Act (“ERISA”), a breach of fiduciary duty complaint is timely if it is filed no more than six years after “the date of the last action which constituted a part of the breach or violation” or “in the case of an omission the latest date on which the fiduciary could have cured the breach or violation.” 29 U.S.C. §1113. Here, petitioner beneficiaries of the Edison 401(k) Savings Plan (“Plan”), in 2007 sued Plan fiduciaries including respondents Edison International, alleging losses suffered by the Plan from purported breaches of their fiduciary duties. The District Court held that petitioners’ claims of a breach of fiduciary duty with respect to mutual funds added to the Plan in 1999 were untimely because they were selected more than six years before the complaint was filed, and the circumstances had not changed enough during the six-year period to place respondents under an obligation to review the mutual funds. The Ninth Circuit affirmed. Today, the Court vacated and remanded, holding that the Ninth Circuit erred by applying a six-year statutory bar based solely on the initial selection of the funds in 1999, and remanded for the Ninth Circuit to consider petitioners’ claims that respondents breached their duties within the relevant six-year period under §1113.

The Court's decision is available here.

Harris v. Viegelahn, No. 14-400: Petitioner Charles Harris filed a Chapter 13 bankruptcy petition, which permitted him to retain assets (including his home), subject to a court-approved plan for payment of his debts; thus, Harris’s post-petition wages were property of the estate for purposes of distribution to creditors. After Harris again fell behind in his mortgage and went through foreclosure, he converted his Chapter 13 case to Chapter 7. Under Chapter 7, a debtor’s assets are immediately liquidated and the proceeds distributed to creditors; post-petition earnings are not estate property, but belong to the debtor. Ten days after the case was converted to Chapter 7, respondent Mary Viegelahn, the Chapter 13 trustee, distributed approximately $5,500 of Harris’s post-petition wages to his creditors. The Bankruptcy Court granted Harris’s request for an order to refund those post-petition wages to him, and the District Court affirmed, but the Fifth Circuit reversed. Today, the Court reversed, holding that under the governing provisions of the Bankruptcy Code, a debtor who converts to Chapter 7 is entitled to return of any post-petition wages not yet distributed by the Chapter 13 trustee.

The Court's decision is available here.

The Court granted review in one case today:

Campbell-Ewald Co. v. Gomez, No. 14-857: (1) Whether a case becomes moot, and thus beyond the judicial power of Article III, when the plaintiff receives an offer of complete relief on his claim. (2) Whether the answer to the first question is any different when the plaintiff has asserted a class claim under Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 23, but receives an offer of complete relief before any class is certified. (3) Whether the doctrine of derivative sovereign immunity recognized in Yearsley v. W.A. Ross Construction Co., 309 U.S. 18 (1940), for government contractors is restricted to claims arising out of property damage caused by public works projects.